This case involved a trust established for a minor beneficiary from a personal injury settlement, where the trustee signed an investment account agreement containing a predispute arbitration clause with a broker. The beneficiary sued the broker and others, and the broker moved to compel arbitration under the agreement. The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed; on further appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and the trust instrument authorized the trustee to enter the arbitration agreement. The court reasoned that trustees have broad powers to manage trust assets and resolve disputes, and that a third-party beneficiary seeking to enforce a contract must also accept its burdens, including arbitration, but only for claims that seek to enforce the account agreement itself. The court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated the order compelling arbitration of all claims, and remanded for the trial court to determine which claims, if any, are subject to arbitration.
This case involved a public records request by media outlets seeking access to police investigative files related to a pending criminal matter in Nashville. The court held that such open criminal investigative files are exempt from disclosure under the Tennessee Public Records Act. The core reasoning was that release could undermine the criminal justice system by exposing confidential sources, victims' personal information, and sensitive details that might compromise ongoing investigations, taint jury pools, or endanger witnesses and victims, consistent with prior precedent interpreting Rule 16(a)(2) as barring disclosure of files relevant to pending criminal actions. The concurrence emphasized that this approach aligns with legislative intent reflected in related statutes protecting victim information post-conviction.
In Circle C Construction, LLC v. D. Sean Nilsen, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed whether a plaintiff could refile a lawsuit under the savings statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-1-105(a), after a tolling agreement set a specific contractual filing deadline. The majority concluded that the refiled action was timely, reasoning that the agreement merely paused and extended the statutory limitations period and did not explicitly bar use of the savings statute. In this partial dissent, Justice Kirby argued that the savings statute applies only to actions commenced within a time limited by a rule or statute of limitation, not by a contractual substitute, so the refiled lawsuit was barred by the agreement's deadline.
The case involved a police captain who was terminated after reporting to the mayor that the police chief had pressured him to fix a traffic ticket for the chief's stepson, violating a department policy against ticket fixing. The officer sued the city under the Tennessee Public Protection Act, alleging retaliation for whistleblowing on illegal activity. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the officer was discharged solely in retaliation for protected conduct, as the city's stated reasons—violating the chain of command and undermining the chief's authority—were either admissions of retaliation or pretextual. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in favor of the officer.
This case concerned a dispute between neighboring utility districts over water supply services. Reelfoot Utility District had provided water to Samburg Utility District under a series of contracts, including a 2008 agreement that explicitly expired on July 31, 2013; before expiration, Samburg arranged to purchase water from Hornbeak Utility District instead. Reelfoot sued to enjoin the new arrangement and claimed an ongoing obligation based on the prior contracts, a state statute, and Reelfoot's own infrastructure loans. The trial court granted summary judgment to Samburg and Hornbeak. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the contract's clear termination date controlled, no statute or other legal principle required renewal or perpetual service, and Reelfoot's loan decisions did not impose obligations on Samburg beyond the contract term.
The case involved a dispute between a general contractor, Anil Construction, Inc., and a subcontractor, Patrick McCollum d/b/a Pat's Custom Cabinets, over a contract for cabinetry installation in a new movie theater. The contractor sued for breach alleging untimely completion and defective work, while the subcontractor filed a counterclaim for failure to pay the contract balance. The trial court ruled in favor of the subcontractor and awarded damages, but the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment. The appellate court held that the trial court failed to issue the detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 for both the complaint and counterclaim, preventing effective appellate review, and remanded the case for compliance with that rule.
This case involved the termination of a father's parental rights to his two sons after he murdered their mother in 2004 and was later convicted of first-degree murder, resulting in a life sentence with no eligibility for release until 2061. The children's maternal relatives, who had served as foster parents and had custody since 2005, petitioned to terminate the father's rights and adopt the children. The trial court granted the petition after considering statutory best-interest factors such as the father's incarceration, failure to support or contact the children, the impact of his crime, and the children's own wishes. The father appealed only the best-interest finding. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court's determination was supported by the evidence under Tennessee law.
This case involves a Tennessee petition by a paternal aunt and her husband to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents of two children and to adopt them; the children had been removed from the parents' Wisconsin home in 2005 due to abuse and neglect and had lived with the petitioners since 2006. The trial court found three statutory grounds for termination—abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and persistent conditions—and concluded that termination served the children's best interest. The parents appealed the termination order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting the grounds and best-interest determination, including the children's lack of bond with the parents and their successful adjustment in the petitioners' care.
The case involved a son's declaratory judgment action in Tennessee chancery court seeking to declare his deceased father's 30-year marriage void on the grounds that the father remained married to the son's mother at the time, thereby protecting the son's inheritance rights against the widow's claims. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that issues of heirship, descent, and distribution of property located in Mississippi were properly resolved there. The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal and remanded, holding that the record lacked necessary preliminary factual findings on the father's residency, property ownership, and the basis for Mississippi jurisdiction, which are required to review the trial court's jurisdictional ruling. The appeal focused on whether Tennessee courts could adjudicate the validity of the marriage under Tennessee law without addressing Mississippi real estate.
Lisa Doyle sued the Town of Oakland for retaliatory discharge after her employment was terminated in 2011, asserting claims under Tennessee common law, the state whistleblower protection statute, and the Public Employee Political Freedom Act. The summons and complaint were served on the town's finance director rather than its chief executive officer or city attorney. The town raised insufficient service of process as a defense in its answer and later moved for summary judgment on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations had expired due to improper service under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04(8). The trial court granted summary judgment to the town, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that service on the finance director failed to satisfy the rule's plain requirements and that the town did not waive the defense by continuing to litigate after asserting it.
The case involved a dispute over whether a Tennessee court could modify a child custody and parenting order originally issued by a Florida court. The parties had divorced in Florida, with the mother designated as primary residential parent, but after the father moved to Tennessee and accrued make-up parenting time, the Florida court allowed the child to live with the father in Tennessee for over six months while permitting the mother to relocate to Alabama. The father then petitioned in Tennessee to be named primary residential parent, but the trial court ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Tennessee court did have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the modification petition, and remanded for further proceedings.
In this healthcare liability lawsuit, Cheryl Hall sued The Jackson Clinic and its physicians after the death of her husband, alleging negligence in his treatment. The issue on appeal was whether the clinic's attorneys could meet privately with two non-defendant employee physicians who treated the decedent. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed the trial court and held that such ex parte communications are permitted. The reasoning was that the medical entity has an independent right to communicate with its own employees, whose knowledge is imputed to the employer, and this right is not affected by the filing of the lawsuit or prior precedent like Alsip.
This case concerns a conservatorship proceeding for Robert E. L. Hathaway, who was diagnosed with cognitive impairment and later determined to be disabled and in need of assistance managing his affairs. His wife petitioned to be appointed conservator and had prepared a quitclaim deed transferring his home into joint ownership shortly after their marriage; she later used a power of attorney to transfer his truck. The trial court appointed a public conservator rather than the wife and set aside the real property transfer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in selecting the public conservator given the fractured relationship and questions about the wife's suitability, and that the evidence supported invalidating the property transfer due to the ward's incapacity.
This case involved a dispute between owners of property on an island in the Tennessee River and a neighboring landowner over access via a causeway connecting the island to the mainland. The defendant sought private condemnation of an easement across the plaintiffs' property to reach the causeway and a public road after the trial court denied the claim and enjoined the defendant's use. The appellate court reversed the denial of condemnation, holding that the defendant had no adequate and convenient outlet because boat access was insufficient and building a separate causeway was impractical, and it vacated the injunction on grounds that the causeway is publicly accessible. The matter was remanded for appointment of a jury of view to set the easement terms and compensation.
This case was a medical malpractice wrongful death action filed by Timothy Davis after his wife died following surgery, alleging negligence by two physicians. After the plaintiff filed a certificate of good faith that omitted the required statement of zero prior statutory violations, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. The plaintiff then filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit without prejudice under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01, which the trial court granted over the defendants' objection that any dismissal must be with prejudice due to the certificate defect. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the medical malpractice statute does not preclude a plaintiff's right to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice even when the certificate may be noncompliant. The core reasoning was that Rule 41.01 provides a free and unrestricted right to nonsuit, and nothing in the statute mandates automatic dismissal with prejudice in these circumstances.
This case concerned a former bank employee's claim for unemployment compensation benefits after her termination. The employee had been fired for refusing to take a blood alcohol test when supervisors smelled alcohol on her at work, following a prior warning that such a refusal would result in dismissal. The Tennessee Department of Labor denied the benefits on the ground that the refusal amounted to work-related misconduct under state law, a determination upheld through administrative appeals and by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record contained substantial and material evidence that the employee was aware of the policy and consequences yet chose to refuse the test.
This case involved a petition for dependency and neglect, child support, and breach of contract stemming from an international adoption from Russia. The adoptive mother sent the child back to Russia shortly after adoption and attempted to annul it, leading the adoption agency and others to sue in juvenile court, which was appealed to circuit court. The circuit court entered a default judgment against the mother for failing to answer the petition and cooperate with discovery, awarded damages and child support after a hearing on damages, and denied post-judgment relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decisions, finding no error in the proceedings or rulings.
This case involved a lawsuit by buyer Dereck Cruz Legens against used car sellers Bobby and Larry Lecornu over the purchase of a 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche, alleging fraud and misrepresentation regarding the vehicle's mileage as well as violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court initially dismissed the fraud claim for lack of proof but found a technical TCPA violation without actual damages; after post-trial motions, it amended its ruling to find fraud, rescind the sale, and award attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the amended decisions, reinstated the original ruling dismissing the fraud claim and denying TCPA damages or fees, and remanded the case. The core reasoning was that the buyer failed to meet his burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation in the sale, and the lack of proven actual damages precluded recovery under the TCPA despite the statutory violation.
This case is a divorce appeal concerning the division of marital property between Kathy Hudson and William T. Hudson after an 11-year marriage with no minor children. The trial court classified four pieces of real property as marital assets based on the wife's contributions through income, labor on the farm, and household support, then divided the main 68-acre tract (awarding the wife the home and 13 acres while giving the husband the rest plus other properties) and split personal property and debts. The husband appealed, arguing errors in valuation and overall distribution, but the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly considered statutory factors under T.C.A. § 36-4-121, that the division was supported by the evidence, and that the husband had not provided sufficient valuation evidence himself.
This case concerned a health care liability action filed by Deborah Mason Hawkins, as administratrix of her late husband's estate, against Dr. Rodney A. Martin and Baptist Memorial Hospital, alleging medical malpractice caused his death. The plaintiff's attorney sent pre-suit notice to the defendants but inadvertently omitted the HIPAA-compliant medical authorizations required by T.C.A. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court dismissed the lawsuit after finding no extraordinary cause to excuse the noncompliance, even after remand to consider the attorney's circumstances including his military deployment. On the second appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the totality of the circumstances and dismissing the case.