Thomas R. Frierson 2

In this termination of parental rights action, maternal grandparents petitioned—with the biological mother’s consent—to terminate the father’s rights to his minor child, Jaden H., after gaining custody through juvenile court proceedings. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence supporting two statutory grounds: the father’s failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child, based on his lack of support despite claimed income, extensive criminal history involving drugs and reckless driving with the child present, and risk of substantial harm; and abandonment by willful failure to support during the relevant four-month period. It also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination served the child’s best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed, holding that the trial court committed no reversible error in its findings or procedures.

family law

This case concerned a petition by Brittany A. and Ronald A. to terminate the parental rights of Aliyah H. (Mother) to her son Alexander B. (born 2020) on grounds including abandonment by failure to visit, persistence of conditions that led to the child's removal from her custody in 2022, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or responsibility. The trial court terminated Mother's rights after finding clear and convincing evidence of the first two grounds plus that termination served the child's best interest, but it rejected the third ground; it also rejected Mother's challenge to Ronald A's standing based on his criminal history and lack of legal relation to the child. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that Ronald A. had standing because he had maintained physical custody of the child for nearly a year under a prior court order. The court reversed the trial court's rejection of the third ground, holding that it too was established by clear and convincing evidence, and otherwise affirmed the termination and best-interest findings.

family law

This case involved a petition by Jaime M. to terminate the parental rights of Brittany B. (Mother) to her young child, Michael S., on grounds including abandonment by failure to visit and failure to financially support the child, followed by a request to adopt the child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence supporting both abandonment grounds and that termination was in the child's best interest, then granted the adoption by default after Mother did not appear. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ground of abandonment by failure to support based on unrebutted evidence that Mother provided no financial support during the relevant three-month period before the amended petition. It reversed the failure-to-visit ground, however, because the evidence did not support that finding, and it vacated the best-interest conclusion for lack of sufficient statutory findings and analysis under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i), remanding the case for a proper best-interest review.

family law

This partial concurrence and dissent addresses the appeal of a Sullivan County Chancery Court ruling in a case involving the dismissal of tenured teacher Matthew Hawn by the Sullivan County Board of Education under the Teacher Tenure Act. Judge Frierson concurs that Hawn did not engage in unprofessional conduct but agrees that the record established one act of insubordination, requiring modification of the trial court’s judgment to recognize this as a proven statutory ground for potential dismissal. He dissents from the majority’s holding that dismissal was excessive for an isolated incident, noting that the trial court had explicitly found no statutory violation and thus lacked authority to address the appropriateness of the penalty. Because the majority’s modification creates a statutory ground, Frierson would remand the case to the trial court for factual findings and legal conclusions on the proper level of discipline rather than deciding that issue on appeal.

labor & employment

In this case, plaintiffs John William Owens and several members of the Hollis family sued Meredith Elizabeth Owens, alleging violations of federal and state wiretapping statutes based on her alleged use of a motion-activated recording device (described as a nanny cam) and spyware to capture private audio and video in their homes and vehicles, followed by disclosures of some recordings. After a two-day jury trial in which Owens and Owens testified, the jury found that Owens had not intentionally intercepted, used, or disclosed any communications in violation of the statutes; the trial court entered judgment for Owens and later denied the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in full. The court reasoned that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence, that the trial court had correctly denied the plaintiffs’ summary-judgment and directed-verdict motions because genuine issues of fact existed regarding intent, and that the jury instructions were substantially accurate and not misleading.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned a petition by the child's biological father and his wife to terminate the parental rights of the child's mother, Starquesha T., after the child had lived primarily with the petitioners since 2018. The Shelby County Chancery Court found that one statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence and that termination served the child's best interest, based on factors including the mother's history of child abuse convictions, domestic violence, drug use, mental health issues, and repeated violations of court orders. The mother appealed, arguing errors in the best-interest analysis. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings on the statutory ground and best-interest factors were supported by clear and convincing evidence, with only one factor needing reweighing that did not alter the overall result. The court therefore upheld the termination of the mother's parental rights.

family law

In this probate case, the executor of Ronald C. Perry’s estate (his son) sued the decedent’s widow, alleging she had exerted undue influence by using her role as attorney-in-fact to convert several of his bank accounts into joint accounts with right of survivorship, thereby frustrating the distribution terms of his will. After a bench trial, the Chancery Court dismissed the complaint, finding that no confidential relationship existed between the decedent and his wife. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence did not establish the wife exercised dominion and control over the decedent; instead, it showed she acted as a caretaker assisting with his own wishes regarding gifts to his children. Because no confidential relationship was proven, the undue influence claim could not proceed.

