John Gleeson

This case involves seven hedge funds that opted out of a class action settlement and sued Comverse Technology, its officers, and board committee members for alleged securities fraud and negligent misrepresentation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rule 10b-5, and New York common law. The claims stem from the company's alleged stock option backdating practices between 2001 and 2007, including false statements about the accounting and disclosure of those options. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the Exchange Act and negligent misrepresentation claims against most defendants to the extent they relied on 2007 statements, as well as the negligent misrepresentation claim against the new management defendants entirely; it denied the motion as to the remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the 2007 statements were protected by the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements, while earlier claims sufficiently alleged material misrepresentations, scienter, reliance, and loss causation.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved two indigent defendants from California charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in an indictment filed in the Eastern District of New York. Neither posed a flight risk or danger, but both required funding for lodging and subsistence to attend their two-week trial in Brooklyn as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a). After reviewing options, the court authorized payment from Criminal Justice Act funds, concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 4285 only covers travel to and from proceedings and subsistence during travel, not during the trial itself, and that the Marshals Service lacked authority or obligation to provide the housing. The ruling noted the statutory gap and urged Congress to enact legislation assigning responsibility for such expenses, typically to the Marshals Service.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the consequences of the State's failure to meet a deadline set by a conditional writ of habeas corpus granted to petitioner Ramchair after his state conviction was found constitutionally defective. The court decided that the State's delay converted the conditional writ into an unconditional one, barring the State from retrying Ramchair or continuing to detain him under the invalid conviction. The core reasoning was that the State took 81 days to declare its intent to retry Ramchair instead of complying with the 45-day period reinstated by the Second Circuit's affirmance, and neither of its explanations—efforts to contact the witness or considering a certiorari petition—excused the missed deadline. The court emphasized the 13-year delay since the original unfair trial and the absence of any request for an extension or substantial justification for the inaction. It rejected the State's claim of minimal prejudice, finding that accountability was warranted given the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

Spirit Locker, an Alabama liquor store, sued EVO Direct, a credit card payment processor, in a diversity action alleging that a $395 early termination fee in their three-year Merchant Services Agreement was an unlawful penalty rather than reasonable liquidated damages. The complaint asserted claims under New York General Business Law § 349 for deceptive practices and for unjust enrichment, claiming the fee was imposed uniformly regardless of timing, reason for termination, or actual harm and was designed to deter switching providers. The court granted EVO's motion to dismiss the deceptive practices claim because the allegations involved only private commercial transactions between businesses and did not plead the required consumer-oriented conduct under § 349. The court denied the motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim, finding it plausible that the flat fee bore no reasonable relation to anticipated or actual damages and could therefore be recovered as an unenforceable penalty under New York law.

business & regulatory

This case involves Racky Ramchair's federal habeas petition challenging his state robbery convictions on grounds of ineffective assistance by his appellate counsel. The court had previously granted relief but was directed by the Second Circuit to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether counsel had a strategic reason for not appealing the trial court's denial of a mistrial motion and to explain why a new trial was ordered instead of a new appeal. After the hearing, where counsel testified she failed to raise the issue due to a mistaken belief it was not preserved, the court again granted the writ. The core reasoning was that counsel's error undermined confidence in the state proceedings, the underlying trial was unfair due to a suggestive lineup, and ordering a new trial was the appropriate remedy to avoid prolonged delays from sequential appeals.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involves plaintiff Century 21 Real Estate LLC suing defendants Bercosa Corp. and its owner Pedro Bernard for breaching two franchise agreements by failing to pay required fees, misreporting transactions, and continuing to use Century 21's registered trademarks after the agreements were terminated for material breach. The defendants never responded to the complaint, leading to entry of default. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations and entered default judgment awarding Century 21 a total of $319,832.32 in damages, including contractual amounts, liquidated damages, statutory damages under the Lanham Act, attorneys' fees, and costs, while also ordering an audit and permanently enjoining the defendants from using the marks or holding themselves out as a Century 21 franchise.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Anthony Infantolino, an electrician and union member, sued the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry and a related official for unlawful retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act and its New York State and New York City counterparts. He alleged that after filing prior discrimination charges, JIB removed him from its job referral list, terminated his health benefits, and required him to appear before a subcommittee before restoring those benefits. On summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part by dismissing the withdrawn ERISA claim, the federal retaliation claim to the extent it sought compensatory or punitive damages, and the state-law claim to the extent it sought punitive damages, but denied the motion in remaining respects. The court reasoned that factual disputes existed as to whether JIB's actions constituted retaliation and whether they could support punitive damages under city law, while finding no triable issues on the dismissed portions. The case was set for trial on the surviving claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In McKithen v. Brown, a prisoner convicted of attempted murder and related charges from a 1992 stabbing sought access under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the knife used in the crime for DNA testing, claiming it would prove his wife fabricated his involvement after denial under New York's post-conviction DNA statute. The district court addressed whether the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires such access as an issue of first impression. The court decided that the Clause grants a convicted offender access to physical evidence for DNA testing if it involves negligible cost to the state and exculpatory results would undermine confidence in the trial outcome, that the claim was not precluded by the state court's prior ruling, and that McKithen was entitled to test the knife. It therefore granted his summary judgment motion and denied the district attorney's cross-motion.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves individual merchant plaintiffs alleging that MasterCard violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act through monopolization and attempted monopolization of network services markets for general-purpose payment cards and MasterCard-branded cards. The claims centered on interchange fees charged to merchants and rules such as the Honor All Cards Rule and No Surcharge Rule that allegedly prevented merchants from avoiding or negotiating lower fees. MasterCard moved to dismiss, contending the complaints failed to adequately define relevant markets or show monopoly power. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, which the district judge adopted, on the ground that the allegations—assumed true at the pleading stage—plausibly stated claims for relief under the applicable legal standards.

business & regulatory

This habeas corpus case concerns Racky Ramchair's challenge to his state-court robbery convictions, which rested on a single eyewitness identification made after a suggestive police lineup. The district court granted the petition, holding that Ramchair received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel failed to argue that the trial court should have granted a mistrial after the prosecutor unexpectedly used defense counsel's presence at the lineup as evidence and made unfounded racial accusations against him. The court reasoned that this tactic created an actual conflict for counsel, who became a necessary witness on the central identification issue, and that the state courts' rejection of the claim was based on an incorrect understanding of both the facts and the requirements of New York law regarding preservation of claims. The court ordered Ramchair's release unless the state elects to retry him within 45 days.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the sentencing of defendant Tulio Molina, who pled guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and was also held accountable for a small quantity of powder cocaine, requiring calculation of his advisory guidelines range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court examined how the Drug Equivalency Tables converted the drugs to marijuana equivalents, resulting in a base offense level of 32 rather than 30. The core reasoning was that the tables' conversion method, chosen for administrative simplicity, does not achieve true equivalency across drug types and offense level ranges, producing illogical disparities where adding minimal cocaine raised the level higher than equivalent additional crack would have. The opinion highlighted this as an unwarranted outcome under the Sentencing Reform Act and urged district judges to watch for such false equivalencies until the Commission revises the approach.

criminal law

In Finkel v. Omega Communication Services, Inc., the plaintiff, as chairman of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry, sued the defendant employer under ERISA sections 502 and 515 and the LMRA section 301 to recover unpaid contributions to multiple employee benefit plans required by a collective bargaining agreement for the period February through April 2006. The defendant was properly served but failed to appear or defend, resulting in an entry of default. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and entered a default judgment for $122,846.59 against the defendant, comprising $117,683.01 in unpaid contributions, interest, and liquidated damages plus $5,163.58 in attorneys' fees and costs, based on the admitted allegations of liability and supporting evidence including payroll records and reasonable estimates.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, Carlos Portalatin petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief after receiving an enhanced sentence as a persistent felony offender under New York Penal Law § 70.10 following his state convictions for first-degree robbery and second-degree kidnapping. The sentencing court had found the existence of two prior felony convictions and then made additional findings regarding Portalatin's history, character, and the circumstances of his conduct before imposing a sentence of 18 years to life. The court granted the petition, holding that the sentence violated Portalatin's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as established in Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny. The core reasoning was that New York's statute requires a judge, rather than a jury, to find facts beyond the prior convictions that increase the penalty above the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction, rendering the enhanced sentence unconstitutional.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved Andre Williams, who was charged with two federal firearms crimes: being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). The government sought to apply a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based in part on Williams's 1990 New York conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance, which was classified as a C felony. The court decided that this prior conviction did not qualify as a "serious drug offense" under ACCA, so the sentencing enhancement would not apply if Williams were convicted. The core reasoning was that the plain meaning of the statute requires a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more "is prescribed by law," which must be assessed based on New York's current maximum sentence of five and one-half years following the 2004 Rockefeller Drug Law Reform Act, rather than the fifteen-year maximum in effect at the time of the conviction; the rule of lenity supported this interpretation if any ambiguity existed.

