Michael D. Swiney

Inmate Brandon Shane Wooley sued Dickson County and several jail officials in chancery court, alleging he was wrongfully denied good-behavior sentence credits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236, that his custody classification improperly relied on old criminal history, and that the jail’s policies violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the defendants missed the initial response deadline, Wooley moved for default judgment; the defendants then filed a motion to dismiss on the merits. The trial court denied default, dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that Wooley had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and declined to reach the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals vacated that jurisdictional ruling, holding that the sparse record does not identify what administrative remedies (if any) were available or whether they were exhausted, that the defendants never raised exhaustion, and that the trial court must determine those threshold issues before dismissing on that basis or proceeding to the merits.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In a divorce case between Keith R. Prather and Yvonne R. Prather, who married in 1981, the central dispute concerned the division of the husband's military retirement benefits earned from his service that began in 1978 and ended with retirement in 2019. The trial court awarded the wife a share of those benefits by calculating the marital portion based on the parties' informal separation in 2010 rather than the retirement date, treating the post-2010 benefits as the husband's separate property. The Court of Appeals vacated that classification and the overall marital estate division, holding that retirement benefits accrued during the marriage are marital property under Tennessee law. The court reasoned that the husband retired while the marriage was still legally intact, with no prior order of legal separation having divided assets, so the relevant period for classification runs from the 1981 marriage date until the 2019 retirement. The case was remanded for reclassification of the benefits as marital property and recalculation of an equitable division.

family lawproperty

This case involved a boundary line dispute between neighboring property owners in Bledsoe County, Tennessee, where plaintiff Robert Simmons sought a declaratory judgment to establish the correct common boundary with defendants Michael and Anna Marie Black, specifically regarding control of an access road. The trial court credited the survey and testimony presented by Simmons’s surveyor and set the boundary line accordingly. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err because only one surveyor testified and provided a detailed, credible explanation of his methods and reliance on an artificial monument, while the competing survey lacked any explanatory testimony. The court found no clear and convincing evidence to overturn the credibility determination and rejected the defendants’ related easement request, as the adopted survey placed the road entirely on Simmons’s property.

property

This case involved a dispute between neighboring property owners over a shared driveway in Bradley County, Tennessee. Plaintiffs Robert and Lala Davis sued neighbor Karen Edwards (later substituted by new owners Joe and Amber Hamby) to enforce an oral agreement requiring Edwards to build her own driveway instead of using Plaintiffs’ driveway under the Driveway Easement and Maintenance Agreement (DEMA) that Plaintiffs had signed with the prior owner. After a trial, the circuit court ordered Edwards to build the driveway and then granted Plaintiffs’ post-trial motion to terminate the DEMA, finding it temporary despite the written terms. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the DEMA’s unambiguous language created a permanent easement that runs with the land, with no textual basis or trial evidence supporting termination by estoppel or otherwise, and that the trial court abused its discretion by nullifying it. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

property

This case involves an appeal by Senior Pastor Charles Dowell, Jr. and Priest Baldwin Hutchinson, representing Straitway Truth Ministry, challenging the denial of their motion to recuse Chancellor I’Ashea L. Myles in a Davidson County Chancery Court proceeding. The underlying dispute concerns the ministry’s effort to obtain judicial review of an administrative decision by the State Board of Equalization upholding the Macon County Assessor’s denial of property tax exemptions for certain parcels claimed on religious grounds under Tennessee law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion. The court reasoned that the petitioners’ allegations stemmed solely from the chancellor’s procedural rulings—such as requiring proper service on the Board and the Attorney General, mandating counsel for the entity, and allowing a late response from the opposing party—which do not demonstrate bias or impartiality, as adverse or contested rulings are not grounds for recusal absent evidence of personal prejudice.

religious libertytaxespropertyprocedure

Attorney Thomas J. Tabor, Jr. sued former client Gloria Juanita Milton in General Sessions Court for unpaid fees after successfully defending her in an appeal, claiming she still owed over $8,000 plus collection costs under a retainer agreement that called for a $15,000 initial payment plus $250 hourly rates. The General Sessions Court awarded Tabor $10,030, but Milton appealed to the Circuit Court, which found that any amount beyond the $15,200 she had already paid was excessive and unreasonable given the limited scope of Tabor’s work (preparing one appellate brief and arguing the case). Tabor appealed that ruling. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment, holding that the trial court properly applied the RPC 1.5 factors for determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees and did not abuse its discretion in concluding the additional charges were excessive.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from Laila Rumsey’s 2023 lawsuit against former trustees Regions Bank and Michael Castellarin, alleging that their mismanagement of two trusts created for her partner caused her damages through claims including loss of consortium, emotional distress, conspiracy, and negligence; the trusts had been terminated by court order in 2015. The trial court dismissed the suit on statute-of-limitations grounds and later denied Rumsey’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the motion to alter or amend was untimely because Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 requires both filing and service within thirty days of the January 31, 2024 judgment, and service did not occur until March 4. Because the motion failed to toll the thirty-day appeal period, Rumsey’s June 20 notice of appeal was also untimely. The court rejected defendants’ request for frivolous-appeal sanctions.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

