Paul W. Green

The case concerned whether a class action could proceed against General Motors on behalf of Texas residents who bought or leased new 1997-2001 Chevrolet Malibus, based on claims that the vehicles had a brake-system defect causing pulsation that GM could not effectively repair, resulting in diminished value at the time of purchase; the plaintiffs asserted breach of implied and express warranties and, for a subclass, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The trial court certified the class and approved a trial plan focusing on common questions of defect, breach, and diminished value. On appeal, the court reversed the certification order and remanded the case. It held that the class failed to satisfy the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 because individual issues—such as whether any particular vehicle actually manifested the defect, whether repairs were effective for specific owners, causation, and GM’s defenses like misuse or improper maintenance—would predominate over common questions, rendering class treatment inappropriate.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves Nancy Wolfram's efforts to enforce a 1988 California spousal support judgment against her ex-husband Herbert's assets in Texas after he stopped payments and later died. Nancy filed a petition in Texas probate court to domesticate the foreign judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act and pursued claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act against Lou Ann Wolfram individually and as trustee of a revocable living trust, alleging improper transfers of assets. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lou Ann on grounds including the statute of limitations and lack of a debtor-creditor relationship. On rehearing, the appellate court vacated its prior reversal and held that Nancy failed to properly domesticate the judgment because she filed only an abstract rather than an authenticated copy of the judgment and sued the non-entity 'estate,' rendering the action invalid under the Uniform Act. The court reasoned that an abstract of judgment is not a reproduction of the original judgment's terms and that no legal entity existed to be sued as the estate.

family lawprocedureproperty

The case involved Retamco Operating, Inc. suing Paradigm Oil, Inc. and related entities for breach of contract and fraud over unpaid overriding royalties from oil and gas leases under a 1984 purchase agreement. After Paradigm repeatedly failed to respond to discovery requests and comply with court orders compelling responses and depositions, the trial court imposed death penalty sanctions, struck the answer, and entered a $1,600,000 default judgment. On appeal, the court affirmed the sanctions and default judgment on liability, concluding they were justified by the pattern of discovery abuse and that severance from other defendants was proper, but reversed the damages award because it lacked supporting evidence in the record before the judge who entered the judgment and remanded for a new hearing on the amount of damages.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

In City of Laredo v. Leal, the City and its police chief appealed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of Lieutenant David Leal, who had been indefinitely suspended but had his suspension reduced to a temporary one by a hearing examiner. The court held that the hearing examiner possessed the jurisdiction and authority to modify the suspension from indefinite to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay. It further determined that the police chief was entitled to qualified immunity on Leal's substantive and procedural due process claims because his conduct was objectively reasonable given the notice and opportunities provided to Leal. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgments and rendered take-nothing judgments in favor of the City and the chief on the relevant claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, Josefina Mireles sued her former employers, Laredo Medical Group Corporation and Mercy Health System of Texas, under the narrow Sabine Pilot exception to Texas at-will employment, alleging she was fired solely for refusing to perform illegal acts related to billing and accounting practices. A jury found in her favor and awarded more than $1.5 million in damages. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Mireles failed to present legally sufficient evidence that her employers ordered her to perform an illegal act or that she refused to do so. The court noted that her allegations, if true, would instead support only a whistleblower claim, which is not recognized against private employers in Texas. The decision emphasized that the Sabine Pilot claim requires proof the discharge occurred for no reason other than the refusal to commit an illegal act.

labor & employment

In Ex Parte Gonzalez, the defendant pled nolo contendere to unlawfully carrying an illegal knife and later faced charges for unlawfully carrying a handgun on licensed premises, both arising from the same incident under Texas Penal Code section 46.02. She sought habeas relief, arguing the second prosecution violated double jeopardy protections under the U.S. and Texas Constitutions because the charges involved a single offense from one transaction. The trial court denied relief, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that section 46.02 is a possession-oriented statute where the allowable unit of prosecution is each distinct type of weapon, so carrying different weapons constitutes separate offenses permitting successive prosecutions. It further held that the Texas Constitution provides no greater double jeopardy protections than the federal Constitution in this context.

criminal lawprocedureguns

In ExxonMobil Corp. v. Kirkendall, employees who had received workers' compensation benefits for on-the-job injuries sued their employer alleging fraud in the company's representations about its insurance coverage under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, seeking to pursue additional common-law negligence claims and damages. The trial court, following a jury finding of fraud, ruled that the employer was not a subscriber entitled to the Act's exclusive remedy provision and awarded actual and exemplary damages. On appeal, the court held that the employer proved its subscriber status as a matter of law and that the fraud claims were immaterial to that status. The appellate court therefore reversed the trial judgment and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the employer.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In Brasher v. State, a jury convicted Steve Roy Brasher of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, Brasher claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the punishment phase because his attorney failed to object to or seek a limiting instruction on testimony about prior extraneous offenses used by the State to impeach his father's inconsistent statements. He also argued the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial and new trial based on alleged juror misconduct involving a juror who had prior knowledge of Brasher and his criminal record. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the impeachment evidence was properly admitted under evidentiary rules since there was no indication the State used it as a subterfuge, that counsel's performance was not shown to be deficient, and that no juror misconduct occurred because specific questions about bias were not asked during voir dire and no improper discussions took place during deliberations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an appeal from a juvenile adjudication in which a jury found that the appellant committed aggravated sexual assault against his eight-year-old step-sister and imposed a ten-year commitment to the Texas Youth Commission. The appellant challenged the admission of testimony about abuse of other children, the competency of another child witness to testify about similar conduct, and the denial of a mistrial during the disposition phase. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that any error from the extraneous offense reference was waived because counsel declined a limiting instruction, that inconsistencies in the child witness's testimony went to credibility rather than competency under Texas Rule of Evidence 601, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that out-of-home placement was necessary based on the aggravated nature of the offense and need for supervision. The court reasoned that the trial judge's on-site evaluation of the witness and the evidence of multiple victims and threats supported the disposition.

criminal lawfamily law

In this mandamus proceeding, relator Jeff Cortez challenged language in his judgment of conviction for marijuana possession stating "DAY FOR DAY" at the top, which he argued would improperly limit his eligibility for good-time credit under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.032 while serving a six-month jail sentence after probation revocation. The court held that a trial court has no authority to restrict the sheriff's discretion to award good-time credit and that the disputed phrase, even if only in a heading, constituted an unauthorized limitation on that statutory right. The court rejected arguments that Cortez lacked standing or that the issue was moot due to the current sheriff's interpretation, noting that the language could still jeopardize the relator's right to be considered for credit. Accordingly, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to delete the phrase from the judgment within twenty days.

criminal lawprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, relator Karen Vlasak challenged a trial court order that set aside a default judgment she obtained against defendants Henry Weidner Jr. and Culligan Southwest Inc. in her suit for personal injuries from an automobile accident. The court held that the July 8, 2003 default judgment awarding $250,000 in unliquidated damages was final because it disposed of all parties and claims, included a Mother Hubbard clause denying other relief, and did not contemplate further proceedings. As a result, the trial court's plenary power expired thirty days later, rendering its December 12, 2003 order setting aside the judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief to vacate the order setting aside the default judgment.

procedure

The case concerned a dispute among members of GMP, L.L.C., an entity formed to manage limited partnerships that owned land for a concrete quarry. After GMP's majority approved a capital call for additional funds, Potter refused to contribute his share and was sued by GMP for breach of the company's regulations, while Potter countersued other members on fiduciary-duty and fraud claims. A jury found Potter had agreed to and breached the capital-contribution obligation, awarding GMP damages, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the court held that the regulations were unambiguous and made capital contributions mandatory when approved by a majority in interest, so the trial court properly submitted the issue to the jury and correctly awarded attorney's fees to GMP under the contract statute. The judgment against Potter was therefore affirmed.

business & regulatory

The case involved relators Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. and related parties seeking mandamus relief from a trial court order disqualifying their law firm, Davis, Cedillo and Mendoza, from representing them in a breach of contract lawsuit filed by Advantage Rent-A-Car and Star Shuttle over omitted advertising in a yellow pages directory. The disqualification motion stemmed from the firm's prior representation of Star Shuttle in an unrelated personal injury case, which Advantage claimed created a conflict under Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.06(b)(2). The court of appeals conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to withdraw the disqualification order. It reasoned that even assuming a potential conflict, the movants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the concurrent representation, as required to justify the severe remedy of disqualification under Texas precedents like In re Nitla.

procedure

In this mandamus proceeding, Bexar County Criminal District Attorney Susan D. Reed sought to compel a county court judge to vacate an order recusing her office from prosecuting a justice of the peace for indecent exposure. The judge had granted the recusal based on the district attorney's prior representation of the defendant in civil matters as an elected official, finding a conflict that would violate due process. The court of appeals conditionally granted the writ, holding that the only statutory exceptions to the district attorney's exclusive duty to prosecute do not apply here because there was no prior adverse employment in the same case and no evidence of a disqualifying conflict of interest.

criminal lawprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, inmate Roy F. Hearn challenged a trial court order requiring him to pay court costs in installments from his inmate trust account in a civil suit seeking an injunction to compel the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to treat his skin condition, along with the court's failure to rule on pending motions including a motion to recuse and a prior venue transfer from Galveston to Medina County. The court held that mandamus was unavailable to challenge the costs order because Hearn had an adequate remedy by appeal and the order complied with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and it declined to address the merits of the venue transfer or other motions. However, the court conditionally granted relief to require the trial court to rule on the recusal motion within twenty days.

procedurecriminal law

In this case, an employee signed a waiver agreement with a non-subscribing employer before the 2001 amendment to Texas Labor Code section 406.033 but was injured after its effective date of June 17, 2001. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the ground that the pre-injury waiver remained enforceable. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the amendment renders such waivers void and unenforceable when the injury occurs after the effective date. The decision relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s analysis in Storage & Processors, Inc. v. Reyes, correcting the effective date referenced in that opinion from September 1 to June 17, 2001, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this mandamus proceeding, attorney Daniels sought to withdraw from representing a client in an ongoing divorce and child custody case after the trial court twice denied his motions to withdraw. The underlying dispute involved non-payment of approximately $30,000 in fees, potential additional trial costs of $25,000, and interference by the client's mother that restricted the attorney's work and communication. The court of appeals held that Daniels established good cause for withdrawal under Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(b)(5)-(7) due to the client's failure to pay fees, the resulting unreasonable financial burden, and actions rendering representation unreasonably difficult. It therefore conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to permit withdrawal, noting that such withdrawal is allowed even if it may adversely affect the client.

family lawprocedure

In this habeas corpus proceeding, relator Thomas Anascavage challenged his incarceration for nonpayment of child support, arguing that the trial court's enforcement order violated due process and Texas Family Code section 157.166 by lacking required findings for both criminal and civil contempt and by referencing future obligations. The court held that the order was valid as to the criminal contempt portion because it sufficiently identified the specific past violations of the child support order (four monthly failures in 2002) and imposed a concurrent six-month jail term, satisfying statutory and constitutional requirements. The court declined to review the civil contempt commitment for the arrearage, struck the portion of the order directing resumption of future payments as improperly coercive, and otherwise affirmed the enforcement order as modified while denying habeas relief.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over ancillary probate proceedings in Texas for the will of a Mexican resident whose estate had distributed assets from Texas bank accounts and foreign companies before the proceedings began. The probate court admitted the will to ancillary probate and appointed the deceased's widow as executrix, after she filed suit against other heirs alleging wrongful appropriation of over $60 million in estate assets; one heir moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and alternatively to remove the executrix due to her pending community property claim against the estate. The court of appeals held that it had jurisdiction because the order disposed of the initial phase of the ancillary administration. It affirmed the admission of the will to probate on grounds that the estate retained a potential claim to assets removed from Texas, but reversed the appointment of the executrix and remanded, finding a disqualifying conflict of interest from her adverse claim. The core reasoning centered on probate finality rules under Crowson v. Wakeham and statutory standards for removing an executor whose personal interests conflict with those of the estate.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether certain documents in a civil lawsuit between former law firm associates—concerning alleged mismanagement of an investment partnership—should remain sealed from public view. After initially sealing some documents via protective order and later sealing the entire record sua sponte, the trial court held a hearing and ordered the full record unsealed for failing to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a requirements for notice and hearing. The appellate court held that the 202 documents at issue were not "court records" subject to Rule 76a because they were submitted in camera solely for a discoverability ruling, affirmed the protective order as modified, and reversed the unsealing order due to inadequate notice and improper application of sealing standards, remanding for further proceedings while keeping the record sealed pending resolution.

procedure