family lawproperty

In this grandparent visitation dispute, the child's maternal grandparents petitioned the Williamson County Chancery Court to hold the father in contempt for violating an existing visitation order; the trial court orally found him in contempt, later entered related bond and contempt orders, and awarded the grandparents attorney’s fees, all while a motion for the trial judge’s recusal remained pending and undecided. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that the trial court lacked authority to enter any further substantive orders before resolving the recusal motion. It therefore vacated the August 2023 bond orders and the order adjudicating the second contempt petition. The appellate court also reversed the fee awards, concluding that no statute then in effect authorized attorney’s fees in grandparent-visitation contempt proceedings. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

family lawprocedure

In this post-divorce case, Renee Alyce Lannom petitioned the trial court to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan, which had designated Scott Keith Lannom as the primary residential parent of their young daughter and allocated him 234 parenting days per year. Mother alleged a material change of circumstances based on Father’s relocation, alleged failures to communicate, restrictions on her parenting time, and interference by the paternal grandmother. After Mother presented her proof at a two-day hearing, the trial court granted Father’s motion for involuntary dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41, finding that Mother had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that any material change affecting the child’s well-being had occurred, that the alleged violations were either unfounded or contemplated at the time of divorce, and that Mother’s credibility was undermined by contradictions in her testimony. The court dismissed the petition with prejudice and awarded Father attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly applied the legal standards and that Father was also entitled to his reasonable fees on appeal.

family lawprocedure

In a divorce case between Jason Donaldson and Susan Donaldson, Jason appealed from a July 2025 order of the Loudon County Chancery Court that addressed some property and contempt issues but referred child support to a magistrate and reserved punishment on a criminal contempt motion for alleged violations of a statutory injunction. The Tennessee Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court order was not a final, appealable judgment. Under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a), a party may appeal as of right only after entry of a final judgment that resolves all claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties, leaving nothing further for the trial court to decide. The appellate court noted that unresolved child support determinations and the lack of a completed contempt ruling prevented finality, as confirmed by prior case law requiring both issues to be fully adjudicated before appeal. The dismissal was without prejudice, allowing a new appeal once a final judgment is entered.

family lawpropertycriminal lawprocedure

In this case, buyer Gail Gottesman sued sellers Todd and Tammy Hecker, along with a real estate agent and home inspector, alleging they fraudulently misrepresented or concealed defects in a residential property she purchased in 2024, in violation of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act and common-law fraud principles. The trial court granted summary judgment to the sellers, ruling that an “as-is” clause in the sales contract barred her claims. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed that ruling as to the fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and Disclosures Act claims, holding that an “as-is” provision does not automatically defeat liability for active fraud or statutory disclosure violations, and remanded those issues for further proceedings. The court affirmed dismissal of her remaining claims and denied her request for reassignment to a different trial judge.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a breach-of-contract dispute in which Yin C. Lemley alleged that her sister and brother-in-law, the Rowes, had failed to honor an agreement under which they helped her finance and purchase improved real property in Tennessee while her assets were frozen during divorce proceedings. After a bench trial, the chancery court found that Lemley had committed the first material breach, acted in bad faith, and misrepresented her performance, yet it awarded her $170,470.04 in reimbursement of payments made (less the Rowes’ expenses) because the defendants had continued accepting her payments; the court denied her request for specific performance. Lemley appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in its entirety, holding that substantial deficiencies in her appellate briefs waived all issues for review. The court also denied the Rowes’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal, finding the appeal was not frivolous.

propertyprocedurefamily law

In this zoning dispute, a homeowners’ association and two residents sued Knox County and developer Thunder Mountain Properties after the Knox County Commission approved a sector plan amendment and rezoning of 159 acres from agricultural/rural to planned residential use, subject to density limits of 2.5 units per acre on flatter land, 1 unit per acre on hillsides, and a total cap of 255 units. The petitioners sought a declaratory judgment, claiming the county lacked authority under state law to attach such conditions to the rezoning. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county and developer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-101 expressly permits a local zoning body to impose conditions when rezoning property and that the commission’s decision rested on a rational basis after extensive review of public-welfare factors. The court rejected arguments that the conditions amounted to an improper amendment of the zoning ordinance or violated the broader statutory scheme.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Jarrod Anderson’s appeal from a November 3, 2025, Chancery Court order denying his petition to legally change his name. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not provided to the proper correctional facility representative for mailing until December 26, 2025—more than thirty days after the final order. Although Anderson was incarcerated and pro se, the prison mailbox rule under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(g) did not render the filing timely, as the document reaching the appellate clerk was late. The court held that the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal in civil cases is mandatory and jurisdictional, and it has no authority to waive or extend that deadline even for reasons of justice or mistake.

procedurefamily law

This case involved a will contest in which the decedent's son challenged the validity of a will executed in a hospital, where two nurses signed as attesting witnesses. After the decedent's death, the will's proponent attempted to subpoena the witnesses for the hearing—one via process server and one via certified mail to their former hospital employer—but neither appeared; the notary testified about their presence at execution, but the trial court found only one witness unavailable and ruled the will invalid for lack of proper proof. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tennessee statutes require a contested will to be proved by all living attesting witnesses if they can be found, placing the burden on the proponent to demonstrate unavailability. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's distinction between the service methods or its conclusion that the certified-mail attempt was inadequate to establish the second witness's unavailability.

family lawprocedureproperty

In this divorce case, Mary Sue Gaston Lee sued Danny C. Lee after their 1996 marriage, seeking an equitable division of their substantial marital estate that included multiple businesses and real properties. The trial court classified the Etowah House as the wife’s separate property, assigned a value to the husband-controlled business Precision Technologies, Inc. (PTI), and distributed the marital assets and debts accordingly. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the classification of the Etowah House, holding that any increase in its value during the marriage attributable to the parties’ contributions could be marital property subject to division. The court also reversed the PTI valuation because it improperly included an unrealized $165,000 commission, and therefore vacated the overall property distribution, remanding those issues for further proceedings while leaving other classifications undisturbed.

family lawproperty

This case involves ongoing disputes between Samuel Pinner and Jessie Connatser over modifications to a 2016 permanent parenting plan for their two children, who live primarily with the mother in Virginia during the school year and with the father in Tennessee during summers. The mother repeatedly sought to transfer venue to Virginia under the UCCJEA, while both parents filed competing petitions to modify the plan and raised contempt allegations. The trial court retained jurisdiction in Tennessee, found a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the plan, held the mother in civil contempt for two violations involving co-parenting time, imposed a $100 fine, and ordered her to pay $15,000 in the father’s attorney fees. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals vacated the contempt findings and fine, reasoning that the parenting plan was ambiguous regarding the specific obligations at issue, but affirmed the trial court’s jurisdiction ruling, the modification, and the attorney fee award in all other respects.

family law

In this case, the paternal grandparents and father petitioned to terminate the mother's parental rights to her child Deklan B. on grounds including abandonment, failure to manifest an ability to assume custody, and persistence of conditions leading to removal. The trial court denied a continuance when the mother did not appear for the July 31, 2024 trial, granted her counsel's oral motion to withdraw due to lack of communication, and proceeded without her or counsel present, ultimately terminating her rights based on the grandparents' testimony. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals vacated the termination order and remanded for a new trial. The court reasoned that the record lacked sufficient evidence to show the mother had waived her right to counsel, noting the trial court's limited inquiry into counsel's efforts to notify her of the trial date or intent to withdraw, and citing similar precedent where unsworn statements by counsel alone were inadequate to establish waiver.

family lawprocedure

This case concerns the termination of parental rights of Angela M.C. and Hector M.C. to their child, Juanita M., after the child and both parents tested positive for methamphetamine in 2023, leading the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services to take the child into protective custody and adjudicate her dependent and neglected. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination as to both parents—persistence of conditions that led to removal, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility—and determined that termination served the child’s best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in full, holding that the parents’ continued positive drug tests after removal demonstrated an inability to resolve the core issues despite partial compliance with permanency plans. Although the court noted that DCS should have provided a Spanish interpreter to the father for key documents and meetings, it concluded this deficiency did not overcome the evidence supporting termination when weighed against the child’s health and safety.

family law

This case involves pro se petitioner Keith Dessinger’s appeal from the denial of his motion to recuse Judge W. Christopher Frulla in consolidated Shelby County Circuit Court cases (CT-2617-25 and related matters) against Sally McIver. After the cases were transferred from Division VI to Division III, Dessinger filed a December 2025 Rule 10B motion alleging bias by Judge Frulla based on events during the litigation, including rulings and alleged remarks; the trial court denied the motion for lack of required statements, supporting evidence, and any extrajudicial source of bias. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Dessinger failed to meet Rule 10B procedural requirements, that his claims arose solely from judicial proceedings rather than external sources, and that alleged errors or unsupported assertions of derogatory comments did not establish prejudice warranting recusal. The court remanded the case for further proceedings.

procedure