James Leon Holmes

The case concerned whether JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a national bank chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency but not registered with Arkansas state authorities, could use the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures under the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act. The disputes arose in multiple bankruptcy proceedings and related civil actions where the bank sought to foreclose on properties and include foreclosure fees in proofs of claim, prompting challenges that the bank lacked authorization to use the statutory process. The court held that the bank was permitted to use the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures. The core reasoning was that the National Bank Act authorizes national banks to engage in real estate lending and related activities such as foreclosure as an incidental power, that Arkansas law exempts the collection of debts and enforcement of mortgages from state registration requirements for transacting business, and that state laws do not bar national banks from exercising these federally granted powers.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproperty

This case involves employees at Butterball's poultry processing plants who sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime wages related to time spent donning and doffing protective gear and performing other pre- and post-shift activities. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on issues including whether those activities were compensable as part of the workday and whether the company violated FLSA recordkeeping requirements. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part and denied the defendants' motion, holding that activities integral and indispensable to the employees' principal duties must be compensated after the first principal activity begins and before the last one ends, consistent with the Portal-to-Portal Act amendments. The reasoning drew on Supreme Court precedents defining work and the workday, along with Department of Labor regulations distinguishing preliminary or postliminary tasks from compensable principal activities.

labor & employmentprocedure

The United States sued the State of Arkansas and state officials, alleging that conditions and practices at the Conway Human Development Center violated residents' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act's integration mandate, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. After a six-week bench trial, the court found that the evidence did not support the constitutional or ADA claims, as the plaintiff's witnesses lacked qualifications or benchmarks and the weight of the evidence showed compliance with professional standards and that parents and guardians opposed the suit. On the IDEA claim, the court noted deficiencies in education services but observed that the Center had submitted a corrective action plan still under review by the state education department. The court therefore ruled for the defendants on all claims.

civil rightsfederal powerhealthcare

The City of North Little Rock brought this eminent domain action in state court to acquire a 30-foot-wide easement across railroad property for a pedestrian and bicycle trail. The defendant railroads removed the case and moved to dismiss, arguing that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 confers exclusive jurisdiction over rail transportation to the Surface Transportation Board and preempts state-law takings that would interfere with railroad operations. The court granted the motions and dismissed the action without prejudice, holding that the proposed easement would overlap with and impair the operation of team tracks, transloading facilities, switching equipment, and derailment response areas, thereby regulating rail transportation within the Board's exclusive domain under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).

federal powerpropertybusiness & regulatory

Hilda Buckley sued the University of Arkansas Board of Trustees alleging that her December 3, 2009 employment termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The University moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), contending that Buckley's EEOC charge was untimely and that sovereign immunity barred the ADEA claim. The court determined that Buckley filed a verified charge with the EEOC on June 1, 2010, which fell within the 180-day filing window when computed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1) by excluding the date of the triggering event, so the Title VII claim could proceed. The court granted dismissal of the ADEA claim, holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars suits against state agencies such as the University Board of Trustees.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Jones v. Hobbs, death row inmates challenged Arkansas's Methods of Execution Act under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause, alleging that the law's flexibility in lethal injection protocols could prevent them from discovering and challenging changes. They also claimed that the Arkansas Department of Correction's use of unapproved drugs violated the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Act. The court had previously dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim, and on a Rule 59(e) motion to vacate that judgment, it denied the motion. The court reasoned that newly presented news articles did not show a likelihood of protocol changes that inmates could not challenge, and that the FDCA and CSA claims failed because those statutes provide no private right of action, with enforcement left to the executive branch. The court further held that allowing amendments to add such claims would be futile.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case is a putative nationwide class action brought by Robert Hall against Equity National Life Insurance Company and related entities, alleging breach of contract and bad faith in the interpretation of 'actual charges' benefits under supplemental cancer insurance policies. The defendants moved to deny class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(1)(D), arguing that Hall's claims were precluded by a prior nationwide class settlement approved in Runyan v. Transamerica Life Insurance Co. in Arkansas state court. The court granted the motion, holding that the Runyan settlement barred the class claims. The core reasoning was that the Runyan action consolidated overlapping federal cases, resulted in a court-approved nationwide settlement after extensive negotiations and notice, and that an individual who opts out of such a settlement cannot pursue a competing class action on the same issues.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

