Dissent in [11] urges reconsideration of Kagama as resting on archaic non-textual theory rather than constitutional foundations. Veneno v. United States ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
The case involved New York healthcare workers, including a Christian Scientist employee identified as John Doe 2, who were fired after refusing COVID-19 vaccines on religious grounds following the state's elimination of a religious exemption from its vaccine mandate for such workers. The plaintiffs sued their employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging religious discrimination and proposing accommodations such as testing and masking; the district court dismissed the claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that violating the state regulation would impose an "undue hardship" as a matter of law. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In dissent, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, contended that the Second Circuit's approach was mistaken because Title VII's text and purpose allow federal law to preempt inconsistent state mandates, that other federal civil rights statutes are interpreted to prevent state law from nullifying accommodations or defenses, and that treating state law as automatically creating undue hardship would undermine federal protections.
religious libertycivil rightshealthcarefederal power
The case involved Damon Landor, a Rastafarian inmate, who sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and its individual officers under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) after officers forcibly shaved his head in violation of his religious beliefs, seeking money damages from the officers personally. The Supreme Court held that RLUIPA does not authorize suits for damages against state employees in their personal capacities. The Court reasoned that RLUIPA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause authority, which permits conditions on federal funds but does not allow direct regulation of conduct or imposition of sanctions without the voluntary and knowing consent of those subject to them, as established by contract-law analogies in precedents like Pennhurst. Because the individual officers had entered no agreement with the federal government and thus had not consented to personal liability, Landor’s claims against them could not proceed.
religious libertycivil rightsfederal powercriminal law
In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, inmate Damon Landor, a Rastafarian whose faith requires uncut hair, sued the state prison system and several officers under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) after officers forcibly shaved his head despite knowing his beliefs, seeking money damages from the officers in their personal capacities. The Supreme Court held that RLUIPA does not authorize such suits against individuals who have not consented to personal liability. The Court explained that RLUIPA rests on Congress’s Spending Clause authority, which permits conditions on federal funds but does not allow Congress to impose additional sanctions like personal damages without the voluntary and knowing consent of those bound; because the officers never entered any agreement with the federal government, they could not be sued under the statute, consistent with contract-law principles that limit liability to actual parties to the bargain.
religious libertycriminal lawcivil rightsfederal power
In United States v. Hemani, the government prosecuted a U.S. citizen under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm in his home while being an unlawful user of marijuana, based solely on his admission of using the drug every other day; the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing a Second Amendment violation. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, the Court held that the statute’s automatic, categorical disarmament of anyone who unlawfully uses a controlled substance burdens conduct presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. The government’s analogy to historical “habitual drunkard” laws (vagrancy statutes, civil-commitment proceedings, and surety-of-good-behavior requirements) failed because those laws generally addressed individuals rendered incapacitated by intoxication, pursued different purposes such as promoting productivity or protecting families from financial harm, and typically required individualized process before depriving anyone of liberties—features absent from the modern provision’s automatic and broad application tied to the Controlled Substances Act. The decision is narrow and does not address laws targeting addicts, those presently intoxicated, or prosecutions supported by individualized evidence of dangerousness.
In Sripetch v. SEC, the Securities and Exchange Commission brought a civil enforcement action against Ongkaruck Sripetch for securities fraud involving multiple penny-stock schemes and sought over $4.1 million in disgorgement after he consented to judgment. Sripetch argued that disgorgement was unavailable under Liu v. SEC because the SEC had not shown investors suffered pecuniary losses, and lower courts were split on whether such proof was required. The Supreme Court held that a showing of pecuniary loss to investors is not required before the SEC may obtain disgorgement. The Court reasoned that, under traditional equitable principles, disgorgement deprives wrongdoers of net profits from unlawful activity and may be awarded to remedy interference with a victim’s legally protected interests even if the victim suffered no measurable financial loss, and that Liu imposed no contrary pecuniary-loss requirement.
The case concerned whether the Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption for “contracts of employment” of workers “engaged in... interstate commerce” (9 U.S.C. §1) applied to a Colorado-based franchisee who picked up and delivered Flowers Foods’ baked goods entirely within the state as part of an interstate distribution chain. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling that the exemption covered such workers, so the FAA did not require enforcement of the arbitration agreement Brock had signed. The Court held that the statutory text does not require a worker to cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do, because interstate commerce encompasses the full continuous journey of goods between states, including intrastate segments. This reading was supported by the ordinary meaning of the terms at the time of the FAA’s enactment and by precedents such as The Daniel Ball, which treated intrastate actors participating in interstate transport as engaged in interstate commerce. Flowers’ proposed bright-line rule limiting the exemption to those who cross state lines or touch cross-border vehicles was rejected as unsupported by the statute.
