Kurt D. Engelhardt

In this case, plaintiff Daniel Hill, a seaman employed by Hornbeck Offshore entities, sued for negligence and unseaworthiness after alleged injuries aboard vessels in 2008 and 2009, asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on agreements contained in electronic incentive contracts (restricted stock units and cash payments) that Hill had signed between 2007 and 2010. The court granted the motion, finding that the agreements were valid under the Federal Arbitration Act and Louisiana contract law, that the dispute fell within their scope, and that they were not part of an exempt seaman employment contract because acceptance was not a condition of continued employment. The court rejected arguments based on timeliness, electronic formation, and public policy, noting the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a dispute between North American Catastrophe Services, Inc. (NACS) and its insurer Northfield Insurance Company over whether Northfield had a duty to defend NACS in lawsuits alleging damages from formaldehyde exposure in emergency housing units procured for FEMA. NACS sought a declaratory judgment that Northfield must provide a defense under its commercial general liability policy, while Northfield argued that a total pollution exclusion barred coverage. The court determined that Florida law governs the insurance contract and that the pollution exclusion unambiguously applies to the claims of bodily injury from formaldehyde fumes. Accordingly, the court denied NACS's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Northfield's cross-motion, ruling that Northfield has no duty to defend.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case arose from claims by Mississippi plaintiffs who received emergency housing units from FEMA after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and alleged injuries from formaldehyde exposure in those units, suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence in providing, maintaining, and warning about the housing. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss all remaining FTCA claims by these plaintiffs for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that the FTCA requires the government's liability to be measured by the analogous liability of a private person under Mississippi law, where a statute abrogates tort liability for the gratuitous provision of emergency shelter to disaster victims, and FEMA's actions were deemed equivalent to such voluntary, non-contractual aid rather than a paid rental arrangement.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case involved plaintiff Battaglia suing Fluor Enterprises, Inc. and related entities for negligence and claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act after he fell through the floor of a FEMA travel trailer on two occasions in 2007, alleging that Fluor failed to properly install, inspect, maintain, or repair the trailer provided after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Fluor moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no ongoing duties after its contractual obligations ended on June 30, 2006, that its subcontractor’s installation did not involve the flooring, and that it was not a manufacturer under the LPLA. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims against Fluor. The core reasoning was that plaintiff presented no evidence of deficient installation or inspection that would have revealed the defect, Fluor had no responsibility for repairs or maintenance at the time of the falls, and plaintiff failed to show any basis for LPLA liability.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

In Hinson v. M/V Chimera, various plaintiffs who provided goods and services to the vessel between 2006 and 2007 sought partial summary judgment establishing maritime liens against the Chimera under the Maritime Commercial Instruments and Liens Act (MCILA), 46 U.S.C. § 31301 et seq., after they were not paid by Grande Rouge Charters, LLC (GRC). The district court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to liens for necessaries supplied on the order of the vessel owner or an authorized person. The core reasoning was that the key facts were undisputed, the statutory presumption of authority applied to GRC, and the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for lien creation, with any separate ownership disputes between GRC and other defendants not precluding the liens.

business & regulatoryproperty

This multi-district litigation involves individuals who lived in FEMA-provided emergency housing units (mobile homes) after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and allege injuries from high formaldehyde levels and inadequate warnings. The manufacturing defendants moved to dismiss the state tort claims under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards Act and HUD regulations expressly and impliedly preempt those claims under the Supremacy Clause. The court accepted the well-pleaded facts as true and examined the MHA's preemption provision (42 U.S.C. § 5403(d)), which bars non-identical state standards on the same aspects of construction or safety, along with related HUD Code sections on formaldehyde emissions and notices. It concluded that the federal scheme requires broad preemption to maintain uniform national standards and that allowing state common-law claims would conflict with that objective by imposing different substantive requirements. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs' claims against the manufacturers are preempted and subject to dismissal.

torts & liabilityfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Jenkins v. Aries Marine Corp., plaintiff Troy Jenkins, a rigger employed by Royal Eagle, sued vessel owners Aries and Noble for severe head injuries allegedly caused by a crane accident while working on a vessel, asserting claims under the Jones Act for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. Third-party defendant Royal Eagle moved for summary judgment, contending that Jenkins did not qualify as a seaman under binding Fifth Circuit precedent and that he had withheld material information about prior head injuries, which would bar recovery of maintenance and cure. The court denied the motion in full, reaffirming its earlier ruling that Jenkins was a seaman and finding genuine factual disputes over whether any prior injuries were connected to the current claims or intentionally concealed, precluding judgment as a matter of law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Allied Van Lines and Transguard Insurance suing Fairfield Insurance for breach of contract and statutory bad faith penalties, alleging that Fairfield failed to pay benefits under a worker's compensation policy for an injured worker hired by an Allied contractor, which forced Allied and Transguard to defend and settle an underlying tort suit. Fairfield moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the claims were barred by Louisiana res judicata because the parties had previously litigated the coverage issue and entered a joint dismissal in the prior case. The court denied the motion, holding that the earlier joint dismissal order was without prejudice and therefore not a final judgment for res judicata purposes, and that the identity-of-parties requirement was not met under state law.

business & regulatoryprocedurelabor & employment

This case involved claims by Hurricane Katrina and Rita victims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and contract theories, alleging harm from formaldehyde exposure in FEMA-provided emergency housing units such as travel trailers. The court addressed the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, focusing on whether the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred the claims. It concluded that FEMA's initial selection and deployment of the units amid the urgent post-disaster crisis involved protected policy judgments and thus could not be challenged. However, the court found that FEMA's later awareness of formaldehyde risks and its decision to delay or avoid remediation efforts fell outside that exception, allowing those aspects of the claims to proceed past the jurisdictional stage. The analysis applied precedents like Whisnant v. United States to distinguish discretionary policy decisions from subsequent operational responses.

federal powertorts & liabilityenvironment

This multidistrict litigation consolidated numerous lawsuits by Gulf Coast residents who lived in FEMA-provided travel trailers and manufactured homes after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, alleging health injuries from high levels of formaldehyde in those units. Newly added defendants who had not been named in any prior transferred actions moved to dismiss the Administrative Master Complaint. The court granted the motion under Rule 12(b)(1), holding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because the complaint did not match any individual plaintiff to any specific newly added defendant, and therefore no injury-in-fact traceable to those defendants had been shown. Dismissal was without prejudice, permitting plaintiffs an opportunity to seek leave to amend within set deadlines to cure the standing deficiency.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved H.H. White, L.L.C. suing Hanover Insurance Company and Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company for failing to pay under a commercial property insurance policy for damages to properties in New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina, including business interruption losses. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit as untimely under a Louisiana statute requiring suits for Katrina damages to be filed by August 30, 2007, or alternatively for summary judgment dismissing MBIC as not a proper party. The court denied the motion, reasoning that two related statutes should be read together to set a September 1, 2007 deadline for filing suits to avoid an absurd result where claims could be filed but suits barred, and that evidence of a payment check from MBIC raised a genuine issue precluding dismissal of that defendant.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a personal injury claim by Troy Jenkins, a rigger employed by Royal Eagle, who alleged he was struck by a crane hook while working on supply vessels chartered to service a drilling rig. Jenkins sued Aries Marine and Noble Drilling, prompting those defendants to seek contractual defense and indemnity from Royal Eagle under a chain of maritime indemnity agreements that included the Aries/Royal Eagle contract. The court granted summary judgment to Aries and Noble, holding that the indemnity provisions were enforceable. The core reasoning was that Jenkins qualified as a Jones Act seaman because he spent over 30 percent of his time on vessels owned by a common entity, rendering the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act's bar on certain indemnity agreements inapplicable.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a products liability suit by the wife and daughter of Justin Eschete against Eli Lilly and Company, claiming that the antidepressant Cymbalta caused his January 2005 suicide because the drug was defectively designed and because the manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings of a suicide risk under the Louisiana Products Liability Act. Eli Lilly moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no proof Eschete was still taking the drug at the time of his death and that the warning claim failed as a matter of law. The court denied the motion in part and granted it in part, ruling that the inadequate-warning claim could not proceed because the prescribing physician testified he would have prescribed Cymbalta even with a stronger warning, consistent with the learned intermediary doctrine.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case arose from a 2004 liftboat capsizing incident that injured an Expro employee working for Apache, after which A.M.C. settled the claim and sued Expro for contractual indemnity and defense costs under a 1995 Master Service Agreement between Apache and Expro. Expro moved for summary judgment, contending that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (LOIA) rendered the indemnity provision unenforceable. The court granted the motion and dismissed the claims, reasoning that the contract was non-maritime so LOIA applied and voided the indemnity, and that A.M.C.'s settlement prevented application of the Meloy exception allowing recovery of defense costs.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Louisiana homeowners who sued Allstate Insurance and their local agent after Hurricane Katrina damaged their property, alleging breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and related claims for failing to provide adequate coverage or advise on policy limits under their homeowner's policy. Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, arguing that the non-diverse agent had been improperly joined to defeat jurisdiction. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand, finding that the complaint stated viable state-law claims against the agent for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in procuring or increasing coverage, which provided a reasonable basis for potential liability and thus precluded a finding of improper joinder.

procedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In Tate v. Gusman, a pretrial detainee filed a pro se § 1983 complaint against Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff Marlin Gusman alleging exposure to inhumane conditions, including flooding, lack of food, water, medication, and supervision, as well as inadequate medical care while housed in the medical unit of Orleans Parish Prison during and after Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiff sought only punitive damages and conceded he suffered no physical injury, only stress and emotional harm. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The core reasoning was that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) bars federal prisoner suits for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical injury, and the allegations did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to medical needs.

criminal lawcivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Roshan Associates, Inc. sued defendants Motiva Enterprises LLC and Star Enterprise after they declined to renew petroleum marketing franchise agreements for a New Orleans service station upon expiration and offered to sell the property (excluding underground storage tanks) for $496,000 under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA). The plaintiff claimed violations of the PMPA and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA), seeking damages and reinstatement. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact. It held that the nonrenewal satisfied PMPA requirements because the sale decision was made in good faith without discriminatory motive and in the normal course of business as part of a revenue analysis, with a bona fide offer extended. The LUTPA claim was dismissed as preempted by the PMPA, which provides exclusive remedies for franchise nonrenewal disputes.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

In this case, Apex Oil Company sought reimbursement from the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for approximately $2.7 million in costs to clean up a 1995 slurry oil spill into the Mississippi River after its barges allided with a bridge during flood-stage currents. Apex appealed the National Pollution Fund Center's denial of its claim, arguing that the flood conditions and unpredictable currents qualified as an "act of God" defense under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, affirmed the denial, and dismissed the case, holding that Apex failed to prove the defense because the high river levels and strong currents were foreseeable based on known conditions, and corporate decisions regarding the tow configuration and route choice could have contributed to the incident. The Coast Guard's marine casualty report was deemed insufficient because it did not address issues of corporate liability or whether different decisions at the company level might have avoided the spill.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure