Anne Gardner

The case involved Mockingbird Pipeline’s condemnation action under Utilities Code section 181.004 to acquire a gas pipeline easement across land owned by the Town of Flower Mound, a home-rule municipality. Flower Mound filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity that the Denton County Probate Court denied, prompting the town’s attempted interlocutory appeal under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. It held that section 51.014(a) expressly authorizes such appeals only from interlocutory orders of a “district court, county court at law, or county court,” and the statute’s plain language, strict-construction requirement, and legislative history contain no reference to statutory probate courts.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a Texas trial court’s pretrial ruling on an indictment charging Stewart Le Richardson with multiple counts of aggravated assault arising from an alcohol-related car accident; the indictment also contained paragraphs alleging three prior Iowa “aggravated misdemeanor” convictions that the State sought to use to enhance the punishment range from second-degree to first-degree felonies. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to quash those enhancement allegations, holding that the Iowa convictions were misdemeanors under Penal Code § 12.41(2) and therefore unavailable for enhancement under § 12.42. The State appealed, asserting jurisdiction under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(a)(1) on the ground that the order dismissed a “portion of the indictment.” The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because enhancement paragraphs are not part of the substance of an indictment; they serve only to affect the punishment range and do not constitute an element of the charged offenses or a basis for dismissing any count. Consequently, the trial court’s order did not trigger the State’s limited right to appeal under the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

Angela Dodd Hamal was convicted of possessing between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine after a traffic stop for speeding led to a drug-dog alert and the discovery of drugs in her car. She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence and by refusing her requested jury instructions, including one under Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. It held that the initial stop was valid and that the trooper developed reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention based on Hamal’s nervousness and her inconsistent statements about her criminal history, which included recent drug arrests. The court concluded, however, that a fact issue existed about whether the trooper’s questions and continued detention were lawful, requiring the requested 38.23 instruction that would have let the jury decide whether to disregard the evidence if it found the detention illegal.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Paula Gaughan, a member of the nonprofit National Cutting Horse Association (NCHA), sued for a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to inspect and copy the organization's financial records, including employment contracts, payroll, and vendor payments, without any confidentiality restrictions, after the NCHA conditioned production on a protective order and cost-sharing. The trial court entered a protective order allowing the NCHA to designate certain documents confidential, granted the NCHA's motion for summary judgment, denied Gaughan's cross-motion, and incorporated the protective order into the final judgment; the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that under article 1396-2.23 of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, a member's inspection rights are not absolute and may be limited by legitimate confidentiality interests of the corporation and third parties, as supported by analogous precedents under the Business Corporations Act; Gaughan had already received all requested documents, and the protective order reasonably balanced access with those interests without denying her statutory rights.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns an appeal on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Chamberlain, where the applicant challenged the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief under article 11.072. Chamberlain, who pleaded guilty to sexual assault, argued that the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program's lifetime registration requirement violated his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing ongoing obligations without an individualized mechanism to end them based on low risk. On remand, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior holdings that reputation is not a fundamental right triggering heightened scrutiny, applied rational basis review, and held that the SORP's requirements are rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting the public from sex offenders. The court noted that while Chamberlain is currently ineligible for deregistration under the list promulgated by the Council on Sex Offender Treatment, the statutory framework (Code of Criminal Procedure articles 62.401-.408) provides an early-termination process for certain qualifying offenses, and questions about which offenses qualify or how long registration should last are matters for the legislature. The court therefore overruled the due process claim and affirmed the denial of relief.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a grandmother's petition for court-ordered visitation with her three grandchildren following the death of their mother and disputes with the father over access. After an initial failed custody attempt by the grandparents, the trial court granted temporary and then final visitation orders under the Texas Family Code. The Court of Appeals reversed the visitation judgment, holding that the grandmother lacked standing, the order violated the law of the case from prior proceedings, and the evidence was insufficient to show that denial of access would significantly impair the children's physical health or emotional development. The court remanded solely for reconsideration of the father's request for attorney's fees as the prevailing party.

