Burton A. Scott

This case involved a dispute over insurance coverage under a worker's compensation and employers' liability policy issued by North River Insurance to Kenosha Beef International and its subsidiaries. An employee of Birchwood Transport, a subsidiary, was injured on Kenosha Beef's premises and sued Kenosha Beef for negligence after receiving workers' comp benefits; Kenosha Beef sought reimbursement from North River for the $20,000 it paid in settlement, which was defended under a general liability policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to Kenosha Beef, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the policy did not provide coverage because the insured companies are treated as separate entities and the relevant policy provision applies only to dual persona or capacity claims against an employer, which did not apply here as Kenosha Beef was not the employee's employer.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In this case, property owners near a landfill operated by Land Reclamation, Ltd. (LRL) sued LRL for damages from ongoing environmental pollution including airborne dust, odors, and contaminated water. LRL's insurer, Bituminous Casualty Corporation, moved for summary judgment on the ground that coverage was barred by the policies' pollution exclusion clause, which applied unless any discharge was sudden and accidental. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the insurer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the record contained no facts or reasonable inferences showing sudden and accidental discharges during the policy periods, so the exclusion applied and the insurer had no duty to defend. Arguments that further discovery might reveal qualifying events were deemed waived or speculative and insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

environmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved an appeal from a divorce judgment in which the trial court awarded Barbara DeLaMatter permanent maintenance of $300 per week, retroactive to the divorce date, based on findings that she was unable to work due to chronic mental illness. Theodore DeLaMatter challenged the award, arguing errors in the findings on his income, his wife's ability to work, and the retroactive application. The appellate court upheld the finding on Theodore's income but held that the trial court's determination of Barbara's inability to work due to mental illness was clearly erroneous, as psychiatric testimony indicated her panic and personality disorders did not preclude employment and that her alcoholism was the primary barrier. The court further concluded that the trial court erred by not considering Barbara's refusal to seek recommended treatment for her alcoholism when setting the award. As a result, the maintenance award was reversed and the case remanded for a new determination, rendering the retroactivity issue moot.

family law

This Wisconsin Court of Appeals case involved consolidated actions by a child's mother (D.G.) to terminate the parental rights of the child's incarcerated putative father (F.C.) and by the mother's new husband (R.G.) to adopt the child as a stepparent. The trial court ordered the petitioners to pay F.C.'s transportation costs from Arizona to Wisconsin so he could attend the hearings in person, after finding him indigent and entitled to be present. On appeal, the G's argued there was no legal basis for the order, that the court should have considered alternatives to physical presence, and that the state or county should pay instead. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a circuit court has inherent authority to condition the proceedings on the petitioners covering such costs to ensure the respondent's meaningful participation, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the facts presented, and that no authority existed to shift the costs to the state or county.

family lawprocedure

Cynthia Smith sued her insurer, Atlantic Mutual, for underinsured motorist benefits after an accident in which the other driver tendered $50,000 under a matching liability policy and Smith's alleged damages exceeded $100,000. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the policy's reducing clause was valid and unambiguous under controlling Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent, because it expressly reduced the $50,000 limit of liability by any sums paid by the at-fault driver, leaving zero coverage. Because the clause was clear, the court did not reach the policy's definition of an underinsured vehicle or public-policy arguments.

torts & liability

This case concerned a wrongful death action in which the surviving spouse sought compensation for the termination of her late husband's social security disability benefits, which had been their main source of support until he would have reached age 65. The court affirmed the judgment against the insurer, holding that the loss qualified as a compensable "pecuniary injury" under Wisconsin's wrongful death statute, sec. 895.04(4). The core reasoning drew on prior precedent establishing that pecuniary injury includes any reasonably anticipated financial benefit the beneficiary would have received had the decedent lived, irrespective of whether the benefit was wages or other payments such as pensions or disability benefits. The court rejected a narrower interpretation limited to "actual earnings" and declined to apply the collateral source rule in reverse to bar recovery.

torts & liability

The case involved a dispute over whether an insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty to Jones Sign covered claims for lost profits by Trio's restaurant due to a defective neon sign installed by Jones Sign. The trial court dismissed the insurer from the lawsuit, finding no coverage, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the policy exclusions for property damage to the named insured's products applied, as the lost profits stemmed from the loss of use of the sign itself rather than damage to other tangible property, consistent with policy definitions and precedents distinguishing damage to the product versus other property.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Jane Doe sued Dr. Richard Roe for negligent postpartum care that allegedly caused her lasting neurological deficits, and during trial her counsel disclosed that she had tested positive for HIV. The trial court granted a mistrial and ordered limited disclosure of the HIV test results to defense counsel, the defendant, and his insurer for use at the retrial on any relevant issue such as damages, while changing the case caption to protect confidentiality. Doe appealed, arguing that the disclosure violated Wisconsin statutes restricting HIV test results (sec. 146.025), lacked a finding of informed consent, and constituted an abuse of discretion under evidentiary rules. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the results were relevant and admissible, that the statute permitted disclosure in this context, and that the trial court properly handled the mid-trial revelation by allowing limited access while deferring a final consent ruling pending further discovery.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

This case involved a divorce judgment entered in November 1988, after which one party filed a notice of appeal and the other filed a motion to dismiss the appeal followed by a notice of cross-appeal. The court raised the jurisdictional issue of whether, under Rule 809.14(3), the pending motion to dismiss automatically extended the deadline for filing the cross-appeal. The court held that the cross-appeal was untimely because the time for filing notices of appeal or cross-appeal cannot be enlarged under Rule 809.82(2)(b), and the tolling provision in Rule 809.14(3) does not apply to such filings to avoid nullifying the prohibition on extensions. Timely filing of a cross-appeal is jurisdictional, so the court dismissed the cross-appeal.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Truax, the defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife while armed with a baseball bat, arguing that statements and evidence obtained during police questioning should have been suppressed because he was illegally arrested without probable cause, and that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of homicide by reckless conduct. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that even assuming an arrest occurred, probable cause existed based on the circumstances at the scene and Truax's inconsistent statements, so the post-Miranda statements and derivative evidence were admissible. On the jury instruction issue, the court concluded that any error was harmless because the jury was instructed on both first- and second-degree murder and convicted on the greater offense, indicating it would not have convicted only on the reckless conduct charge. The opinion details the facts of the crime scene, Truax's hospital and station questioning, his confession, and trial testimony describing the incident as an attempt to hit a waterbed that escalated.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Grant Smith suing Samuel Keller for injuries from a punch to the face, asserting claims of intentional battery and negligence, and also suing Keller's homeowner's insurer State Farm for coverage under the policy. The trial court denied State Farm's summary judgment motion on coverage, allowed the negligence claim to go to the jury, and awarded Smith double costs and prejudgment interest based on a pretrial settlement offer. The appellate court reversed, holding that undisputed facts showed Keller intended or expected to hit Smith, triggering the policy's exclusion for expected or intended injuries and entitling State Farm to summary judgment on coverage; it remanded for a new trial limited to the battery issue. The court also ruled the settlement offer invalid to trigger statutory penalties because it was a single offer to multiple defendants facing joint and several liability on some claims and several liability on others, without specifying the theories of liability. The core reasoning focused on policy language excluding intentional acts and procedural requirements for settlement offers under Wis. Stat. sec. 807.01.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Horton, a seventeen-year-old defendant was charged with first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder after the juvenile court waived jurisdiction; following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser offenses of second-degree murder and endangering safety by conduct regardless of life, both while using a dangerous weapon. Horton appealed, raising four claims: that the circuit court lost personal jurisdiction due to an untimely preliminary hearing after remittitur from an appellate stay, that the prosecutor's peremptory strike of the sole Black juror violated his right to an impartial jury, that the trial court erred by refusing a manslaughter instruction based on imperfect self-defense, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove his knife qualified as a dangerous weapon. The court rejected each claim and affirmed the convictions. It held that the statutory time limit for the preliminary hearing was not violated because proceedings had been stayed, that no fair-cross-section violation occurred given that Horton is white, that the evidence did not support an imperfect self-defense instruction, and that the jury could reasonably find the knife met the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a products liability and negligence lawsuit brought by Gordon Farrell after he suffered severe injuries, including amputations, when his arm became entangled in a John Deere corn picker powered by a Navistar tractor during farm work. The jury divided the incident into entanglement and enhancement phases, finding no liability for Deere in the initial entanglement but holding Deere 65% responsible for enhanced injuries due to the lack of an emergency stop mechanism on the husker, while apportioning 35% responsibility to Farrell; it also assigned portions of negligence to other parties like Navistar. Deere appealed various trial court rulings on jury instructions, expert testimony, and additur for damages, while Farrell cross-appealed aspects of the verdict regarding Navistar. The appellate court affirmed the judgment awarding Farrell compensatory damages against Deere, concluding that the trial proceedings and verdict were not erroneous. The core reasoning centered on the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's apportionment and the absence of prejudicial errors in the special verdict or instructions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved property owners Carl and Judith Van who sued the Town of Manitowoc Rapids for flood damage to their land allegedly caused by the town's road construction or maintenance, claiming a violation of Wis. Stat. sec. 88.87(2). The trial court granted summary judgment to the town and dismissed the action because the Vans failed to comply with the statute's requirements for filing a formal notice of claim within 90 days, including a legal description of the property, and for seeking relief other than damages such as inverse condemnation. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that these procedural steps are mandatory conditions precedent to suit under the statute. The core reasoning was that actual notice to town officials does not substitute for the required formal written claim, as the statute lacks a savings clause, serves a distinct function from notice-of-injury statutes, and must be strictly construed because it creates a new right in derogation of common law.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Myra Gonzales's complaint under the Wisconsin Consumer Act alleging that AM Community Credit Union violated debt collection rules by making payroll deductions on an obligation discharged in her prior bankruptcy. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the bankruptcy discharge placed the matter exclusively in federal court. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the discharge injunction under federal bankruptcy law does not bar state-law claims for abusive collection practices or reserve exclusive jurisdiction over them to federal courts. The court reasoned that state courts have general jurisdiction over civil actions unless exclusivity is clearly established, that remedies like contempt are not the sole means to address post-discharge violations, and that the state claim here turned on questions of Wisconsin law rather than reserved federal issues.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case arose from a fatal vehicle accident in which an employee of Kenosha Auto Transport drove a company vehicle that struck and killed Peggy Nelson's husband; Nelson sued the driver, owner, and their insurers (Dairyland for the driver and Protective for the owner), alleging permissive use. The insurers raised a defense of non-permissive use, but the trial court struck the defenses on the ground that the insurers failed to properly correct an SR-21 accident report under Wisconsin's safety responsibility law, sec. 344.15, thereby triggering estoppel. The Court of Appeals reversed as to Dairyland, holding that the statute's estoppel provision applies only to an owner's insurer and does not bind the operator's insurer. It also reversed as to Protective because the sole evidence of non-response to the SR-21 (a department letter) was inadmissible hearsay that did not qualify for the public-record exception, leaving Nelson without proof to support estoppel.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Pence, Dustin Pence was convicted of delivering a controlled substance after selling marijuana to an undercover officer cooperating with a witness who had arranged the transaction. Pence appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly excluded as irrelevant evidence of his two subsequent refusals to sell drugs to the same officer. The court of appeals agreed, reversing the conviction on the grounds that the trial court had applied an incorrect blanket exclusion to post-offense "other acts" evidence instead of assessing its potential relevance to Pence's entrapment defense. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine admissibility under Wisconsin Statute section 904.03, using accepted legal standards for relevance and balancing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by Jean Reznichek against Stan Grall, owner of the Whitelaw Bar and Bowl, for intentional or negligent transmission of genital herpes through a sexual relationship that occurred on the business premises after hours; Reznichek also named Grall's insurer, Wisconsin Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, as a defendant. Farmers Mutual moved for summary judgment, arguing its policy provided no coverage. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the insurer, and the appeals court affirmed. The court reasoned that the policy was an owners', landlords', and tenants' liability policy limited to bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the premises as a tavern, restaurant, or bowling alley, and the sexual activity had no causal connection to those specific business operations.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether David, born to Mary Ann while she was married to Jack Seng, could inherit from Arthur Schneider's estate under Wisconsin's intestate succession statute for nonmarital children by relying on Arthur's written acknowledgments of paternity. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of David's petition and objection. It held that section 852.05(1) requires a claimant to first establish status as a nonmarital child by rebutting the strong statutory presumptions of legitimacy and paternity arising from the mother's marriage at the time of conception and birth, which can only be overcome by clear and satisfactory evidence such as the husband's physical impossibility, absence, or biological incapacity. David's offered proof, focused on Arthur's relationship and statements rather than rebutting those presumptions regarding Jack Seng, was insufficient as a matter of law.

family lawproperty

In State v. LeQue, the defendant was charged in adult circuit court with three counts of first-degree sexual assault after turning eighteen, for alleged acts committed at age fifteen; he moved to dismiss arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper delay to evade juvenile court. The court held that adult court jurisdiction is determined by the defendant's age on the date the action is filed, not the date of the offense, and that the twenty-two-day investigative period between the victim's report and the defendant's birthday did not constitute intentional manipulation by the state. It therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the motions to dismiss, relying on precedent establishing that the timing of filing controls jurisdiction and finding no due process violation from the delay.

criminal lawprocedure