John A. Decker

The case involved the State charging two Milwaukee police officers with misconduct in public office under Wis. Stat. sec. 946.12(1) for allegedly failing to perform CPR on an arrested suspect who stopped breathing and later died after a struggle during transport. The trial court dismissed the complaints, finding that the officers' duty under a police department rule was not mandatory, nondiscretionary, and ministerial, and the court of appeals affirmed that dismissal. The appeals court reasoned that determining the need for and type of first aid involves judgment calls rather than a purely ministerial act, that departmental rules lack the force of law required by the statute, and that public policy prevents converting internal disciplinary rules into criminal liability for public employees.

criminal law

The case concerned a challenge by James Brennan to the constitutionality of Wisconsin statute sec. 111.70(4)(jm), which provides for binding arbitration in collective bargaining disputes for police departments in cities of the first class, specifically affecting Milwaukee. Brennan argued that the statute violated equal protection rights and constituted impermissible special legislation under the Wisconsin Constitution. The court affirmed the trial court's decision that the statute is constitutional. It reasoned that the statute applies uniformly to all cities of the first class, not solely Milwaukee, that legislative classifications of cities are permissible, and that the arbitration provisions do not create unconstitutional distinctions compared to those for other municipalities.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Calvin Ott's appeal from his conviction for injury by conduct regardless of life while using a dangerous weapon, stemming from a tavern fight in which he stabbed another man. The central issue at trial was whether Ott acted with a "depraved mind," as defined in the jury instructions. After the verdict, it emerged that a juror had brought a dictionary definition of "depraved" into the second day of deliberations. The trial court denied Ott's motion for a new trial, finding no substantial prejudice. The appellate court reversed, holding that the extraneous dictionary definition was broader than the legal instruction on depravity, was brought to the jury's attention on a key element, and created probable prejudice warranting a new trial under the standards for extraneous information under Wis. Stat. § 906.06(2).

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Dr. John H. Pflaum appealing an order from the State Psychology Examining Board requiring him to disclose the identities of four volunteers who participated in his experiment using the MELS electrical device during discovery in disciplinary proceedings. The trial court had affirmed the hearing examiner's order compelling this disclosure. The court decided that the psychologist-patient privilege under sec. 905.04 did not apply because the volunteers were not "patients" as defined in the statute, given that they participated solely for scientific research rather than consultation, examination, or treatment. The court also rejected Pflaum's claim that disclosure would violate the volunteers' constitutional right to privacy, concluding that no fundamental privacy interest was implicated.

procedurecivil rights

In State v. Bembenek, Lawrencia Bembenek appealed her jury conviction for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Christine Schultz, her husband's former wife, which occurred in 1981. The case centered on physical evidence including hairs matching Bembenek's found on a gag used in the crime, fibers from a wig linked to the scene, and the murder weapon identified as her husband's off-duty revolver. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and life sentence, holding that the criminal complaint sufficiently established probable cause through facts and reasonable inferences. The court addressed multiple claims regarding the preliminary hearing, suppression of locker evidence, trial conduct, witness sequestration, evidence weight, and jury instructions, rejecting them as insufficient to warrant reversal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Alice Dean, who was convicted of theft by fraud and false swearing; one judge stayed prison sentences and imposed concurrent probation terms with conditions including three years residing in India. After an earlier appeal invalidated the India condition as exceeding statutory authority and remanded for consideration of alternatives, a different judge imposed indeterminate prison terms of up to two years plus fines. The appellate court held that the new prison sentence violated double jeopardy protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Wisconsin Constitution because probation is a form of punishment that cannot be replaced by imprisonment absent a probation violation. The core reasoning was that the double jeopardy clauses prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense, and once probation has been granted, the conditional liberty it provides may be forfeited only by breaching its conditions. The court reversed the judgment and order, remanding to reinstate the original probation except for the invalid condition.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved American Family Mutual Insurance Company seeking reimbursement from Adjusters Auto Rental for payments made to accident victims due to the negligence of a policyholder who was driving a rented vehicle from Adjusters. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Adjusters, holding that Wisconsin Statute section 344.51(2) does not impose direct liability on the vehicle lessor to the lessee's insurer for damages paid out. The reasoning was that the statute's purpose was to partially abrogate common law by making lessors secondarily liable to injured third parties if the lessee cannot pay, but not to allow insurers of lessees to recover from lessors, as supported by legislative history and comparison to a companion statute on out-of-state rentals.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involves Ivan L. Higginbotham, who was committed to the Department of Health and Social Services under Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Law after his 1976 convictions for indecent liberties with a child and endangering safety. After the department failed to provide a required periodic examination, Higginbotham petitioned for discharge under sec. 975.09, but a jury found him dangerous due to mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality, and the trial court ordered continued commitment. On appeal, Higginbotham argued that hearsay testimony from his probation agent violated due process and confrontation rights, that certain evidence and jury instructions were improperly handled, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the dangerousness finding. The Court of Appeals rejected all claims, holding that the minimal due process requirements for such hearings were met, that the evidence was properly admitted and sufficient, and that no errors occurred in the trial court's rulings. The court therefore affirmed the order denying discharge.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Pepin, the defendant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion for a new trial after being convicted of armed robberies, first-degree murders, and attempted murder, claiming the trial court violated due process by excluding as hearsay his out-of-court statement admitting involvement in the robberies but denying he committed the shootings. The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the statement was inadmissible hearsay under Wisconsin statutes secs. 908.01 and 908.02, and did not qualify for the against-interest exception in sec. 908.045(4) because the exculpatory portions were not closely connected enough to the inculpatory parts to be equally trustworthy. The core reasoning was that admissibility of such evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court rather than being a pure question of law for de novo review, and the statement lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, distinguishing it from cases like Chambers v. Mississippi.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Department of Health and Social Services could hold a second parole revocation hearing for James Leroy after an initial hearing found insufficient evidence based on the stabbing incident, but Leroy was later convicted of the same conduct. The court affirmed the revocation order, holding that the Department had jurisdiction for the second hearing because the conviction constituted new evidence on different grounds, and that proceeding without Leroy's absent counsel did not violate due process since the issues were straightforward. The core reasoning was that due process permits separate revocation proceedings on a conviction even after a prior hearing on the underlying facts, provided notice and minimal procedural safeguards are met, and counsel is required only when complex mitigating factors are at issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the West Allis School District’s termination of employee Buff shortly after rehiring him following a work-related back injury covered by workers’ compensation. The Labor and Industry Review Commission found that the district violated Wis. Stat. sec. 102.35(3) by failing to rehire Buff in good faith, as it had requested abolition of his position days before his return and later hired others for similar duties. The circuit court affirmed the commission, and the Court of Appeals upheld that decision. The court interpreted the statute to require good faith in rehiring to prevent employers from circumventing the law through pro forma rehiring followed by immediate termination, and it found sufficient credible evidence of bad faith in the record.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether a Wisconsin bank holding company could carry forward a net business loss from 1971 to 1972 without having that loss offset by intercorporate dividend income received in 1971. The Wisconsin Department of Revenue had offset the dividends against the loss under Wis. Stat. § 71.06 (1971), treating them as “other items of income,” which reduced the available carryforward and increased Midland’s 1972 tax liability; the Tax Appeals Commission upheld the Department. The circuit court reversed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that reversal, holding that the dividends were not “other items of income” for offset purposes because they were already deducted from gross income under § 71.04(4) and the statutes distinguished them from ordinary business income. The court also rejected procedural challenges, finding the dissolved corporation retained capacity to pursue the review under the corporate survival statute.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved William Mosser, a longtime laborer for the Village of West Milwaukee, who suffered repeated work-related lower back injuries from heavy lifting and other duties between 1961 and 1976. After his last on-the-job injury, Mosser experienced a back injury at home while on vacation when he sneezed while carrying a light box, leading to surgery and disability; he sought worker's compensation benefits. The Labor and Industry Review Commission determined that the condition was an occupational disease caused by cumulative employment trauma, set the date of injury as Mosser's last day of work, awarded benefits for temporary and permanent disability plus medical expenses, and held the current insurer (Shelby Mutual) fully liable while dismissing the prior insurer. The circuit court affirmed, and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision, reasoning that it aligned with Wisconsin precedent treating such cumulative work-related conditions as occupational diseases under the Worker's Compensation Act, which imposes full liability on the last employer or insurer without apportionment. The court also found the disability rating supported by credible medical evidence.

labor & employment

In State v. Weller, the State of Wisconsin and the City of Milwaukee sued landlord Richard Weller for violating housing code provisions and a special order regulating tenant relations, seeking civil forfeitures, a permanent injunction, and receivership to abate what they alleged was a public nuisance on his rental properties. After a lengthy trial, the trial court found that Weller had ignored thousands of code violation orders, acted in bad faith, and substantially harmed neighborhood conditions, leading it to impose forfeitures, appoint a receiver, and enjoin Weller from future residential rental activity without court approval. On appeal, the court held that the complaint's allegations of ongoing and future violations permitted assessment of post-complaint forfeitures and that the evidence supported the receivership and injunction to abate the nuisance under Wis. Stat. sec. 823.02, but it modified the injunction as overbroad because its scope exceeded what was equitably necessary. The court rejected Weller's arguments that he should choose his own abatement methods and that the forfeiture amounts were excessive.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Cornejo v. Polycon Industries, Inc., an employee sued his employer for bad faith, emotional distress, fraud, and outrage after being fired and later not rehired following a workplace hand injury, claiming the employer's actions violated his rights beyond the worker's compensation process. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision in Wis. Stat. sec. 102.35(3) for unreasonable refusal to rehire an injured employee. The court reasoned that the suit essentially sought redress for refusal to rehire after a work-related injury, which falls squarely under the worker's compensation statute's exclusive liability framework, distinguishing it from cases involving insurer bad faith like Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co. It rejected arguments that the claims fell outside worker's compensation, that constitutional remedy rights were violated, or that other tort precedents allowed bypassing the statutory exclusivity, emphasizing the legislative balance limiting employer liability in exchange for sure recovery.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned whether Milwaukee County's executive could veto a county board resolution to raise capital funds for the Metropolitan Sewerage District, and whether a writ of mandamus could compel the executive to approve such funding. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of mandamus, holding that the board's statutory duty to provide financing for the district is subject to the county executive's constitutional veto power. The board fulfilled its obligation by passing the resolution, but the executive had no ministerial duty to approve it and could exercise the veto. The court noted that later legislation created new funding methods that avoid this conflict but did not render the present dispute moot.

environmentprocedure

In the case In Interest of I.V., a minor appealed orders finding him delinquent for burglary and requiring restitution for unrecovered stolen property under the Children's Code. The court addressed whether Wisconsin statute sec. 48.34(5) permits restitution for property loss in addition to damage. The court affirmed the restitution order, interpreting the statutory term 'damage to the property of another' broadly to include unrecovered stolen items based on dictionary definitions, the remedial nature of restitution provisions, and legislative context.

criminal lawfamily law

This case was an appeal by Greyland Hegwood from a trial court order denying his motion to modify his 1976 sentences of twenty-five years for rape (party to a crime) and ten years for armed robbery (party to a crime), which ran concurrently. The appellate court vacated the order and remanded for a hearing on the merits, holding that the legislature's later repeal of the rape statute and enactment of a sexual assault statute reducing the maximum penalty from thirty to twenty years constituted a "new factor" for sentence modification purposes. The core reasoning was that a statutory penalty reduction reflects the legislature's assessment of the offense's gravity, a key sentencing consideration, and thus qualifies as a new factor even though it does not automatically require retroactive sentence reduction under prior precedent like Moore v. State.

criminal law

This case concerned a paternity action in which the putative father, Jerry Slocum, denied paternity at his initial appearance before a family court commissioner, who then ordered him to submit to a blood test; the trial court vacated that order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the vacation, holding that the commissioner lacked authority to require the test at the first appearance. Under the 1980 amendments to Wisconsin's paternity statutes, the putative father must first be informed of his rights, after which a pretrial hearing is held to assess the probability that paternity can be established at trial and to determine whether a judicial finding would serve the child's best interests. Only if those conditions are met may the court order blood testing, followed by a final recommendation and, if necessary, a trial. The court resolved the matter on statutory grounds without reaching constitutional questions.

family lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a misdemeanor conviction for carrying a concealed weapon after police stopped and frisked Marvin Williamson near a squad car at night, found a revolver in his coat pocket, and arrested him. Williamson challenged both the sufficiency of the criminal complaint and the constitutionality of the stop, frisk, and arrest under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court upheld the stop and frisk as reasonable under Terry v. Ohio standards, admitted the evidence, and convicted Williamson after a bench trial. The appellate court reversed the conviction, concluding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Williamson or to frisk him for weapons based on the totality of circumstances, including the lack of prior information about him or his companion and the absence of other justifying factors.

criminal lawgunsprocedure