Ahmed al-Sharaa

Early life and military career

Youth in Syria

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa was born on 29 October 1982 in Riyadh to a middle-class Syrian Sunni Muslim family of four brothers and two sisters. The family claims to trace their lineage back to the Sahabi Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf of the Banu Zuhra clan of the Quraysh tribe, whose grandson migrated to the al-Kafarat region of Jordan as part of the early Islamic expansion. Like many other Qurayshi families across the Arab world, they had historically been involved in scholarly pursuits. According to The New York Times, the family discussed politics at home but had no record of involvement in Islamic extremism.

His father, Hussein al-Sharaa, worked as an oil engineer at the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, while his mother, Widad al-Khaled, was a geography teacher. The family returned to Syria in 1989, settling in the affluent Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus, where his father opened a real estate office. Whilst living in an apartment block in the Mezzeh neighbourhood in the west of the city, al-Sharaa worked part-time as a child in a grocery store owned by his father. He frequented the Shafi'i mosque in his neighbourhood, and at the age of seventeen, he became religious, habitually wearing a long austere tunic and a knitted cap.

According to Syrian researcher Hussam Jazmati, al-Sharaa's classmates remembered him as a studious but unremarkable boy who wore thick glasses and avoided attention. During his youth, he was described as "bookish", "quiet" and "shy", "manipulatively intelligent" but "socially introverted", and was noted for his "good looks" and a romance with an Alawite girl which both families opposed.

Al-Sharaa said that, while he largely disagreed with his father ideologically, they both shared a commitment to defending the Palestinians. Besides the displacement of his grandfather and his family from the Golan Heights, al-Sharaa said that the Second Intifada in 2000 had an impact on his life choices. According to an interview with Frontline in 2021, al-Sharaa stated he was radicalized by the Palestinian Second Intifada in "the early 2000s." He said: "I started thinking about how I could fulfil my duties, defending a people who are oppressed by occupiers and invaders." In a 2024 interview, when asked about his reaction to the September 11 attacks, al-Sharaa stated that "anyone who lived in the Islamic or Arab world at the time who tells you he wasn't happy about it would be lying", but added that he understood "regret" about the killing of innocent people.

Iraq war

Al-Sharaa traveled from Damascus to Baghdad by bus just weeks before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In 2003, he was detained and questioned by the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate for his illegal departure from Syria to Iraq, but was released after denying affiliation with any political parties or extremist groups. After arriving in Iraq, al-Sharaa quickly rose through the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In 2004, Iraqi intelligence believed al-Sharaa was Zarqawi's deputy, according to The Economist. The Times of Israel claimed in 2013 that al-Sharaa was a close associate of AQI leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. But in later years, al-Sharaa denied ever meeting al-Zarqawi and stated that he served only as a regular foot-soldier under al-Qaeda against the American occupation.

Before the beginning of the Iraqi civil war in 2006, al-Sharaa was arrested by American forces while planting explosives and imprisoned for over five years in various detention centres, including Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper and Camp Taji prisons. Al-Sharaa convinced the Iraqi authorities holding him that he was a local Iraqi, not a foreign fighter, by speaking in Iraqi-accented Arabic and using a pseudonym, Amjad Mudhafar. It is said that during this time, al-Sharaa taught classical Arabic to other prisoners, increasing his popularity.

Syrian civil war

Syrian uprising and foundation of al-Nusra Front

During a routine detention review, Iraqi authorities, finding no charges against al-Sharaa's pseudonym, Amjad Mudhafar, released him on 13 March 2011, days before the beginning of the Syrian revolution. Al-Sharaa was tasked in August 2011 by al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri to establish al-Qaeda's mission in Syria. The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, gave him $50,000 (approximately 60 million dinar) to establish a branch of the group in Syria. Alongside senior al-Qaeda operatives, he formed Jabhat an-Nuṣrah li-Ahl ash-Shām (lit. 'Front of the Supporters of the People of the Levant'), also known as al-Nusra Front, which was envisioned by al-Zawahiri as a broad coalition of Islamist militant groups led by al-Sharaa in Syria, with direct allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command. During this time, al-Sharaa went under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani. According to his PBS Frontline interview, his "al-Julani" nisba referred to his family's origins in the Golan Heights.

Despite tensions with the leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)), who were content with his departure, al-Sharaa proceeded to orchestrate an agreement with al-Baghdadi to expand Jabhat al-Nusra as al-Qaeda's Syrian branch. ISI provided al-Sharaa with fighters, weapons and funding, and maintained an alliance with al-Nusra Front until 2013, with an arrangement between al-Sharaa and al-Baghdadi to resolve disputes through mediation by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Sources differ on whether al-Sharaa was the one who came up with the idea of forming Jabhat al-Nusra or another leader in ISI; however, what is certain is that al-Sharaa became the "general emir" of al-Nusra Front when it was officially announced in January 2012. By December of that year, the US Department of State designated Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, identifying it as an alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq. The US State Department listed al-Sharaa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in May 2013. Under al-Sharaa's authority, al-Nusra Front emerged as one of Syria's most powerful rebel groups. Its stronghold was centered on the Idlib Governorate in northwestern Syria, where they attacked both Ba'athist Syrian government forces and US-supported opposition groups.

War crimes of al-Nusra Front (2012–2016)

Under al-Sharaa's leadership, Jabhat al-Nusra perpetrated a series of war crimes against Syria's Christian, Alawite, Shia and Druze minorities, including suicide bombings, forced conversions and sectarian massacres. These included the January 2012 al-Midan bombing, which killed 26 people and wounded 63. In 2015, al-Nusra Front fighters killed Druze villagers during the Qalb Loze massacre. The Saudi state-owned Al Arabiya news network claimed that Jabhat al-Nusra's leadership denounced the attack, asserting that the actions of the attackers were in contradiction to the organization's policy. Al-Nusra Front was also suspected of carrying out the 10 May 2012 Damascus bombings killing 55 people and injuring over 400, and the February 2013 Damascus bombings which killed 83 people, most of them civilians and children, and were condemned by the Syrian opposition.

In June 2013, al-Nusra Front fighters took part in the Hatla massacre, during which 30 to 60 Shia civilians were killed as part of a wider campaign of sectarian cleansing in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate. On 12 May 2016, rebel militants led by al-Nusra Front killed 42 civilians and seven NDF militiamen while kidnapping up to 70 people after taking control of the Alawite village of Zara'a in Southern Hama. Al-Nusra Front was also behind suicide bombings in Lebanon directed against Alawites and Shia populations, including the 2015 Tripoli bombings.

Conflict with ISIS

As al-Sharaa carved out a fiefdom in northwestern Syria between 2012 and 2013, the Iraqi leadership of ISI grew suspicious of him. Al-Nusra Front became increasingly popular for providing social services and cooperating with other Syrian rebel groups against the Assad regime, and al-Sharaa ignored al-Baghdadi's orders to begin fighting these groups and assassinate opposition activists. Over time, al-Sharaa began distancing himself from transnational jihadism, increasingly framing his faction within the context of a nationalist Syrian struggle. Al-Baghdadi's top aide, Abu Ali al-Anbari, travelled to Syria to investigate al-Sharaa, concluding that he was a "cunning person; two-faced; [...] [who] glows when he hears his name mentioned on satellite channels".

Concerned about Jabhat al-Nusra's popularity and al-Sharaa's perceived insubordination, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced that al-Nusra Front would merge into ISI to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2013. The proposed merger would have eliminated Jabhat al-Nusra's autonomy and allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command by placing all its leaders, decisions, and operations under al-Baghdadi's direct control. To preserve Jabhat al-Nusra's independence, al-Sharaa publicly pledged allegiance (bay'ah) directly to al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who issued a declaration that confirmed the independence of al-Nusra Front from ISI, proclaiming that Syria was the "spatial state" of al-Nusra Front and that ISI's rule was restricted to Iraq.

Al-Zawahiri repudiated al-Baghdadi's merger, which was announced without consulting or informing al-Qaeda's central command, and appointed Abu Khalid al-Suri as his emissary to mediate between the two groups and supervise the implementation of the accords. In late 2013, al-Zawahiri ordered al-Baghdadi to accept the annulment of the merger, who refused and attempted to proceed with it. By February 2014, efforts to end the dispute between ISIS and al-Nusra Front had failed, leading to al-Qaeda formally severing its ties with ISIS in February 2014; leaving Jabhat al-Nusra as the sole representative of al-Qaeda in Syria.

