This case involves seven hedge funds that opted out of a class action settlement and sued Comverse Technology, its officers, and board committee members for alleged securities fraud and negligent misrepresentation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rule 10b-5, and New York common law. The claims stem from the company's alleged stock option backdating practices between 2001 and 2007, including false statements about the accounting and disclosure of those options. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the Exchange Act and negligent misrepresentation claims against most defendants to the extent they relied on 2007 statements, as well as the negligent misrepresentation claim against the new management defendants entirely; it denied the motion as to the remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the 2007 statements were protected by the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements, while earlier claims sufficiently alleged material misrepresentations, scienter, reliance, and loss causation.
The case involved two indigent defendants from California charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in an indictment filed in the Eastern District of New York. Neither posed a flight risk or danger, but both required funding for lodging and subsistence to attend their two-week trial in Brooklyn as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a). After reviewing options, the court authorized payment from Criminal Justice Act funds, concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 4285 only covers travel to and from proceedings and subsistence during travel, not during the trial itself, and that the Marshals Service lacked authority or obligation to provide the housing. The ruling noted the statutory gap and urged Congress to enact legislation assigning responsibility for such expenses, typically to the Marshals Service.
This case concerned the consequences of the State's failure to meet a deadline set by a conditional writ of habeas corpus granted to petitioner Ramchair after his state conviction was found constitutionally defective. The court decided that the State's delay converted the conditional writ into an unconditional one, barring the State from retrying Ramchair or continuing to detain him under the invalid conviction. The core reasoning was that the State took 81 days to declare its intent to retry Ramchair instead of complying with the 45-day period reinstated by the Second Circuit's affirmance, and neither of its explanations—efforts to contact the witness or considering a certiorari petition—excused the missed deadline. The court emphasized the 13-year delay since the original unfair trial and the absence of any request for an extension or substantial justification for the inaction. It rejected the State's claim of minimal prejudice, finding that accountability was warranted given the circumstances.
Spirit Locker, an Alabama liquor store, sued EVO Direct, a credit card payment processor, in a diversity action alleging that a $395 early termination fee in their three-year Merchant Services Agreement was an unlawful penalty rather than reasonable liquidated damages. The complaint asserted claims under New York General Business Law § 349 for deceptive practices and for unjust enrichment, claiming the fee was imposed uniformly regardless of timing, reason for termination, or actual harm and was designed to deter switching providers. The court granted EVO's motion to dismiss the deceptive practices claim because the allegations involved only private commercial transactions between businesses and did not plead the required consumer-oriented conduct under § 349. The court denied the motion to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim, finding it plausible that the flat fee bore no reasonable relation to anticipated or actual damages and could therefore be recovered as an unenforceable penalty under New York law.
This case involves Racky Ramchair's federal habeas petition challenging his state robbery convictions on grounds of ineffective assistance by his appellate counsel. The court had previously granted relief but was directed by the Second Circuit to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether counsel had a strategic reason for not appealing the trial court's denial of a mistrial motion and to explain why a new trial was ordered instead of a new appeal. After the hearing, where counsel testified she failed to raise the issue due to a mistaken belief it was not preserved, the court again granted the writ. The core reasoning was that counsel's error undermined confidence in the state proceedings, the underlying trial was unfair due to a suggestive lineup, and ordering a new trial was the appropriate remedy to avoid prolonged delays from sequential appeals.
The case involves plaintiff Century 21 Real Estate LLC suing defendants Bercosa Corp. and its owner Pedro Bernard for breaching two franchise agreements by failing to pay required fees, misreporting transactions, and continuing to use Century 21's registered trademarks after the agreements were terminated for material breach. The defendants never responded to the complaint, leading to entry of default. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations and entered default judgment awarding Century 21 a total of $319,832.32 in damages, including contractual amounts, liquidated damages, statutory damages under the Lanham Act, attorneys' fees, and costs, while also ordering an audit and permanently enjoining the defendants from using the marks or holding themselves out as a Century 21 franchise.