Dixon v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-12-14 · cited 22×
In Dixon v. State, Anthony James Dixon appealed his conviction for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly weapon after an incident in which he allegedly chased his passenger, Cherlyn Kelly, with his truck following an argument, striking a house and tree in the process. The trial court used a single verdict form allowing the jury to convict on the greater offense of aggravated assault, the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated assault, or acquit, and admitted a 911 call and witness statements over hearsay objections while denying requests for instructions on additional lesser-included offenses like deadly conduct and reckless driving. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the single verdict form complied with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 37.07, 37.08, 37.09, and 37.14 for handling greater and lesser-included offenses in one count; the jury instructions and evidence rulings were proper; and no separate unanimity requirements applied beyond those statutes. The court rejected claims of error in the jury charge and evidentiary admissions.
criminal lawprocedure
Houston Independent School District v. Morris
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-07-13 · cited 6×
This case involved taxpayers who were listed on the appraisal roll as owners of property including 0.96 acres they did not actually own and who paid taxes on that land under protest after the taxing units sued to collect delinquent taxes from prior years; the taxpayers then filed a counterclaim seeking a refund once the taxing units nonsuited. The trial court denied the taxing units' plea to the jurisdiction, but the appellate court reversed. The court held that the taxpayers were required to exhaust administrative protest remedies under the Tax Code before filing suit for a refund, even though non-ownership can be raised as a defense in a collection action, and therefore the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the refund claims. The opinion emphasizes that the statutory exhaustion requirement applies to refund actions and that the taxpayers had not timely protested the erroneous ownership determination.
taxespropertyprocedure
Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-05-19 · cited 39×
In Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, a patient sued a nurse staffing agency alleging both direct negligence and vicarious liability under respondeat superior for an alleged sexual assault by a temporary nurse employee during a hospital stay for kidney infection complications. The trial court denied the agency's motions to dismiss the health care liability claims for inadequate expert reports under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and granted a 30-day extension to file amended reports. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction to review the first motion to dismiss but affirmed denial of the second, reasoning that the reports were adequate as to the vicarious liability theory based on the employee's conduct, even if deficient regarding direct liability.
healthcareproceduretorts & liability
Taylor v. Allstate Insurance Co.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-05-19 · cited 7×
In Taylor v. Allstate Insurance Co., the insured sued his auto insurer after settling an underlying personal injury suit above policy limits, alleging that Allstate negligently handled his defense through retained counsel, along with claims for breach of contract, tortious interference, vicarious liability, and statutory violations under the Insurance Code and DTPA. The trial court granted Allstate's summary judgment motion, ruling that no viable causes of action existed beyond a Stowers claim, which the facts did not support, and denied leave to replead. On appeal, the court affirmed summary judgment on the negligence, vicarious liability, and tortious interference claims, finding that Texas law limits common-law recovery for insurer mishandling of third-party claims to Stowers actions and that Taylor had already amended his pleadings. However, it reversed and remanded on the breach of contract and statutory claims, holding that those theories were not precluded by the Stowers doctrine. The court also upheld the denial of further repleading because Taylor had received prior notice and opportunity to amend.
torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Kibble v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-05-11 · cited 72×
The case involved Marara Jean Kibble's conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine after officers executing a search warrant at her apartment found crack and powder cocaine in a red bag, along with stolen items and drug paraphernalia, and cash on her person that a narcotics dog later alerted to. Kibble appealed, challenging the admission of the dog-sniff evidence on the money, the prosecutor's closing argument, and the factual sufficiency of the evidence for intent to deliver. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that any errors regarding the dog evidence and argument were harmless and that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict under the Jackson standard applied to both legal and factual sufficiency challenges.
criminal lawprocedure
TDIndustries, Inc. v. Rivera
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-03-31 · cited 31×
The case involved Marco Rivera suing TDIndustries (TDI), a licensed professional engineering firm providing management services at the George R. Brown Convention Center, along with the City of Houston, for personal injuries from a freight elevator door striking him; Rivera asserted negligence and premises liability claims without initially filing a certificate of merit. TDI moved to dismiss under Section 150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, arguing that the claims required such a certificate with the original petition and that a later-filed certificate was untimely and deficient. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Rivera's premises liability and negligence allegations against TDI did not implicate the certificate of merit requirement. The reasoning focused on the nature of the claims as presented in the pleadings and the statute's scope regarding professional services.
proceduretorts & liability
Gonzalez v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-03-17 · cited 77×
In Gonzalez v. State, the appellant was convicted of sexual assault for penetrating the complainant's sexual organ and aggravated sexual assault for penetrating her anus after forcing her into his car, threatening her, and committing the acts without consent. The court affirmed both convictions after addressing five issues on appeal. It held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the aggravated sexual assault conviction, the indictment was not materially defective, the sexual assault conviction was not barred by double jeopardy as it involved a separate act from the aggravated offense, the State's jury arguments were proper, and any error from admitting extraneous offense testimony without prior notice was harmless because the defendant showed no unfair surprise or prejudice. The core reasoning relied on review of the trial record, application of Texas Penal Code provisions and procedural rules like Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.07, and precedents on double jeopardy and evidentiary notice requirements.
criminal lawprocedure
Smith v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-03-10 · cited 86×
In Smith v. State, Jesse James Smith was convicted of continuous sexual assault of a child under Texas Penal Code § 21.02 and sentenced to 70 years in prison after his stepdaughter testified to multiple acts of abuse occurring over a period exceeding 30 days when she was under age 14. On appeal, Smith challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, a jury instruction that omitted explicit reference to the 30-day duration requirement, and the trial court's exclusion of text messages and voicemails from the complainant's mother offered for impeachment. The court held the evidence sufficient, concluded the jury-instruction error was harmless, and found no abuse of discretion in excluding the messages, which did not reference the abuse allegations. The judgment of conviction was therefore affirmed.
criminal lawprocedure
Brookshire Katy Drainage District v. Lily Gardens, LLC
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-02-25 · cited 5×
This case concerned a drainage district's lawsuit against landowners who had added a decorative cover to an existing bridge over a canal on their property, which the district held via a private easement for drainage purposes. The district sought removal of the cover, arguing it could potentially interfere with future maintenance, repair, or drainage operations, even though it had not done so to date. The court ruled in favor of the landowners, allowing the cover to remain in place. The core reasoning was that the district failed to present any evidence showing actual or potential interference with its easement rights under the contract or Texas law, as the cover sat above ground level, did not affect water flow during heavy rains, and merely improved the bridge's appearance without obstructing access.
propertyprocedure
Smith v. MOODY GARDENS, INC.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-02-17 · cited 7×
The case involved Derek Scott Smith suing Moody Gardens, Inc., after he fell on an ice skating rink and suffered injuries, claiming the fall resulted from a groove in the ice caused by the operator's failure to properly maintain and resurface the ice. Smith asserted common law claims for negligence and premises liability, plus a statutory claim under the Texas Ice Skating Rink Statute for breach of the duty to inspect and maintain the ice surface in good condition. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the common law claims, and a jury found in favor of Moody Gardens on the statutory claim by determining that any negligence did not proximately cause the fall, leading to a take-nothing judgment. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that factually sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding and that any error regarding the summary judgment was harmless because the jury's determinations addressed the same underlying facts and theory of liability.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Ervin v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-02-16 · cited 254×
The case involved Kenneth Shaye Ervin's appeal of his murder conviction and life sentence for the shooting death of Quincy Sheppard in Houston. The court addressed challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence, which included identifications by two witnesses who knew the defendant, ballistic matches from recovered bullets and casings, and testimony about prior confrontations and the defendant's statements after the shooting. Applying standards from Jackson v. Virginia for legal sufficiency and reviewing factual sufficiency under Texas precedent including Brooks v. State, the court concluded the evidence was adequate to support the jury's guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. It therefore affirmed the conviction.
criminal lawprocedure
Glattly v. Air Starter Components, Inc.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2011-01-26 · cited 71×
This case involved a dispute between Air Starter Components, an established air starter manufacturer, and Specialized Components, a newly formed company, along with its shareholders and a salesman, over allegations of trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference with contracts related to air starter parts and sales. The trial court awarded Air Starter damages for lost profits and tortious interference, as well as an injunction against using the trade secrets for 30 years. On appeal, the court reversed the damages award after determining there was no evidence that lost profits were proven with reasonable certainty, modified the injunction to remove the time limit and make it permanent, and affirmed the remainder of the judgment regarding issues such as the enforceability of a covenant not to compete and piercing the corporate veil.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure
Ervin v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-12-15 · cited 92×
Ashley Ervin was convicted by a jury of capital murder for the shooting death of Brady Davis and automatically sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, she challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction and the trial court's admission of three statements she made to police, which she argued were obtained in violation of Miranda. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient and concluding that the first two statements did not require statutory warnings because Ervin was not in custody at the time, while the third statement was admissible after she waived her Miranda rights with no evidence that officers deliberately used a two-step technique to circumvent those protections.
criminal lawprocedure
Woodard v. State
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-12-09 · cited 4×
The case involved Shirley Jean Woodard, who was arrested for domestic violence and transported to jail with her purse, in which officers discovered a small bag of cocaine. She was convicted by a jury on two counts: possession of a controlled substance in an amount less than one gram and possession of a controlled substance while in a correctional facility. The court affirmed the first conviction, concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show she knowingly possessed the cocaine at her home before arrest, but reversed the second conviction and rendered an acquittal, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove she exercised care, custody, control, or management over the cocaine during the booking process at the jail.
criminal lawprocedure
Izen v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-09-10 · cited 55×
This case involved Texas attorney Joe Alfred Izen Jr., who was charged with violating multiple Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct through a half-page telephone directory ad and two websites that advertised low-cost divorce services and other legal areas without prior filing or approval by the Advertising Review Committee. The jury found violations including failure to file ads, use of misleading statements about results and experience, improper identification of non-attorney staff, and lack of required disclosures, leading to a judgment that suspended Izen's license for 24 months, probated. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the website violations provided independent grounds to uphold the discipline and that Izen's due process challenges to the prosecution of those ads lacked merit. Other claims regarding evidence, jury instructions, conflicts in verdicts, and judicial procedure were either waived or unnecessary to resolve the appeal.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Imkie v. Methodist Hospital
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-09-10 · cited 53×
In Imkie v. Methodist Hospital, the plaintiff, a resident physician, sued the hospital for premises liability after slipping and falling on paraffin residue outside a pathology lab, alleging the hospital knew of the hazard. After her attorneys withdrew, Imkie proceeded pro se and did not file a written response to the hospital's no-evidence motion for summary judgment, leading the trial court to grant the motion. She then sought a new trial, providing testimony at an evidentiary hearing, but the court denied the motion, finding the evidence insufficient to show the hospital's actual knowledge of the dangerous condition or failure to address it. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment and denial of the new trial, holding that Imkie failed to meet the requirements under Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines to set aside the judgment and that her evidence did not raise a fact issue on the premises liability elements.
proceduretorts & liability
Quarterman v. Hampton
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-08-26
In this case, inmate Robert Hampton sued several Texas Department of Criminal Justice employees in their individual and official capacities, alleging theft, conversion, and constitutional violations after they removed $710 from his inmate trust account following a disciplinary offense. The employees, through a motion filed by the non-party TDCJ, sought dismissal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.106(e), which requires dismissal of employees when a suit is filed against both a governmental unit and its employees. The trial court denied the motion, and on interlocutory appeal the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the statute applies only when the governmental unit is actually named as a defendant in the lawsuit, which did not occur here. The court reasoned from the plain language of the statute and related provisions that no suit had been filed against TDCJ, so the dismissal provision was inapplicable. The decision leaves the underlying claims to proceed in the trial court.
criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability
Marin v. IESI TX CORP.
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-08-05 · cited 28×
The case involved IESI TX Corporation suing its former employee and division manager Janell Marin after an audit revealed forged customer confirmation letters, overstated accounts receivable by over $1.5 million, misdeposited customer checks totaling over $112,000 into a related account, and an overall profit overstatement of $2.4 million at the Alvin Division. IESI asserted claims for forgery, misapplication of fiduciary property, fraud, conversion, and sought compensatory and exemplary damages. A jury found in favor of IESI on all claims, and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the court affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence from IESI's designated witnesses, the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's findings, and the award of exemplary damages was proper under applicable standards.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure
Simien v. Unifund CCR Partners
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-07-15 · cited 75×
In Simien v. Unifund CCR Partners, Unifund sued Michelle Simien to collect on a credit card debt originally owed to Citibank that Unifund had purchased, seeking damages for breach of the credit card agreement along with interest and attorney's fees. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Unifund for $34,600.08 in damages and $6,000 in attorney's fees. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly admitted Unifund's business records affidavit, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the damages award, and the awards of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest were proper without any double recovery.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Gulley v. Davis
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston) · 2010-07-01 · cited 23×
The case concerned a dispute over ownership of mineral rights in a 52-acre tract in Texas, where the Gulleys claimed title through adverse possession by their predecessors William and Rosia Moore, while the Davises claimed as successors to the original title holder George Davis. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Davises, and the appellate court affirmed after excluding certain evidence and finding no reversible error. The court held that the Gulleys' predecessors were not in exclusive, adverse possession because George Moore had been a tenant of George Davis, the 1898 judgment confirmed the tenancy arrangement, and Davis had asserted ownership through leasing and possession. The core reasoning was that the Moores' occupancy amounted to joint possession with the title owners rather than repudiation of their claim, so the statutory requirements for adverse possession were not met as a matter of law.
property