The case concerned whether JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a national bank chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency but not registered with Arkansas state authorities, could use the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures under the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act. The disputes arose in multiple bankruptcy proceedings and related civil actions where the bank sought to foreclose on properties and include foreclosure fees in proofs of claim, prompting challenges that the bank lacked authorization to use the statutory process. The court held that the bank was permitted to use the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures. The core reasoning was that the National Bank Act authorizes national banks to engage in real estate lending and related activities such as foreclosure as an incidental power, that Arkansas law exempts the collection of debts and enforcement of mortgages from state registration requirements for transacting business, and that state laws do not bar national banks from exercising these federally granted powers.
This case involves employees at Butterball's poultry processing plants who sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime wages related to time spent donning and doffing protective gear and performing other pre- and post-shift activities. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on issues including whether those activities were compensable as part of the workday and whether the company violated FLSA recordkeeping requirements. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part and denied the defendants' motion, holding that activities integral and indispensable to the employees' principal duties must be compensated after the first principal activity begins and before the last one ends, consistent with the Portal-to-Portal Act amendments. The reasoning drew on Supreme Court precedents defining work and the workday, along with Department of Labor regulations distinguishing preliminary or postliminary tasks from compensable principal activities.
The United States sued the State of Arkansas and state officials, alleging that conditions and practices at the Conway Human Development Center violated residents' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act's integration mandate, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. After a six-week bench trial, the court found that the evidence did not support the constitutional or ADA claims, as the plaintiff's witnesses lacked qualifications or benchmarks and the weight of the evidence showed compliance with professional standards and that parents and guardians opposed the suit. On the IDEA claim, the court noted deficiencies in education services but observed that the Center had submitted a corrective action plan still under review by the state education department. The court therefore ruled for the defendants on all claims.
The City of North Little Rock brought this eminent domain action in state court to acquire a 30-foot-wide easement across railroad property for a pedestrian and bicycle trail. The defendant railroads removed the case and moved to dismiss, arguing that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 confers exclusive jurisdiction over rail transportation to the Surface Transportation Board and preempts state-law takings that would interfere with railroad operations. The court granted the motions and dismissed the action without prejudice, holding that the proposed easement would overlap with and impair the operation of team tracks, transloading facilities, switching equipment, and derailment response areas, thereby regulating rail transportation within the Board's exclusive domain under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).
Hilda Buckley sued the University of Arkansas Board of Trustees alleging that her December 3, 2009 employment termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The University moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), contending that Buckley's EEOC charge was untimely and that sovereign immunity barred the ADEA claim. The court determined that Buckley filed a verified charge with the EEOC on June 1, 2010, which fell within the 180-day filing window when computed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a)(1) by excluding the date of the triggering event, so the Title VII claim could proceed. The court granted dismissal of the ADEA claim, holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars suits against state agencies such as the University Board of Trustees.
In Jones v. Hobbs, death row inmates challenged Arkansas's Methods of Execution Act under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause, alleging that the law's flexibility in lethal injection protocols could prevent them from discovering and challenging changes. They also claimed that the Arkansas Department of Correction's use of unapproved drugs violated the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Act. The court had previously dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim, and on a Rule 59(e) motion to vacate that judgment, it denied the motion. The court reasoned that newly presented news articles did not show a likelihood of protocol changes that inmates could not challenge, and that the FDCA and CSA claims failed because those statutes provide no private right of action, with enforcement left to the executive branch. The court further held that allowing amendments to add such claims would be futile.