Thomas E. Huff

In Fuller v. Fuller, a South Carolina family court reduced a divorced husband's monthly alimony obligation from $1,200 to $250 after he sought modification, citing his age and health issues including multiple knee surgeries. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the family court judge erred by focusing almost exclusively on the husband's age of 67, repeatedly stating he would not require a man that age to work, and excluding relevant evidence such as medical testimony about the husband's ability to work or earning capacity. The appeals court reasoned that alimony modification requires consideration of all statutory factors under South Carolina law, including the parties' financial situations and the original alimony order, rather than age alone or a mischaracterization of the issue as whether the husband must return to employment.

family law

In State v. Johnson, the defendant was convicted of DUI in magistrate court after a jury was selected from a pool of 33 potential jurors, even though the magistrate had initially drawn 75 names as required by S.C. Code § 22-2-90. Johnson appealed, arguing that the statute mandated at least 40 jurors be available for selection, and the circuit court reversed the conviction on that ground. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and reinstated the conviction, holding that the statute requires only that a sufficient number of names be drawn in advance (here, 75), not that a minimum number actually appear on the day of trial. The court reasoned that the statutes governing magistrate court juries set no fixed minimum for jurors present, that 33 available jurors were enough to seat a six-member jury after peremptory strikes, and that Johnson suffered no prejudice from the process.

criminal lawprocedure

In Clark v. State, Anthony Clark was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after a jury trial; no direct appeal was filed, and his subsequent application for post-conviction relief was denied by the PCR court on grounds that his testimony about requesting an appeal was not credible. Clark petitioned for a belated review of his direct appeal under White v. State, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to address both the PCR denial and the underlying claim that the trial court erred in denying a directed verdict for insufficient evidence. The court reversed the PCR denial, holding that trial counsel failed to ensure Clark was made fully aware of his right to appeal after conviction and that there was no probative evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver, but it affirmed the murder conviction after reviewing the direct appeal issue. The court reasoned that multiple witnesses' testimony identifying Clark as the shooter or linking him to the scene and statements after the shooting constituted sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury, with any discrepancies in the evidence presenting questions of credibility rather than grounds for a directed verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

In Kimmer v. Wright, the personal representative of a worker injured in a 1999 car accident sued attorney Philip Wright for legal malpractice, alleging that Wright's unauthorized settlement of a third-party claim without notice to the employer caused the denial of workers' compensation benefits. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the statute of limitations had not run because it was triggered by the workers' compensation commission's adverse ruling. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the three-year limitations period began to run no later than February 2000, when Wright informed Kimmer of the settlement error, advised him to obtain new counsel, and Kimmer signed a waiver acknowledging a potential claim against Wright. The court explained that under the discovery rule, actual knowledge of the injury and its cause starts the clock, the prior denial of summary judgment was not law of the case, and the parties' tolling agreement could not revive an already time-barred claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Chisholm, Jerome Chisholm was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor after his six-year-old stepdaughter’s mother interrupted him during an alleged assault, leading to a sexual assault examination, DNA testing of the child’s underwear that matched Chisholm’s profile, and later medical testing that revealed the child was HIV positive. Chisholm appealed, arguing the State lacked probable cause for his DNA buccal swabs, the trial court should have excluded the HIV test results for lack of chain of custody and undue prejudice, and a mistrial should have been granted when the child’s doctor testified that the victim said Chisholm “did something bad.” The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that any evidentiary errors were harmless because the brief hearsay remark was cumulative to the direct identifications by the victim and her mother, the DNA evidence was properly obtained and overwhelmingly incriminating, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Leon Hill's convictions for two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree and two counts of lewd act upon a child, based on testimony from the eleven-year-old victim and supporting evidence from medical experts, a forensic interviewer, and a witness. Hill appealed the trial court's rulings on the jury pool selection process, admission of a DVD recording of the victim's forensic interview along with related expert testimony, denial of a mistrial motion over undisclosed impeachment evidence, and jury instructions regarding corroboration of the victim's testimony. The appellate court affirmed the convictions in full, determining that the trial judge had properly handled each of the challenged issues without reversible error.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ross v. Ross, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed a family court decision denying a wife's post-divorce claim for alimony, which she filed over two years after the thirty-day deadline set in the 2005 divorce decree based on habitual drug use. The wife argued that ongoing physical abuse and death threats from the husband, including incidents leading to his arrest for criminal domestic violence in 2007, prevented her from timely filing and warranted equitable tolling of the deadline. The family court acknowledged the violence but concluded the delay was unreasonable and partly attributable to her inability to afford counsel. The appellate court reversed, finding that the record showed continuous threats and abuse until at least 2007 that justified tolling, and remanded for a determination on whether the wife could pursue alimony.

family law

In State v. Orozco, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and two counts of lewd act upon a child based on allegations from his minor nieces. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his suicide attempt shortly after the allegations surfaced and by instructing the jury that a victim's testimony need not be corroborated in criminal sexual conduct cases. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the suicide attempt evidence was admissible as probative of consciousness of guilt, akin to flight evidence, given circumstantial indications Orozco knew of the allegations. On the jury charge, the court found it followed controlling precedent, was not unduly emphasized, and was accompanied by proper instructions on the burden of proof and credibility determinations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Thomas Bryant, a paraplegic man living in a hotel room, who was convicted of murdering Daniel Austin following an altercation that began outside a nightclub and continued to Bryant's room. Bryant appealed his conviction, claiming the trial court erred by refusing to admit a 911 dispatch log into evidence and by declining to instruct the jury on the defense of habitation. The appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the evidence presented warranted a jury charge on the defense of habitation because it showed Bryant was attempting to eject a trespasser from his premises when he inflicted the fatal blows.

criminal law

In State v. Ravenell, the defendant was convicted in absentia of armed robbery and first-degree burglary after failing to appear for trial following jury selection, despite having been warned that the trial would proceed without him. He later challenged the trial court's decision to try him in his absence and to deny his motion to quash the jury, which he claimed underrepresented minority races and thus violated fair cross-section requirements. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in proceeding in absentia given the defendant's notice and voluntary absence, and that Ravenell failed to prove systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of minorities in the jury selection process as required for a prima facie violation. The sentencing judge had already modified the original consecutive sentences to concurrent terms upon the defendant's motion.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

John Brayboy was convicted of murder after his girlfriend died from a gunshot wound during an argument in their home. He appealed, claiming the trial court should have instructed the jury on involuntary manslaughter based on his statement that the victim produced a gun, they struggled over it, he gained control, and it discharged accidentally while he was swinging his arms. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case, holding that the evidence supported a jury finding that Brayboy was lawfully armed in self-defense yet negligently handled the gun. The court reasoned that this evidence distinguished the case from precedents where no such charge was required and clarified that entitlement to the charge turns on whether the defendant was lawfully armed, not on whether self-defense was fully established.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute between Plantation A.D., LLC and Gerald Builders of Conway, Inc. along with Jimmy Gerald over an alleged profit-sharing agreement for the development and sale of a 45-acre property. Plantation A.D. sued for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and related claims after Gerald Builders purchased the foreclosed property at auction, developed it, and resold it without sharing profits. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the Memorandum of Understanding unenforceable for lack of consideration, unmet conditions precedent, and no individual liability for Gerald. The appellate court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding acceptance of the Memorandum, its enforceability, and Gerald's personal participation in alleged torts such as conversion and fraud. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liabilityprocedure

State v. Liverman concerned the conviction of Chris Anthony Liverman on two counts of murder for a gang-related shooting on August 26, 2004, that killed two teenagers, resulting in consecutive life sentences. Liverman appealed on grounds that the trial court failed to conduct an in camera hearing on the reliability of one witness's identification and improperly permitted a gang expert to testify about body markings on Liverman indicating prior murders. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, determining that any identification issues were adequately addressed or preserved for review and that the expert testimony was admissible under rules allowing experts to rely on facts reasonably relied upon in their field. The decision rested on procedural preservation of objections and evidentiary standards for expert opinions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a declaratory judgment action arising from a 2004 car accident in South Carolina, in which plaintiff Leggett sought to establish that New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company provided liability coverage for driver Bryan Smith under a policy issued to his parents in New York. The trial court ruled that South Carolina had personal jurisdiction over the insurer and that the policy covered the accident; the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the insurer had waived the policy's household-residency and principal-garaging requirements by continuing to accept premiums after learning that Smith had moved to South Carolina and was using the vehicle there. The court also upheld jurisdiction based on the insurer's contacts with the state through the policy and post-accident actions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this workers' compensation case, employee Susette Hieronymus, a dental hygienist, sought benefits for injuries to her neck, hands, and upper extremities from repetitive motions at work on October 1, 2002, along with a related ganglion cyst, after her original claim for right arm and wrist issues was accepted by insurer Clarendon National Insurance Company. Clarendon appealed the circuit court's affirmance of the Workers' Compensation Commission's rulings that Hieronymus sustained a compensable injury by accident including to her neck, that Clarendon was liable, that the claim was timely, and that the cyst was caused or aggravated by the original injury and surgery. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings of injury and causation, that the initial claim covered all effects of the accident for timeliness purposes under S.C. Code § 42-15-40, and that medical opinions along with other facts established the cyst's compensability. The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review under the Administrative Procedures Act and precedents like Shealy v. Aiken County.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a mortgage foreclosure action brought by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems against Daniel and Amanda White after they defaulted on a loan secured by real property in Clarendon County that was actually owned by White's father, who was not a party to the mortgage. The special referee declared the mortgage void ab initio, ordered the sale of the mobile home, and entered judgment for the lender while denying the Whites' requests for a jury trial and recusal of the referee. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Whites waived their initial jury demands by failing to timely appeal an earlier order, their later fraud-based jury request was not properly preserved, no evidence showed bias by the referee, and the fraud counterclaim was not preserved because the referee did not rule on it and no motion to alter or amend was filed.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a partition action between MariChris, LLC and George Rodney Derrick over waterfront property they purchased together in South Carolina. The master-in-equity determined that the parties each held a 50% interest in the property based on their agreement and the deed, ordered its sale, and allocated proceeds with credits for contributions, while denying various equitable claims. On appeal, the court affirmed the equal ownership determination and most rulings but modified the distribution to deduct $240,000 from the common fund to properly account for each party's share of pre-trial bank note payments. The court also remanded the issue of attorneys' fees for further determination.

property

This case concerned an appeal by Evan and Leslie Jones challenging the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's issuance of an amended dock permit to Arthur Moore, which allowed his dock to extend to the Wando River rather than a tributary creek. The Administrative Law Court approved the permit with conditions, and this was upheld by the Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel and the circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding substantial evidence that the permit did not violate relevant regulations on dock placement and navigation, that an initial denial letter was a non-final draft that could be revoked due to mistake, and that the Joneses' due process rights were not violated.

environmentpropertyprocedure

This case involved a workers' compensation claim by Roger Dale Watt against his former employers, Piedmont Automotive and Piedmont Chrysler Plymouth, alleging that stressful conditions from a new "Net Profit" program at work caused or aggravated his heart disease, leading to congestive heart failure and bypass surgery shortly after his termination in January 2001. The single commissioner and Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission denied benefits, finding that the work conditions were not extraordinary and unusual compared to normal employment, that Watt failed to provide timely notice of a work-related injury, and that no employer-employee relationship existed on the date of the alleged injury. The circuit court reversed on all grounds, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court and reinstated the denial. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Commission's conclusions that the stress did not meet the statutory threshold for compensable heart attacks under S.C. Code § 42-1-160 and that notice was inadequate because supervisors were not informed the condition was claimed to be work-related. The court emphasized the deference owed to the Commission's factual findings on credibility and evidence.

labor & employment

In State v. Vick, the defendant was convicted of murder, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping after the victim was found beaten and strangled in her beauty salon; the evidence included witness identifications of a man matching Vick's description fleeing the scene and other circumstantial details tying him to the crime. Vick appealed, challenging the admission of certain testimony about a phone conversation as hearsay and arguing that his kidnapping sentence should be vacated under South Carolina Code Ann. § 16-3-910. The court held that the challenged testimony was either not hearsay or its admission was harmless given the other evidence of guilt, thereby affirming the convictions. It further determined that the kidnapping sentence was improper under the statute when a life sentence for murder was imposed, and vacated that sentence in the interest of judicial economy despite the lack of a trial objection.

criminal lawprocedure