In Wavell v. Roberts, appellant Cage Wavell sued appellee Aubrey Roberts for negligence and civil conspiracy, alleging that Roberts participated in a scheme connected to Margaret Covington's efforts to harm Wavell through assault or planting drugs, while Roberts represented Covington in related federal criminal proceedings. The trial court granted summary judgment for Roberts after other defendants had been dismissed or settled. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that Roberts' affidavits and deposition testimony, along with other evidence, established as a matter of law that Roberts committed no overt acts in furtherance of any conspiracy and caused no damages to Wavell. Wavell's opposing affidavit was deemed conclusory and insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and the court also upheld the denial of a continuance for additional discovery.
This case involved a civil forfeiture action by the State of Texas seeking to seize $17,000 in currency from Santiago Cantu under the Texas Controlled Substances Act, alleging the money was linked to illegal drug activities. Cantu moved for summary judgment, arguing the State lacked evidence connecting the money to any illegal conduct. The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant moving for summary judgment must affirmatively negate an element of the plaintiff's claim rather than merely asserting that the plaintiff has insufficient evidence at that stage. The court reasoned that without such affirmative proof, the State was not required to produce evidence supporting forfeiture at the summary judgment phase. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
This case involved a dispute between Texstar North America, Inc. and Ladd Petroleum Corporation over a joint operating agreement for an oil and gas well on the Zalman tract. Texstar claimed that Ladd breached the agreement and an implied duty of cooperation by refusing to consent to a fracture stimulation procedure on the well, seeking injunctions, declaratory judgment, and damages, while Ladd counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Ladd on Texstar's claims and to Texstar on Ladd's counterclaim, which the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the agreement's terms governed the parties' non-consent rights to rework operations, no breach occurred, and there was no justiciable controversy regarding future proposals.
This case involves an attorney suing a newspaper and its employees for publishing articles about judicial proceedings connected to an assault on him by his former lover, claiming invasion of privacy, emotional distress, and related torts. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, which the appellate court mostly affirmed. The court reasoned that the First Amendment protects the accurate reporting of public judicial proceedings from civil liability under privacy or other tort theories. However, it reversed the judgment as to two individual defendants because they failed to provide proper notice of the summary judgment hearing to the plaintiff.
This case involved an appeal by H.E. Butt Grocery Co. from a no-answer default judgment in favor of Bay, Inc. and related companies for approximately $550,000 plus attorney fees, interest, and foreclosure on liens arising from construction work at a shopping center. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that the trial court's judgment was not final. Absent a trial on the merits, default judgments carry no presumption of finality and must dispose of all parties and issues while being sufficiently certain for enforcement by a clerk without needing additional facts. The judgment's reference to prejudgment interest "as provided by the laws of Texas" was ambiguous because it did not specify whether the rate came from a statute setting six percent interest on ascertainable accounts or from common-law equitable principles applying a market rate, leaving the exact amount unascertainable from the judgment's terms.
In Graham v. Pazos De La Torre, appellants challenged a trial court judgment that voided a foreclosure sale of real property and a subsequent sale to appellee Pazos. The property owner, Arsing, had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy the day before the scheduled foreclosure, triggering an automatic stay under federal bankruptcy law that barred enforcement actions against estate assets. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the foreclosure and conveyance were void because the stay deprived the state court of jurisdiction and preempted state law remedies, regardless of whether the parties received notice of the bankruptcy filing. A later bankruptcy court order retroactively annulling the stay did not alter the outcome in this suit between the creditor and the third-party purchaser, as Pazos received no valid title or consideration.