After the assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri on 23 February 2014, al-Sharaa denounced ISIS and likened them to the Iraqi "sahawat" who fought against al-Qaeda alongside the U.S., accusing them of undermining the fight against Assad by fighting rebels. Open warfare between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra ensued; al-Sharaa warned that the fighting risked giving a reprieve to Assad. Over the following months, ISIS captured much of the territory controlled by al-Nusra Front and the Syrian opposition, leaving an estimated four thousand fighters on both sides dead by February 2015. In June 2015, al-Sharaa told Al-Jazeera that no resolution to the conflict was forthcoming, and that unless ISIS "repent to God and return to their senses", there would be "nothing but fighting between us".

Split from al-Qaeda

The Russian entrance into the war led to military setbacks for the Syrian opposition, causing their foreign backers to exert a greater level of influence over them. In January 2016, al-Nusra Front held unity negotiations with other rebel groups in a bid to pre-empt any foreign attempt to co-opt these groups against it. When the talks collapsed due to concerns over Jabhat al-Nusra's affiliation with al-Qaeda, the reformist wing of al-Nusra Front, which may have comprised a third of its overall membership, presented al-Sharaa with an ultimatum: to sever ties with al-Qaeda and merge with other rebel groups, or face a mass defection.

In July 2016, al-Sharaa convened Jabhat al-Nusra's Shura Council twice to discuss the matter. The first council was inconclusive, while the second council settled on a "middle way" after several meetings: to break ties with al-Qaeda outside of Syria while retaining them inside Syria. As al-Zawahiri could not be contacted, several senior al-Qaeda leaders, including al-Zawahiri's deputy Abu Khayr al-Masri, approved the split contingent on al-Zawahiri later approving it himself. If he did not, the split would have to be reversed. Al-Sharaa agreed to these terms, which Jabhat al-Nusra's Shura Council narrowly approved.

On 28 July 2016, al-Sharaa announced that al-Nusra Front had severed ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). He added that the new organisation would have "no affiliation to any external entity". Ayman al-Zawahiri was publicly supportive of the split, even though he had rejected the plan when it was presented to him. In protest, several leading al-Qaeda loyalists in al-Nusra Front left JFS.

Formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

After forming JFS, al-Sharaa attempted to arrange a merger with Ahrar al-Sham. However, negotiations collapsed due to al-Sharaa supporting Jund al-Aqsa, a group that he had secretly established to discourage Jabhat al-Nusra's foreign fighters from defecting to ISIS, in their conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. Ahrar al-Sham's leadership was also concerned that JFS continued to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa came under attack from al-Qaeda. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi wrote a critique of the manhaj of JFS, and rumours circulated that al-Qaeda was preparing to launch a new affiliate in Syria.

In a last-ditch attempt to secure a merger, al-Sharaa led efforts to undermine Ahrar al-Sham's nationalist and anti-merger wing. When Ahrar al-Sham's leadership again refused to merge in December 2017, the Islamist and pro-merger wing formed a breakaway "sub-faction" named Jaysh al-Ahrar. Shortly afterwards, JFS attacked Free Syrian Army (FSA) positions across Idlib and Aleppo, precipitating a conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. The conflict allowed JFS to defeat CIA-backed FSA groups, which it viewed as a "foreign conspiracy".

On 28 January 2017, al-Sharaa announced that JFS would dissolve and merge with Liwa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunna, Ansar al-Din Front and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), gaining approximately 3,000 to 5,000 more fighters. In an effort to demonstrate the maturity of the new group, al-Sharaa arranged for Jaysh al-Ahrar's leader Abu Jaber Sheikh to serve as the nominal leader of HTS, although leadership was formally transferred back to al-Sharaa by December 2017. The remaining al-Qaeda loyalists in JFS viewed the formation of HTS as a definitive break from the organisation and refused to join. A number of al-Qaeda veterans publicly criticised al-Sharaa for his moves. As a result, several were arrested by HTS towards the end of 2017. After their release, some were involved in forming Hurras al-Din, the new Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda.

The U.S. government quickly rejected this rebranding, with the U.S. Embassy in Syria stating that "The core of HTS is Nusra, a designated terrorist organisation. This designation applies regardless of what name it uses or what groups merge into it." The Embassy characterized HTS's formation as an attempt to "hijack the Syrian revolution" rather than a move toward moderation. On 10 May 2017, the Rewards for Justice program announced a $10 million reward for information leading to the identification or location of al-Sharaa, who was identified by the program as the leader of al-Nusra Front. The Rewards for Justice program described this as the first reward offer for a leader of al-Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda.

Idlib governance

Under al-Sharaa's technocratic administration, Idlib experienced significant economic development, becoming Syria's fastest-growing region despite being historically its poorest province. The area featured new luxury shopping malls, housing estates, and a round-the-clock electricity supply surpassing that of the capital, Damascus. Educational facilities included a university with 18,000 segregated students. However, his government faced criticism for its taxation policies, including customs taxes on goods from Turkey and checkpoint fees on smuggled goods, as well as the economic impact of the Turkish lira's depreciation, which was the main currency in the region.

In August 2018, al-Sharaa said that both HTS's allies and opponents viewed the group as "the greatest defender of Sunnis in Syria." He cautioned that Turkish positions were uncertain, as political stances could change anytime. He also defended the evacuation of the Shia-majority villages of Foua and Kafraya, saying it removed the threat of "sectarian militias" and prevented Iran from having a pretext to attack.

In February 2023, Idlib Governorate, which was under the control of the Syrian Salvation Government, was one of the territories hardest hit by the Turkey–Syria earthquakes. The Assad regime's policy of besieging northwestern Syria and blockading the supply of food, medicines and other humanitarian supplies further worsened the crisis in Idlib. Al-Sharaa criticized aid agencies for neglecting Idlib and urged the international community to step up reconstruction and relief efforts, saying, "The United Nations needs to understand that it is required to help in a crisis." When asked about efforts to rebrand HTS, al-Sharaa said, "We have built a government that meets our people's needs, but much more is still required."

In March 2024, widespread protests erupted in Idlib Governorate against al-Sharaa's rule, with demonstrators adopting the slogan "Isqat al-Julani" ("Down with Julani"), reminiscent of earlier protests against the Assad regime. Hundreds of protesters marched through Idlib's cities and towns for over a month. The protests were triggered by multiple factors, including allegations of brutality by HTS, with reports of thousands of critics held in prisons, and economic grievances related to high taxes. In response, al-Sharaa made several concessions. He released hundreds of detainees from a previous summer's security operation, including his former deputy Abu Maria al-Qahtani, who had been arrested along with 300 others in a purge. He also promised local elections and increased employment opportunities for displaced persons, while warning protesters against what he termed as treachery.

Fall of the Assad regime

Planning by Syrian opposition forces for a military offensive against Aleppo began in late 2023 but was delayed by Turkish objections. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sought negotiations with the Assad regime, to "determine Syria's future together," but received a negative response, following which he allowed the HTS-led opposition troops to begin their offensive against the Assad regime.

In late November 2024, al-Sharaa led HTS in its Deterrence of Aggression offensive against the Ba'athist Syrian government's armed forces. Near the start of the offensive, it was rumored that al-Sharaa had been killed in a Russian airstrike, but this was soon disproven. During the Battle of Aleppo, al-Sharaa instructed his forces not to "scare children" and HTS channels broadcast footage of Christians in the city continuing their everyday activities. Archbishop Afram Ma'lui stated that services would not be affected by the change in control. After government forces were expelled from the city, al-Sharaa declared that "diversity is a strength".

On 6 December, in a face-to-face interview with CNN, al-Sharaa declared that the offensive's goal was to remove Assad from power. Using his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, he explicitly pledged to protect minority communities and outlined plans for establishing a government grounded in institutions and a "council chosen by the people". He also expressed his intention to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their homes.

De facto leader of Syria (2024–2025)

Formation of caretaker government

On 8 December 2024, al-Sharaa stated on Telegram that Syrian public institutions would not be immediately handed over to military forces but would instead remain temporarily under then–Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali until they were officially transferred, while al-Jalali announced in a social media video that he would stay in Damascus, cooperate with the Syrian people, and expressed hope that Syria would become "a normal country" and begin engaging in diplomacy with other nations.

On the same day, al-Jalali announced that the Ba'athist Syrian government would hand over power to a newly elected government following Assad's departure from Damascus, adding that he had been in contact with al-Sharaa prior to the announcement to discuss the transfer of authority. The same day, al-Sharaa delivered a speech at Damascus's Umayyad Mosque, calling the fall of the Assad regime "a new chapter in the history of the region" and condemning Syria's role as "a playground for Iranian ambitions", characterized by sectarianism and corruption. In his victory speech following the fall of Damascus, he condemned Iran as a source of sectarianism and corruption, and framed the triumph as a turning point for Syria.

Al-Sharaa became the country's de facto leader as head of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the new Syrian administration, and on 9 December, HTS released a video showing al-Jalali and Mohammed al-Bashir, the Prime Minister of the Syrian Salvation Government; following the fall of the Assad regime, al-Bashir was tasked with forming an interim government after meeting with al-Sharaa and al-Jalali to coordinate the transfer of power, and was officially appointed the next day by the General Command of Syria as prime minister of the Syrian caretaker government.

Post-Assad governance

Only a few days after the fall of the Assad regime, al-Sharaa met with Turkish officials, marking the first diplomatic delegation to Syria since Assad's overthrow. The United States rescinded a seven-year-old $10 million Rewards for Justice bounty for information leading to al-Sharaa's capture after he met with a U.S. delegation—the first formal U.S. diplomatic presence in Syria in more than a decade—with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara A. Leaf stating that the decision was made to initiate dialogue with HTS and noting that, during discussions in Damascus, al-Sharaa committed to preventing ISIS and other terrorist groups from operating within Syria.

On 24 December, al-Sharaa announced the dissolution and merger of multiple opposition factions, including the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, into the Ministry of Defense, while excluding the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces due to conflicts with Turkish-backed rebels in northeastern Syria. This reorganization coincided with his efforts to establish new state institutions, including law enforcement and security forces, amid reports of revenge killings and highway banditry, and included the creation of processing centers for former government soldiers and the initiation of police force recruitment. In an interview with al-Arabiya on 29 December, al-Sharaa said that he expected the process of writing a new constitution of Syria to take two or three years, with elections expected after four years.

On 3 January 2025, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot became the first top diplomats from European Union member states to visit Damascus since Assad's downfall, meeting with al-Sharaa to discuss a new political beginning between Europe and Syria. A Russian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov also visited Damascus on 29 January to meet al-Sharaa, reaffirming Moscow's support for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity following the Assad regime's collapse.

Presidency (2025–present)

Appointment

On 29 January 2025, during the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference, Hassan Abdul Ghani, spokesman for the rebels' Military Operations Command, stated that al-Sharaa had been appointed president of Syria by the Syrian General Command and would govern the country during the transitional period, assume the duties of the president, and represent the nation on the international stage. After his appointment as president, al-Sharaa gave a brief speech outlining the government's immediate priorities—filling the power vacuum, maintaining civil peace, building state institutions, developing the economy, and restoring Syria's international and regional standing—and received congratulations from leaders of many countries, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Canada, Mauritania, Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Early actions

A day after al-Sharaa's appointment as president, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani became the first head of state to visit Damascus since the fall of the Assad regime to discuss post-conflict reconstruction and other topics, and on 12 February 2025, al-Sharaa held his first phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin since Assad's overthrow, while also meeting representatives of the Syrian National Coalition and the Syrian Negotiation Commission, including their presidents Hadi al-Bahra and Bader Jamous, with both organizations announced to dissolve under the new authorities.

In mid-February, al-Sharaa made his first official trip to the coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus, former strongholds of the ousted president Bashar al-Assad, and on 21 February, he met with China's ambassador to Damascus, Shi Hongwei, marking the first official interaction between the two nations since Assad's overthrow, while in early June, he visited Daraa Governorate for the first time since the fall of the Assad regime, coinciding with Eid al-Adha, in the city widely known as the "cradle of the revolution" for being the site of the first protests against the Assad regime.

On 13 March 2025, he signed the constitutional declaration, which set a five-year transitional period, established a presidential system with executive power vested in the president who appoints ministers, and abolished the position of prime minister. It enshrined Islamic law as the main source of jurisprudence while preserving freedoms of opinion and expression, and established the People's Assembly to serve as the parliament during the transition and oversee the drafting of a new permanent constitution.

By 6 March 2025, clashes had broken out in western Syria between Assad loyalists and the armed forces of the Syrian caretaker government, marking the worst violence since rebels toppled the Assad regime. Al-Sharaa urged fighters in the pro-government forces to "avoid any abuses" following reports of massacres of Alawite civilians in Latakia, and on 9 March, he announced the formation of an independent national committee of seven judges to investigate the events and violations in the Syrian coastal areas, emphasizing that the committee must submit its findings to the president within 30 days and describing the coastal violence as part of the "expected challenges." The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that 1,614 civilians were killed by armed militias aligned with the Syrian caretaker government during clashes between 6 and 12 March 2025, and on 12 March, the caretaker government announced the formation of a National Security Council to be chaired by al-Sharaa.

Administration and cabinet

On 29 March 2025, al-Sharaa announced the formation of the Syrian transitional government during a ceremony at the People's Palace in Damascus, where the newly appointed ministers took their oaths and presented their plans, replacing the Syrian caretaker government established after the fall of the Assad regime. The government included four ministers from minority communities— Yarub Badr, an Alawite; Amjad Badr, a Druze; Hind Kabawat, a Christian; and Mohammad Abdulrahman Tarkou, a Kurd—as well as figures from different former opposition groups, such as Mohammed Abu al-Khair Shukri, former member of the Syrian National Coalition and the new Minister of Endowments, and Raed al-Saleh, former Director of the White Helmets and the new Minister of Disaster Management and Emergency Response, and was described by some observers as technocratic, with ministers chosen according to their competences, according to al-Sharaa.

On 9 May 2026, as part of a partial cabinet reshuffle, al-Sharaa appointed Khaled Fawaz Zaarour and Basel al-Suweydan as the Ministers of Information and Agriculture, replacing Hamza al-Mustafa and Amjad Badr, respectively. The reshuffle was the first since the overthrow of former president Bashar al-Assad.

Foreign relations

After being appointed as president, al-Sharaa made a trip abroad, visiting Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Qatar, Turkey, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates. He attended the emergency summit of the Arab League, the fourth Antalya Diplomacy Forum, and the 2025 Arab–Islamic extraordinary summit.

On 2 February 2025, al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani visited Saudi Arabia and met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, marking al-Sharaa's first foreign visit since the fall of the Assad regime. On 7 May 2025, he met with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on his first official visit to Europe since becoming president of Syria, and on 14 May, he met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Riyadh— the first meeting between American and Syrian presidents since Bill Clinton and Hafez al-Assad met in Geneva in 2000—during which Trump urged him to join the Abraham Accords. On 28 January 2026, al-Sharaa met with Putin in Moscow for the second time to discuss Russia's military presence in Syria, during which Putin reaffirmed Moscow's support for Syria's unity and territorial integrity, congratulated Damascus on recent political developments, and expressed hope that the return of the Jazira region would advance the full restoration of Syrian sovereignty, while both sides also emphasised continued economic and reconstruction cooperation.

Easing sanctions on Syria

Since 2011, several countries and international bodies have imposed sanctions on Syria under Bashar al-Assad's rule, mainly due to the Ba'athist Syrian government's violent crackdown on civilians during the civil war. In an interview with The New York Times in April 2025, al-Sharaa stated that the sanctions should be permanently lifted, as they were imposed on the Assad regime. He noted that the sanctions were damaging his government and slowing economic recovery.

In November 2025, with the support of the United States and other countries, the UN Security Council removed al-Sharaa and Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab from the sanctions list of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. On 7 November, the United States also delisted him from its Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) sanctions list, while the United Kingdom announced the removal of both him and Khattab from its consolidated sanctions list, stating that he was no longer subject to asset freezes.

Political positions

Views on Bashar al-Assad's handover to Syria

In an interview with The New York Times in April 2025, al-Sharaa said that Syrian officials requested Russia to extradite Assad as a condition for allowing their military presence in Syria, but Russia refused. In a September 2025 interview with 60 Minutes, al-Sharaa said he still intended to pursue justice against Bashar al-Assad through legal means.

In a Fox News interview on 10 November 2025, al-Sharaa said that Russia had a different view on sending wanted individuals back to Syria, but he stressed that justice must be carried out through a transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for all perpetrators, including Assad. In a November 2025 interview with The Washington Post, al-Sharaa said that the issue of Bashar al-Assad remained sensitive for Russia, with Syria's relationship with Moscow still in its early stages and emphasized that "Syria will preserve its right to demand Assad's trial."

Views on Syria

In an interview with Al Arabiya, al-Sharaa spoke about his ambitions for Syria's economic development. Al-Sharaa said that Syria needs "experts who know the country's assets and try to benefit from all the experiences of the world, so as to come up with something that suits the nature of the society." He said that after the fall of the Assad regime, there are "major investment and economic opportunities", and predicted that Saudi Arabia would have a very large role in Syria's economic development. He also pointed to a great investment opportunity for all neighbouring countries that can implement joint economic projects with the new Syrian administration. Regarding the sanctions imposed on Syria, al-Sharaa said he had hoped the incoming U.S. administration, led by then-president-elect Donald Trump, would lift them. He said that one of his top priorities is to rebuild the economy by issuing a new currency after the value of the current currency is stabilised.

On 14 December, al-Sharaa stressed in his statements after the fall of the Assad regime that the next phase will be an opportunity to serve the Syrian people and build the future. He explained that there is no justification for any foreign intervention after the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria, condemning the "Iranian project" as harmful, and declaring that the victory in Syria is a victory over this project. He also stressed that what happened in Syria was not a coincidence but the result of long preparations. He stated that Russia had become frustrated with the Assad regime and that the change in leadership represented an opportunity for Russia to build a new relationship with Syria. Regarding the Syrian leadership, he pointed out the need to move away from the mentality of revolution and move towards a state of law and institutions. Al-Sharaa stated to Al Jazeera Arabic that the choices of governance will be discussed among a group of legal experts; and then public elections would be held to make the final choice.

In an interview with the BBC, al-Sharaa discussed his plans and said that Syria is not like the Taliban. He said that their way of leading the country is different because Afghanistan has a tribal system, while the people and way of thinking in Syria are not the same. He also stated that the new Syrian government will follow its own history and culture in its governance.

In his first interview as president on 9 February 2025, al-Sharaa told The Economist that he opposed the federalization of Syria. He also mentioned that Turkey was planning a full-scale operation in the north against Kurdish forces but had asked them to wait to allow for negotiations. In response to a question about whether Sharia could be implemented, he stated, "That decision rests with the experts. If they approve it, my duty is to enforce it; if they reject it, my duty is to uphold their decision as well." When asked if Syria would become a democracy, he responded, "In our region, there are various definitions of democracy. If democracy means that the people decide who will rule them and who represents them in parliament, then yes, Syria is moving in that direction."

Views on Israel and Gaza

Al-Sharaa has stated that he believes in a commitment to defending the Palestinians, and that the displacement of his family from the Golan Heights as well as the Second Intifada in 2000 had a strong impact on his life choices. During a speech to exhort HTS fighters in January 2018, he declared: "If Allah wills it, we will reach not only Damascus, but Jerusalem awaits us as well."

In an interview with Syria TV regarding the ongoing Israeli invasion of Syria, al-Sharaa said that after the fall of the Assad regime, Israel no longer has "any excuses" for attacking Syrian territory. He emphasized that diplomacy was the only way to ensure security and cautioned against "ill-considered military adventures". Al-Sharaa reportedly told a group of journalists that HTS would continue to uphold the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement that ended the Yom Kippur War between Syria and Israel. In an interview with The New York Times in December 2024, he reaffirmed Syria's commitment to the 1974 Agreement. He stated, "Israel entered Syria under the pretext of the Iranian presence, and its pretext has now ended."

On 14 December 2024, al-Sharaa clarified that his administration was not interested in engaging in a new conflict with Israel, emphasizing that Syria's priority was rebuilding after years of war. He noted that the country's deteriorating situation did not permit further hostilities and that maintaining state stability was paramount. Al-Sharaa stressed that diplomatic solutions were the only viable path to ensuring security and long-term stability in the region.

On 11 February 2025, al-Sharaa stated in an interview with The Rest Is Politics that Trump's proposed United States takeover of the Gaza Strip would not succeed, asserting that no power can drive people from their land. He noted that many countries had tried and failed, especially during the recent war in Gaza. His statement came after a joint press conference in which Trump declared that the U.S. would "take over the Gaza Strip; we'll own it."

On 4 March 2025, at the extraordinary Arab League summit on Gaza, al-Sharaa condemned calls for the forced displacement of Palestinians, calling them a threat to all Arabs. On 26 August 2025, al-Sharaa said his country would not join the Abraham Accords, stressing that its dispute with Israel is very different from the conflicts experienced by other Arab nations.

Views on Iran

Since the fall of the Assad regime, al-Sharaa has made several statements regarding Iran's involvement in Syria. For many years, Syria and Iran maintained a strategic alliance, with Damascus serving as a key component of Iran's "Axis of Resistance". In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat published on 20 December 2024, al-Sharaa asserted that under Bashar al-Assad, Syria became a platform for Iran to exert influence over major Arab capitals, expand conflicts, and destabilize Gulf nations through activities such as drug trafficking, including the distribution of Captagon. He described Iran's regional ambitions as detrimental and framed the developments in Syria as a setback for Iran's influence in the region. "What we have done and achieved with the least possible damage and losses," he stated, adding that "the Iranian project in the region has been set back 40 years." In February 2025, al-Sharaa condemned Iran and its "Axis of Resistance" as a "strategic threat to the entire region".

Public image

In 2025, Time 100 listed him as one of the world's most influential people, and Agence France-Presse noted that he made global headlines that year. In the same year, The Economist awarded its country of the year title to Syria, under al-Sharaa's rule, noting that he had generated a "series of positive surprises".

Public opinion

A YouGov opinion poll commissioned in 2026 by the Council for a Secure America showed largely favorable views of al-Sharaa's presidency among Syrians, with 69% of respondents rating his performance as "good," 12% rating it poorly, and 19% saying they were undecided.

Personal life

Not much is known about al-Sharaa's personal life, which he is careful not to share with the media. In 2012, Time reported that in one of the meetings of prominent Islamist militant groups attended by the leaders of Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, and other rebel brigades, al-Sharaa wore a mask, refusing to reveal his identity, and was introduced to the attendees by Jabhat al-Nusra's emirs in Aleppo and Idlib.

Al-Sharaa met his wife Latifa al-Droubi while they were both studying at Damascus University. They were married in 2012 and have three children. Al-Sharaa plays chess, basketball, pool, and goes horse riding, while he reportedly played football in his childhood. In a November 2025 interview with The Washington Post, al-Sharaa said he admired Michael Jordan and the National Basketball Association, preferred baseball to football, and was skilled at playing pool.

On 1 April 2026, during Ahmed al-Sharaa's visit to the United Kingdom, he participated in an interview at Chatham House with Bronwen Maddox. During the interview, al-Sharaa corrected Maddox, clarifying that he has one daughter, along with two sons, rather than two daughters. When asked whether he would want his daughter to become a future president of Syria, he stated that running public affairs is a major responsibility and that he would not wish the role on any of his children.

Assassination attempts and death threats

The U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, Tom Barrack, warned of a possible assassination attempt against al-Sharaa due to his efforts to build ties with the West and promote inclusive governance. On 12 June 2025, L'Orient–Le Jour reported that al-Sharaa escaped two assassination attempts by jihadist groups for rejecting their ideology. On 27 June 2025, al-Sharaa was the target of a Hezbollah and ISIS-backed assassination attempt. It was planned to be carried out in the Daraa Governorate, but was foiled before it could be executed. However, the government denied reports of the assassination that was planned to be carried out in Daraa. On 16 July 2025, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel's Minister of National Security, publicly urged for al-Sharaa's assassination, referring to al-Sharaa as the "head of the snake" and stating that "the only thing that can be done is to eliminate al-Julani." On 10 November 2025, Syria thwarted two attempts on al-Sharaa's life by the Islamic State.

On 5 January 2026, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) claimed that Iran, along with additional "hostile elements", was planning to assassinate al-Sharaa.

On 12 February 2026, the United Nations and its secretary-general, António Guterres, said that al-Sharaa, along with Anas Khattab and Asaad al-Shaibani, were the targets of five foiled ISIL and Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah assassination attempts within the previous year on their lives. On 6 March 2026, Reuters reported that Turkey's National Intelligence Organization had asked Britain's MI6 the previous month to take a larger role in protecting al-Sharaa following recent assassination plots, highlighting foreign allies' efforts to support a country shaken by sporadic violence after the overthrow of president Bashar al-Assad. However, Turkey denied that its intelligence organization had made any such request.

Documentary

On 1 June 2021, PBS Frontline released a documentary, The Jihadist, investigating al-Sharaa's past in the context of the ongoing Syrian civil war. In the interview, reflecting on his past affiliation with al-Qaeda, on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Palestinian cause, al-Sharaa commented:The history of the region and what it went through over the past 20 or 30 years needs to be taken into consideration... We are talking about a region ruled by tyrants, by people who rule with iron fists and their security apparatuses. At the same time, this region is surrounded by numerous conflicts and wars... We can't take a segment of this history and say so-and-so joined Al Qaeda. There are thousands of people who joined Al Qaeda, but let us ask what was the reason behind these people joining Al Qaeda? That's the question. Are the U.S. policies after World War II toward the region partially responsibility for driving people towards Al Qaeda organization? And are the European policies in the region responsible for the reactions of people who sympathize with the Palestinian cause or with the way the Zionist regime deals with the Palestinians?... Are the broken and oppressed peoples who had to endure what happened in Iraq, for example, or in Afghanistan, are they responsible?... Our involvement with Al Qaeda in the past was an era, and it ended, and even at that time when we were with Al Qaeda, we were against external attacks, and it's completely against our policies to carry out external operations from Syria to target European or American people. This was not part of our calculations at all, and we did not do it at all.