John P. Foley

The case involved the Manitowoc Company's challenge to property taxes assessed by the City of Sturgeon Bay on two graving docks used for shipbuilding and repair, seeking refunds for taxes paid from 1976-82 and declaratory relief from future assessments. The company argued the docks qualified as exempt manufacturing machines under Wis. Stat. sec. 70.11(27), while the city and Department of Revenue maintained they were taxable. The court held that the actions could proceed as common-law claims for recovery of a void tax, were not barred by sovereign immunity, and that declaratory relief was unavailable because exemptions turn on annual use. It further ruled that the docks were machines rather than buildings, applied an integrated-plant test to find they were used directly in manufacturing despite incidental nonexempt uses, and therefore reversed the dismissal and remanded for calculation of the refund.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved employees of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation who received unemployment compensation benefits while taking compensatory time off for overtime work, despite continuing to receive their regular salaries and benefits. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision upholding the Labor and Industry Review Commission's grant of benefits. The court reasoned that the salaries and benefits constituted "wages" under the Unemployment Compensation Act, similar to vacation pay, meaning the employees were not unemployed and thus ineligible for benefits. It further held that granting benefits would contradict the Act's purpose of aiding workers who suffer economic loss from unemployment and would produce an absurd result, and rejected viewing the payments as deferred cash overtime since federal overtime laws do not apply to state governments.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether Eau Claire County’s combined position of register in probate and probate registrar qualified as a “managerial” employee under the Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA), which excludes such employees from collective bargaining. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission determined that the position lacked significant managerial authority and included it in the bargaining unit, but the circuit court reversed that determination. On appeal, the court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the commission’s interpretation of managerial status was entitled to deference but had been misapplied to the facts. The court reasoned that the position’s role in preparing and forwarding a recommended budget to the county board constituted the establishment of an original budget, thereby satisfying the commission’s own standard for authority to commit employer resources.

labor & employment

This case involved a dispute over liability on a land contract for commercial property, where J & J Rec. Corp. assumed the balance due as part of acquiring the vendee's interest from Lonsway, who had misrepresented the amount owed, and Mews personally guaranteed J & J's performance. After J & J obtained a judgment against Lonsway for the excess balance and later defaulted, leading to foreclosure sales that produced insufficient proceeds, a deficiency judgment was entered and Lonsway sought indemnification from J & J and Mews. The court affirmed the judgment holding J & J and Mews jointly and severally liable to indemnify Lonsway, concluding that Mews had knowledge of the misrepresentation and subsequent litigation and impliedly waived any defense based on it, that the method of calculating interest was correct, and that evidence supported the trial court's finding of fair value at the foreclosure sale.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Carlson Heating, Inc. sued Dale Onchuck for payment on labor and materials but the trial court dismissed the complaint after Carlson's counsel failed to provide a list of lay and expert witnesses as required by a pretrial order. Carlson appealed, arguing the court lacked authority to order disclosure of lay witnesses and that dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that Wis. Stat. § 802.11(1)(m) permits trial courts to order exchange of lay witness names because the listed pretrial matters are not exhaustive and the rule mirrors federal practice allowing such orders. It further ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring testimony and dismissing the case, as Carlson had no justifiable excuse for noncompliance despite clear notice and opportunity to comply. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

procedure

In State v. Bono, Philip Bono was convicted of arson and sentenced to twelve years in prison; he was released on bail pending appeal but failed to appear at a hearing to consider revoking bail and his whereabouts became unknown. The state moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Bono had absconded and could not be compelled to respond to any judgment the court might issue. The court exercised its discretion to dismiss the appeal, relying on precedents such as Smith v. United States and Molinaro v. New Jersey, because the defendant was unlikely to appear voluntarily whether the judgment was affirmed or reversed, and continuing the appeal would waste judicial resources and taxpayer funds while potentially encouraging bail jumping.

criminal lawprocedure

In Patterson v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, Dean Patterson appealed a circuit court order that dismissed his petition for judicial review of a Board of Regents determination. The circuit court had ruled that Patterson failed to properly serve the petition under sec. 227.16(1)(a), Stats., because he used registered mail rather than the required personal service or certified mail. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that service by registered mail satisfies the statute. The court reasoned that registered mail fulfills the underlying purpose of ensuring delivery and documenting the date of service to an even greater degree than certified mail, and that such service constitutes strict compliance with the statutory requirements for invoking circuit court jurisdiction over agency review proceedings.

procedure

In State v. Smith, the defendant filed a request under sec. 971.20(3) to substitute the judge assigned to the preliminary hearing. After the defendant was bound over for trial, the same judge was assigned to the trial, prompting an objection that the trial court denied on the ground that post-arraignment proceedings constituted a new action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the statute bars a substituted judge from presiding over any later stage of the same case except for the narrow functions of conducting the initial appearance, accepting not-guilty pleas, and setting bail. The decision rested on the plain language of sec. 971.20(2), rules of statutory construction that give effect to every provision, and the legislative purposes of providing a fair trial without proof of prejudice and maintaining orderly case administration.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Frederick Schiller's appeal from a circuit court order dismissing his complaint seeking judicial review of a Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) decision denying his unemployment compensation benefits. The court decided to affirm the dismissal, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Schiller failed to commence the action within the required 30 days after the decision was mailed. The core reasoning is that strict compliance with the statutory requirements under sections 108.09(7) and 102.23 is necessary to invoke jurisdiction, and the three-day extension for mail service under section 801.15(5) does not apply to the commencement of such administrative reviews.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the State of Wisconsin's appeal of a trial court's dismissal of a criminal complaint charging Black Steer Steak House, Inc., a retail liquor licensee, with violating statutory credit restrictions under Wis. Stat. § 176.05(23)(c), which prohibit purchasing liquor on credit from wholesalers if debts are more than 30 days old. The sole issue was whether the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court applied rational basis review, as no suspect class or fundamental right was at stake, and reversed the dismissal. It held that the law is presumed constitutional and that Black Steer failed to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt, because the credit limits rationally advance the legitimate goal of preventing monopolistic control in the liquor industry, such as through "tied house" arrangements.

business & regulatorycriminal law

In this case, Steve Spacek sued Vincent & Vincent for truck repair costs and joined Ford Motor Company as a third-party defendant, alleging implied warranty and negligent manufacture of a 1974 truck whose engine failed after the warranty period, seeking $2,200 in damages. Spacek served broad interrogatories on Ford seeking details of all complaints from 1974-1979 about engine defects in valves, heads, or pistons, plus related transmission issues. The trial court denied Ford's motion for a protective order and ordered discovery while imposing costs and fees on Ford. On appeal, the court affirmed the sanctions because Ford failed to timely seek protection but reversed the discovery order, holding that the interrogatories imposed an undue burden and expense disproportionate to the small claim amount, with the trial court's factual finding of deliberate inaccessibility unsupported by evidence. The court reasoned that the requesting party generally bears discovery costs and that Ford showed good cause under the rules for protection.

proceduretorts & liability