James E. Lockemy

North Point Development Group sued the South Carolina Department of Transportation after the agency denied its application for an encroachment permit to build a driveway from its property onto U.S. Highway 378 at a location the Department classified as a controlled-access facility. The circuit court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that judicial review under section 57-5-1120 applies only to non-controlled-access highways and that the Department had validly acquired access rights from North Point’s predecessor in title. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that the chain of title sufficiently established the transfer of access rights and that the location of the highway plans did not violate any statutory notice requirements. It reversed the jurisdictional ruling, however, reasoning that courts retain authority to review whether the Department’s refusal to consider a permit application constituted an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the discretion granted by section 57-5-1040. The case was remanded for the circuit court to make that determination.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Fettler v. Gentner, a passenger sued for negligence and damages after being rear-ended at a yield sign on an interstate on-ramp in Columbia, South Carolina, when the driver behind her (Gentner) struck the vehicle while it was yielding to oncoming traffic. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motions for directed verdict and JNOV on the issue of the defendant's negligence, allowed the case to go to the jury, and the jury returned a verdict for Gentner; the court later denied post-trial relief. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Gentner was negligent as a matter of law because the evidence permitted only one reasonable inference: he breached his duty to keep a proper lookout by admitting he stopped watching the vehicle ahead and instead focused on a distant turning car, with no contrary evidence showing the lead vehicle acted improperly. The court further ruled that the jury should not have been instructed on negligence principles at all, as the issue was resolved by law rather than fact, rendering the charge irrelevant and potentially confusing.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Galimore, Rodney Galimore faced charges of reckless homicide, driving under suspension, child endangerment, and felony DUI after a vehicular accident. The trial court quashed the initial felony DUI indictment for failing to allege a specific traffic violation, granted the State a continuance on the remaining charges, allowed re-indictment alleging a violation of section 56-5-1810 (failure to drive on the right side of the roadway), denied Galimore’s motions for directed verdicts at trial, and entered convictions on all counts. Galimore appealed the directed-verdict denials and the continuance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that evidence of the roadway violation, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to submit both the felony DUI and derivative child-endangerment charges to the jury, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in granting the brief continuance because Galimore had long been aware of the indictment’s potential defect.

criminal lawprocedure

In Black v. Lexington County Board of Zoning Appeals, Margie Kay Black appealed the circuit court's affirmance of the Lexington County Board of Zoning Appeals' decision granting Reitech, LLC a zoning variance to reduce buffering, setback, and screening requirements for an existing paint shed and a proposed sandblasting shed on its steel fabrication property in Leesville, South Carolina. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the Board correctly found the property met the statutory criteria for a variance under S.C. Code § 6-29-800 and the county zoning ordinance, as the pre-existing fabrication facility (dating to 1982, before the 2001 zoning) created an extraordinary condition unique to the site that would otherwise unreasonably restrict its use, and the variance would not harm adjacent properties or the district's character.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In this workers’ compensation case, Henry Dinkins sought total disability benefits after suffering three work-related injuries at Lowe’s Home Centers—an ankle injury in 2001, a knee injury in 2002, and a back injury in 2005—arguing that his preexisting leg impairments combined with his back condition to cause a greater overall disability under S.C. Code § 42-9-400. The single commissioner, Appellate Panel, and circuit court all rejected this claim, awarding Dinkins only a 12% permanent partial disability rating for his back under the scheduled benefits of § 42-9-30 and finding his prior injuries did not contribute to his current disability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Appellate Panel’s determination that Dinkins’ back injury was separate and distinct, with no greater disability resulting from the combined effects of his injuries, and that he therefore could not establish total disability under § 42-9-10. The court further noted that Dinkins’ evidence of unsuccessful job searches did not need to be addressed once the combination issue was resolved against him.

labor & employment

Robert Taylor was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and kidnapping for sexually assaulting an 11-year-old boy during a 1998 church camping trip, after he had previously pled guilty to a similar 1999 offense against the same victim. On appeal, Taylor challenged the trial court’s rulings on the State’s Batson motion regarding jury strikes, the admission of his prior conviction as evidence of a common scheme or plan, the denial of his directed-verdict motion, and his sentence of life without parole under South Carolina’s recidivist statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court properly found the challenged strike racially motivated, that the prior conviction was admissible, that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts, and that the 1995 version of the recidivist statute applied to authorize life without parole based on the sequence of the offenses.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In State v. Senter, Bradley Senter was convicted after a jury trial of assault and battery with intent to kill and criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature for shooting his estranged wife in 2006; he raised an insanity defense based on evidence of his delusional disorder but did not dispute shooting the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court properly denied directed-verdict and new-trial motions because evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, permitted a reasonable jury to find Senter was sane at the time of the offense and capable of conforming his conduct to the law. The court also upheld the denial of Senter’s request to waive a jury trial, concluding there is no constitutional right to a bench trial without the consent of both the prosecutor and the judge under Rule 14(b), SCRCrimP, and that Senter’s additional due-process and constitutional arguments were either unpreserved or abandoned on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, a divorce case between Alice and Lloyd Fitzwater with no children, the wife appealed the family court's rulings on the equitable division of assets, specifically challenging the classification of the husband's pre-marital Antioch Church Road property as nonmarital, the valuation of his retirement account, a 60-40 split of marital property favoring the husband, the husband's special equity award in the Hill Billy Way marital home, and the requirement that she contribute to his attorney's fees. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the family court's decisions in full after a de novo review of the facts and law. The court held that the Antioch property was not transmuted into marital property because it remained titled solely in the husband's name and lacked sufficient objective evidence of intent to treat it as jointly owned, despite some joint payments on the mortgage. It further upheld the asset division, special equity award, and fee allocation as consistent with statutory equitable distribution factors and the parties' respective contributions, incomes, and conduct during litigation.

family lawproperty

The case involved Stacy Howard’s appeal of his ABHAN conviction arising from an incident in which he struck his former girlfriend during an argument, breaking her nose. At trial, the court admitted three of Howard’s prior ABHAN convictions for impeachment after concluding their probative value on credibility outweighed any prejudice; this court previously remanded for an on-the-record weighing under the Colf factors and, after the trial court again admitted the convictions on remand, Howard appealed that ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court misapplied the Colf factors by failing to adequately account for the high degree of similarity between the prior convictions and the charged offense, which rendered the evidence more prejudicial than probative for impeachment purposes. The court therefore reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In this post-divorce family court case, Mother sought supervised visitation and custody changes after receiving reports and evidence that Father and his wife were using drugs during the children's visits; the parties eventually agreed to maintain joint legal custody with Mother having primary physical custody, require Father's quarterly drug testing, and bar the wife from visits, while litigating only the issue of attorney's fees. The family court awarded Mother $15,000 in fees and nearly $4,000 in costs after finding she was the prevailing party who obtained beneficial results. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Father's delays in providing drug test results, failure to respond to mediation requests, and lack of credibility in his financial declaration unnecessarily increased Mother's litigation expenses. The court further determined that the award was supported by the evidence and properly calculated under the relevant factors, including the reasonableness of hours and rates and the beneficial outcome for Mother.

family law

In this juvenile criminal appeal, Jamal G. challenged his family court murder adjudication arising from a February 2008 shooting outside a convenience store, arguing that the evidence of provocation warranted reduction of the charge to voluntary manslaughter. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s ruling without reaching the merits of that claim. The court held that the issue was not preserved for appellate review because Jamal neither objected when the family court rejected voluntary manslaughter during its verdict nor filed a post-trial motion for reconsideration. South Carolina precedent requires that an issue be both raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be considered on appeal, and the court declined to create an exception for juvenile matters.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In this divorce action, Sara Roesler challenged the family court's authority over her marriage to Scott Roesler, its decision to proceed to trial without appointing her counsel after she defaulted, its failure to consider or award alimony, and its waiver of mandatory mediation. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the family court's rulings on jurisdiction, the lack of appointed counsel, and the mediation waiver, but reversed on alimony and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction was proper under state law because the couple had resided in South Carolina for more than three months before the husband filed. The court found no error in proceeding without counsel or waiving mediation because the wife was in default with unknown whereabouts, providing good cause for the exemptions. On alimony, however, the family court had failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether an award was warranted based on the parties' circumstances at the time of the final hearing.

family lawprocedure

In Landry v. Carolinas Healthcare Systems, a radiation therapist with a childhood bunion condition sought workers’ compensation benefits after surgeries, claiming her pre-existing foot deformities were aggravated by years of prolonged standing on hard surfaces at work, which she characterized as a repetitive-trauma injury by accident. The single commissioner awarded benefits, but the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed, finding no compensable injury; the circuit court affirmed that decision, and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial. The court reasoned that, under Pee v. AVM, an injury qualifies as accidental only if it was unexpected from the worker’s perspective, and substantial evidence showed Landry had long known—from prior medical treatment and her doctor’s warning—that continued standing would worsen her structural deformities, making the progression foreseeable rather than accidental.

labor & employment

In Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn, a mortgage foreclosure action, Wachovia sought judgment on a defaulted promissory note secured by a mortgage on investment property and personal guaranties, while the Blackburns asserted counterclaims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, and related tort and contract claims arising from alleged pre-sale misrepresentations about the property and its amenities. The circuit court granted Wachovia's motion to strike the Blackburns' jury trial demand, finding that the clear jury waiver provisions in the note and guaranty were knowing and voluntary and covered the counterclaims. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the waivers were enforceable as knowing and voluntary but reversed on scope, holding that the counterclaims based on pre-purchase fraud and sales misrepresentations did not arise out of the note or guaranty and thus fell outside the waivers, which were to be strictly construed.

propertyproceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In this negligence case, a minor's conservators received life insurance proceeds that were required by probate court order to be held in a restricted account with no withdrawals permitted without court approval. The conservator forged signatures, opened accounts at Bank of America without proper title designations or restrictions, and later transferred the funds to her personal account. A jury found the bank negligent for failing to enforce the account restrictions and awarded actual and punitive damages, which the trial court upheld after post-trial review. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the bank's conduct supported liability for negligence and that the punitive damages award was constitutionally permissible based on the degree of reprehensibility, the ratio to actual damages, and comparable cases. The court rejected arguments that the conservator's actions were unforeseeable intervening causes.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryfamily law

This case concerns a dispute over ownership of approximately 9 acres of saltwater marsh tidelands adjacent to Peter Grant's 3-acre highland property on Folly Beach, South Carolina. Grant sued the State under section 48-39-220 to quiet title, claiming ownership through a 1696 grant and a 1786 surplus grant and plat. The trial court ruled that Grant failed to overcome the State's presumptive title to the tidelands, which are held in trust for the public, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The core reasoning was that South Carolina law requires a claimant to show both a valid chain of title and grant language or plat markings that specifically demonstrate an intent to convey land below the high-water mark; the grants here named tidal waterways or marsh only as boundaries without such explicit language, and grants of tidelands are strictly construed in favor of the State.

propertyenvironment

In State v. Burgess, the defendant appealed her convictions for trafficking crack cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine and ecstasy, and possession of marijuana, arguing that a narcotics investigator lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle after observing what he believed was a drug transaction in the parking lot of a Hardee's restaurant known for drug activity. The trial court denied her motion to suppress the drugs found during the stop, and she was convicted following a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the stop was justified because the officer's training and experience, combined with the location's reputation for drug sales and the observed behavior of the vehicles and occupants consistent with a hand-to-hand drug transaction, provided reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the facts were analogous to prior precedent involving stops near known drug locations based on suspicious short-term activity.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a divorce action in which the husband appealed the family court's award of permanent periodic alimony to the wife, its valuation of the parties' retirement accounts for equitable distribution, and its grant of retroactive alimony. The court affirmed the alimony award after reviewing the statutory factors including the 14-year marriage duration, the parties' education levels, employment histories, and earning potentials. It also affirmed the use of the date-of-filing values for the retirement accounts, consistent with precedent requiring marital property to be valued as of the commencement of litigation. However, the court reversed the retroactive alimony award because the family court lacked authority to amend the final decree on its own initiative more than ten days after entry.

family lawproperty

This case involved the estreatment of a $200,000 surety bond posted by three bonding companies for defendant Mario Hinojos, who was charged with drug trafficking and firearm offenses in South Carolina. After Hinojos pled guilty and failed to appear for sentencing, the trial court estreated $66,666.66 against one set of bondsmen (the Appellants), finding they had received proper notice and consented to remain on the bond at the plea hearing despite an earlier unnotified bond modification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the Appellants remained liable on the bond, holding that the key consent occurred at the guilty plea rather than the prior modification and that equitable estoppel could apply. However, the court reversed the specific estreatment amount and remanded, reasoning that the trial court failed to consider the required statutory factors under S.C. Code § 38-53-70 and precedent, including costs to the State, the purpose of the bond, and the nature of the default.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns ITC Commercial Funding, LLC's effort to enforce a personal guaranty on a promissory note against Alice Crerar after the borrower, a company owned by Crerar's family, defaulted on a loan used to refinance an ice skating rink. ITC filed suit on the guaranty, properly served Crerar, and obtained a default judgment after she failed to file a responsive pleading or acknowledge service despite multiple notices and extensions. Crerar moved to set aside the judgment under Rules 54, 55, and 60, SCRCP, citing her own negligence, her attorney's limited representation, and alleged misconduct by ITC, but the trial court denied relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion because Crerar received adequate notice that her attorney could not represent her in South Carolina, showed no excusable neglect or misconduct by the opposing party, and thus did not establish grounds under Rule 60(b).

procedurebusiness & regulatory