Ralph R. Erickson

This case involved claims by Fair Housing of the Dakotas and individual plaintiffs against Goldmark Property Management under the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the company's policy of imposing application fees, deposits, and monthly charges on tenants with disabilities using non-specially trained assistance animals, while waiving them for trained animals, constituted discrimination. The court determined that the Fair Housing Act applies to all types of assistance animals regardless of training. It granted summary judgment to the defendant on the disparate treatment claim due to lack of evidence of discriminatory intent but denied summary judgment on the disparate impact and reasonable accommodation claims, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the necessity, reasonableness, and permissibility of the policy.

civil rightsproperty

The case involved two defendants, Peterson and Murphy, who were indicted and pled guilty to crack cocaine conspiracy and distribution charges based on conduct occurring between 2007 and 2009, prior to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. They sought application of the FSA's reduced mandatory minimum sentences at their post-enactment sentencings. The court denied the motions, holding that the FSA does not apply to offenses committed before its enactment even if sentencing occurs afterward. The core reasoning rested on the Act's legislative history, which showed it was the product of bipartisan compromises without any indication of retroactive intent, leading the court to conclude that the date of the offense controls the applicable penalties.

criminal law

The case involved a challenge by Red River Freethinkers against the City of Fargo regarding a Ten Commandments monument on city property, claiming it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs had previously lost a similar case, and after the city considered moving the monument, an initiated ordinance prevented its removal. The court decided to grant the city's motion to dismiss, converted to summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their alleged injury of unwanted contact with the monument was not redressable by the relief sought, which could not force removal of the monument itself due to prior rulings and the new ordinance.

religious libertycivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Defendant Roman Cavanaugh, Jr., who faced a federal indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) for committing domestic assault in Indian country as a habitual offender based on prior Spirit Lake Tribal Court convictions for domestic abuse. Cavanaugh moved to dismiss, claiming the indictment omitted an essential element, that § 117(a) exceeded Congress's authority, and that the statute violated the Constitution by allowing uncounseled tribal convictions to prove an element of the federal offense. The court denied dismissal on the first two grounds, holding the indictment adequately stated the charge and that Congress validly enacted the statute under the Indian Commerce Clause, but granted the motion on the third ground because reliance on uncounseled convictions infringed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and due process.

criminal lawfederal powercivil rights

The case concerned whether three former employees who had cashed out of their company's ESOP could sue plan fiduciaries under ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) for alleged breaches that caused the plan to overpay for company stock. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of its earlier dismissal order and reinstated them as named plaintiffs in the proposed class action. It concluded that the former employees qualified as statutory "participants" because they asserted a colorable claim that fiduciary misconduct reduced the value of their accounts at the time of distribution. The ruling relied on the Supreme Court's LaRue decision and a line of circuit precedents treating defined-contribution plans differently from defined-benefit plans, while distinguishing an earlier Eighth Circuit case as inapposite.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, two foreign nationals with approved I-140 visas and H-1B nonimmigrant status filed I-485 applications to adjust their status to permanent residents, but the applications remained pending at USCIS due to incomplete background checks and visa number availability. They sued to compel adjudication of the applications. The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) for discretionary decisions on adjustment of status. The court denied the motion, holding that although the merits decision on adjustment is discretionary, USCIS has a nondiscretionary duty to process and decide the applications, allowing jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act and APA.

immigration

The case involved an estate that had overpaid income taxes on the sale of Medtronic stock after a court ruling upheld the IRS's higher valuation of the stock for estate tax purposes, leading the estate to file a refund claim more than four years after its 1999 income tax return. The government moved to dismiss, arguing the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the claim was untimely and that the mitigation provisions of 26 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 did not apply. The core reasoning was that an estate tax valuation decision does not qualify as a "determination" under the mitigation rules, and even assuming it did, the erroneous gain recognition occurred in the sale transaction rather than the basis-determining event of the decedent's death, so the required circumstances for adjustment were not met.

taxesprocedure

In Twombly v. City of Fargo, plaintiffs sought a declaration that a Ten Commandments monument donated by a private civic group and located on public land in Fargo, North Dakota, violated the Establishment Clause, along with an order for its removal after it had stood there for over forty years. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted defendants' cross-motion, ruling that the monument did not violate the Establishment Clause. The core reasoning was that the display conveyed a permissible dual message of both religious and secular ideals, consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Van Orden and Eighth Circuit precedent in ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, and that its long history without significant controversy indicated it would not be perceived by a reasonable observer as government endorsement of religion.

religious liberty

In this federal capital case, defendant Alfonso Rodriguez Jr. faced charges of kidnapping Dru Sjodin resulting in her death, and the government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty listing statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors. The district court addressed multiple pretrial motions by the defendant to strike aggravating factors from the notice and a government motion to reconsider a prior order. The court denied all motions, holding that the factor alleging the defendant caused the victim's death during the kidnapping did not unconstitutionally duplicate an element of the offense because the jury would determine actual causation only at the penalty phase and scenarios exist where a kidnapper would not cause the death; prior state convictions remained valid or presented factual issues; precedent supported psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness; and no exceptional circumstances justified reconsideration. The rulings preserved the government's ability to present the factors to the jury while requiring clarification of the notice.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

This case involves pretrial motions in a federal capital prosecution of Alfonso Rodriguez Jr. for kidnapping resulting in the death of Dru Sjodin, with the government seeking the death penalty under the Federal Death Penalty Act. The court denied motions to declare the FDPA and its relaxed evidentiary standards unconstitutional, reasoning that the statute complies with the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments as well as Supreme Court precedent, and that the judge retains gatekeeping authority over evidence. It granted motions for discovery of grand jury transcripts and Rule 404(b) evidence, ordered an amended death penalty notice with specific factual bases, and directed the government to provide a tentative witness list 60 days before trial, while finding other requests moot based on the government's ongoing disclosures.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involved a declaratory judgment action by Centre Insurance Company seeking a ruling that its homeowners policy did not cover injuries to a minor visitor on rental property owned by Jeffrey Blake. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment after denying Blake's request for more time to conduct discovery under Rule 56(f). The policy limited coverage to the residence premises where the insured resided in at least one unit, and because the term "reside" was unambiguous and Blake had moved out of the duplex before the injury occurred, the court held that coverage was excluded under the plain language of the policy.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In United States v. Owlboy, the defendant moved to suppress statements he and his 16-year-old son made to federal and tribal officers during execution of a search warrant at their home, arguing that the statements were involuntary because they resulted from an alleged "deal" with law enforcement and that the lack of electronic recording violated due process. The court denied the motion after a hearing, finding no federal constitutional requirement that custodial interviews be recorded and determining, based on credibility assessments, that the officers' account was more believable than the defendant's claim of coercion or promises. The court credited testimony that the defendant was advised he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and made the statements without threats or deals; the defendant and his son initialed and signed the written statements. The standing issue regarding the son's statement was deemed moot because the statements were found voluntary and admissible.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff denied permission by Target Corporation to collect signatures for a political petition on the private property of its Super Target store in Grand Forks, leading to claims of violations under the federal First Amendment and sections 4 and 5 of the North Dakota Constitution. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that the First Amendment applies only to state action and does not confer rights on private property, even when open to the public, as established in precedents like Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, and that North Dakota's constitution provides no broader protections here.

free speechproperty

This case involves a product liability claim by plaintiff Dean Symington against Daisy Manufacturing Co., the maker of a Model 856 Daisy Powerline airgun. Symington was injured when his friend Steve Logan fired a pellet into his eye while they were playing with the unloaded gun, which allegedly had a design defect allowing ammunition to lodge and later discharge unexpectedly. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It ruled that the plaintiff's expert witness was qualified and his opinions reliable, that the supplemental expert report could be considered, and that under North Dakota's comparative fault statute the jury must allocate responsibility between the intentional act of the shooter and any product defect by the manufacturer.

