The case involved D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund (now Fortress Value Recovery Fund I LLC) suing Vikas Mehrotra in Massachusetts state court for state-law fraud claims arising from an alleged scheme that defrauded Zwirn of roughly $7.5 million; Mehrotra removed the action to federal district court on diversity grounds and obtained dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds. On appeal, the First Circuit focused on whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court held that the parties’ pleadings and affidavit were insufficient to establish complete diversity because Zwirn is a limited liability company whose citizenship is determined by the citizenship of all its members, and merely stating that no member was a Rhode Island citizen (Mehrotra’s state) did not affirmatively identify those members or trace citizenship through any layers of unincorporated entities. Relying on Supreme Court precedent such as Cameron v. Hodges and Seventh Circuit authority in Meyerson, the panel ordered Zwirn to file, under seal, a detailed jurisdictional statement listing every member’s identity and citizenship as of the date of removal, with Mehrotra given an opportunity to contest the filing.
In Matos-Santana v. Holder, a Dominican Republic native and lawful permanent resident sought judicial review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' denial of his 2010 motion to reopen removal proceedings that had ended in a final order of removal in 2004. The petitioner had been ordered removed after his convictions for second-degree robbery and third-degree auto stripping, both classified as crimes involving moral turpitude, and he argued that the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky entitled him to reopen the case on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his auto-stripping plea. The First Circuit denied the petition, concluding that the motion was filed more than six years after the removal order became final and was therefore time-barred under the applicable statute and regulations. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen the proceedings, noting that the petitioner had made no effort to vacate his state conviction.
In this case, Mr. S. moved to quash a grand jury subpoena served on his real estate attorney's law office for documents from a 2007 property purchase, including deeds, settlement statements, payment records, and related materials. He claimed protection under the attorney-client privilege because the attorney handled the transaction and under the Fifth Amendment, citing Fisher v. United States for the argument that documents transferred to counsel for legal advice could not be compelled. The district court denied the motion after in camera review. The First Circuit affirmed, ruling that the documents were standard transactional records prepared by the attorney rather than materials reflecting legal advice or confidentiality, so neither privilege applied and the hybrid Fisher claim failed.
In this age discrimination case under the ADEA, plaintiff Genaro Bonefont, a 71-year-old stevedore with 57 years at International Shipping Corp., sued after being fired for allegedly attempting to assault his supervisor during a heated argument. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the First Circuit affirmed. The court held that Bonefont failed to show evidence of discriminatory animus by the decision-maker, the HR director, who stated she terminated him based on a security report indicating he raised his hands to strike the supervisor. Even if the assault did not occur or the decision was unwise, the employer’s stated reason was not shown to be pretext for age bias, as coworker comments alone did not demonstrate that the decision was motivated by age rather than the reported conduct.
The case involved an appeal by Juan Garcia-Hernandez from his federal drug-trafficking convictions and sentence in New Hampshire, arising from a large-scale cocaine distribution operation uncovered through an informant and undercover work. Agents executed a search warrant at his home on April 12, 2009, using an armored vehicle, battering ram, and noise-flash devices without prior announcement, seizing cash, drugs, and paraphernalia, plus additional cocaine from his car; he moved to suppress the evidence for a knock-and-announce violation and challenged a three-level aggravating-role sentencing enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that Hudson v. Michigan (2006) categorically bars exclusion of evidence as a remedy for knock-and-announce violations and that USSG §3B1.1(b) authorizes the enhancement whenever the overall criminal activity involves five or more participants, regardless of how many individuals the defendant personally supervised. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court precedent controls the suppression issue and that the guideline text focuses on the scope of the enterprise rather than the precise number of direct supervisees.
This case concerns a petition for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after the petitioner succeeded in a habeas corpus challenge to his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The petitioner, a lawful permanent resident with a prior state conviction, had been taken into custody without bond under the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) based on the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation that any post-IIRIRA release from criminal custody triggered the provision. The court had previously ruled that the statute was unambiguous and did not apply in these circumstances, granting relief. In denying fees, the court held that the government's position was substantially justified because the question of whether the statute was ambiguous under Chevron was a novel issue of first impression among the courts of appeals.