This case involves the SEC's civil enforcement action against George David Gordon alleging violations of federal securities laws through a 'pump and dump' scheme involving three target stocks, including false statements, manipulative trading, and unregistered sales. Gordon had previously been convicted on 23 counts in a related criminal prosecution for conspiracy, wire fraud, securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and other offenses based on the same conduct. The court granted the SEC's motion for summary judgment, holding that collateral estoppel barred Gordon from relitigating the factual and legal issues decided in the criminal case because those issues were identical, Gordon had a full opportunity to litigate them, and the criminal judgment was final. The court found complete overlap between the civil claims and the criminal convictions, including the elements of the securities fraud violations, and rejected Gordon's arguments that the issues differed or that he lacked a fair opportunity to defend himself.
This case concerned a products liability suit by plaintiffs Brian and Suzanne Howard against medical device manufacturers, alleging that a knee implant (the Sulzer Natural Knee II Tibial Baseplate) failed due to manufacturing residue left from changes in the production process, causing pain, inflammation, bone loss, and the need for revision surgery. The plaintiffs asserted a negligence per se claim based on alleged violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and its Medical Device Amendments (MDA) good manufacturing practices. The court granted the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment on the negligence per se claim and deemed the plaintiffs' counter-motion moot, dismissing the remaining derivative claims for medical monitoring and loss of consortium. The core reasoning was that the FDCA was intended to protect the public at large rather than any specific class of individuals, so the plaintiffs could not use it as the basis for a negligence per se action under Oklahoma law, and there is no private right of action under the statute.
In Brown v. Eppler, a pro se plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority and several employees, along with their attorneys, alleging violations of his equal protection and due process rights under the U.S. Constitution, as well as related federal civil rights statutes and state law, stemming from his permanent ban from using MTTA buses following an incident. The district court had previously granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed most claims. Plaintiff then filed multiple post-judgment motions seeking a new trial or reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), sanctions for alleged perjury, and recognition of additional claims such as retaliation. The court denied all motions, holding that they failed to identify an intervening change in law, newly available evidence, or clear error in the prior ruling, and instead largely reargued issues already decided or raised untimely new arguments.
In Brown v. Eppler, a pro se plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority and its employees, alleging that his temporary and permanent bans from riding municipal buses violated his equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims after dismissing others earlier. It reasoned that the plaintiff lacked a protected property interest in unrestricted bus access, that any claimed right to process alone did not create such an interest, and that he presented insufficient evidence of racial discrimination or disparate treatment to support an equal protection claim.
The case involved Dr. Henry T. Wittenberg, a Medicaid provider in Oklahoma, who sued Innovative Resource Group, LLC (APS) and its employees after they conducted a peer review of his patient records under a contract with the Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA), identified deficiencies, and recommended a corrective action plan. Dr. Wittenberg alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and tortious interference with his OHCA contract. The court granted the APS Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that they were not state actors subject to suit under § 1983 because peer review organizations performing Medicaid quality control functions, even under state contract, do not act under color of state law. The court relied on precedents establishing that such entities are private actors and rejected arguments that statutory provisions or the nature of the Medicaid program transformed their conduct into state action.
The case involved Jeffrey Stillwell, a licensed wrecker operator in Skiatook, Oklahoma, who was removed from the local police department's rotation log for providing towing services after an incident in which he confronted officers about his son's arrest for underage drinking and subsequently followed and harassed an officer. Stillwell sued the police chief and town under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the removal violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because the notice did not strictly comply with the 10-day written notice and other requirements of Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 952(C), and he also raised related state-law claims under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Stillwell received adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process and that state-law claims were barred by statutory exemptions. The court analyzed the federal constitutional claim separately from any state statutory requirements and addressed immunity defenses and jurisdictional issues for the state claims.