In this case, prisoner Rodger Broadway challenged a prison disciplinary board’s finding that he was guilty of Class B Defiance for cursing at another inmate, after internal appeals left the conviction in place; he filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Hickman County Chancery Court, which upheld the board’s decision. Broadway then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the trial court denied as untimely. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded the case. It held that Broadway’s motion was timely under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 5.06 because he delivered it to the appropriate prison official within the filing period, and that the trial court’s order denying the motion did not become effective until it was properly served, making his notice of appeal timely as well.

procedure

The case involved the Tennessee Court of Appeals review of a Juvenile Court order terminating Josue O.’s parental rights to his infant daughter Neyra S. after the Department of Children’s Services took custody shortly after her birth due to the mother’s positive drug tests and the father’s initial failure to engage with the agency. The Juvenile Court found multiple statutory grounds for termination applicable to a putative father, plus the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, and concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest; the father did not contest the grounds but appealed only the best-interest determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the best-interest finding because the father had shown limited early interest, tested positive for methamphetamine during the case, exercised only sporadic supervised visitation without forming any bond (the child was described as terrified of him), and the child had instead bonded with her foster family while receiving needed services that the father had not attended.

family law

This case involved a petition by a child's mother and stepfather to terminate the biological father's parental rights in Knox County Chancery Court on the ground of abandonment by failure to support. The trial court granted the petition after finding that the father, who had the ability to pay, had not provided any support during the relevant four-month period and that termination was in the child's best interest. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the father had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to pay was not willful. The court reasoned that a prior Juvenile Court order had expressly reserved "any and all issues" of custody, visitation, and child support for later determination, and the father could reasonably rely on that order while attempting through other court filings to establish a relationship with the child. Because no ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence, the appeals court did not reach the best-interest analysis.

family law

This case involved a dispute over whether two contingency fee agreements complied with Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e), which requires a client's written agreement to any division of fees between lawyers not in the same firm. Trinity Clark and her original attorney Troy Jones sued Lance Baker after a civil rights case settled, claiming Baker's 45% fee agreement was invalid and unreasonable; the trial court denied Baker's motion for summary judgment, ruling that both the Clark-Jones 1/3 fee agreement and the later Clark-Baker agreement violated the rule. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals held the Clark-Jones agreement invalid for lack of compliance but reversed as to the Clark-Baker agreement. The court reasoned that the latter satisfied Rule 1.5(e) because Clark signed a written provision allowing Baker to associate other attorneys without increasing her overall fee obligation, and the rule (per its comment) does not require advance disclosure of specific fee shares or the identities of associated counsel.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved Kelly D. Bush and Byron V. Bush, who had lost a 2012 deficiency judgment to Commerce Union Bank (d/b/a Reliant Bank) after foreclosure on property securing a loan, and who had already lost four prior appeals on related claims. In 2024, the Bushes filed a new complaint alleging fraudulent breach of contract against the bank and several of its officers, which the trial court dismissed with prejudice after granting the defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions; the court also awarded attorney’s fees and imposed a pre-filing screening requirement on the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the new claims were barred by res judicata because the underlying issues—whether the note was recourse and whether the foreclosure sale price reflected fair market value—had already been finally decided against the Bushes in earlier litigation. The court further found that the Bushes knew or should have known their complaint was meritless, that it violated Rule 11.02, and that the appeal itself was frivolous, warranting an award of appellate damages to the defendants.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a rezoning dispute in which CCD Oldsmith Henry, LLC and related entities sought approval from the Town of Nolensville to develop residential property, prompting concerns about increased traffic at a nearby intersection. At a public hearing, manager-member Christopher Smith stated that the company could contribute funds toward intersection improvements, after which the town approved the rezoning; the company later refused to pay the full amount cited by the town, leading to a denial of building permits, a lawsuit by the company, and a counterclaim by the town seeking to add Smith and co-manager John Olderman as individual defendants for alleged promissory fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court denied the town’s motion to join the individuals, concluding that complete relief was available without them and that they could not be held personally liable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial only as to Olderman, holding that the allegations against him were not actionable because he made no relevant statements, but reversed as to Smith. The court reasoned that the town had sufficiently pled promissory fraud based on Smith’s specific hearing statements, that an LLC manager’s status does not shield him from personal liability for his own tortious acts, and that denying joinder of Smith was an abuse of discretion because the record did not support the trial court’s conclusion that the town could obtain complete relief without him.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute between Kathryn Claire Adams, acting as executrix of her father Randolph D. Miller’s estate, and Charlene S. Fields, Miller’s longtime companion. Adams alleged that Fields used a durable power of attorney executed days before Miller’s death from terminal cancer to convert roughly $241,000 from his bank accounts and line of credit for her own benefit, while also failing to vacate estate property and misusing funds for improvements. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Campbell County ruled in Adams’s favor on claims including conversion and undue influence, entering judgment against Fields. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed, holding that the statement of evidence supported the trial court’s findings on the transactions, witness credibility, and property values, and that Fields presented no reversible error or sufficient counter-evidence.

family lawpropertytorts & liability

In this case, Alexander Georg Warnatzsch (Father) petitioned the Rutherford County Chancery Court to modify the parties’ 2019 permanent parenting plan for their three minor children, under which Ashly Camille Warnatzsch (Mother) had been the primary residential parent with most of the parenting time; Father sought equal parenting time based on a claimed material change in circumstances. After hearings, the trial court found such a change had occurred, conducted a best-interest analysis under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a), kept Mother as primary residential parent, and awarded Father equal parenting time while also addressing tax exemptions, holiday schedules, exchanges, and a child-support credit for overpayments. Mother appealed, challenging several discretionary rulings and claiming the modifications harmed her financially. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, that its credibility findings and application of the modification standards were supported by the record, and that Mother had not shown any reversible error in the parenting plan or support adjustments.

family law

This case is an appeal by a father challenging the Juvenile Court for Sevier County’s termination of his parental rights to his daughter, who was removed from his custody in 2022 along with half-siblings after allegations of homelessness and parental substance abuse. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the termination, holding that clear and convincing evidence supported the grounds of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The court reasoned that the father’s housing remained unstable years after removal—he lived in shelters, with acquaintances, and eventually in his sister-in-law’s living room without a lease—while he had not completed recommended assessments or services, had not seen the child in over a year after visitation was suspended, and had not shown urgency in addressing the issues that led to removal. The court further found termination was in the child’s best interest because she was bonded to her foster family, including half-siblings, and the father’s living situation was too tenuous to provide stability.

family law

This case concerned inmate Darryl Whisnant’s challenge to the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole’s denial of parole after a 2023 hearing, where the Board cited the seriousness of his offense (attempted rape of a child) and directed him to continue positive behavior, remain drug-free, and engage in daily positive reflection as recommended by his Strong-R Assessment, with his next hearing set for 2029. Whisnant petitioned the Davidson County Chancery Court for review, arguing that the Board violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2)(B) by failing to provide clear, completable written steps for improving his parole chances. The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the recommendations were specific, time-bound actions meant to be followed until the next hearing, at which compliance could be assessed, and thus satisfied the statute’s requirement without being open-ended or impossible.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Father Robert A. Martin and Daughter Donna Saas sued Son Robert E. Martin and his wife, seeking Son’s removal as trustee of the Martin Irrevocable Trust, an accounting of trust assets, and damages for alleged breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. The claims centered on Son’s actions as trustee and Father’s former attorney-in-fact, including his failure to make required distributions to Daughter, his $100,000 self-distribution from trust assets, and his alleged misappropriation of $40,000–$60,000 from Father’s accounts. The trial court struck the defendants’ defenses for their repeated failure to provide a court-ordered accounting and, after a damages hearing, awarded Daughter half the value of the disputed assets and converted funds plus attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and lost wages. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the petition sufficiently alleged the elements of breach of fiduciary duty and that the trial court committed no reversible error in its sanctions or damages award. The appellate court also granted Daughter reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal under the trust statute.

family lawpropertyproceduretorts & liability

This case involved the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services petition to terminate the parental rights of Rikiya P. (Mother) to her three children and Daniel R. (Father) to his son Liam, after the children were removed from the home. The Juvenile Court terminated the rights on the ground of severe child abuse, and the parents appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that clear and convincing evidence showed Mother had starved and beaten Father’s older daughter Kenna, causing severe malnutrition and physical injuries, while Father was aware of the abuse, failed to protect her, and at times participated in it. The court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination served the children’s best interests, as the severe abuse posed an ongoing risk that outweighed the parents’ later compliance efforts.

family law

Gayla Henry filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Washington County to vacate two 2019 default judgments entered against her by the General Sessions Court in a lease dispute involving eviction and unpaid rent, and to reopen a related 2020 case she had filed there; she alleged the judgments resulted from fraud by opposing counsel and cited her own medical emergency and her attorney's scheduling conflict as reasons she missed a key hearing. The Trial Court denied the motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Henry's Rule 60.02 motion was untimely because it was filed nearly five years after the judgments, far beyond the one-year deadline, and that her claims of later incapacity did not toll the deadline or establish grounds for relief. The court also awarded the defendants attorney fees and costs, finding the appeal frivolous and devoid of merit.

propertyprocedure