Linda Lau

In State v. Truong, Sindy Truong was charged as a juvenile with two counts of first degree robbery after she and several companions boarded a Seattle bus, grabbed a Zune MP3 player and headphones from one passenger, then searched another passenger's pockets and took his cigarettes while repeatedly punching both victims to overcome resistance. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court convicted her of first degree robbery of the Zune and headphones and the lesser offense of second degree robbery of the cigarettes. The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, holding that unchallenged findings of fact established Truong's participation in the takings and use of force, and that under Washington's transactional analysis for robbery, force used after the initial taking to retain the property satisfies the statutory force element.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute over possession of a mobile home space in Thunderbird Mobile Home Park, where MHM & F, LLC sought to evict Edward Pryor Jr. under Washington's Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act after Pryor allegedly defaulted on stock purchase payments tied to his space, leading to foreclosure of his shares and unpaid maintenance charges. The trial court granted the LLC a writ of restitution and judgment for unlawful detainer. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the superior court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action. It further concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact regarding Pryor's defaults and that those findings supported the legal conclusions authorizing eviction and restitution of the premises, along with an award of attorney fees to the LLC.

propertyprocedure

In Re Haghighi involves a personal restraint petition filed by Baron Haghighi challenging his convictions for unlawful issuance of checks or drafts and first degree theft. The convictions stemmed from evidence consisting of bank records that the trial court admitted under the inevitable discovery rule after finding a search warrant unenforceable; the Court of Appeals had affirmed on direct appeal. Haghighi argued that the Washington Supreme Court's later decision in State v. Winterstein, which rejected the inevitable discovery rule under the state constitution, should apply retroactively to his already-final case and that his appellate counsel was ineffective. The court dismissed the petition, holding that Winterstein does not apply retroactively on collateral review to convictions final before it was decided because it neither decriminalized the conduct nor constituted a watershed procedural rule, and that the ineffective assistance claim was time-barred under RCW 10.73.090.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Pacific Continental Bank provided up to $10.3 million in construction financing to Soundview 90 LLC, secured by a deed of trust, while Village Framers Corp. (VFC) performed framing work and later recorded a $385,465.48 mechanics’ lien. After VFC served the Bank with a stop notice under RCW 60.04.221, the Bank set aside $386,000 in a reserve but continued disbursing other loan funds to Soundview; when Soundview defaulted, the receiver sought to give the Bank priority over the lien for escrowed sale proceeds. The trial court granted summary judgment to the receiver, finding the Bank’s security interest had priority. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Bank’s entire deed of trust is subordinated to VFC’s lien under RCW 60.04.221(7) because the statute expressly requires withholding the claimed amount from the next and subsequent draws rather than merely creating a reserve while advancing other proceeds. The court reasoned that the Bank’s method of compliance violated the stop-notice provision’s plain terms, triggering the statutory penalty of subordination.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Breaux, the Washington Court of Appeals addressed sentencing under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b) for a defendant who pleaded guilty to two serious violent offenses—attempted first degree rape and first degree rape—plus one violent offense of second degree rape arising from separate conduct. The statute mandates consecutive sentences for multiple serious violent offenses and requires calculating the standard range for the offense with the highest seriousness level using the defendant's prior convictions and other non-serious violent current offenses, while setting an offender score of zero for the remaining serious violent offenses. Because the two serious violent offenses carried the same seriousness level, creating ambiguity about which would receive the zero score, the court applied the rule of lenity to resolve the question in the defendant's favor. It held that the zero-score rule applies to the first degree rape conviction (producing the shorter total sentence), while the attempted first degree rape conviction uses the higher offender score that includes priors and the second degree rape. The court remanded for resentencing under this calculation.

criminal law

This case involved a tax dispute over whether Nord Northwest Corporation owed retailing business and occupation tax and retail sales tax on payments received for building two condominiums. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's reversal of the Board of Tax Appeals, holding that Nord did not qualify as a "speculative builder" under WAC 458-20-170 and thus owed the taxes. The court reasoned that the two LLCs—not Nord—held legal title to the properties, obtained the construction loans, entered into the contracts with Nord for its services, and sold the completed units to buyers, even though Nord held a partial ownership interest in the LLCs and contributed services in exchange for profit shares. The court rejected Nord's arguments that its LLC membership or other arrangements effectively established ownership of the real property.

business & regulatorypropertytaxes

Kenneth House sued the estate of William McCamey for negligent entrustment after suffering injuries in a car accident caused by William's son Michael, who was driving a truck that William had purchased and provided to him. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that House failed to raise material fact issues showing William knew or reasonably should have known Michael was a reckless, heedless, or incompetent driver. Although Michael had an extensive criminal and traffic record, recent parole violations involving alcohol, and reports of drinking and abuse, the evidence did not establish William's knowledge of reckless driving habits or that any such habits proximately caused the accident, which was not alcohol-related.

torts & liability

This case arose from David Martin's attempt to pursue claims against the estate of William Wilbert for alleged misconduct by Wilbert while serving as personal representative in the earlier probate of the Jack DelGuzzi estate. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Wilbert estate. The court held that res judicata barred the claims because a prior superior court order closing the DelGuzzi estate constituted a final judgment, and the claims and issues were identical in subject matter, cause of action, parties, and quality of parties to those that were or could have been litigated in the prior probate proceedings.

procedureproperty

The case involved unit owners who purchased condominium units from a developer financed by primary and secondary construction lenders; after the escrow agent failed to obtain release of the secondary lender's deed of trust, the secondary lender sought nonjudicial foreclosure on five units. The unit owners sued to quiet title in themselves, seeking equitable estoppel, imposition of a constructive trust based on unjust enrichment, or equitable subrogation to the primary lender's priority position. The trial court dismissed the quiet title action, dissolved a preliminary injunction, and authorized foreclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the unit owners failed to establish grounds for equitable estoppel or unjust enrichment and that equitable subrogation was unavailable because it would materially prejudice the secondary lender.

property

In Bird v. Best Plumbing Group, LLC, a homeowner sued a plumbing company for trespass and negligence after its employee cut a sewage line on his property, causing extensive damage and leading to a $3.75 million settlement that included a stipulated judgment, covenant not to execute, and assignment of claims against the company's insurer, Farmers. The trial court, after a multi-day hearing, found the settlement reasonable under RCW 4.22.060 despite the insurer's objections and denied its demand for a jury trial on that issue. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that a reasonableness hearing is an equitable proceeding that carries no constitutional right to a jury and that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in evaluating factors such as the strength of the claims, potential damages, and absence of collusion. The decision establishes that the settlement amount can serve as the presumptive measure of damages in a subsequent bad faith action against the insurer.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case was an insurance coverage dispute between two excess insurers, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London and Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, over responsibility for flood losses to a nursing facility in Centralia, Washington. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lloyd's, requiring Travelers to pay $11 million in flood and ordinance or law coverage before Lloyd's excess policy would attach. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Travelers, holding that the Lloyd's policy unambiguously attaches once Travelers admits its $1 million flood liability. The court reasoned that the Travelers policy's flood endorsement caps coverage at $1 million for flood losses in high-risk zones, that ordinance or law limits are not part of that flood sublimit, and that the Lloyd's policy follows the Travelers form without expanding the attachment point.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved Michael Rowland's 1991 conviction for first-degree murder, where the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 180 months based on judicial findings of deliberate cruelty after calculating an offender score of 3. Rowland later filed a personal restraint petition successfully challenging the offender score as miscalculated due to a non-comparable prior conviction, leading to resentencing with a corrected score of 2. At resentencing, the court reimposed the same exceptional sentence without submitting aggravating facts to a jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the exceptional sentence, holding that Blakely v. Washington does not apply retroactively to require jury findings because Rowland's collateral attack did not disturb the finality of the exceptional sentence imposed before Blakely. However, the court remanded solely to correct the offender score and resulting standard range.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved homeowners Christopher Gray and Julie Lassonde-Gray seeking to release a construction lien filed by Bourgette Construction, LLC, on their Mercer Island home for unpaid remodeling work. The Grays argued the lien was frivolous because Bourgette failed to provide the required notice of right to claim a lien under RCW 60.04.031, as they had no direct contract with Bourgette and disputed that Geoffrey James was their common law agent. Bourgette responded that no notice was required under the common law agent exception because it had contracted directly with James, whom the Grays had authorized to manage the project. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to release the lien under the summary procedure of RCW 60.04.081, concluding that the record showed debatable issues of law and fact on the agency question that did not establish the lien was frivolous and without reasonable cause. The court also upheld the award of attorney fees to Bourgette.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over attorney fees following a trial de novo in a spousal maintenance modification action that had been arbitrated under Washington law. After the arbitrator's award, McCauley requested a trial de novo but failed to improve her position, yet the trial court denied fees to Brown, finding the discretionary fee provision in RCW 26.09.140 for dissolution proceedings to be controlling. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that recent amendments to RCW 7.06.060 make an award of fees and costs mandatory against a party who appeals an arbitration award without improving their position on trial de novo, and this statute governs over the family law fees statute. The court remanded for an award to Brown while rejecting his separate request for pro se fees.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Mohamoud, the juvenile court, over the State's objection and contrary to a plea agreement in which the defendant agreed not to seek deferral, sua sponte continued a disposition hearing and later ordered a six-month deferred disposition for a first-time juvenile offender convicted of third-degree assault. The Court of Appeals held that the deferred disposition order was void. The court reasoned that RCW 13.40.127 grants no inherent or express authority for a juvenile court to initiate deferral on its own motion; instead, the statute requires a timely motion by the juvenile, consultation with a parent or guardian, the juvenile's consent, and other mandatory procedural steps that were not followed here. The case was remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brown, Frederick Brown was convicted by a jury of five counts of felony violation of a no-contact order based on multiple contacts with his former partner over several days in October, November, and December 2007. Brown appealed, claiming violations of double jeopardy from convictions on consecutive days, lack of a Petrich instruction for jury unanimity, improper prosecutorial arguments, ineffective assistance of counsel, and insufficient proof of underlying convictions to elevate the charges to felonies. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, reasoning that the contacts on separate days constituted distinct violations not subject to double jeopardy, that the acts formed a continuing course of conduct obviating the need for a Petrich instruction, that any prosecutorial statements caused no prejudice, that counsel's performance was not deficient, and that recent precedent supported the felony elevation.

criminal law

In Ahten v. Barnes, homeowner Jan Ahten sued contractor Bradley J. Barnes for breach of contract damages and named the surety to recover against the contractor's required bond under Washington law. Ahten served the Department of Labor and Industries but not Barnes personally, then obtained a large default judgment against Barnes personally. The trial court vacated the judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute's substituted service provision applies only to claims against the bond and does not confer jurisdiction over personal claims against the contractor. The court reasoned that the statute's language requires service on the Department for suits against both the contractor and the bond, and legislative history shows no intent to allow personal jurisdiction through this method alone.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a homeowner who sued her licensed contractor for breach of contract damages and the surety on the contractor's required bond. She served the summons and complaint only on the Department of Labor and Industries as permitted by RCW 18.27.040(3), obtained a large default judgment against the contractor personally after he failed to appear, and the trial court later vacated that judgment for lack of proper service and personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the vacation order, concluding that the statute's substituted service mechanism applies exclusively to claims seeking recovery against the bond and does not extend personal jurisdiction over the contractor for separate breach of contract claims. The court based its holding on the statute's plain language requiring service in actions against the contractor and the bond, as well as legislative history confirming no intent to broaden jurisdiction.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a guardian suing on behalf of 93-year-old Dottie Brown after her son Barry, acting under powers of attorney, obtained a reverse mortgage on her condominium through Wells Fargo Bank and misappropriated the proceeds, including by transferring funds to his girlfriend Beverly Hogg. Dottie appealed summary judgment dismissals of her federal reverse mortgage law and Consumer Protection Act claims against Wells Fargo, as well as her misappropriation and conversion claims against Hogg. The court affirmed dismissal of the claims against Wells Fargo because Dottie presented insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the bank's liability. It reversed the dismissal of the conversion claim against Hogg, however, because material issues of fact existed as to whether she received identifiable proceeds from the loan.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This case involved a negligence lawsuit by Jamie Stanley against Harold Cole arising from a 2004 car accident, which was transferred to mandatory arbitration under Washington court rules. Stanley's attorney failed to submit a prehearing statement or appear at the arbitration hearing due to caring for her ill parents, resulting in a $7,000 award to Stanley that became final after neither party requested a trial de novo. Stanley moved to vacate the award under CR 60(b)(9) on grounds of unavoidable casualty or misfortune, but the trial court denied the motion and entered judgment on the award. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion because the circumstances did not meet the standard for relief and clients are generally accountable for their attorney's acts or omissions in prosecuting the case.

proceduretorts & liability