gunstorts & liabilityprocedure

In United States v. Wendling, the United States brought a criminal forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 853 seeking title to real property in Minnesota that the defendant had used to manufacture marijuana as part of a conspiracy. The defendant pleaded guilty and admitted forfeiture of his interest, but his mother, a joint tenant who paid most of the purchase price and had no knowledge of the crimes, petitioned in an ancillary proceeding to protect her claimed ownership. The court granted the government's summary judgment motion in part and denied it in part, ruling that the property would be forfeited only to the extent of the defendant's 50% interest. It reasoned that neither side had rebutted the presumption of equal ownership among joint tenants and that the statute authorizes partial forfeiture of real property without converting the proceeding into an improper in rem action against an innocent third party.

criminal lawproperty

This case involved a contract dispute between Soo Line Railroad Company and Enderlin Farmers Elevator over an indemnity clause in their Track Agreement. The Railroad sought summary judgment after paying $170,000 to an injured employee who slipped on the Elevator's spur track, arguing that the clause required the Elevator to reimburse it for any payments stemming from the Elevator's acts or omissions, and alternatively claiming common law premises liability. The court denied the motion, holding that the indemnity clause does not require proof of negligence but does require evidence that an act or omission by the Elevator caused the injury. Conflicting evidence in the record created a genuine issue of material fact on causation, precluding summary judgment on both the contractual and premises liability claims.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a defendant charged with unlawful firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) after agents executing a search warrant at his home found a rifle and drug paraphernalia. While handcuffed during the search, the defendant made statements admitting to recent drug use and owning the rifle without having received Miranda warnings. The court granted the motion to suppress those statements, reasoning that the defendant was in custody because he was restrained in a manner associated with formal arrest and a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. The court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, finding no due process violation from the temporary seizure of the firearm pending trial and holding that federal law preempts any conflicting state property rights in firearms.

criminal lawgunsprocedureproperty

The case involved a defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after law enforcement executing a search warrant for a specific house on an Indian reservation found a rifle in an abandoned shed about 60 yards away. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search of the shed exceeded the warrant's scope and that the agents disregarded procedural requirements for obtaining the warrant. The court granted the motion to suppress. The warrant authorized a search only of the described house, the shed was not part of the curtilage because it was not intimately connected to the home's private activities, and while officers could observe items in an open field they could not enter a man-made enclosure without a warrant; the agents' conflicting beliefs about the shed's status further supported the need to secure it and obtain a second warrant instead of searching immediately.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over coverage under a commercial property insurance policy issued by Lexington to R.D. Offutt Company for property in multiple states, including Oregon where a loss occurred due to electrical failure. RDO sued in North Dakota federal court seeking declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and bad faith after Lexington denied part of the claim under a growing crops exclusion. Lexington moved to transfer venue to Oregon under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), citing convenience of witnesses, location of evidence, and the interests of justice. The court denied the motion, reasoning that North Dakota law governs the policy interpretation given the substantial contacts there and that the defendant failed to meet its burden of showing transfer was warranted.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves the United States seeking enforcement of an IRS summons against Danny L. Norwood to obtain financial records for investigating his tax liability in 1999 and 2000, including accounts, certificates of deposit, credit cards, and foreign ownership interests. The court granted the government's motion to amend its prior order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 to correct a mistake in relying on the wrong document, and it ordered Norwood to produce the requested documents from the correct summons paragraphs and execute a consent directive. The core reasoning was that the IRS met the four Powell factors for summons enforcement by showing a legitimate purpose, relevance of the information, lack of prior possession, and compliance with administrative steps, while Norwood failed to demonstrate any abuse of process, Fifth Amendment violation, or need for discovery or in camera review.

taxesfederal powerprocedure