family law

In this mandamus proceeding, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services challenged a June 2011 order returning a child, M.P., to his mother on a monitored basis and setting a new dismissal date, along with the trial court's failure to rule on the underlying petition to terminate parental rights. The case arose after an associate judge in a parental termination suit, which had already passed its statutory dismissal date, ordered the monitored return mid-trial and reserved a final ruling to allow for additional evidence later. The Court of Appeals held that the monitored return order was void because it was entered after the dismissal deadline under Family Code section 263.403 and that mandamus was appropriate due to the lack of an adequate appellate remedy. However, the court denied the request to compel an immediate ruling on the termination petition, finding that the trial court had not yet refused to act. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus relief directing the county court to vacate the monitored return order.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned a dispute between surface owner Allegiance Hillview and oil and gas lessee Range Texas Production over a Surface Use Agreement that set a July 2009 deadline for commencing drilling on property in Denton, Texas. The agreement included a force majeure clause that could extend the deadline if the City of Denton failed to issue required permits, provided the applications were timely submitted. After a bench trial, the court found that force majeure events had occurred due to permit delays, that Range had given proper notice, and that the deadline should be extended; it also awarded Range attorney fees and issued a permanent injunction. Allegiance appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on notice, the existence of force majeure, timeliness of applications, and related rulings. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in full, holding that the evidence supported the findings and that Allegiance's other issues lacked merit.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Joel D. Miles, who had received deferred adjudication community supervision after pleading guilty to assault causing injury to a family member and possession of less than one gram of heroin. The State petitioned to proceed to adjudication, alleging that Miles violated a condition of supervision by committing a new robbery offense against Nora Rojo; Miles pleaded not true, and the trial court heard testimony from Rojo, two eyewitnesses, and a police officer regarding the identification of Miles via license plate, clothing, and in-court identifications. The trial court found the allegation true by a preponderance of the evidence, adjudicated Miles guilty in both cases, and imposed sentences of twenty years and 180 days. Miles appealed, contending the evidence was insufficient to establish he was the perpetrator, but the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking supervision because the State met its burden under the applicable standards.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services seeking to terminate S.G.'s parental rights to her two-year-old child M.E.-M.N. after a referral for neglectful supervision, including the mother passing out at a methadone clinic while the child was present, positive drug tests, and a history of opioid addiction. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the mother's rights under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(1)(D) and (E) for endangering the child's physical or emotional well-being, plus a best-interest finding. On appeal, the mother challenged the frivolousness determination, raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding the post-trial period, and contested the legal sufficiency of the endangerment evidence. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the termination order, holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the section 161.001(1)(E) finding based on the mother's drug use and related conduct, and resolving the procedural issues without disturbing the judgment.

family lawprocedure

In Smith v. State, James Lawrence Smith appealed his conviction for assault family violence based on an incident in which he allegedly pushed, shook, and threw his then-wife during a domestic argument, after which she called 911 and obtained a protective order. The appellate court affirmed the conviction after reviewing the evidence presented at trial, including testimony from the complainant, her son, and responding officers. It held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject the self-defense claim, that the trial court did not err in excluding certain evidence or refusing a jury instruction on confinement as a defense, and that the claim regarding the right of allocution was not preserved because no objection was made at trial.

criminal law

The case involved Capital One's lawsuit against Carter & Burgess, an engineering firm, alleging negligent misrepresentation, statutory fraud, and aiding and abetting fraud based on a representative's statement that all required wastewater easements had been obtained for a bank branch development project, when in fact one was missing. Capital One claimed it relied on this representation in proceeding with a lease, leading to later disputes and arbitration. The trial court granted C&B's motion to dismiss under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 150.002 for failure to file a required certificate of merit from a licensed professional engineer. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal, holding that all claims, regardless of their labels, arose out of the provision of professional engineering services and were therefore subject to the certificate requirement, as the underlying allegations centered on negligence in making the representation.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

In Marchbanks v. State, the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault against a public servant and aggravated robbery after stealing shirts from a department store and injuring a police officer who attempted to stop him by grabbing his shirt as he drove away. The officer was thrown off when another vehicle struck the appellant's car. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by denying motions for mistrial, claiming the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and knowingly used perjured testimony regarding whether the officer had punched the appellant. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the State properly disclosed the information and allowed further examination of witnesses, that any false testimony was corrected without a due process violation, and that the second point regarding jury argument was forfeited due to an inconsistent trial objection.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose from a wrongful death lawsuit filed after a child died from abuse in a foster home; the plaintiffs sued Cen-Tex Childcare, a private corporation that contracted with the state Department of Family and Protective Services to provide foster placement services, alleging failures in reporting abuse and supervising placements. Cen-Tex moved for summary judgment on official immunity grounds, which the trial court denied, prompting an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that civil practice and remedies code section 51.014(a)(5) allows such appeals only by individuals who are officers or employees of the state, and Cen-Tex is expressly an independent contractor under its contract and the statutory definition of employee. The court distinguished prior cases extending immunity to contractors, noting they did not address the interlocutory appeal statute's plain limits and predated controlling supreme court precedent.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves consolidated interlocutory appeals by the City of North Richland Hills challenging the denial of its partial pleas to the jurisdiction in lawsuits brought by developers Urban Partners and Arcadia over a large-scale development project. The developers alleged breach of a 2001 Development Agreement when the City relocated a planned recreation center outside the project area, amended zoning to require a specific use permit for multi-family housing without prior notice, and related claims including inverse condemnation and declaratory relief regarding the zoning change. The court granted rehearing and substituted its opinion, holding that governmental immunity barred some claims but not others, such as the breach claim seeking specific performance under the agreement and certain inverse condemnation claims, while also addressing standing to challenge the zoning amendment for lack of statutory notice. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts' denials of the pleas in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings on the surviving claims.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved Wesley Wayne Miller, who had been civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under Texas law after serving a prison term for murder. Following his release, he was indicted on multiple third-degree felony counts for violating the terms of his civil commitment order by failing to comply with required treatment and making unauthorized contacts. Miller moved to quash the indictments, arguing they were ambiguous or failed to allege offenses, but the trial court denied the motions, after which he pleaded guilty and received concurrent ten-year sentences. On appeal, the court affirmed the convictions, holding that one challenge was not preserved because it was not raised in the trial court and that the indictments sufficiently invoked jurisdiction and provided notice of the charges without needing to include evidentiary facts such as the appellant's confinement status. The court reasoned that any potential defense based on suspension of duties during confinement was outside the scope of reviewing the facial validity of the indictments.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Relator Billy Earl Dacus petitioned for writs of mandamus and prohibition to require the trial court to dismiss a 2008 murder indictment, arguing that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA) barred prosecution because the State had previously obtained him from federal custody under a detainer for related 1983 capital murder charges, dismissed those charges without trial, and returned him to federal prison. The court of appeals found that the State violated Article IV(e) of the IADA by returning the relator before trying the underlying charges and that the 2008 indictment, based on the same transaction, must be dismissed with prejudice. The court held that the relator had no adequate alternative remedy and a clear right to relief under the IADA, which requires dismissal when a receiving state fails to try the prisoner within the statutory period or returns him prematurely. It therefore conditionally granted mandamus and prohibition relief directing dismissal, while rejecting the double-jeopardy claim. The decision rests on the plain language of the IADA compact as adopted in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 51.14 and federal precedents interpreting its mandatory dismissal provisions.

criminal lawprocedure

Mohammed Reza was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child based on evidence of multiple incidents involving his niece over several years. Reza appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to require the State to elect a specific act for each count upon his request and by not instructing the jury on the effect of that election. The court determined that the trial court committed error by not ordering an election or giving a limiting instruction after the close of evidence, but concluded that the error did not result in egregious harm because the evidence centered on one primary incident for the convicted count, the jury acquitted on the second count, and other mitigating factors were present. The appellate court therefore affirmed the conviction and fifteen-year sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over personal liability on a nonrecourse mortgage for an apartment complex after the borrowers defaulted on payments and allowed mechanic's liens to attach to the property. Ridgepine purchased the mortgage, foreclosed on the property, and sought to recover a deficiency of about $146,615 from the borrowers under an exception in the loan documents that triggered personal liability if mechanic's liens were not released of record or remedied within 30 days of creation. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment for Ridgepine, finding the borrowers personally liable. The court reasoned that foreclosure did not automatically release the liens of record as required by the deed of trust, so the exception applied and created personal liability for the deficiency.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In TTHR, L.P. v. Coffman, the plaintiff sued a hospital after its staff released her urine test results to university police, leading to disciplinary action; she alleged negligence and violation of medical record confidentiality under the Texas Occupations Code. The hospital moved to dismiss under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351(b) for failure to serve an expert report, arguing the claim was a health care liability claim subject to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claim involved a departure from accepted standards of professional or administrative services directly related to health care. The court reasoned that because the underlying act concerned confidentiality of medical records obtained during treatment, it qualified as a health care liability claim regardless of how it was pleaded, requiring dismissal for lack of a timely expert report and remanding for an award of costs and fees.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability