This case involved claims by Fair Housing of the Dakotas and individual plaintiffs against Goldmark Property Management under the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the company's policy of imposing application fees, deposits, and monthly charges on tenants with disabilities using non-specially trained assistance animals, while waiving them for trained animals, constituted discrimination. The court determined that the Fair Housing Act applies to all types of assistance animals regardless of training. It granted summary judgment to the defendant on the disparate treatment claim due to lack of evidence of discriminatory intent but denied summary judgment on the disparate impact and reasonable accommodation claims, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the necessity, reasonableness, and permissibility of the policy.
The case involved two defendants, Peterson and Murphy, who were indicted and pled guilty to crack cocaine conspiracy and distribution charges based on conduct occurring between 2007 and 2009, prior to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. They sought application of the FSA's reduced mandatory minimum sentences at their post-enactment sentencings. The court denied the motions, holding that the FSA does not apply to offenses committed before its enactment even if sentencing occurs afterward. The core reasoning rested on the Act's legislative history, which showed it was the product of bipartisan compromises without any indication of retroactive intent, leading the court to conclude that the date of the offense controls the applicable penalties.
The case involved a challenge by Red River Freethinkers against the City of Fargo regarding a Ten Commandments monument on city property, claiming it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs had previously lost a similar case, and after the city considered moving the monument, an initiated ordinance prevented its removal. The court decided to grant the city's motion to dismiss, converted to summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their alleged injury of unwanted contact with the monument was not redressable by the relief sought, which could not force removal of the monument itself due to prior rulings and the new ordinance.
The case involved Defendant Roman Cavanaugh, Jr., who faced a federal indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) for committing domestic assault in Indian country as a habitual offender based on prior Spirit Lake Tribal Court convictions for domestic abuse. Cavanaugh moved to dismiss, claiming the indictment omitted an essential element, that § 117(a) exceeded Congress's authority, and that the statute violated the Constitution by allowing uncounseled tribal convictions to prove an element of the federal offense. The court denied dismissal on the first two grounds, holding the indictment adequately stated the charge and that Congress validly enacted the statute under the Indian Commerce Clause, but granted the motion on the third ground because reliance on uncounseled convictions infringed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and due process.
The case concerned whether three former employees who had cashed out of their company's ESOP could sue plan fiduciaries under ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) for alleged breaches that caused the plan to overpay for company stock. The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of its earlier dismissal order and reinstated them as named plaintiffs in the proposed class action. It concluded that the former employees qualified as statutory "participants" because they asserted a colorable claim that fiduciary misconduct reduced the value of their accounts at the time of distribution. The ruling relied on the Supreme Court's LaRue decision and a line of circuit precedents treating defined-contribution plans differently from defined-benefit plans, while distinguishing an earlier Eighth Circuit case as inapposite.
In this case, two foreign nationals with approved I-140 visas and H-1B nonimmigrant status filed I-485 applications to adjust their status to permanent residents, but the applications remained pending at USCIS due to incomplete background checks and visa number availability. They sued to compel adjudication of the applications. The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) for discretionary decisions on adjustment of status. The court denied the motion, holding that although the merits decision on adjustment is discretionary, USCIS has a nondiscretionary duty to process and decide the applications, allowing jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act and APA.
