Laurel H. Siddoway

The case concerned whether a real estate developer could rely on a Shoreline Management Act exemption to build docks for speculative waterfront homes without first obtaining a substantial development permit from the City of Spokane Valley. The Washington Court of Appeals held that the developer was not entitled to the exemption and reversed the superior court's denial of the Department of Ecology's land-use petition. The court reasoned that the statutory exemption in RCW 90.58.030(3)(e)(vii) applies only when an existing owner, lessee, or contract purchaser of a residence seeks to construct a dock for their own private, noncommercial use, not when a developer builds docks for later sale to unidentified buyers. Because this threshold issue was dispositive, the court did not reach arguments about potential cumulative environmental impacts from multiple docks.

environmentpropertybusiness & regulatory

CherryAnn Coballes appealed a superior court ruling that upheld Spokane County’s declaration of her dog Gunnar as dangerous after the dog bit a three-year-old child who entered a bedroom where the dog was confined. The Court of Appeals addressed whether Coballes was entitled to a second appeal as of right from the superior court’s decision reviewing the county board’s determination. The court held that no such appeal of right exists and instead granted Coballes leave to file a motion for discretionary review under RAP 2.3(d). It reasoned that the dangerous-dog proceeding had already received one level of review in superior court under RCW 36.32.330, and allowing an automatic further appeal would exceed the appellate process available in comparable civil and criminal cases, making discretionary review the proper avenue.

procedure

The case involved a dispute over a real estate purchase and sale agreement for approximately 30 acres in Quincy, Washington, between buyer Patrick Kofmehl and seller Baseline Lake, LLC. After the parties could not agree on the property boundaries or complete the transaction, Kofmehl invoked the statute of frauds to void the contract due to an inadequate legal description and sued for rescission and restitution of his earnest money and costs. The trial court granted summary judgment to Kofmehl, ordering restitution and attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a buyer who avoids a contract under the statute of frauds is not entitled to restitution if the seller was ready, willing, and able to perform, and that the buyer bears the burden of proving the seller was not ready, willing, and able. Because the trial court had improperly placed that burden on Baseline, the appellate court remanded for further proceedings.

propertyprocedure

Jorge Cantu filed a workers' compensation claim after injuring his knee at a WestFarm Foods cheese plant in 2004; the claim closed in 2005 with a permanent partial disability award, but he later sought to reopen it, alleging that his ongoing knee problems caused new back pain and major depressive disorder. The Department of Labor and Industries denied reopening, and the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals affirmed that denial after finding no causal link or objective worsening. On Cantu's de novo appeal, the superior court reversed the board, treated certain unchallenged board findings as verities, and ordered the claim reopened based on medical testimony establishing causation and aggravation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that any error in treating the board findings as binding was harmless because substantial evidence supported the superior court's independent determinations on credibility, causation, and the need for further treatment.

labor & employmentprocedure

In State v. Winborne, the defendant pleaded guilty to three felony counts of violating a domestic violence no-contact order and received a standard-range sentence of 60 months of confinement per count—the statutory maximum—plus a required 12-month term of community custody, for a combined total exceeding the maximum. The trial court followed the prior practice, upheld in In re Brooks, of adding a notation in the judgment directing the Department of Corrections to ensure the combined terms did not exceed 60 months. The Court of Appeals held that 2009 amendments to the Sentencing Reform Act eliminated the variable community-custody provisions that had made the Brooks notation workable, so sentencing courts must now reduce the community-custody term at the outset under RCW 9.94A.701(9) to avoid an excessive sentence. Because the imposed sentence exceeded the statutory maximum without that adjustment, the court remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In Melter v. Melter, William Melter challenged the fourth will and related lifetime asset transfers of his mother, Mary Virginia Melter, arguing that his brother John had exerted undue influence to disinherit him and receive nearly all of the estate. The trial court set aside the will and transfers after finding undue influence, but the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence failed to meet the required clear, cogent, and convincing standard. The court noted sustainable findings that Virginia had testamentary capacity when executing the will, had legitimate reasons for favoring John, and had explained her wishes to an attorney acting in her interest, even while acknowledging John's failure to fully account for some asset transfers and the brothers' mutual withholding of information. The opinion emphasized that a will is presumed valid absent such strong proof of undue influence and remanded for entry of judgment upholding the documents in favor of John and Sandra Melter.

family lawproperty

Stephanie Strong was convicted as an accomplice to second-degree extortion after her boyfriend demanded $5,000 from corrections officer Velven York in exchange for silence about York’s violations of county policy by fraternizing with Strong, a former inmate. She appealed on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the threat to disclose truthful information was protected speech, comparable to a demand to settle embarrassing facts underlying a threatened lawsuit. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the extortionate threat was not protected speech. The court reasoned that, unlike a threat tied to a plausible claim of right in litigation, this demand for payment to conceal wrongdoing constituted conduct punishable under the extortion statute independent of any pure-speech protection, and independent review of the record confirmed the speech fell outside First Amendment safeguards.

criminal lawfree speech

In River House Development, Inc. v. Integrus Architecture, the dispute arose from a construction project contract containing provisions for mediation followed by arbitration of claims; after sending a demand letter and attempting to negotiate a tolling agreement, River House filed a protective lawsuit in superior court, served formal discovery, participated in case scheduling that referenced a potential trial, and delayed seeking a stay, while Integrus ultimately disavowed any duty to arbitrate. The trial court ruled that River House had waived its contractual ADR rights through this litigation conduct, and River House appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding first that waiver by litigation conduct is a question for the court rather than an arbitrator to decide. It reasoned that, despite River House’s initial references to the contract’s ADR clauses, its subsequent actions—pursuing discovery, complying with court procedures, and failing to initiate arbitration—were inconsistent with preserving a right to mediate and arbitrate, thereby waiving that right under Washington law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Hymas v. UAP Distribution, Inc., a concrete pump operator employed by Narum Concrete Construction was seriously injured when he fell into an unguarded trench at a fertilizer plant construction site owned by UAP, which had directly hired multiple specialty contractors rather than a general contractor. Hymas sued UAP for negligence, alleging it owed him a statutory duty under WISHA as a jobsite owner that retained control over the work and a common-law duty as a landowner to protect invitees from known hazards. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for UAP, holding that the company owed no duty as a matter of law. The court reasoned that the parties’ contract expressly assigned Narum sole responsibility for supervision, construction methods, and all safety programs, while disclaiming any UAP duty for jobsite safety; evidence showed UAP did not actually exercise control over Narum’s work or the trench; and, as an open and obvious condition known to Hymas, the trench did not trigger premises liability.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In State v. Ponce, Antonio Ponce was convicted of second degree burglary after being found inside a tire shop that showed signs of forced entry; he claimed he had been invited in by men who appeared to work there and argued this permissible entry negated the “unlawfully” element of the crime. The trial court refused his proposed jury instruction treating permissible entry as a defense to burglary, though it did instruct on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. The Court of Appeals held that while Ponce presented enough evidence to argue the defense, no separate instruction was required because the standard burglary instructions already clearly placed on the State the burden of proving both unlawful entry and intent to commit a crime. The court therefore affirmed the conviction, distinguishing the case from an earlier decision that had required an explicit abandonment instruction only when the existing instructions failed to convey the State’s burden.

criminal lawprocedure

In Hook v. Lincoln County Noxious Weed Control Board, property owner Bert Hook sued to invalidate a lien placed on his land for the cost of eradicating noxious weeds and to block the county board’s further actions, claiming the 1970 resolution that activated the board was void because the county commissioners failed to give the ten days’ published notice required by RCW 36.32.120(7) for exercises of local police power. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county and board and denied Hook’s request to amend his complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that chapter 17.10 RCW supplies a complete, independent statutory scheme for activating and operating county weed control boards, so the general notice rule did not apply; the board was properly activated in 1970 after published notice and a hearing. The court also ruled that Hook’s failure to attach a proposed amended pleading, as required by CR 15(a), justified denial of leave to amend.

propertyenvironmentprocedure

Jackie Burton was convicted of solicitation to commit first-degree murder after she paid an undercover officer $1,000 to kill her former employer and lover, following recorded meetings in which she described her desire for his death and provided details about his home. On appeal, she sought a new trial, arguing primarily that a three-year delay in preparing the trial transcript violated her rights and that other errors occurred at trial, including evidentiary rulings related to her entrapment defense. The court held that the reporter’s delay was inexcusable but did not require reversal because the record was adequately settled through available procedures and Burton showed no actual prejudice to her appeal. It also found no other trial errors and affirmed the conviction, noting that appellate delay claims require a demonstration of prejudice rather than presumptive harm from the passage of time alone.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a second lawsuit by Barbara and Ray Steinbock against Ferry County Public Utility District No. 1 after the PUD terminated electric service to their properties for nonpayment of over $9,000 in arrears, despite a prior payment agreement. The Steinbocks asserted tort claims including negligence, negligent supervision, outrage, harassment, and wrongful debt collection, later seeking to add civil rights and declaratory relief claims based on alleged failures to follow PUD service policies. The trial court denied the motion to amend and granted summary judgment dismissing all claims, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that the parties' relationship was governed by contract, the first action had already determined that the PUD fulfilled its contractual obligations by complying with applicable service procedures, and the new tort and proposed claims necessarily failed or were futile in light of that prior ruling and the public availability of the policies.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In Brotherton v. Kralman Steel Structures, Inc., homeowners Mark and Georgie Brotherton sued contractor Kralman Steel for breach of contract after it built a defective driveway that failed to slope properly for drainage, was too thin in places, lacked adequate base preparation, and developed uncontrolled cracking, despite the parties' agreement that the work would meet industry standards. The trial court awarded the Brothertons damages equal to the reasonable cost of removing and replacing the driveway, based on expert testimony and contractor bids showing this was necessary to achieve the promised performance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the damages award, holding that it was supported by evidence of the cost to meet the contract standard without improper betterments. It reversed the award of attorney fees and costs against the contractor's surety bond, however, because RCW 18.27.040 limits such recovery to amounts remaining after damages claims are paid, consistent with the Supreme Court's construction of the statute in Cosmopolitan Engineering Group, Inc. v. Ondeo Degremont, Inc.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Link v. Link, a mother appealed the denial of her petition to regain custody of her son from her own mother, to whom she had voluntarily relinquished custody by agreement during a period of substance abuse, without any contested hearing finding her unfit or that her custody would harm the child. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary dismissal of the modification petition. It held that the statutory hurdles for showing adequate cause to modify a custody decree under RCW 26.09.260(1), (2) and .270 were unconstitutional as applied, because they unduly burdened the mother's fundamental right to parent absent any prior determination of unfitness or actual detriment. The court reasoned that custody placement must instead be decided under the best-interests standard of RCW 26.10.100, which accounts for the parental presumption, and remanded for proceedings consistent with that standard.

family law

This case concerns a civil forfeiture action by the City of Walla Walla to retain $401,333.44 in cash seized from a residence during a 2006 narcotics investigation that led to Adrian Ibarra-Raya’s arrest and later-reversed drug convictions. After an earlier reversal of summary judgment for the City because illegally obtained evidence could not be used, the trial court ruled for the City following a bench trial on two alternative grounds: statutory forfeiture under RCW 69.50.505 and the court rule allowing retention of property when the claimant is not its rightful owner. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting challenges to jurisdiction and judicial estoppel but finding the trial court’s findings insufficient to review probable cause for statutory forfeiture. It nonetheless upheld the judgment because substantial untainted evidence supported the finding that Ibarra-Raya was not the owner, making him ineligible to recover the funds under CrR 2.3 regardless of the statutory claim.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

In State v. Guerrero, Cesar Bribiesca Guerrero was convicted of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine with a school-zone enhancement and requested an alternative sentence under the drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) statute, RCW 9.94A.660, for which he was eligible. The trial court denied the DOSA request without ordering a chemical dependency screening report, imposed a standard-range sentence of 40 months, and added a $3,000 methamphetamine lab clean-up fine. On appeal, Guerrero argued that the court violated RCW 9.94A.500(1) by failing to order the report, did not meaningfully consider his DOSA request, and abused its discretion on the fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the more specific 2009 DOSA statute made such reports permissive rather than mandatory, that the trial court adequately considered and rejected the request on the record, and that any procedural omission was harmless given the court's expressed unwillingness to grant DOSA.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Arreola, a police officer followed the defendant's car after a citizen report of possible drunk driving, observed no signs of impairment, but noticed a modified muffler violating state equipment law and stopped the vehicle primarily to investigate for DUI. The defendant moved to suppress the resulting evidence as the product of an unconstitutional pretextual stop, but the trial court denied the motion and convicted him of felony DUI after finding the muffler violation an independent, hypothetically sufficient reason for the stop. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for dismissal, holding that the stop violated article I, section 7 of the state constitution. The court reasoned that the officer's primary motive was DUI investigation without corroboration or observed impairment, rendering the stop pretextual despite the secondary equipment violation, and that the trial court's own findings compelled this conclusion under precedents such as State v. Ladson.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Prudential Almon Realty’s claim for a real estate commission under the “tail” provision of an expired exclusive listing agreement with Dr. Kipp and Carmen Young. That provision entitled Prudential to a commission if the Yakima home sold within 365 days after the listing expired to a buyer whose attention had been drawn to the property through Prudential’s signs, advertising, or other efforts. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no material factual dispute that the buyers had learned of the home independently. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that disputed facts and differing reasonable inferences about how the buyers became aware of the property—particularly through a brochure and sign seen by an intermediary who later contacted them—created triable issues under the contract’s language. The court remanded for further proceedings, applying Washington principles that contract interpretation involving credibility or inference from extrinsic evidence must be decided by the fact-finder rather than on summary judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the Washington State Nurses Association and a nurse suing Sacred Heart Medical Center for allegedly violating Washington's Minimum Wage Act by compensating missed rest breaks at straight time rather than overtime rates. The nurses argued that state-mandated 10-minute rest breaks missed during the first 40 hours of a workweek counted as additional hours worked, entitling them to time-and-a-half pay under the MWA when it pushed total hours over 40. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's ruling in favor of the nurses, holding that the hospital's straight-time payments for missed breaks complied with the MWA. The core reasoning was that the missed breaks occurred within the nurses' regular 40-hour schedules and did not constitute extra hours worked beyond that threshold, so overtime was not required.

labor & employment