John C. Few

In Smith v. Widener, Sandra Smith sued Tracy Widener, Stacy Currie, and Epting's estate for conversion and other claims after a dispute over her rights as beneficiary of a $75,410 deferred compensation account following Epting's death; Smith had withdrawn $40,000 after CitiStreet initially transferred the funds to her, but CitiStreet later sent the remaining $35,410 to the estate based on a competing waiver form. Smith settled with CitiStreet for $35,410 before trial, and a jury later awarded her exactly that amount against Widener and Currie on the conversion claim. The trial court denied the defendants' request for a setoff to reduce the verdict by the settlement amount. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when actual and punitive damages arise from the same injury, they constitute a single claim under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-50, so a nonsettling defendant is entitled to setoff by operation of law to prevent double recovery for the identical loss.

torts & liabilityprocedureproperty

In State v. McKerley, Jimmy Paul McKerley appealed his convictions for criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree and lewd act upon a child under sixteen, based on allegations that he sexually abused his seven-year-old daughter. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the State’s expert forensic interviewer. The court reasoned that statements such as finding the victim’s interviews “compelling for sexual abuse,” along with related testimony about consistency, sensory details, and other indicators of abuse, improperly commented on the victim’s credibility in violation of State v. Jennings and Rule 608(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, which reserve credibility assessments exclusively for the jury. The court further concluded that the error was not harmless, given the extent of the bolstering testimony and its likely effect on the verdict in the context of the other evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Coker, the circuit court revoked Phillip Coker’s probation and imposed part of his suspended prison sentence based solely on his failure to pay money. Coker appealed, arguing that the court had not made required findings on whether the violation was willful. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that under Bearden v. Georgia and State v. Spare, probation may not be revoked for nonpayment unless the record shows specific findings: that the State proved a violation, that the probationer willfully chose not to pay or failed to make bona fide efforts to obtain funds, and, if he could not pay despite such efforts, that no adequate alternatives exist to meet the State’s interests in punishment and deterrence. The circuit court had made none of these findings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a post-conviction relief (PCR) action in which Joseph Walker challenged his convictions for kidnapping and first-degree criminal sexual conduct on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The PCR court granted Walker a new trial, finding that counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate a potential alibi witness (Reed) and that the cumulative effect of other alleged deficiencies prejudiced the defense. The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although counsel’s failure to investigate Reed was deficient under the Sixth Amendment, Reed’s PCR testimony did not meet the legal definition of an alibi and thus Walker could not show the required prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The court further held that any other instances of deficient performance were unrelated and created no cumulative prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. It therefore reversed the grant of PCR relief.

criminal lawprocedure

York County appealed after the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) issued C & D Management a permit to build a construction and demolition debris landfill, claiming that the county's 2007 "emergency ordinance" had declared all unpermitted landfills inconsistent with its 1994 solid waste management plan and therefore barred the permit under state law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Administrative Law Court's ruling upholding the permit. The court held that DHEC alone possesses exclusive statutory authority to determine whether a proposed landfill is consistent with local plans and ordinances, and that the county could not override this authority by enacting an ordinance that simply labeled all new landfills inconsistent; the emergency ordinance was therefore properly disregarded. The decision rested on the Solid Waste Policy and Management Act and the precedent in Southeast Resource Recovery, Inc. v. DHEC, which prohibit delegating permitting power to local governments.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Melissa Crosby's lawsuit against her former employer, Prysmian, alleging retaliatory discharge under South Carolina law for firing her shortly after she filed a workers' compensation claim for a knee injury sustained on the job. The workers' compensation commission had previously ruled in Crosby's favor, finding she suffered a compensable work-related injury, after which the circuit court granted her partial summary judgment by treating that finding as conclusive and dismissing Prysmian's affirmative defense that the claim was fraudulent, along with its counterclaims. On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the commission's factual determination was entitled to preclusive effect under collateral estoppel because the injury issue was identical, actually litigated to a final decision, and Prysmian had a full opportunity to contest it. The court rejected Prysmian's arguments that public policy or differences in proceedings warranted relitigation, noting that the fraud defense could not succeed as a matter of law once the commission's ruling was given preclusive weight.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case arose when the City of Columbia entered a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a development team, including Stevens & Wilkinson, to plan and finance a publicly funded hotel near the convention center, but later awarded the project to a different developer after more than a year of work under the MOU. The original team sued the City for breach of contract, claiming the MOU was enforceable, along with related quantum meruit and promissory estoppel claims; the circuit court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims, ruling the MOU was not a contract as a matter of law because it contemplated future definitive agreements. The appellate court reversed summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim, holding that the MOU’s recital of mutual promises and consideration, combined with the parties’ performance of specified tasks, created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it formed a binding contract that a jury must decide. It also reversed on the quantum meruit claim but affirmed on promissory estoppel, reasoning that the MOU’s payment provisions were expressly contingent on bond closing—an event that never occurred—preventing any unambiguous promise. The court remanded the contract and quantum meruit issues for trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Gilmore, Willie Albert Gilmore appealed his conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct after a jury found that he raped the victim at knifepoint following an argument, relying on her testimony about the assault and statements he made during it. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) as a lesser-included offense and did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s testimony about Gilmore’s threatening statements. The court reasoned that ABHAN may be charged only when evidence supports a finding that the defendant committed that offense rather than CSC, but here the record showed aggravated force used to accomplish sexual battery with no factual basis for consent or a non-sexual assault; the statements were admissible as integral to the crime. The remaining issues were unpreserved.

criminal law

David Ray Tant appealed after the South Carolina Department of Corrections changed its calculation of his sentence from fifteen years to thirty years. Tant had pleaded guilty to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature plus multiple animal-fighting counts, and the original sentencing sheets listed a ten-year term for the assault followed by four consecutive five-year terms, for a total of fifteen years. SCDC initially recorded fifteen years but later relied on a 2007 letter from the sentencing judge—stating an intent for a forty-year aggregate sentence reduced by ten years upon payment of restitution—and on a review of the sentencing transcript to reinterpret the sentence as thirty years; the Administrative Law Court upheld that reinterpretation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sentencing sheets were unambiguous and that SCDC therefore could not look beyond them to the judge’s later letter or to the transcript to alter the sentence length. The court concluded that the proper interpretation of the sentence remained fifteen years.

criminal lawprocedure

In West v. Morehead, Rebecca West sued a newspaper and its reporters for defamation after an article described her in sensational terms as a “two-bit” and “corruptible” lawyer involved in a high-profile divorce case, drawing on public court filings but adding narrative language and adjectives not present in those documents. The jury awarded West $10,000 in actual damages and $30,000 in punitive damages. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the actual-damages award, holding that the fair-report privilege applied to the article’s reporting of judicial proceedings but that the jury could reasonably find the privilege was abused and that the defendants acted with common-law malice; the court also upheld the trial judge’s evidentiary rulings on a post-publication clarification. It reversed the punitive award, however, ruling as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to prove constitutional actual malice.

free speechtorts & liability

In Nestberg v. Nestberg, a South Carolina divorce case, the central disputes concerned whether land Paul Nestberg purchased shortly before the 1996 marriage—later developed into a residential subdivision through Eastview Development Company—qualified as marital property subject to equitable division, and whether Paul's sale of subdivision lots at allegedly below-market prices during separation proceedings constituted marital economic misconduct warranting adjustment of the division. The family court ruled the property had been transmuted into marital assets through its use as the marital home and development during the marriage, included it in the estate, found misconduct, and adjusted the award accordingly while granting Hala attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the transmutation finding under S.C. Code § 20-3-630 and case law requiring objective evidence of intent to treat nonmarital property as common marital property, but reversed the misconduct ruling because the court improperly altered the valuation date rather than accounting for any effect within the statutory factors at the proper filing-date valuation. The court remanded for a new trial solely on the valuation of Eastview and related fees.

family lawproperty

In this case, the Hollis family and Robinsons sued Stonington Development for negligence, trespass, private nuisance, and unfair trade practices after the company's upstream residential development caused severe flooding, erosion, and sediment buildup on their multi-generational property, damaging ponds and access to their home. The jury awarded $400,000 in actual damages (later reduced to $315,000 after setoff) and $3.5 million in punitive damages, based on evidence that Stonington ignored its engineers' stormwater plans, violated state and local regulations over several years, and misled the plaintiffs about remediation. The trial court denied Stonington's motion for a directed verdict on punitive damages and upheld the jury instructions. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of the directed verdict and the jury charge but held the punitive award excessive under due process standards, requiring reduction while affirming all other aspects of the judgment.

propertytorts & liabilityenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

The case arose from an automobile accident in which the plaintiff's vehicle was damaged in a collision allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence. After settling personal injury claims, the plaintiff sought damages for property loss and loss of use of the vehicle, requesting a jury instruction that loss of use damages remain recoverable even if the vehicle is a total loss; the trial court denied the request and the jury awarded $120. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court erred in refusing the instruction, but the Court of Appeals affirmed because the plaintiff failed to include the requested charge or the full jury instructions in the record on appeal, making the issue unreviewable. A dissent maintained that the issue had been preserved and should have been resolved on the merits.

proceduretorts & liability

5 Star, Inc. sued Ford Motor Company in a product liability action claiming that negligence in the design of a speed control deactivation switch caused a fire that destroyed a 1996 Ford F-250 truck and damaged other property. At trial, 5 Star presented fact and expert witnesses on the fire's origin but offered no evidence or expert testimony addressing Ford's conduct in designing the switch or whether the design breached the duty of care in 1996. The trial court denied Ford's motion for a directed verdict and the jury awarded damages to 5 Star, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a negligent design claim requires proof that the manufacturer breached its duty of reasonable care at the time of design and that expert testimony is necessary when the subject matter is beyond lay knowledge. The court entered judgment for Ford.

torts & liability

In Wilson v. McDonald, an unmarried father appealed the family court's denial of his request to change his three-year-old daughter's surname from Wilson to Wilson-McDonald after agreeing on custody and support issues with the mother. The court affirmed the denial, holding that the father failed to meet his burden of proving the change was in the child's best interest under S.C. Code § 15-49-10(B). Applying the nine Mazzone factors, the court emphasized the child's long use of her current name and identification with it, the father's lack of involvement at birth, the parents' equal community standing, and the absence of evidence that hyphenation would meaningfully improve her family relationships or reduce any stigma, while noting a name change could cause stress.

family law

In Burke v. AnMed Health, Elise Burke sued the hospital after a nurse left a cleansing sponge inside her during a preoperative procedure before a hysterectomy, causing ongoing discomfort and odor until the fragments were discovered and removed two months later; AnMed admitted liability but appealed the $250,000 jury verdict. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly refused to automatically disqualify prospective jurors who owed debts to AnMed and instead conducted appropriate voir dire to assess impartiality. The court also found that AnMed failed to preserve its objection to evidence of the hysterectomy costs and that the verdict was not so excessive as to require a new trial, as it was supported by evidence of the patient's physical and emotional harm.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Burgess, the defendant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, arguing that the arresting officer lacked jurisdiction because a multijurisdictional narcotics enforcement agreement was invalid, that the officer's employment records should have been admitted, and that the jury should have been instructed on mere presence. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the agreement complied with statutory requirements for temporary officer transfers between jurisdictions, that the trial court properly excluded the employment records, and that a mere presence instruction was unnecessary because the state relied solely on actual possession rather than constructive possession. The core reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of multijurisdictional authority, evidentiary relevance, and the distinction between actual and constructive possession in jury instructions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Peter Brown, a Medicaid recipient with mental disabilities living in a community center, who appealed the termination of his twelve hours per week of one-on-one assistance services provided outside the listed MR/RD waiver services. The South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed whether the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) had subject matter jurisdiction to hear such appeals from decisions by the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs. The court reversed the decisions of DHHS and the Administrative Law Court finding no jurisdiction, and remanded for a hearing on the merits. The core reasoning was that DHHS has jurisdiction over appeals concerning Medicaid waiver services under federal regulations, and the lower tribunals applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring proof that each service was necessary to prevent institutionalization.

healthcareprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Timothy Wallace's appeal of his conviction and 25-year sentence for trafficking cocaine, in which he argued that evidence from a search should have been suppressed because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him after a traffic stop on Interstate 85. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the officer's observations during the stop created reasonable suspicion justifying further detention for a drug-sniffing dog and subsequent search. The court also rejected Wallace's arguments regarding an unpreserved statement and the denial of a mistrial motion, finding the trial judge acted within his discretion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose after the parents of a young man killed in a car accident sued the county coroner and Beaufort County, claiming that the coroner's failure to perform an autopsy or toxicology testing before cremating the body reduced the value of their wrongful-death settlement with a gas station that had sold alcohol to the minor. The Trasks alleged negligence, spoliation of evidence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on various statutes governing coroners and cremation. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the cited statutes do not create private rights of action for civil damages, that South Carolina does not recognize a tort of third-party spoliation of evidence, and that the facts alleged did not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

torts & liabilityprocedure