Allyson Kay Duncan

In United States v. Malloy, the defendant, a 33-year-old man, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) for producing a videotape depicting himself and another adult engaging in sexual activity with a 14-year-old girl, with the visual depiction using materials transported in interstate commerce. Malloy appealed, arguing that the statute exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority, that it should be interpreted to include a reasonable mistake-of-age defense, and that his 15-year mandatory minimum sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the production of child pornography is part of an economic class of activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce, that the statute does not require a mistake-of-age defense given its purpose to protect minors, and that Eighth Amendment proportionality review does not apply to sentences less than life without parole.

criminal lawfederal power

This case involves the conviction of defendant Moose for trafficking in cocaine based on evidence obtained from a search of his business premises. The police obtained a search warrant relying on information from a first-time informant whose details were verified, and during the search, the defendant directed officers to the location of nearly a kilogram of cocaine. On appeal, the defendant challenged the nondisclosure of the informant's identity, certain jury instructions, and other procedural aspects of the trial. The court found no violations of his constitutional rights or errors in the proceedings, reasoning that the informant was merely a tipster not entitled to disclosure and that the trial court's rulings were proper. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and sentence of thirty-five years imprisonment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Atlantic Tobacco Co. could pierce the corporate veil of two insolvent companies, Honeycutt Truck Stop, Inc. and Hassman Enterprises, Inc., to hold Joseph and Barbara Honeycutt personally liable for unpaid debts. The trial court had directed verdicts for both defendants, but the appeals court held that the directed verdict was proper only as to Barbara Honeycutt because the evidence showed no domination or control by her over the corporations. As to Joseph Honeycutt, who was president and sole shareholder, the court found sufficient evidence of complete control, commingling of corporate funds to pay personal mortgages, and resulting depletion of assets available to creditors, so the claim should have gone to the jury under the mere instrumentality rule. The judgment was therefore affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved William Shaffner, a long-term Westinghouse employee who sustained a back injury while lifting a motor at work in April 1987, filed a workers' compensation claim, and was later terminated in June 1987 for alleged misrepresentation regarding the extent of his disability after the company learned he had attended an amusement park. Shaffner sued for wrongful discharge, claiming retaliation for instituting the workers' compensation proceeding in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-6.1. The jury found in favor of the employer, determining that the termination was not because of the claim, and the trial court denied Shaffner's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that there was no close temporal connection between the claim and the firing, that the employer challenged the extent rather than the fact of the disability, and that the evidence supported the jury's verdict when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant.

labor & employment

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by an employee of Duke University Medical Center who suffered a back injury on the job in 1986 and sought temporary total disability benefits. The employer appealed the Industrial Commission's award, arguing there was insufficient evidence that the employee could earn no wages, that findings on the extent and permanency of disability were inadequate, and that the findings did not support the benefits conclusion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award, holding that the Commission had exclusive fact-finding authority and that competent evidence from physicians, a vocational counselor, a supervisor, and the employee himself supported the finding of total wage-earning incapacity caused by the injury. The court further reasoned that the Commission properly applied the burden of proof and that no specific termination date was required for temporary total disability benefits given the uncertain duration of such claims.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs suing a hospital, doctors, and an anesthesiologist for medical malpractice, alleging negligence in recommending and administering electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) that caused hip fractures, along with related failures in documentation, advice, and precautions; a spouse also claimed loss of consortium. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital and later dismissed the remaining claims against other defendants for failure to prosecute after the plaintiffs refused to proceed to trial. The appeals court affirmed both rulings, holding that the interlocutory appeal from the partial summary judgment did not stay the other claims and that the hospital's conduct was not a proximate cause of the injuries because the treating physicians already knew of the patient's pain complaints from direct communications. The court also determined that the issues against each defendant were severable, supporting the dismissal under procedural rules.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved Triad Bank seeking deficiency judgments against James Elliott after repossessing and auctioning two luxury cars that secured his installment promissory notes, following his failure to return the vehicles to North Carolina or make payments after September 1987. Elliott raised defenses including improper debits from his accounts, inadequate notice of sale, and errors in the sale process, along with counterclaims for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank, and the appellate court affirmed that ruling, finding no material factual disputes on default or compliance with UCC requirements for notice and commercial reasonableness of the sale under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-9-601. However, the court remanded the case because the trial judge had not ruled on Elliott's counterclaims. The core reasoning centered on Elliott's concession of nonpayment, the substantial accuracy of sale notices, and the bank's adherence to statutory procedures despite minor discrepancies.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In State v. Gallagher, the defendant was convicted of first-degree rape and felonious breaking or entering based on the victim's identification, with conflicting alibi testimony from coworkers and no physical evidence linking him to the crimes. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's rulings allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about details of his prior convictions beyond the time, place, and punishment, including questions about arrests, running from officers, and circumstances of dismissed charges. The court held that these inquiries exceeded the proper scope for impeachment under Rule 609 and related precedent, and because the case turned on credibility with inconclusive forensic evidence and disputed timelines, the errors were prejudicial under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a). The judgments were therefore reversed, and the defendant was granted a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Linwood Roger Riggs, who was convicted of breaking or entering a motor vehicle and felonious larceny based on evidence that he and others stole wine from a parked truck. The court affirmed the convictions and denied the defendant's motion for appropriate relief on grounds of newly discovered evidence. The court reasoned that the date variance between the indictment and the trial evidence was not prejudicial because the defense was not deprived of an opportunity to present its case, that no probable cause hearing was required after the indictment issued, and that the new evidence from a codefendant's trial was cumulative and did not satisfy the criteria for a new trial due to lack of demonstrated due diligence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James Darrell Faircloth, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree rape and taking indecent liberties with his 13-year-old stepdaughter, A.G. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of testimony regarding two prior alleged sexual assaults by him on the victim and expert testimony about hair samples found at the scene. The court decided that the prior acts evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) as relevant to show a common scheme or plan in sexual offense cases, citing State v. Coffey, and that the defendant waived his objection to the expert testimony by failing to move to strike the improper portions. The reasoning for the prior acts focused on their probative value to the charged incident despite their prejudicial effect, while the hair microscopy testimony was deemed to improperly express an opinion on guilt but was not preserved for review under evidentiary rules and appellate procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned defendant Glenn Williams's convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, stemming from an armed robbery attempt at an oil company that left the victim wounded. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's jury instructions on identity of the perpetrator, the weight of evidence, and evaluation of police testimony, as well as the sentencing process. The court upheld the convictions, finding the instructions adequate and supported by the evidence and law. It remanded for resentencing, however, after determining that the trial judge had improperly treated the defendant's refusal to express remorse—tied to his exercise of the right against self-incrimination—as a nonstatutory aggravating factor warranting the maximum sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

In this equitable distribution action following divorce, the court addressed whether a house built during the marriage using proceeds from selling a shrimp boat constructed by the husband before the marriage was marital or separate property. The trial judge had classified the home as marital and ordered equal interests for the parties, with the wife receiving $21,000 for her share. The appellate court reversed, holding the house to be the husband's separate property. Under the source-of-funds doctrine, the boat was the husband's pre-marital separate asset, so its sale proceeds and the resulting home retained that status; there was no evidence of a gift or titling by the entirety that would convert it to marital property, and no requirement existed to declare an intent for it to remain separate.

family lawproperty

The case involved a defendant convicted of two counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property and one count of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury after shots were fired into apartments at 3606 and 3608 Jonquil Street, injuring a three-year-old child. The defendant argued that prosecuting two discharging counts violated double jeopardy because the apartments were in the same building and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. The court held that the two counts did not violate double jeopardy under the same-evidence test, as each required proof that bullets penetrated a different occupied dwelling with knowledge of occupancy. The court also upheld the sufficiency of the evidence, including eyewitness identification, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state.

criminal lawguns