The case concerned criminal forfeiture following Mark St. Pierre's conviction on 53 counts of bribery, honest services wire fraud, and money laundering arising from a scheme to bribe New Orleans city officials in exchange for IT subcontracts and related payments. The court issued a preliminary order of forfeiture imposing a personal money judgment against St. Pierre for the traceable proceeds of the crimes, including amounts billed under the GSA contract through Imagine Software and sales of crime cameras through Veracent. The core reasoning was that statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and § 982, applied via 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), require forfeiture of property or proceeds with a proven nexus to the offenses, which the government established by a preponderance of the evidence from the trial record, and that St. Pierre is personally liable for those amounts as the direct beneficiary.
This case involves a products liability claim by Macie Wagoner on behalf of her deceased husband, alleging that his fatal multiple myeloma resulted from chronic workplace exposure to benzene in Liquid Wrench (made by Radiator Specialty) and Varsol (made by ExxonMobil) from the 1970s to 2008. The opinion addresses a dozen pending motions, primarily Daubert challenges to exclude expert witnesses on general causation and related summary judgment requests under Alabama law, including the Alabama Extended Manufacturers’ Liability Doctrine. The court focuses on whether the experts’ opinions rely on reliable methodology and studies linking benzene to multiple myeloma, rather than on the ultimate conclusions, while also considering preemption issues from prior rulings on federal labeling requirements and defenses like assumption of risk. Core reasoning emphasizes that the admissibility inquiry targets principles and methodology under Daubert standards, and that benzene-focused studies are appropriate for the general causation question presented.
This case involved a breach of contract claim by Dr. W. Ryckman Caplan, an obstetrician/gynecologist, against Ochsner Clinic and related entities, along with claims for detrimental reliance and age discrimination. Caplan alleged that Ochsner orally promised him five years of employment when recruiting him and his colleagues, but the written Professional Services Agreement provided only a one-year initial term with automatic renewals terminable without cause on 90 days' notice after the first year; Ochsner terminated him after one year and sought repayment of a loan. The court granted summary judgment to Ochsner on all of Caplan's claims and denied his motion for reconsideration. The core reasoning was that the fully integrated written contract unambiguously controlled, any reliance on contradictory oral assurances was unreasonable as a matter of Louisiana law, and the contract terms were followed.
This multidistrict products liability litigation arose from claims that Merck's prescription drug Vioxx increased the risk of heart attacks and strokes, leading to thousands of lawsuits consolidated in federal court and various state courts. After extensive discovery, bellwether trials, and state-court proceedings, the parties reached a global settlement of $4.85 billion. The court had previously valued the common benefit work performed by attorneys at 6.5% of the settlement fund, or $315,250,000, and this order addresses the allocation of those fees among the attorneys who contributed to the settlement. The court reviews the litigation history, the role of the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee and other counsel in discovery and trials, and the procedures established for submitting time records and determining allocations under the settlement agreement and the court's inherent authority.
The case concerned environmental groups' challenge to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' supplemental environmental impact statement and plans for replacing a lock in New Orleans' Industrial Canal, including allegations that the project would involve discharges of contaminated dredged sediments in violation of the Clean Water Act's citizen-suit provision. The court addressed the Corps' motion to dismiss the CWA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and ripeness. It granted the motion and dismissed those claims without prejudice. The core reasoning was that plaintiffs had not alleged a violation of an effluent standard or limitation to waive sovereign immunity under the CWA, the claims were more appropriately brought under the APA, and the dispute was unripe because the project lacked funding and thus no discharge was imminent.
This case involves an insurance coverage dispute in which ASI Lloyds sought a declaratory judgment that its homeowners policy did not cover water damage to the insureds' unoccupied Louisiana property from a burst copper pipe, arguing the loss fell under a freeze exclusion because the insureds failed to maintain heat or shut off the water. The insureds counterclaimed for breach of contract and opposed summary judgment, contending there was insufficient evidence the pipe burst due to freezing and that the exclusion was unenforceable without specific notice. The court denied ASI's motion for summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding causation based on conflicting expert reports and other evidence, precluding judgment as a matter of law under the summary judgment standard. The court separately found that the freeze exclusion could be enforced because the policy had been delivered and Louisiana law presumes insureds have read its terms.