gunscriminal law

The case challenged New York’s judicial convention system for nominating Supreme Court justices, alleging that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing party leaders to control nominations and preventing voters and independent candidates from meaningful participation. After a 13-day hearing with extensive evidence, the court found that the system gave local party leaders effective control over delegate selection and nominations, resulting in an opaque process that excluded challengers without leadership support. The court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of the convention procedures under Election Law §§ 6-106 and 6-124. It ordered that major-party nominations instead be made through direct primary elections until the legislature enacts a replacement system. The ruling rested on the conclusion that the existing process deprived voters of their rights and imposed severe burdens on candidates lacking party backing.

electionscivil rightsfree speech

In United States v. Hiruko, defendants Hiruko and Gonzalez were charged with conspiracy and counterfeiting offenses after police stopped their car in Queens for alleged speeding and seatbelt violations, leading to the discovery of counterfeit bills. The defendants moved to suppress counterfeit currency seized from the car's back seat floor, from Gonzalez's pocket, and their post-arrest statements, arguing the evidence resulted from an unlawful detention. The government opposed on the grounds that the bills were in plain view or properly seized as contraband in a drug-prone area during a lawful stop. The court granted the suppression motions, finding that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the two bills were present on the rear floor as claimed, rendering the subsequent arrests and seizures invalid. The decision also noted inconsistencies in the officer's testimony regarding the location and vouchering of the bills.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a class action antitrust lawsuit by approximately five million merchants against Visa and MasterCard, alleging illegal tying of debit card services to credit card services in violation of the Sherman Act, along with attempted monopolization claims. After years of litigation including class certification and summary judgment motions, the parties reached settlements on the eve of trial that required the defendants to end their Honor All Cards rules, pay over $3 billion into a settlement fund, reduce interchange rates, and implement other injunctive relief such as clearer debit card identifiers. The court approved the settlements and the plan for distributing funds to class members. It also awarded lead counsel attorneys' fees of approximately $220 million and expense reimbursement of about $18.7 million, determining these amounts reasonable under a percentage-of-recovery approach given the size of the fund and the results achieved. The opinion noted the settlements represented the largest antitrust resolution in history and included ongoing court supervision for compliance.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Mashiska Washington suing the U.S. Tennis Association for alleged racial discrimination in the distribution of wild card entries to the U.S. Open, claiming violations of public accommodation laws under the Civil Rights Act as well as federal and state antitrust statutes, including the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Donnelly Act. This action followed a prior 2002 case in which the court granted summary judgment to the USTA on Title VII claims arising from the denial of a 1998 wild card entry. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that claims tied to the 1998 events were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from the earlier ruling, while post-1998 claims were dismissed without prejudice for failure to clearly state viable causes of action, such as lacking a private right of action under the Commerce Clause or FTC Act and insufficient allegations of monopoly power or anticompetitive conduct. The decision emphasized that any amended complaint must specify distinct subsequent events and meet pleading standards to proceed.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Denise Smith sued the City of New York and several police officers, alleging that Detective Melville Carter and others conspired to intimidate her from filing a cross-complaint in a criminal trespass matter, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3), after he made unwanted advances and comments about her sexual orientation. The City moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion and dismissed the claims against the City. The core reasoning was that the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine barred the § 1985 claims because all individual defendants were employees or agents of the same municipal entity and therefore could not legally conspire with one another or with the City.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

Edward Dunphy sued Delta Airlines alleging age discrimination under the ADEA and related New York state and city laws, claiming he was denied several internal positions after his prior role was eliminated and faced hostile treatment from his supervisor after filing an EEOC charge. The district court granted Delta's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case in full. It held that Dunphy presented no evidence that age was a factor in the hiring decisions, which were instead based on factors such as qualifications, timing of applications, and internal promotions for other candidates. The court further concluded that the supervisor's post-charge conduct amounted only to routine performance monitoring rather than an adverse employment action supporting a retaliation claim, and that Dunphy's state and city claims were waived by a general release he signed when accepting a voluntary separation package.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure