
LITTLEFAIR v. Schulze
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-06-05 · cited 23×
Peter Littlefair and David Schulze own adjacent lots in a subdivision accessed by a private road within a 40-foot-wide easement shown on the plat map. Littlefair sued to require removal of a fence Schulze built parallel to the road within the easement area, claiming interference with the easement and violation of a county zoning ordinance that prohibits structures in easements. The trial court found the fence did not interfere with the road's historical one-lane use and declined to enforce the zoning ordinance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the easement's scope is defined by the plat's 40-foot width and that the fence constitutes a nuisance per se because it violates the unambiguous zoning ordinance prohibiting such structures.
property
Raven v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVICES
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-03-27 · cited 6×
The case concerned whether Resa Raven, a court-appointed limited guardian for Ida, a vulnerable adult with severe medical and mental health issues, neglected her ward under the Abuse of Vulnerable Adults Act by failing to ensure necessary medical care. DSHS initially found neglect, an ALJ reversed that finding, but the DSHS Board reinstated it; the superior court then reversed the Board and awarded Raven attorney fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's finding of neglect, concluding that Raven's duty required making every reasonable effort to meet Ida's medical needs and that she failed to do so, while also holding that the applicable standard of proof was preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing; the court further reversed the fee award because DSHS's action was substantially justified.
family lawhealthcareprocedure
Columbia Community Bank v. Newman Park, LLC
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-02-22 · cited 3×
The case involved Columbia Community Bank seeking to enforce a loan agreement against Newman Park LLC after Joseph Sturtevant, who lacked authority, used the LLC's property as collateral and defaulted on the loan. The trial court granted summary judgment denying direct liability on the loan but allowing equitable subrogation for the bank's payments on a prior loan and delinquent taxes to prevent unjust enrichment. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that issues of fact did not preclude summary judgment on authority and that equitable subrogation applied under the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages even though the bank was not a volunteer.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
AUDIT & ADJUSTMENT CO. v. Earl
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-11-29 · cited 1×
The case involved a debt collection action by Audit & Adjustment Company against Donald Earl to recover unpaid emergency medical bills from Jefferson Healthcare. Earl asserted as an affirmative defense that he qualified for charity care under chapter 70.170 RCW, which would have reduced or eliminated the debt, but the hospital had denied his application after treating net proceeds from a property sale as income that made him ineligible. The district court entered judgment for Audit, finding Earl ineligible for charity care, and the superior court and Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the hospital properly applied the income rules under RCW 70.170.060(5) and WAC 246-453-010(17), that Earl failed to meet his burden of proof with incomplete financial information, and that no reversible procedural errors occurred.
healthcarebusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure
In Re Detention of Cherry
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-09-13 · cited 7×
The case involved Gary Cherry, civilly committed since 1999 as a sexually violent predator under Washington's chapter 71.09 RCW, who sought unconditional release after multiple annual reviews by state evaluators concluded he no longer met the SVP definition due to successful treatment and community management. The parties presented the trial court with a stipulated order dismissing the commitment petition, as the State conceded it could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cherry continued to qualify as an SVP, but the court refused to enter the order or grant a jury trial. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that CR 41 required the trial court to accept the agreed dismissal because SVP proceedings are civil in nature and the civil rules apply absent inconsistency with the statute. The core reasoning centered on the absence of any statutory conflict with CR 41 and the fact that the State's stipulation itself established grounds for release without further adjudication.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Evans
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-09-13 · cited 21×
In State v. Evans, Jarrett Reedy and JoJo Hamilton Evans Sr. were convicted by a jury of first degree robbery as accomplices after an incident at a motel where undercover officers observed events leading to charges involving an alleged robbery, assault, and drug-related offenses. On appeal, the defendants challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence for the robbery convictions and the prosecutor's statements during closing argument that characterized the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. However, it concluded that the prosecutor's improper comments mischaracterized core legal standards in a way that could not be cured by jury instructions, even without a defense objection, requiring reversal. The convictions were reversed and the case remanded for retrial.
criminal lawprocedure