Michael Brian Brennan

The case arose after an industrial fire in Richmond, Indiana, that burned for over a week and allegedly caused injuries to nearby residents and businesses; 150 plaintiffs sued the City and other property owners in state court under various tort theories, and the defendants removed the suit to federal court as a “mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court raised the Act’s local-event exception on its own, concluded that all claims stemmed from the single Indiana fire, and remanded the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the local-event exception is jurisdictional because it defines what qualifies as a removable mass action and therefore may be raised at any time. The court further held that the fire plainly constituted an “event or occurrence” in Indiana that produced the alleged injuries there (or in an adjacent state), so every claim arose from that local event and the exception applied.

proceduretorts & liability

In 2015, American Airlines contracted with Twin Hill to produce new uniforms, but after rollout, many employees reported health issues such as rashes, respiratory problems, and allergic reactions, including some claiming symptoms from proximity to the garments. A group of employees sued the airline and manufacturer under the Class Action Fairness Act, asserting products liability (strict and negligent) and intentional tort claims, but the district court excluded the plaintiffs’ two expert witnesses as unreliable and granted summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, first confirming subject-matter jurisdiction under CAFA because the fourth amended complaint properly invoked the statute’s prerequisites despite an earlier version that dropped class allegations. The court held that, without the excluded experts, the plaintiffs lacked any evidence that the uniforms were defective or caused their injuries. It further ruled that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine (including Illinois’s Tweedy variant) did not apply, as the uniforms did not malfunction in a manner that would permit an inference of defect or causation absent direct proof.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case arose when the Betts family sued Boone County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that former coroner Wesley Hyland violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by retaining their sister Louise’s skull as a trophy after her 1977 murder investigation, contrary to a state statute requiring coroners to promptly return remains to next of kin. The district court dismissed the claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the County was not liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services because Hyland’s conduct did not establish an official municipal policy or custom; instead, it violated Illinois law (55 ILCS 5/3-3021), which expressly directed coroners to release decedents’ bodies to families. Drawing on precedents such as Auriemma v. Rice and Killinger v. Johnson, the opinion explained that an official with final authority cannot create Monell liability by acting ultra vires or contrary to state law, as municipal responsibility requires implementation rather than frustration of governing policy.

civil rightsprocedure

Jewel Sanitary Napkins sued Busy Beaver Publications for defamation after Busy Beaver published a reader-submitted ad in one of its regional editions questioning the safety of Jewel’s Reign sanitary pads, which contain graphene and are marketed for health benefits to Amish communities. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Busy Beaver and its denial of Jewel’s sanctions motion. Because Jewel conceded it was a limited-purpose public figure, Wisconsin defamation law and First Amendment precedent required it to prove actual malice—publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The court held that no evidence supported such a finding: the proofreader who reviewed the ad had no serious doubts about its accuracy, minor punctuation changes did not materially alter its meaning, failure to investigate further was not reckless disregard, and Busy Beaver’s offer of free advertising instead of a retraction did not show bad faith. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying sanctions, as Busy Beaver produced the original submission once subpoenaed and any discovery delays were largely attributable to Jewel’s own lack of diligence.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned Heriberto Perez-Castillo’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order affirming denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge found him ineligible both because his Illinois battery conviction against family members qualified as a crime of domestic violence and because he failed to demonstrate that his U.S.-citizen wife would face exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The court denied the petition, holding that Perez-Castillo had waived the hardship claim before the Board and that, even if reached, the record did not compel reversal under the substantial-evidence standard, while the domestic-violence conviction independently barred relief. The opinion also addressed the petitioner’s opening brief, which contained two dozen fabricated quotations, seven nonexistent or mislabeled Seventh Circuit cases, and multiple false factual assertions traceable to AI use by contract attorney Farah Chalisa; lead counsel Abdullah Salah, who filed the brief without review, was fined $5,000 under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46, while Chalisa was referred to the Illinois disciplinary commission.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Galesburg Community Unit School District No. 205 violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by proposing to place C.T., an elementary student with behavioral disabilities, at a private therapeutic day school in another district rather than in a special education classroom at his local school. After an independent hearing officer ruled for the district, C.T.’s parents sought judicial review, and the district court reversed, holding that the proposed placement violated the IDEA’s least restrictive environment requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court committed no legal error and that its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The court reasoned that C.T. could receive a satisfactory education in the local classroom with supplementary aids and services, such as a one-on-one aide, and that the district’s explanations for rejecting those measures lacked cogency and responsiveness to contrary evidence.

civil rights

In United States v. Glenn Wooden, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of possessing and distributing methamphetamine based on evidence that he sold nearly 100 grams to confidential informants across multiple controlled buys, possessed another 222 grams packaged for distribution in his apartment, and admitted on video to obtaining and selling the drugs. Wooden appealed, contending that the convictions should be reversed because the government failed to prove the substances were “illegal” methamphetamine under the Controlled Substances Act (specifically, that it contained only certain optical isomers rather than the generic drug), and he also challenged the jury instructions, witness testimony procedures, and the sufficiency of the drug quantity evidence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. The court held that 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 and 841 criminalize methamphetamine using the generic term, not a specific chemical formula or limited set of isomers; the government’s expert testimony established that the drugs were pure d-methamphetamine hydrochloride; and no trial errors occurred regarding instructions, witnesses, or evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Edlando Watson, who was indicted under the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after police linked him to firearms found in a storage unit; his predicate felony was a conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Watson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, Watson pleaded guilty, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the statute is constitutional as applied because Watson’s prior drug-trafficking conviction is inherently dangerous and his resulting disarmament aligns with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating arms possession by dangerous individuals. The panel expressly left open whether the statute could constitutionally disarm someone convicted of a non-dangerous felony.

gunscriminal law

The case involved Edlando Watson, who was indicted under the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after police linked him to firearms found in a storage unit; his predicate felony was a conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Watson moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The district court denied the motion, Watson pleaded guilty, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the statute is constitutional as applied because Watson’s prior drug-trafficking conviction is inherently dangerous and his resulting disarmament aligns with the nation’s historical tradition of regulating arms possession by dangerous individuals. The panel expressly left open whether the statute could constitutionally disarm someone convicted of a non-dangerous felony.

gunscriminal law

Keisha Lewis, a Black employee with a kidney condition who worked in the Indiana Department of Transportation’s Real Estate Division, sued the agency after her December 2022 termination, claiming disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and retaliation under Title VII. The claims arose from disputes over her remote-work accommodation, a smaller percentage pay raise than a white colleague, performance reviews, and her refusal to process certain vouchers. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department on the remaining claims after Lewis dismissed some counts, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that no reasonable jury could find for Lewis because the Department articulated legitimate reasons for firing her—insubordination, work backlogs, and performance problems—and she produced no evidence that those reasons were pretextual or that her disability, race, or complaints caused the termination.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned a challenge by manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and users of electronic nicotine delivery systems (such as vapes and e-cigarettes) to a 2023 Wisconsin statute requiring FDA premarket authorization before those products could be sold in the state. Plaintiffs argued that federal law under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and Tobacco Control Act preempted the state law and sought a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. The district court denied the injunction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the federal statutes’ text does not preempt state authority to regulate the sale and marketing of these products, so plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits; although plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm, the balance of equities and public interest favored allowing the state law to take effect.

business & regulatoryhealthcarefederal power

This consolidated appeal involved three cases under Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), in which plaintiffs alleged repeated violations from biometric scans and sought damages calculated on a per-scan basis under Section 20. In 2024, the Illinois legislature amended Section 20 to specify that damages must be assessed on a per-person basis, responding to concerns about potentially enormous liability raised in Cothron v. White Castle. The Seventh Circuit held that the amendment applies retroactively to pending cases. It reasoned that, under Illinois retroactivity rules, the change is remedial because it alters only the measure of damages available under Section 20 without modifying the underlying standards of liability in Section 15 or depriving parties of any vested rights. The court therefore reversed the district courts’ contrary rulings and remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved three consolidated appeals under Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), in which plaintiffs alleged repeated violations of the Act’s requirements for handling biometric data, such as fingerprint scans. The central issue was whether a 2024 amendment to Section 20 of BIPA—which clarified that damages are assessed on a per-person rather than per-violation basis—applies retroactively to cases already pending when the amendment was enacted. The Seventh Circuit held that the amendment does apply retroactively. The court reasoned that the change was remedial in nature because it affected only the measure of statutory damages available under Section 20 without altering the substantive standards of liability under Section 15, and that no constitutional barriers prevented its retroactive application. As a result, the district courts’ contrary rulings were reversed, and the cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with a per-person damages calculation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The cases concern whether a 2024 amendment to Section 20 of Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), which clarified that statutory damages are assessed on a per-person rather than per-violation basis, applies retroactively to lawsuits already pending when the law changed. The amendment responded to the Illinois Supreme Court’s Cothron decision, which held that BIPA claims accrue with each scan or transmission of biometric data and raised concerns about potentially enormous liability. The Seventh Circuit held that the amendment is a remedial change that affects only the measure of damages available under Section 20 and does not alter the substantive standards of liability under Section 15, so Illinois courts would apply it retroactively to pending cases. The court reasoned that under Illinois retroactivity doctrine, procedural or remedial amendments are given effect unless they impair a vested right, and here no such constitutional concern arises because the amendment reduces rather than expands potential penalties and plaintiffs have no vested right to any particular remedy. The district courts’ contrary rulings were therefore reversed.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

Danuta Dec, a Polish citizen present unlawfully in the United States for over a year, sought a waiver of inadmissibility so she could obtain a family-based visa petitioned by her U.S.-citizen sister without first leaving the country for ten years. She relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l), arguing that her mother’s death as a lawful permanent resident qualified her for relief, but USCIS denied the application because the mother was not the relative who filed the visa petition. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) commits waiver decisions—including threshold eligibility determinations—to the agency’s sole discretion and expressly bars judicial review of those decisions. A separate portion of the opinion admonished Dec’s counsel for including nonexistent citations and a fabricated quotation in the brief, apparently generated by AI, but imposed no further sanction.

immigrationprocedure

Danuta Dec, a Polish citizen present unlawfully in the United States for over a year, sought a waiver of inadmissibility so she could obtain a family-based visa petitioned by her U.S.-citizen sister without first leaving the country for ten years. She relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1154(l), arguing that her mother’s death as a lawful permanent resident qualified her for relief, but USCIS denied the application because the mother was not the relative who filed the visa petition. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) commits waiver decisions—including threshold eligibility determinations—to the agency’s sole discretion and expressly bars judicial review of those decisions. A separate portion of the opinion admonished Dec’s counsel for including nonexistent citations and a fabricated quotation in the brief, apparently generated by AI, but imposed no further sanction.

immigrationprocedure

In 2015, Calumet City police officers entered Elias Villalobos’s home without a warrant after responding to a 911 call about a knife-throwing incident and learning of a prior domestic violence report at the address; they later tased and shot him during the encounter, prompting Villalobos to sue the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations, including an unlawful entry claim. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Villalobos on the warrantless entry issue, rejecting the officers’ qualified immunity defense after finding no exigent circumstances justified the entry. On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated that ruling and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court had addressed only one prong of the qualified immunity analysis and that material factual disputes—such as when officers learned key information and what they heard at the door—prevented a definitive legal determination on the totality of the circumstances. The court directed the parties to develop arguments on both qualified immunity prongs and invited clarification of the disputed facts before trial.

civil rightsprocedure

In Shareef Childs v. Cheryl Webster, a Muslim inmate at Stanley Correctional Institution sued prison officials under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. He alleged that officials violated his rights by distributing inaccurate prayer schedules and refusing to use state funds to print and distribute corrected versions for the rest of 2023 and 2024, after initially providing flawed ones based on an incorrect location input. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. It held that requiring Childs to obtain an accurate schedule through donation or a low-cost personal purchase did not impose a substantial burden on his religious exercise, as the prison’s neutral policy barred using taxpayer funds for any inmate personal property and permitted inmates to possess or receive such items otherwise. The court also ruled that RLUIPA does not obligate states to subsidize religious materials and that one Free Exercise claim was waived for failure to allege intentional or reckless conduct.

religious libertycivil rightscriminal law

The case involved a dispute between two judgment creditors—Vivek Bedi and MedLegal Solutions, Inc.—over priority to the assets of debtor Premium Healthcare Solutions, LLC. Bedi obtained a 2022 state-court judgment and lien against a misnamed entity (“Premier”), which a later state-court order purported to correct retroactively to the correct name (“Premium”), while MedLegal obtained a 2024 federal judgment against Premium and sought to establish its lien’s superiority. The Seventh Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s turnover order and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the district court from deciding priority. On the merits, the court affirmed that MedLegal’s interest was superior because Bedi had waived any arguments on Illinois priority law by failing to raise them in the district court and instead relying solely on the unsuccessful Rooker-Feldman challenge.

propertyprocedure

In Nicholas Giovannelli v. Walmart Inc., a U.S. Army veteran sued several companies, including Walmart, under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act after discovering that a photograph of him taken during a 2009 patrol in Afghanistan had been downloaded, licensed, and sold as posters online years earlier without his consent. The district courts granted summary judgment to the defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the one-year limitations period began when the image was first published, not when Giovannelli discovered it, because an Illinois Appellate Court decision had applied the single-publication rule to claims under the Act and rejected a discovery rule. Sitting in diversity jurisdiction, the federal court followed that state precedent, finding no basis to predict that the Illinois Supreme Court would rule differently, and noted that the publicly available online image did not qualify for any exception to the rule.

proceduretorts & liability