James C. Dever 3

This case concerned whether Country Boys Auction and Realty, Inc. was an "insider" of debtor Joe Denning & Sons Farms under 11 U.S.C. § 101(31), which would disqualify the firm from serving as the bankruptcy estate's auctioneer. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that Country Boys was not an insider. The court reasoned that the firm did not meet any of the statutory insider categories for a partnership debtor under § 101(31)(C) and was not a non-statutory insider because Douglas Gurkins had fully resigned, transferred his ownership to his adult son, and had no financial interest or control over Country Boys for more than five years before the relevant events, despite the family relationship and minor ongoing contacts.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves state inmates serving life sentences imposed between 1974 and 1978 under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-2, who claimed that accumulated good time, gain time, and merit time credits entitled them to unconditional release and that North Carolina's refusal to release them violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses. After the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected these claims in Jones v. Keller, the petitioners sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2241. The district court applied the deferential AEDPA standard of review to the state court's decision and concluded that it was neither an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, the court granted the state's motions for summary judgment, dismissed the petitions, and denied evidentiary hearings and certificates of appealability.

criminal lawprocedure

Kimya Swann sued her former employer, Source One Staffing Solutions, alleging that it created a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and that it wrongfully discharged her in violation of North Carolina public policy in retaliation for her complaints about sexual harassment. Source One moved for summary judgment, which the court granted after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Swann. The court concluded that the incidents described were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. The court also held that Swann could not use her opposition memorandum to recharacterize her wrongful-discharge claim and that her original claim failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the case was closed.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Smith v. Atkins, the plaintiffs (the mother and minor children of inmate Demittarus Burden) sued Bertie and Martin County sheriffs, jail administrators, and Southern Health Partners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after Burden committed suicide in the Bertie-Martin Regional Jail in 2007. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the remaining federal claims after striking the plaintiffs' expert disclosure. The core reasoning was that no defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a known suicide risk, as Burden's intake screening showed no suicidal ideation and he had no history of self-harm known to jail staff; without an underlying constitutional violation, claims against the municipalities and healthcare provider for policies or failure to train also failed.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In Myers v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., the plaintiff sued debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, claiming they violated the statute and North Carolina law by not promptly notifying the Cumberland County Clerk of Court about partial payments made on a confessed judgment, which allegedly caused inaccurate docket and credit information. After the plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the defendants pursued their pending motion for Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff's attorney for filing a complaint that misrepresented the relevant statute, lacked factual and legal basis, and was brought for an improper purpose. The court granted the sanctions motion, concluding that the attorney violated Rule 11(b) by failing to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law before filing, as the claims had no chance of success under existing precedent and the attorney had misrepresented N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-239(c). As a result, the court admonished the attorney and ordered her to pay $250 into the court as a deterrent sanction, while declining to award fees or costs to the defendants due to lack of evidence and absence of unusual circumstances.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Bufford v. Embarq Management Corporation, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to hire her because of her race and sought relief under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2. The court denied the motion to dismiss the Title VII and § 1981 claims, finding them legally and factually sufficient under the standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. However, the court granted the motion to dismiss the state-law claim, holding that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 does not create a private right of action and that the related tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy applies only to employees who have been discharged, not to job applicants.

civil rightslabor & employment

Native Angels Home Care Agency, a Medicare-certified hospice provider, sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services challenging the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1), which governs the calculation of the Medicare reimbursement cap for hospice providers based on the number of beneficiaries served. The plaintiff argued that this regulation conflicts with the statutory formula in 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2)(C) for determining the cap. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding the regulation invalid and contrary to law, while denying the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. The core reasoning was that the regulation's method of counting beneficiaries, including those electing hospice care in a 70-day window around the cap period, does not align with the congressional mandate.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

In Vick v. Nash Hospitals, Inc., the plaintiff attempted to remove a state-court breach-of-contract action filed by a subsidiary of his former employer into his pending federal Title VII gender discrimination lawsuit, relying on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Rule 13(a). The court granted the defendants' motion to remand the state action, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because supplemental jurisdiction does not confer original jurisdiction over a separate action. The court reasoned that neither diversity nor federal-question jurisdiction existed over the state claim, as the parties were not diverse and the claim arose solely under North Carolina law, and Rule 13(a) does not authorize removal or enjoining state proceedings.

procedurecivil rights

The case involved a challenge to the denial of Social Security disability benefits, in which the plaintiff argued that the Appeals Council had failed to consider new and material evidence from his treating ophthalmologist. The magistrate judge recommended granting the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanding the matter to the Commissioner, and the district court adopted that recommendation without objection, entering a final judgment under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner later moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate the order, contending that the remand should instead have been under sentence six so that the court would retain jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, reasoning that sentence four was the correct basis because the new evidence had been presented to the Appeals Council, which simply failed to consider it.

procedurehealthcare

The case involved Iraqi plaintiffs suing U.S.-based RTI and foreign security firm Unity for damages after Unity personnel fatally shot two Iraqi citizens and injured a third during a 2007 incident in Baghdad while providing security under an RTI contract with USAID. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act, along with state-law tort claims for assault, battery, wrongful death, and negligence. The court dismissed the actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the ATS and TVPA claims failed due to the absence of required state action and other limitations on those statutes, that diversity jurisdiction was unavailable because both plaintiffs and Unity were aliens, and that supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims should not be exercised after the federal claims were dismissed.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Wyeth against Sandoz under the Hatch-Waxman Act, where Wyeth alleged that Sandoz's proposed generic extended-release venlafaxine hydrochloride product infringed three Wyeth patents related to formulations for treating depression and anxiety disorders. Wyeth moved for summary judgment on claims of direct infringement, inducement of infringement, and contributory infringement, while Sandoz cross-moved for summary judgment on noninfringement and patent invalidity. The court granted Wyeth's motion and denied Sandoz's motions, finding that Sandoz's ANDA product would infringe the asserted claims based on the court's prior claim construction regarding the patents' requirements for Cmax and Tmax values in extended-release formulations. The decision addressed the application of summary judgment standards under Rule 56 and the framework for ANDA-related infringement actions under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).

business & regulatoryhealthcare

Lorene Williams sued the Brunswick County Board of Education under Title I of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that her transfer from Director of Pre-K and Student Services to Dean of Students at Shallotte Middle School was discriminatory on the basis of her diabetes and gynecological conditions or retaliatory for her request for medical leave. The transfer involved no change in pay, benefits, or seniority and was part of a larger reorganization recommended by the superintendent. The court granted summary judgment to the Board, holding that Williams was not disabled under the statutes, the lateral transfer did not constitute an adverse employment action, and there was no evidence of discrimination or retaliation because the decision-makers lacked knowledge of her conditions and the transfer was unrelated to her leave request. The court further found that Williams could perform the duties of either position and that her preference for the prior role did not qualify as a reasonable accommodation.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Mark Oxford suing his former employers for alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, California anti-discrimination law, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming pay disparity and harassment based on his sex, race, national origin, and religion during his work in Iraq. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims except the Title VII claim against two defendants, finding insufficient factual allegations to support the claims, lack of applicability of state law, and no state action for constitutional claims against private actors. The court also denied Oxford's motion for summary judgment on the remaining Title VII claim due to the absence of discovery and genuine issues of material fact. The decision focused on the legal sufficiency of the complaint under federal pleading standards.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Hill v. Robeson County, the plaintiff alleged that while she was a 21-year-old on pretrial supervision awaiting trial on armed robbery charges, several county officers sexually abused her as part of a scheme involving drugs and money, and she brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers, Robeson County, county officials, the sheriff's office, and related entities for violations of her Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Multiple defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim and to strike certain paragraphs, while the sheriff's office separately moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motions to dismiss the relevant counts against the moving defendants and the sheriff's office, denied the motion to strike, and dismissed the claims, finding that the allegations did not sufficiently plead municipal liability or other required elements under the applicable legal standards.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Dennis Stephen Johnston, who pleaded guilty to two counts of manufacturing child pornography by sexually abusing two young children over six years and recording the acts. After sentencing him to 60 years in prison, the district court addressed the government's request for mandatory restitution to the victims under 18 U.S.C. § 2259. The court granted $1,662,930 in total restitution, allocating $710,910 to the female victim and $952,020 to the male victim, based on evidence of their past and future medical and mental health costs. The core reasoning was that the statute requires full compensation for losses proximately caused by the offense, and the government's expert report provided a reasonably certain estimate of those losses supported by the facts of the abuse.

criminal law

In 2006, plaintiffs purchased a yacht from defendants and later sued in North Carolina state court alleging revocation of acceptance and breach of express warranty under state law. After amending the complaint in 2009 to add a claim against the manufacturer under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)), defendants removed the case to federal court. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that their amended complaint did not assert a federal claim or that state law predominated. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that the amended complaint presented a federal question under the MMWA and that supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

In Bostic v. Rodriguez, married plaintiffs Walter and Meredith Bostic sued two East Carolina University police officers in their individual capacities after a 2007 traffic stop on campus for a seatbelt violation led to Mr. Bostic's arrest. The officers removed the case to federal court, and after discovery they moved for summary judgment, which the plaintiffs opposed; the court also addressed a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' evidence. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion to strike and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the seatbelt infraction was a noncriminal violation under North Carolina law that did not supply probable cause for arrest, rejected the officers' alternative justifications such as refusal of the citation at the summary-judgment stage, and concluded that the officers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claims presented.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, homeowner Earl Clyde Kelly sued Georgia-Pacific LLC and related entities after PrimeTrim, an exterior wood product manufactured by the defendants and installed by his builder, allegedly absorbed moisture and caused damage to his home and the trim itself. Kelly asserted claims for breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and unfair trade practices under North Carolina law, seeking to proceed as a class action; the defendants acknowledged the express warranty claim but moved to dismiss the others and filed a third-party complaint against the builder for indemnification. The court granted the defendants' partial motion to dismiss, dismissing the implied warranty, negligence, Magnuson-Moss, and unfair trade practices claims, while denying Kelly's motion to strike the third-party complaint and permitting him to file an amended complaint. The decision rested on North Carolina's economic loss rule limiting tort claims arising from contractual relationships, lack of privity for implied warranty claims, and the adequacy of the limited warranty's remedies.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Sharon Iglesias sued the City of Oxford, North Carolina, and various officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and North Carolina law, claiming she was fired from her administrative assistant position in the police department in retaliation for reporting suspected embezzlement by the police chief from a special fund used for investigations. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that Iglesias's speech occurred pursuant to her official job duties and therefore received no First Amendment protection, that the City could not be held liable under Monell absent an official policy or custom causing the alleged violation, and that her state-law wrongful discharge claim failed because North Carolina applies the same free-speech standards as federal law.

free speechlabor & employmentcivil rightscriminal law

Time Warner Cable Information Services (North Carolina), LLC sued the Commissioners of the North Carolina Rural Electrification Authority in their official capacities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief after the NCREA issued orders in 2006 and 2008 that dismissed TWCIS's interconnection petition and denied reconsideration. The dispute centered on whether those state orders improperly blocked TWCIS, as a competitive local exchange carrier, from obtaining interconnection and reciprocal compensation arrangements with incumbent local exchange carriers under Sections 251 and 252 of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. Intervenor telephone membership corporations defended the NCREA orders. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the Commissioners' and intervenors' motions, granted TWCIS's motion in part, vacated the NCREA orders, and remanded the matter to the NCREA. The court reasoned that the federal statute establishes a specific process for negotiating or arbitrating interconnection agreements and limits the grounds on which a state commission may reject them, and that the NCREA's dismissal orders failed to comply with those federal requirements.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure