This case is a Fair Labor Standards Act collective action brought by a former part-time retail sales consultant against Cingular Wireless, alleging that the company's policy of delaying payment for "exception time" hours beyond an employee's standard 19-hour schedule violated minimum wage requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 206 and related record-keeping rules. The plaintiff sought conditional class certification for similarly situated employees, claiming that unverified exception hours often resulted in paychecks covering only regular hours and thus sub-minimum wages for weeks with extra scheduled time. The court conducted an independent review of the record, statutory law, and objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. It adopted the factual background, party arguments, and applicable law sections, declined to adopt the minimum wage violation analysis, and adopted the record-keeping violation conclusion on alternative grounds.
The case involved a black female nurse who sued Dauterive Hospital and its parent company HCA for racial discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and defamation under Title VII, Louisiana employment discrimination law, and the state whistleblower statute, alleging events such as demotion from charge nurse, unequal raises, understaffing, hostile conduct by coworkers after an EEOC filing, denial of transfer, and constructive discharge. The court granted HCA's motion for summary judgment in full and dismissed all claims against it with prejudice, reasoning that HCA was not the plaintiff's employer. As to Dauterive, the court granted summary judgment in part by dismissing the Title VII claims as prescribed and certain state claims for lack of notice in the pleadings, while denying it in part and allowing remaining retaliation and defamation claims to proceed on the basis that the plaintiff had raised genuine issues of material fact regarding adverse employment actions and causation under the applicable standards.
The case concerned a worker who suffered injuries in two separate accidents while employed by drilling companies, first as a crane operator on a barge in 2006 and later as a galley hand on a land-based rig in 2007; he sued under the Jones Act for both incidents. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was not a Jones Act seaman at the time of the second accident and thus limited to Louisiana workers' compensation remedies. The court denied the motion, holding that material factual disputes existed about whether the reassignment from barge work to land operations was permanent and whether the plaintiff maintained a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation. These issues, including inferences from medical releases, employer statements, and the temporary nature of the land assignment, precluded summary judgment and required jury resolution under Chandris v. Latsis standards.
In Robertson v. W & T Offshore, Inc., the plaintiff sued W & T Offshore and Baker/MO Services for personal injuries allegedly caused by negligence on an offshore oil platform, claiming damages under tort law. W & T argued it was immune from suit because the plaintiff was its borrowed employee under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), made applicable by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, while Baker contended it was similarly immune as the nominal employer of a supervisor who was also a borrowed employee of W & T, making the two co-employees. The plaintiff opposed summary judgment by asserting genuine issues of material fact regarding control and borrowed-employee status but offered no specific evidence. The court granted both defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing all claims with prejudice, after finding that undisputed facts established borrowed-employee status for both the plaintiff and the supervisor, triggering the LHWCA's exclusive-remedy provisions and resulting tort immunity.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued Stryker Orthopaedics, alleging damages from a recalled hip replacement device used in his 2004 surgery that required revision surgery in 2008. The plaintiff asserted claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act and for redhibition based on alleged defects in the device. The court dismissed both sets of claims with prejudice. It adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss the LPLA claims but rejected the recommendation to allow the redhibition claim to proceed, holding that the redhibition claim was preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 under the Supreme Court's decision in Riegel v. Medtronic because the device had received premarket approval from the FDA.
This case is an appeal from two identical bankruptcy court orders entered on April 15, 2009, that denied motions for summary judgment in adversary proceedings arising from the Chapter 7 bankruptcies of Sunnyside Land, LLC and Sunnyside Timber, LLC. The underlying disputes center on a 2005 court-approved sale of Utah property and timber under 11 U.S.C. § 363, a settlement term sheet, credit bids by SCO, and post-sale claims of fraud or misconduct potentially implicating Rule 60(b)(3) relief. The district court first addresses the appellants' motions for leave to appeal the interlocutory orders, adopts the bankruptcy court's factual findings, and examines the applicability of the one-year limitations period under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and (c) as incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 9024, along with standards for granting interlocutory review. The court notes the absence of controlling Fifth Circuit precedent and consults persuasive authority from other districts and circuits.
In Little v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., a former Chevron employee sued his homeowners and umbrella insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, and related claims after USAA denied coverage for a lawsuit filed by Chevron alleging breach of employment agreements. The plaintiff argued that the Chevron suit amounted to malicious prosecution, which was covered as "personal injury" caused by an "occurrence" under the policies. The court granted USAA's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding that the underlying allegations did not trigger coverage obligations. The decision was based on the policy terms and applicable state law regarding insurance coverage and malicious prosecution claims.
This case concerns the death of Alan Bross, a contractor employee providing supervisory diving services on Chevron's offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico, who fell about 20 feet from the cellar deck of the damaged Zulu structure and died from a skull fracture after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Chevron moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' tort claims, contending that any hole in the platform was an open and obvious condition imposing no duty to warn or repair, or that it had adequately warned Bross not to board the inactive platform. The court denied the motion in full, holding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to how the fall occurred—whether through an open hole or defective grating—and whether any warning was given. Under Louisiana negligence and comparative fault principles, summary judgment is precluded when such factual disputes remain unresolved regarding the duty element.
This case was a putative class action brought by business owners against oil and drilling companies for purely economic damages, including lost business and opportunity, after an oil well blowout in Iberville Parish closed Interstate 10 in 2007. The plaintiffs asserted claims under Louisiana tort law and Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The court granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions and dismissed all claims with prejudice, affirming the magistrate judge's recommendations. It held that the economic loss rule under Louisiana law bars recovery for negligent acts causing only economic harm absent a contractual relationship or physical damage to the plaintiffs' property, and that no viable claim existed under Article 667.
The case concerned an appeal by Automotive Leasing Specialists, L.L.C. from a bankruptcy court order confirming debtor Ida Little's Chapter 13 plan, with the sole issue being whether the parties' Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement for a 1998 Ford Mustang created a true lease or a security interest under Louisiana law. The district court examined the agreement's terms, including a $206 purchase option at the end of the lease term, an early termination formula, and a clause declaring it a "true lease," against La. Rev. Stat. § 10:1-203, which distinguishes leases from security interests when a lessee can become owner for nominal consideration. The court noted that ALS conceded the purchase option price was nominal and applied the statutory factors, such as the reasonably predictable fair market value at the time of contracting, to resolve whether the transaction was a financed lease creating a security interest. The bankruptcy court's treatment of the agreement as a secured transaction in the confirmed plan followed from this analysis.
In this case, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission sued UForex Consulting, LLC, Paulo Correa, and Mario Garcia under the Commodity Exchange Act, alleging that the defendants operated a fraudulent scheme involving the solicitation of investments for trading over-the-counter foreign currency futures contracts. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the transactions were spot contracts rather than futures contracts, placing them outside the CFTC's jurisdiction under the Act. The court examined the contractual terms, including provisions for rollover, margin requirements, and lack of standardized exchange trading or physical delivery options, to determine whether the deals qualified as contracts for future delivery. Applying precedents distinguishing futures from spot transactions, the court concluded that the agreements did not meet the criteria for futures contracts and therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants on the jurisdictional issue.
In Haymon v. Union Pacific Railroad, plaintiff Eddie Haymon sued Union Pacific under the Federal Employers' Liability Act after sustaining injuries while working on UP railroad tracks as a W.T. Byler employee assigned to a maintenance crew. Haymon alleged he was a "borrowed employee" of UP at the time, based on a UP supervisor directing his tasks such as operating equipment and assisting with materials. UP moved for summary judgment, arguing the contract with Byler established independent contractor status and that the nine borrowed-employee factors weighed against FELA liability. The court denied the motion, finding that issues of material fact existed regarding control, the nature of the work performed, and other factors that could establish borrowed-employee status under FELA.
The case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by Hector Ovalle challenging his 1994 in absentia deportation order to Guatemala and his 2007 removal, on grounds that he received no notice of the proceedings in violation of due process and that he was eligible to adjust status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen after filing a motion to reopen. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The core reasoning is that the REAL ID Act of 2005 made a petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of removal orders, barring habeas corpus challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, with the amendments applying retroactively regardless of when the removal order was issued.
This case arose from a labor dispute between PHI, Inc. and unions representing its pilots under the Railway Labor Act, involving claims of bad faith bargaining by the unions and a subsequent strike by the pilots. In a counterclaim, the unions alleged that PHI violated Louisiana wage law (La. Rev. Stat. § 23:631) by making unauthorized deductions from the pilots' final paychecks after the strike, when PHI coded them as permanently replaced. PHI moved to dismiss this claim, contending that the pilots were not discharged or otherwise entitled to the withheld amounts under the statute. The court denied the motion, holding that unresolved factual questions about the pilots' employment status, the company's vacation and benefits policies, and the applicability of the state statute prevented dismissal as a matter of law.
The case concerns contractual indemnification and insurance obligations under a Master Service Agreement between OCS and Unocal in the oil and gas sector, with OCS and Simmons seeking to enforce defense and indemnity duties against subcontractor PMI and its insurer Lexington following an underlying personal injury claim. On the motion for summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that PMI had a duty to defend OCS and Simmons based on the MSA's broad indemnity provisions and additional insured requirements. The core reasoning applied Texas contract law to interpret the reciprocal indemnity clauses as encompassing claims of negligence, required waiver of subrogation, and allowed recovery of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the duty to defend under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001, while deferring determination of specific fee amounts pending further submissions.
This case involves a surety company's action against a construction firm and its principals under a Master Surety Agreement for indemnification of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against subcontractor claims and arbitration on bonded projects. The defendants filed a third-party complaint against the surety's separate counsel, alleging claims arising from that representation. The court granted the surety's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the defendants could not prove any set of facts entitling them to relief against the attorneys. The ruling rested on the absence of any viable legal theory connecting the third-party defendants' conduct to recoverable damages from the defendants in the underlying indemnity dispute.
The case involved plaintiffs Francis and Kate Bladen suing manufacturers C.B. Fleet Holding Co. and C.B. Fleet Company for injuries Mr. Bladen allegedly suffered from ingesting Fleet Phosphosoda prior to a medical procedure, which they claimed caused acute renal failure due to inadequate warnings and other defects. Plaintiffs asserted a claim under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) along with additional counts for unjust enrichment, violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA), and fraud. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the non-LPLA counts, ruling that the LPLA supplies the exclusive remedy for product-related damages in Louisiana and therefore precludes recovery under other theories such as LUTPA. The decision rested on the statute's text establishing exclusivity and precedents confirming that it codifies and limits products liability claims.