Old St. Paul Missionary Baptist Church sued First Nation Insurance Group and associated individuals and entities over performance and payment bonds issued for a church construction project, alleging fraud in the defendants' representations of authority to issue valid bonds and in their handling of the church's bond claims. The court granted the church's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part while denying Daniel Esparza's motion, which it treated as a response. The ruling was based on summary judgment standards, evidence from a recorded meeting, affidavits, and criminal convictions of defendants Gwen Moyo and AA Communications establishing fraudulent conduct related to the bonds and unauthorized insurance activity under Arkansas law.

business & regulatorycriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In Jones v. Hobbs, a death-row inmate convicted of capital murder, rape, and attempted capital murder in 1996 filed a § 1983 action challenging Arkansas's newly enacted Method of Execution Act, alleging that it violated his due process right to access the courts by restricting information about the lethal injection protocol and that it violated the ex post facto clause by increasing the risk of pain and mental anxiety during execution. The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and stayed the scheduled March 2010 execution. The court reasoned that the plaintiff faced irreparable harm, the balance of equities favored a stay, he had raised serious questions on the merits warranting further litigation, and the public interest supported review of the constitutional claims before execution, while noting that the plaintiff had not unjustifiably delayed bringing the claims.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves Eric Wayne Kelley, indicted on federal charges of possessing child pornography, who moved to suppress evidence seized from his home during a nighttime search warrant executed shortly after his arrest on unrelated warrants. The court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the warrant was supported by probable cause based on the juvenile victim's detailed statements about the location of the evidence, that any deficiencies in the nighttime search authorization were cured by the good faith exception given the officers' reasonable reliance on the issuing judge's approval, and that the officers did not exceed the warrant's scope as they did not manipulate or search the computer beyond observing its running state.

criminal lawprocedure

Karen Rosby filed an ERISA action against Unum Life Insurance Company of America seeking long-term disability benefits under her employer's plan after undergoing spinal fusion surgery following a 2007 car accident, asserting that back and leg pain prevented her from performing her sedentary customer-service job. Unum initially approved benefits through December 2007 but denied further coverage based on treating physicians' reports indicating that Rosby could return to sedentary work with restrictions. Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard because the plan granted Unum discretionary authority to interpret terms and determine eligibility, the court affirmed Unum's decision, finding it supported by the administrative record including medical opinions and a functional capacity evaluation, and concluding that any conflict of interest did not alter the outcome.

labor & employment

Hollie Wolfe sued Clear Title, LLC under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that she was not paid for overtime hours worked as a nonexempt employee and that she was terminated in retaliation for demanding overtime pay. Clear Title moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wolfe qualified as an exempt administrative employee, that any violation was not willful so a two-year statute of limitations applied, and that punitive damages were unavailable. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Wolfe's primary duties involved discretion over significant matters and were directly related to management or business operations, whether the alleged violation was willful, and whether her termination was retaliatory. The court reasoned that conflicting affidavits about job duties and the reasons for termination precluded summary judgment on the exemption, limitations, and damages issues.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a contract dispute between Eventrestrooms.com, L.P., which provided portable restroom services to Entergy Services, Inc. after Hurricane Katrina, and Entergy, which counterclaimed for overbilling. The court considered Entergy's motion for summary judgment on Event's claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit, as well as Entergy's counterclaim. The court granted summary judgment on the quantum meruit claim but denied it on the breach of contract claim and counterclaim, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the interpretation of the contract terms, particularly whether a service agreement amended the original contract or was merely an exhibit, affecting compensation and termination rights.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved John Chism Bail Bonds, a licensed bail bond company, suing Saline County officials including judges, the sheriff, jail administrator, and prosecutor for allegedly violating its procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by issuing and enforcing an order that prohibited 'credit bonding' and limited felony bonds to cash or 'Sheriff's Bonds.' The amended complaint also raised state-law claims for separation of powers violations, interference with business expectancies, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted the motions to dismiss the federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, holding that the judges, prosecutor, and related officials were protected by absolute judicial, prosecutorial, and quasi-judicial immunity in their individual capacities, and that abstention was required as to the county and official-capacity claims to allow state courts to address the underlying state-law questions. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Barbara Ford's Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit against the United States for the suicide of her husband, Joe Ford, who had been under VA psychiatric care in Arkansas; she alleged negligence in failing to follow suicide prevention protocols, inform her of risks, and implement proper policies. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Ford's Standard Form 95 administrative claim was defective because she was not yet appointed personal representative of the estate and did not properly allocate damages between personal injury and wrongful death. The court denied the motion, holding that the claim satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) because it provided written notice of the incident, enabled the agency to investigate, and demanded a sum certain in damages. The court reasoned that substantial compliance with the statute was sufficient even if regulations under 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2 and 14.3 were not perfectly met, as the agency had actually reviewed the claim on the merits.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves plaintiff Wanda Sentell alleging that defendant RPM Management Company violated the Fair Housing Act by failing to design and construct accessible features, such as proper door widths and bathrooms, in its Arkansas apartment complex. RPM filed a third-party complaint against architect Robert Bailey for contribution, breach of contract, and negligence in the design. Sentell moved to amend her complaint to add Bailey as a direct defendant, while Bailey moved for summary judgment on RPM's claims. The court denied Sentell's motion to amend, holding that the FHA's two-year statute of limitations barred the claim against Bailey because the limitations period begins at the completion of construction rather than continuing due to ongoing effects. The court denied Bailey's summary judgment motion without prejudice, finding that further discovery was needed on issues including the existence of a contract and the unsettled Arkansas statute of limitations rules for negligence claims against architects.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In Ross v. Advance America Cash Advance Centers, Inc., plaintiff Lavern Ross, who has bipolar disorder, sued her former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and related laws, alleging that her manager improperly disclosed her medical condition to a coworker and that she faced retaliation, including discipline and eventual termination, after complaining about the disclosure. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all federal claims. The court reasoned that the manager's disclosure, while violating company policy, did not breach the ADA's confidentiality requirements because it concerned information not protected in the manner alleged and there was no evidence the plaintiff reasonably believed it was illegal. On the retaliation claim, the court found that Ross's complaints did not constitute protected activity under the ADA since they did not oppose conduct made unlawful by the statute. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves a dispute between Chicago Title Insurance Company and Arkansas Riverview Development, LLC over an owner's title insurance policy for real property in Little Rock, Arkansas, including a building partly located on fee-simple lots and partly in leased airspace above a city street. Chicago Title sought a declaratory judgment on its rights and obligations under the policy, while Arkansas Riverview Development asserted counterclaims for breach of contract and negligence arising from alleged defects in title related to the airspace lease rights. The court granted Chicago Title's motion for summary judgment on the negligence counterclaim, denied its motion on breach of contract, and partially granted Arkansas Riverview Development's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the insured had marketable title to the fee-simple lots at issuance and that certain policy exceptions did not exclude the unmarketable title issue. These rulings rested on the undisputed facts about the property descriptions in the deed and policy commitment, the distinction between fee-simple ownership and leased airspace interests, and the lack of evidence on damages.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case was an antitrust dispute in which a cardiology clinic and affiliated physicians sued Baptist Health and Blue Cross entities, claiming violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act through alleged conspiracies to exclude competitors from networks, restrain trade, and monopolize markets for cardiology services and private health insurance in central Arkansas. The court dismissed the third amended complaint in full with prejudice. It held that the plaintiffs never alleged a coherent relevant market despite repeated opportunities to amend, which is required to state viable claims under the Sherman Act. The court also found that counts concerning insurance markets were time-barred by the statute of limitations and that claims for equitable relief were barred by laches.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved a defendant facing federal charges including conspiracy to commit mail fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion, with the government seeking forfeiture of over $1.8 million in alleged proceeds and filing a lis pendens notice on his residence as potential substitute property under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). The defendant moved to release the lis pendens, contending it was unauthorized under Arkansas law for actions seeking a money judgment. The court granted the motion and ordered the government to remove the notice, reasoning that the Arkansas lis pendens statute applies only to suits affecting title or liens on property and does not extend to claims for a money judgment, where the residence was merely identified as substitute assets rather than directly forfeitable proceeds with a vested government interest.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure