Michael Yale Scudder jr

In United States v. Fernando D. Bolden, the defendant, a convicted felon, was charged with federal firearms offenses after Milwaukee police executed a search warrant at a residence and recovered guns, ammunition, fentanyl, cocaine, and cash. Bolden conditionally pleaded guilty but preserved his challenge to the warrant, arguing it lacked probable cause to connect him to the address and contained material misrepresentations or omissions in the supporting affidavit. The district court found probable cause questionable but upheld the search under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The appeals court held that the officers reasonably relied on the warrant issued by a neutral judge, as the affidavit established Bolden’s access to the home through surveillance showing him entering while armed, and any minor inaccuracies or omitted details did not demonstrate reckless or deliberate falsehoods that would negate good faith.

gunscriminal lawprocedure

In City of Chicago v. Ahmed Alayah (consolidated with a related case), two below-median-income debtors filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions and proposed three-year repayment plans that allocated funds to pay their attorneys’ fees (priority claims) before or alongside distributions to nonpriority unsecured creditors such as the City, which held claims for unpaid fines. The City objected to plan confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), arguing that the statute required all projected disposable income to go exclusively to unsecured creditors and that attorneys could not receive payments without filing proofs of claim. The bankruptcy court overruled the objections and confirmed the plans, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that other Code provisions—particularly §§ 1322(a)(2) and 1326(b)(1)—expressly require plans to pay priority administrative expenses such as reasonable attorneys’ fees before or concurrently with payments to other creditors, and that the 2005 BAPCPA amendment to § 1325(b)(1)(B) did not alter this longstanding practice or preclude attorneys from qualifying as unsecured creditors entitled to receive projected disposable income.

procedurefederal power

In City of Chicago v. Stephen Falkner, two Chapter 13 debtors proposed three-year repayment plans that allocated funds to pay their bankruptcy attorneys’ fees (a priority administrative expense) before or alongside distributions to nonpriority unsecured creditors such as the City, which held claims for traffic and other debts. The City objected to confirmation under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), arguing that the plans failed to apply all projected disposable income solely to unsecured creditors because attorneys’ fees could not qualify or, alternatively, because the attorneys had not filed proofs of claim. The bankruptcy court overruled the objections and confirmed the plans. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that §§ 1322(a)(2) and 1326(b)(1) expressly require plans to pay priority claims including attorneys’ fees before or at the same time as other creditors during the commitment period, that the 2005 BAPCPA amendment did not displace this practice or the Code’s treatment of such fees as either necessary expenses or allowable unsecured claims, and that a separate request for payment under § 503(a) suffices without a proof of claim.

procedure

The case involved several media organizations suing Indiana prison officials under the First Amendment, seeking a preliminary injunction to allow journalists to attend executions that the state otherwise restricts to prison staff, a few victim family members, the inmate’s spiritual advisor, and up to five people invited by the inmate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the injunction. The majority held that the qualified right of access recognized in cases such as Press-Enterprise II does not extend to executions, which are not court proceedings and have not historically been open to the press and public; even under the “experience and logic” test, the long-standing trend toward private executions since the mid-nineteenth century precludes such a right. The court further concluded that the policy does not violate the Press Clause because it treats members of the media the same as the general public and is generally applicable rather than targeted at the press.

free speechcriminal law

In United States v. Thomas Hawkins, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a district court’s revocation of supervised release for a defendant who, while on release following 2008 robbery convictions, committed two additional armed commercial robberies in 2020. The district court conducted a combined sentencing hearing, first imposing 135 months for the new offenses and then revoking supervised release and imposing the statutory maximum of 108 months, emphasizing public protection under the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Hawkins appealed, contending that the court improperly considered retribution (a factor barred by Esteras v. United States) by incorporating its earlier § 3553(a) analysis and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable and created unwarranted disparities. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the district court had explicitly omitted retribution from the revocation analysis, properly weighed the seriousness of the new violations only insofar as they demonstrated ongoing danger to the public, and that the 108-month term was not plainly unreasonable given Hawkins’ repeated violent conduct.

criminal law

James C. Wenzler, a longtime member and leader in the Coast Guard Auxiliary, sued the Coast Guard after it removed him from the organization for refusing to delete LinkedIn posts that depicted him in uniform while making crude and derogatory remarks about public figures, including Supreme Court Justices and a university president. The district court granted summary judgment to the Coast Guard, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court applied the Connick/Pickering balancing test and concluded that, even assuming Wenzler’s posts addressed matters of public concern, the Auxiliary’s interests in maintaining internal discipline, public confidence, and its mission outweighed his speech interests. The opinion emphasized that the Auxiliary functions as a uniformed, congressionally established component of the Coast Guard with a military-style hierarchy, warranting deference to its reasonable judgments about how members’ public statements affect its reputation and operations when they present themselves as representatives.

free speechfederal power

Aberdeen Developers, LLC secured a $41 million loan with a Chicago mixed-use building and sued Wells Fargo Bank (as trustee) and special servicer LNR Partners for breach of contract after a tenant bankruptcy during the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a Cash Sweep Event Period. Under the governing Loan Agreement and Cash Management Agreement, the parties disputed whether LNR Partners could hold excess cash flow (about $150,000 monthly) indefinitely in a Sweep Account as additional security until a Cash Sweep Cure occurred, or had to disburse it to Aberdeen Developers at the end of each month. The district court dismissed the claim, ruling that the contracts unambiguously permitted retention until a cure. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the agreements are ambiguous because both sides’ interpretations—Aberdeen’s reliance on CMA § 3.4(j) for monthly disbursement and the defendants’ reliance on CMA § 3.4(i) plus Loan Agreement § 6.3(b) for holding funds—are reasonable. Under Illinois law, such ambiguity presents a factual question of intent that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In 2022, officers arrested William Fillyaw in an Illinois apartment parking lot under a warrant, seized his backpack during the arrest, and later searched it without a warrant, discovering a loaded handgun and drugs that led to federal charges. Fillyaw moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the district court denied the motion under the inventory search exception; he then pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that officers may lawfully take custody of an arrestee’s personal property in a public place and conduct an inventory search according to established procedures, as the Fourth Amendment did not require leaving the backpack unattended or following the specific alternatives Fillyaw proposed. Minor deviations from department policy did not invalidate the search, and the court declined to address a forfeited argument about license plate readers.

criminal lawprocedure

Sanaullah Khan Mohammed, an Indian national from a Muslim family that ran a slaughterhouse, entered the United States on a visitor visa in 2016, overstayed, and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief more than 18 months after the one-year deadline. An immigration judge found the asylum application untimely without extraordinary circumstances, denied the other claims for lack of past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution, and ordered removal; the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction over the asylum timeliness ruling, adhering to its precedent in Khan v. Filip because Mohammed’s briefs did not address recent Supreme Court decisions that have created a circuit split on the issue. The court denied the rest of the petition, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings that Mohammed suffered only minor injuries in one incident where police intervened, that his family’s business had closed, and that he could relocate within India.

immigration

Michael J. Madigan, the longtime Speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives, was convicted after a four-month federal jury trial on multiple counts stemming from two bribery schemes. In one, ComEd funneled over $3 million to Madigan’s political allies through sham contracts and subcontracts in exchange for his support of legislation that stabilized the utility’s rates; in the other, Madigan agreed to recommend Chicago Alderman Daniel Solis for a state board seat in return for insurance business referrals to his son’s employer. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial evidence was sufficient to prove the required quid-pro-quo exchanges and that any instructional error regarding the definition of bribery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court therefore upheld the district court’s denial of Madigan’s post-trial motions and left the 90-month sentence and $2.5 million fine intact.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Mitchell Melega, the defendant appealed his 75-month sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy, bank fraud, and money laundering for his role in a scheme that caused over $7 million in losses to two banks by submitting falsified loan documents and diverting funds intended for vehicle purchases and property improvements. The district court applied two-level sentencing enhancements for use of sophisticated means and for Melega’s supervisory role in the offense, then imposed a sentence below the advisory guidelines range but higher than that given to his co-defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the enhancements were properly supported by evidence of Melega’s procurement of altered invoices, concealment of assets, and direction of employees to provide false information. The court also found no error in the district court’s consideration of Melega’s prior similar misconduct and lesser acceptance of responsibility when applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, which justified the sentencing disparity with his co-defendant.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

Kayla Smiley, an elementary school teacher, challenged an Indiana statute barring public schools and teachers from providing “instruction” on “human sexuality” to students in prekindergarten through third grade, alleging that the law was facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief, concluding that Smiley had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. The court reasoned that the statute primarily restricts teachers’ official classroom and school-related speech, which lacks First Amendment protection; that the terms “instruction” and “human sexuality” possess a discernible core of meaning sufficient to survive a vagueness challenge; and that the law is not substantially overbroad, with enforcement unlikely to be arbitrary given existing procedural safeguards and the rarity of license actions for curriculum matters.

free speechcivil rights

Bato Petrov, a stateless German native who entered the United States illegally as a child in 1974 and has lived here since, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) on the ground that his deportation would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-citizen wife, children, and father. An immigration judge denied the application after a hearing, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the Board later denied Petrov’s motion to reopen, which added evidence of his wife’s mental-health conditions, a miscarriage, family medical issues, and adverse conditions for Roma in Germany. The Seventh Circuit denied Petrov’s petitions for review, holding that the record supported the agency’s conclusion that the hardship to qualifying relatives did not rise to the required statutory level. The court further concluded that much of the new evidence submitted with the motion to reopen had been available earlier and that the remaining evidence, considered individually or cumulatively, failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. Any error in the Board’s treatment of country-conditions articles was harmless because such evidence did not show the requisite hardship to U.S.-citizen family members.

immigration

Bato Petrov, a stateless German native who entered the United States illegally as a child in 1974 and has lived here since, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) on the ground that his deportation would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-citizen wife, children, and father. An immigration judge denied the application after a hearing, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the Board later denied Petrov’s motion to reopen, which added evidence of his wife’s mental-health conditions, a miscarriage, family medical issues, and adverse conditions for Roma in Germany. The Seventh Circuit denied Petrov’s petitions for review, holding that the record supported the agency’s conclusion that the hardship to qualifying relatives did not rise to the required statutory level. The court further concluded that much of the new evidence submitted with the motion to reopen had been available earlier and that the remaining evidence, considered individually or cumulatively, failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. Any error in the Board’s treatment of country-conditions articles was harmless because such evidence did not show the requisite hardship to U.S.-citizen family members.

immigration

Bato Petrov, a stateless native of Germany who entered the United States illegally as a child and has lived here since 1974 with his U.S. citizen wife, three children, and father, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) on the ground that his deportation would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. An immigration judge denied the application after a hearing, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the Board later denied Petrov’s motion to reopen the proceedings with new evidence of his wife’s mental health conditions, a miscarriage, family medical issues, and general reports on economic conditions and anti-gypsy bias in Germany. The Seventh Circuit denied Petrov’s petitions for review, holding that the agency’s hardship determination was supported under either clear-error or substantial-evidence review because the evidence did not show hardship substantially beyond that normally expected from deportation. The court further concluded that much of the new evidence was previously available, that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening, and that any error in failing to address the country-conditions articles was harmless because hardship to Petrov himself is relevant only insofar as it affects his U.S. citizen relatives.

immigration

Bato Petrov, a stateless native of Germany who entered the United States illegally as a child and has lived here since 1974 with his U.S. citizen wife, three children, and father, sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) on the ground that his deportation would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. An immigration judge denied the application after a hearing, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the Board later denied Petrov’s motion to reopen the proceedings with new evidence of his wife’s mental health conditions, a miscarriage, family medical issues, and general reports on economic conditions and anti-gypsy bias in Germany. The Seventh Circuit denied Petrov’s petitions for review, holding that the agency’s hardship determination was supported under either clear-error or substantial-evidence review because the evidence did not show hardship substantially beyond that normally expected from deportation. The court further concluded that much of the new evidence was previously available, that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening, and that any error in failing to address the country-conditions articles was harmless because hardship to Petrov himself is relevant only insofar as it affects his U.S. citizen relatives.

immigration

This case arose from a state-court property-line dispute between Robert Barker and his neighbors, the Boettchers, in which the Boettchers served subpoenas on USDA employees seeking farm records; the Department removed only the subpoena proceeding to federal court under the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442), after which the Boettchers sought to remove the entire case on the ground that historical federal land surveys and ordinances created federal-question jurisdiction. The district court retained jurisdiction over the subpoena matter, remanded the property dispute to state court, and later quashed the subpoenas. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first confirming its own appellate jurisdiction under the § 1447(d) exception for § 1442 removals, then holding that the underlying property claims presented no federal question because derivation of title from old federal land grants is insufficient to confer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and finally ruling that the subpoenas were properly quashed on principles of derivative jurisdiction and the Boettchers’ concession that the state court lacked authority to enforce them.

propertyprocedurefederal power

William Clyde Gibson III, an Indiana death-row inmate, missed the one-year deadline to file a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his two murder convictions and death sentences. In district-court proceedings on whether equitable tolling could excuse the late filing, the court granted Gibson’s request under the All Writs Act to be transported to a hospital for brain-scan testing aimed at documenting mental impairments. The Seventh Circuit reversed that transportation order. It held the order was incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decision in Shoop v. Twyford and that Gibson had not shown the required specific link between the etiology-focused scans and his equitable-tolling claim of attorney abandonment or inability to meet the filing deadline. The case returns to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on tolling.

criminal lawprocedure

In Paul Daugerdas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Seventh Circuit considered whether 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4)(A) authorizes the IRS to assess and collect criminal restitution imposed for tax-related offenses under Title 18. Daugerdas, convicted in 2013 of conspiring to defraud the IRS through fraudulent tax shelters, had been ordered to pay $371 million in restitution to the Treasury, with payments scheduled at 10% of his gross monthly income after release from prison; the IRS then assessed the full amount as immediately due and filed a tax lien. The Tax Court upheld the IRS actions, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute’s plain language requires the IRS to assess and collect such restitution “in the same manner as if such amount were such tax,” without being bound by the criminal court’s payment schedule. The court rejected arguments that the provision is limited to internal accounting or that the IRS must follow sentencing terms, finding no separation-of-powers violation in Congress’s dual Title 18 and Title 26 framework for tax restitution.

taxescriminal lawfederal power

The case arose from a 2018 SWAT-team search of a Wisconsin property for methamphetamine, during which officers encountered Ryan Steinhoff in a camper; he exited cooperatively but was tackled from behind by Detective Cody Kowalczyk, and a rifle barrel struck his head, causing a gash requiring stitches, with body-camera footage too unclear to show whether the blow was intentional. Steinhoff sued several officers under the Fourth Amendment for excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed qualified immunity for Kowalczyk, holding that the tackle was reasonable given Steinhoff’s criminal history and possible attempt to flee, but reversed summary judgment for Investigator Matthew Malovrh because disputed facts—whether he intentionally swung his rifle at Steinhoff’s head while Steinhoff was standing—precluded qualified immunity and required a jury trial on the claim. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that Malovrh could raise qualified immunity again at trial once facts are developed.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure