Frank Hoover Easterbrook

Clayton Creason sued his former employer, Elanco US Inc., under Indiana’s Wage Payment Statute after participating in its voluntary “vacation buy” program, which allowed employees with under four years of service to reduce their salary by roughly one week’s pay in exchange for a fourth week of paid leave; he claimed the arrangement was an invalid wage assignment lacking required written notice of rescission rights, and he also sought pay for unused COVID-era vacation rollover hours when he quit in 2021. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for Elanco. It first held that the home-state exception to CAFA jurisdiction applied but that Creason’s remand motion, filed nearly a year after removal and after substantial federal proceedings, was untimely. On the merits, the court ruled there was no “assignment” of wages because Elanco simply paid the lower base salary Creason had agreed to accept, with no deduction placed in escrow or sent to a third party, a conclusion supported by his tax records showing the reduced amount was not treated as income; it further held that Indiana law did not require payout of the unused rollover hours, which Elanco’s policy had expressly made non-compensable. Class certification was not moot but unnecessary given the outcome on the merits.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power

Jacqueline Stevens sued ICE under FOIA after the agency failed to timely respond to her requests for files on three immigration detainees. The district court found the agency's searches inadequate and its Vaughn index flawed, including unsupported exemption claims and errors suggesting bad faith by agency staff, and ordered full release of more than 2,000 pages without redactions as a sanction while the case continued. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that it failed to describe the required actions with the specificity demanded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). The court reasoned that although the agency's performance was deficient, ordering blanket disclosure bypassed statutory exemptions and risked exposing confidential information of third parties—such as Social Security numbers and law-enforcement data—without the judge reviewing the documents or considering alternatives like referral to a magistrate. The case was remanded for the district court to reassess the sanction and limit any required releases to information the agency could properly waive.

immigrationprocedure

Jacqueline Stevens filed a FOIA lawsuit against ICE after the agency failed to timely respond to her requests for files on three immigration detainees. The district court, frustrated with the agency's inadequate searches, flawed Vaughn index, and repeated errors in asserting exemptions, sanctioned ICE by ordering the unredacted release of over 2,000 pages of documents without reviewing them for valid statutory exemptions. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case, holding that the order was too vague to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and that the blanket disclosure sanction was an abuse of discretion because it exposed third parties' confidential information, such as Social Security numbers and law-enforcement data, to potential harm without justification. The court reasoned that agency mismanagement, even if sanctionable, does not permit bypassing exemptions that protect non-parties and that the district judge should have considered alternatives like review by a magistrate judge.

immigrationprocedure

The case involved a dispute between a Chicago hotel and a union over the firing of an employee who displayed a knife at work, prompting a co-worker to feel threatened. After the union grieved the termination under the collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator selected by random.org from a contractually designated list found that the conduct warranted only a ten-day unpaid suspension, not discharge, and ordered reinstatement with partial back pay. The hotel refused to participate in that arbitration or comply with the award, leading the district court to compel arbitration and later confirm the award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the agreement’s specified random-selection method had to be followed under 9 U.S.C. §5 with no qualifying “lapse,” that courts cannot overturn an arbitrator’s factual findings, and that Illinois public policy against workplace violence does not bar enforcement because it does not dictate how employers must respond to such incidents.

labor & employmentprocedure

In David Watts v. Kevin Jones, an inmate at a Wisconsin prison sued two detectives under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging they violated his constitutional rights by approaching his cell during a murder investigation in a manner that could have led other inmates to suspect he was cooperating with law enforcement, thereby exposing him to risk of harm (though he suffered only alleged harassment and no physical injury). The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. The court reasoned that qualified immunity applied because no clearly established law at the time showed that prison officials or detectives could be liable in damages for creating a risk of harm to an inmate that never materialized into physical injury, distinguishing precedents like Farmer v. Brennan (which involved actual harm) and Monfils v. Taylor (which involved a resulting death after a confidentiality breach). The opinion also noted that 42 U.S.C. §1997e(e) limits recovery for emotional injuries absent physical harm and that the mere exposure to risk does not violate the Constitution.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

Sarah Hinkes sued her employer, Sunera Technologies, and two coworkers for federal employment discrimination, but the district court stayed the case for arbitration. After the arbitrator ruled for the defendants, Hinkes sought to vacate the award, the district court confirmed it, and she appealed. The Seventh Circuit first addressed jurisdiction, holding that federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 existed because the original suit arose under federal law and continued to support confirmation proceedings. On the merits, the court affirmed confirmation, ruling that 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3) permits vacatur only for arbitrator misconduct such as refusing to hear pertinent evidence, not for admitting hearsay, undisclosed evidence, or otherwise departing from court-like procedures, which arbitration is not required to follow.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned Adam Blocker’s appeal from his guilty plea to federal child-pornography charges. He argued that the district court should have suppressed evidence found on his Dropbox account because the company’s detection and report of the material to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children amounted to an unconstitutional search by a government agent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that Dropbox remained a private actor whose actions were not fairly attributable to the government. The court reasoned that Dropbox examined the files pursuant to its own terms of service and business policies rather than any governmental directive, and that those terms validly authorized the company to inspect and disclose the content. It therefore concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to Dropbox’s conduct.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In United States v. Erlin Lucero-Asencio, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy and substantive offenses involving methamphetamine distribution, money laundering conspiracy, and illegal reentry after deportation. The district court sentenced him to 324 months in prison after holding him responsible for about 4.5 kilograms of pure methamphetamine and imposing a $500 fine. On appeal, Lucero-Asencio challenged the drug quantity and purity finding as unsupported by evidence in the record and argued that the court had ignored his financial situation when setting the fine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, ruling that the defendant had waived any objection to the purity determination by explicitly agreeing at sentencing to an offense level of 38, which depended on that finding. The court further noted that the fine had been addressed at sentencing and that, even under plain-error review, the defendant had not shown prejudice from the lack of lab-report evidence.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedure

The case arose from a 2022 incident in which Kenosha police officer Shawn Guetschow, working as a school security officer, intervened in a fight between two sixth-graders in a cafeteria, took plaintiff J.P. to the ground, placed a knee on her neck, and handcuffed her; J.P. and her parent sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied Guetschow’s motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, finding genuine disputes of material fact, and he appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the appeal turned on unresolved factual questions—such as whether and when J.P. stopped resisting and whether Guetschow continued applying force after any resistance ended—rather than on purely legal issues. The court further concluded that the available video footage was too limited and unclear to resolve those disputes as a matter of law under precedents like Scott v. Harris.

civil rightsprocedure

In Rashaan Carter v. SP Plus Corporation, an employee sued his employer under state and federal minimum-wage laws, and the employer sought to compel arbitration based on a checked box and electronic signature in an onboarding form. The district court initially stayed the case for arbitration but later lifted the stay after Carter submitted an affidavit stating that an HR staff member had completed and signed the arbitration agreement on his behalf without his knowledge or consent. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s order denying arbitration was appealable because SP Plus had forfeited any right to an evidentiary hearing by failing to request one or present contrary evidence in the district court. The court affirmed the denial, concluding that the evidence did not establish a valid agreement to arbitrate and that no federal policy favors enforcing arbitration agreements more strictly than other contracts.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, Daniel Hewitt and Lynne Thompson sued Capital One for breach of contract after the bank resigned as custodian of their IRAs and transferred the funds to Inspira Financial Trust, which placed them by default in a low-yield (0.02%) sweeps account based on bank deposits; the plaintiffs alleged that Capital One violated an implied duty of good faith by selecting a successor offering such poor returns compared to their prior investments. The district court dismissed the claims against Capital One on the merits, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Capital One fully complied with the contract, which expressly allowed resignation after 30 days’ notice and selection of any successor custodian in its sole discretion. Even assuming a good-faith duty applied, Capital One did not breach it, because it gave plaintiffs ample opportunity to choose a different custodian or investment vehicle, used a standard low-risk sweeps account as a default, and did not limit their ability to redirect the funds afterward.

business & regulatory

William Walls, civilly committed by Illinois as a sexually violent person after a 2015 trial, sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254. He principally argued that his custody rested on the improper use of compelled statements from a prison sex-offender treatment program. The district court dismissed the petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the filing was an unauthorized successive challenge to the 2015 commitment order under §2244(b), and that any attempt to contest the 2018 recommitment order failed because Walls had not raised or preserved federal claims in state court, resulting in procedural default and non-exhaustion. The opinion noted the protracted state-court delays but concluded they did not alter the procedural bars.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned Asucena Velazquez-Olais, who was removed to Mexico in 2018 under a Final Administrative Removal Order after a state drug conviction and later sought to reopen that order after a state court reduced the conviction to simple possession. She petitioned the Seventh Circuit for review of an email from a Chicago DHS officer declining to revisit the 2018 order. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the email was not a “final order of removal” reviewable under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a). The 2018 order had already been executed and was not reinstated, while a new removal process had begun via a Notice to Appear in which Velazquez-Olais could raise her arguments.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Kenneth Karwacki, who was convicted by a military court martial of delivering peyote (classified as a misdemeanor by the military but equivalent to a Class E felony in Wisconsin) and later denied a concealed-carry permit under Wis. Stat. §941.29(1m)(b), which bars firearm possession by anyone convicted elsewhere of an offense that would be a felony if committed in the state. Karwacki sued Wisconsin’s Attorney General, arguing that treating his military conviction as a felony violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and infringed his Second Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the state, reasoning that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to federal military judgments and does not bar states from determining the domestic civil consequences of out-of-jurisdiction convictions, while the firearm restriction was valid both on its face (under recent circuit precedent) and as applied to a drug-distribution offense due to the established link between such crimes and violence.

gunscriminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

In United States v. Glen Prince, the government charged defendant Glen Prince under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) with being a felon in possession of a firearm after his arrest with a loaded gun on public transit, following prior convictions for armed robbery and aggravated battery; the district court dismissed the indictment, holding that the statute is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reversed that dismissal on appeal. The court reasoned that Supreme Court decisions in Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and Rahimi have consistently upheld longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons as consistent with the Second Amendment, and that every other circuit to address the issue post-Bruen has likewise concluded the statute has valid applications and cannot be invalidated on its face. The panel reserved judgment on potential as-applied challenges by individuals whose felony convictions do not indicate danger but found no basis for a facial challenge here.

gunscriminal law

Julius Robinson, convicted of murders committed during drug offenses and originally sentenced to death (later commuted to life), filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241 in the Southern District of Indiana after his direct appeal and §2255 motion in the Northern District of Texas were denied, along with requests for further review. He raised five claims, including lack of jurisdiction due to an allegedly deficient indictment, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The district court dismissed the petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that §2255(e) bars resort to §2241 because the remedy under §2255 is neither inadequate nor ineffective. Relying on Jones v. Hendrix, the court reasoned that the sentencing court remains available for any permissible claims under §2255(h), Robinson's arguments (including those framed as jurisdictional) do not qualify as "unusual circumstances" allowing §2241, and the Suspension Clause does not require additional review beyond the writ's historical scope.

criminal lawprocedure

Five Indian citizens on F-1 student visas who enrolled in optional practical training (OPT) programs sued the Department of Homeland Security under the Administrative Procedure Act after airport officials revoked their visas upon reentry and ordered expedited removal for four of them, based on findings that the plaintiffs had misused the OPT program. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(A)(i) bars judicial review of claims arising from or relating to expedited removal orders issued under §1225(b)(1), and that the plaintiffs could not evade this bar by challenging only the antecedent OPT determinations that led to the visa revocations. It further reasoned that those administrative findings were not final agency action reviewable under the APA, as they were merely intermediate steps toward the removal orders rather than terminal events determining rights.

immigrationprocedure

Mitchell Green was charged in Wisconsin state court with child trafficking and related offenses. During his jury trial, after his cousin testified as an alternative perpetrator without prior notice, the trial judge declared a mistrial over Green’s objection, finding the lack of pretrial notice incurable. After state courts upheld the mistrial as manifestly necessary, Green sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2241, arguing that retrial would violate double jeopardy. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of relief and ordered an unconditional writ, holding that no manifest necessity existed because the witness had been disclosed months earlier, the state failed to seek timely rulings or hearings, the testimony was later ruled admissible, and less drastic alternatives such as a curative instruction or brief continuance were available.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case arose from competing warehouse and infrastructure projects in Illinois’ Joliet Intermodal Zone. CenterPoint Properties had an agreement with local governments to build a toll bridge and limit heavy-truck traffic on certain roads; East Gate later obtained permission from Joliet to allow such traffic on a restricted road, prompting CenterPoint to sue in state court to block that permission. East Gate then filed a federal antitrust suit alleging that CenterPoint’s agreement unlawfully restrained competition, but the district court stayed the federal case under the Colorado River doctrine while rejecting CenterPoint’s arguments for dismissal under Rooker-Feldman and Noerr-Pennington. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the stay was merely a timing order that left the federal antitrust claims to be resolved in federal court and that denials of motions to dismiss are not immediately appealable. It reasoned that, unlike true Colorado River abstention that ends federal litigation over a limited resource, this stay did not finally resolve any claim or create appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

The case arose from competing warehouse development projects in Illinois' Joliet Intermodal Zone. CenterPoint had an earlier agreement with local governments allowing it to collect tolls on a new bridge in exchange for restricting heavy truck traffic on other roads, while East Gate later secured a deal permitting such traffic on a restricted road; CenterPoint obtained a state-court preliminary injunction blocking that deal, prompting East Gate to sue in federal court alleging antitrust violations. The district court rejected CenterPoint's arguments for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Noerr-Pennington doctrine but stayed the federal case, citing Colorado River abstention to await state-court resolution of related issues. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the stay was a non-appealable interlocutory case-management order rather than a final disposition, and that denials of the motions to dismiss were likewise not immediately reviewable.

business & regulatoryprocedure