This case involved an injured railroad worker who sued his employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for negligence, prompting the employer to seek summary judgment on whether it qualified as a “common carrier” under that statute. The trial court referred the common-carrier question to the federal Surface Transportation Board under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine, and the worker sought mandamus relief from that referral order. The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion because no statute clearly grants the Board authority to decide common-carrier status for purposes of FELA liability. The Court explained that administrative agencies possess only the powers expressly conferred by the legislature and that Texas courts have long resolved such FELA questions themselves. It therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to vacate the referral.
This case concerned private organizations challenging Texas statutes that authorize temporary closures of Boca Chica Beach for spaceflight safety, arguing the closures violate the public's constitutional right under Article I, Section 33 of the Texas Constitution to unrestricted ingress, egress, and use of state-owned beaches. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the plaintiffs' claims were barred because subsection (d) of the constitutional provision expressly states that it does not create a private right of enforcement, meaning only governmental actors may sue to protect the right. As a result, the private plaintiffs failed to allege a viable claim, governmental immunity was not waived, and the trial court properly dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction; the court of appeals' reversal was overturned. The decision rested on the plain text of the amendment, its historical context following the Open Beaches Act, and the principle that courts cannot rewrite constitutional limits on enforcement.
The case involved a disciplinary proceeding against attorney William W. Ruth for allegedly violating Rule 4.02(a), the no-contact rule, by directly serving filings and correspondence on members of the Commission for Lawyer Discipline while he represented himself pro se in an earlier matter. The Supreme Court of Texas held that Rule 4.02(a) does not apply to a lawyer representing only himself. The court's core reasoning was that the rule's prefatory phrase "[i]n representing a client" requires a separate client and therefore excludes self-represented lawyers, leading it to reverse the five-year suspension imposed by the lower courts.
This case involves a challenge to a default judgment entered against respondents Maurice and Ni-Ida Colter in favor of petitioners Huffman Asset Management and Prairie Capital, turning on questions of proper service under Section 5.253 of the Business Organizations Code and related Whitney certificates. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed or declined to uphold the default judgment, consistent with its longstanding practice. The core reasoning is that default judgments are greatly disfavored because they bypass adversarial presentation and adjudication on the merits, requiring strict compliance with statutory and procedural service rules to ensure actual notice whenever reasonably possible. The concurrence catalogs two decades of unanimous or near-unanimous reversals on these grounds, whether based on statutes, rules of procedure, the Craddock test, or due process.
In this case, Emily Lehmberg sued Studio E. Architecture and Interiors, Inc. and others over a home remodel, but failed to file the certificate of merit required by Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 150.002 with her original petition against the architecture firm, leading to dismissal of those claims without prejudice. The trial court allowed Lehmberg to reassert the claims in an amended petition that included the certificate, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that when claims against a covered professional are dismissed without prejudice but the underlying lawsuit continues, the plaintiff may reassert them with the required certificate in an amended petition in the same suit. The Court reasoned that the statute's text does not prohibit such an amendment, and a without-prejudice dismissal returns the parties to their pre-suit positions as if the claims against that defendant had never been filed.
This case involves a dispute between neighboring property owners where the Kolles alleged that development by the Kuceras, including a dam and berms, caused flooding and damage to their land, leading to claims of nuisance and violations of the Water Code. The jury awarded economic damages of $425,000 and substantial exemplary damages, but the court of appeals reduced the economic damages to $175,000. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the exemplary damages cap under Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 41.008 applies to each defendant based on their apportioned percentage of responsibility multiplied by the total economic damages awarded jointly to the plaintiffs, resulting in a cap of $200,000 per defendant here. The court reversed the judgment in part regarding the exemplary damages awards and remanded for the trial court to allocate the capped amounts between the plaintiffs and reassess for constitutional excessiveness.