John T.J. Kelly

The case involved appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the Franklin County Probation Department (FCPD) lodged a detainer against him for alleged violations of three concurrent 24-month special probation sentences imposed by the trial court following his convictions for escape, resisting arrest, and receiving stolen property. The sentences followed a state incarceration term and were supervised by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (PBPP) under 61 P.S. § 331.17, but FCPD detained him upon release from a PBPP detainer due to new criminal charges. The trial court denied the petition, and the Superior Court affirmed, holding that while PBPP handled supervision, the Court of Common Pleas retained exclusive authority over revocation of special probation sentences exceeding two years, allowing FCPD to act as the court's enforcement arm in lodging the detainer. The court distinguished prior precedent on special parole cases and found no jurisdictional bar under the statute for county probation officials to detain the appellant pending violation proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was an appeal from convictions for first-degree murder and robbery, in which the defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress statements made to police on April 16, 2002, and physical evidence seized under an April 15, 2002 search warrant, claiming violations of Miranda rights and Fourth Amendment protections. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of suppression in part but reversed in part, finding the search warrant lacked probable cause and that some evidence including clothing was improperly seized without proper identification in the warrant or valid consent, and remanded for a new trial. The court applied the standard of reviewing factual findings for record support and legal conclusions for correctness, determining that the warrant's deficiencies required suppression of certain fruits while other aspects of the interrogation did not constitute custodial interrogation requiring warnings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a child support order for K.O., a child with autism and mental retardation, where Mother has primary custody and Father, a civilian Department of Defense employee in Germany, was ordered to pay $1,387 per month. Father appealed the trial court's inclusion of his military living quarters and post allowances in his net income for support calculations, while Mother cross-appealed on related issues including her own earning capacity. The court affirmed the order, holding that the allowances qualify as net income under Pennsylvania support guidelines because they represent benefits the child would share if living with the parent. The court reasoned that excluding them would contradict the principle that the child should receive the same proportion of parental income as if the parents resided together, and it found no abuse of discretion in assigning zero income to Mother given the child's needs.

family law

The case concerned a mortgagor's repeated attempts to halt a sheriff's sale of his foreclosed residential property through successive bankruptcy filings. After defaulting on a mortgage held by GMAC, Buchanan filed three Chapter 13 petitions within a year, the first two of which were dismissed and triggered automatic stays, while the third (filed one business day before the May 2006 sale) did not under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act amendments. The property was sold to a third party, and Buchanan petitioned to set the sale aside, claiming due process violations from an alleged oral assurance by the sheriff's office that the property would be removed from the list and from the trial court's denial of the petition without a hearing. The court affirmed the denial, reasoning that no automatic stay applied, Buchanan received adequate notice of the sale, he had the burden to verify removal from the sale list, and the trial court had discretion to rule without a hearing based on the record.

propertyprocedure

In this case, the appellant challenged the dismissal of his third petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) after being sentenced to life imprisonment for second-degree murder in 1995, with his direct appeal becoming final in 1997. The PCRA court dismissed the 2005 petition as untimely without a hearing, and the Superior Court affirmed. The court reasoned that all PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of final judgment unless one of three statutory exceptions is alleged and proven in the petition itself, that the appellant's filing was over eight years late, and that he failed to invoke any exception in his original petition, depriving the courts of jurisdiction. The court noted that exceptions raised only in response to a notice of intent to dismiss do not suffice, as the petition must plead them to proceed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs who obtained a default judgment against defendants for failing to timely file an answer to a third amended complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, RICO violations, and other claims. The trial court reinstated the default judgment after initially opening it, leading defendants to appeal. The appellate court reversed, ruling that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3(b) required opening the judgment because the petition was filed within ten days and defendants asserted a meritorious defense based on the statute of limitations, which had previously been identified as a factual issue for jury resolution. The court noted that defendants had also filed a complete answer providing notice of their defenses.

procedure

This case arose from a 1995 incident in which the plaintiff was injured after driving under a stopped train at a railroad crossing, which then began moving and dragged his vehicle. The plaintiff brought negligence claims against Conrail for failure to warn of the train's presence and for negligence per se based on a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting unreasonable blocking of crossings. The trial court dismissed the failure-to-warn claim under the Occupied Crossing Rule and granted summary judgment on the per se claim, finding it preempted by federal railroad safety regulations. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Occupied Crossing Rule applies to stopped trains and that no exception for hazardous conditions was warranted, but reversed the summary judgment ruling because the state statute does not necessarily conflict with federal regulations on train operations such as length or speed, and remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

This case involved a medical malpractice action brought by the husband of a patient who died from excessive blood loss and multiple organ failure following laparoscopic surgery for chronic pelvic pain and subsequent procedures to address bleeding complications. The jury returned a verdict for the three defendant physicians after finding they were not negligent, and the trial court denied post-trial motions. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, holding that the weight-of-the-evidence challenge failed because the verdict was supported by the physicians' testimony regarding their exploration and management of the bleeding and was not shocking to the conscience. The court also rejected claims of error in evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and other trial matters, finding no abuse of discretion and deeming many issues waived for failure to preserve them properly.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an insurance company's appeal from a trial court order denying its request for a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify a driver, Chester Roberts, for liability arising from a collision that occurred while he was fleeing police in a vehicle covered by a policy issued to his mother. The trial court ruled against the insurer on stipulated facts, finding coverage applied, and the appellate court affirmed after addressing a procedural issue regarding the lack of post-trial motions. The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, an event qualifies as an "auto accident" eligible for coverage absent proof that the insured specifically intended to cause the resulting harm to the victims, even if the insured was intentionally evading police. It distinguished cases involving intentional harm or specific criminal acts like drug sales and rejected the insurer's argument that the flight itself rendered the collision non-accidental. The policy's intentional act exclusion and "auto accident" language did not bar coverage here because no intent to collide with the victims was shown.

proceduretorts & liabilitycriminal law

This case involved a strict products liability claim by David Colville and his wife against Crown Equipment Corporation and Omnilift, Inc., after Colville's foot was crushed while operating a stand-up forklift at work; the plaintiffs alleged the forklift was defectively designed due to the lack of an enclosing door on the operator's compartment. A jury awarded over $3.8 million in damages, but the defendants appealed, arguing errors including the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the crashworthiness doctrine. The appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the crashworthiness instruction was required because the plaintiffs had presented evidence and arguments invoking the theory of enhanced injury in a second collision, and the trial court's determination that it alone could decide crashworthiness was incorrect. The court reasoned that the jury should have been charged on all applicable elements of the claim under Pennsylvania products liability law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a patient, Mary Parker, who sued her gastroenterologist, Dr. Howard Freilich, and his practice group after a nurse anesthetist (an independent contractor) allegedly left a catheter in her arm following an in-office colonoscopy, seeking to hold the doctor liable for the nurse's negligence under a theory of ostensible agency. The trial court granted a nonsuit on the ostensible agency claim, ruling that the doctrine applies only to hospitals and HMOs and not to individual physicians' offices, after which a jury found the nurse negligent but not an agent of the doctor. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded, holding that ostensible agency can apply in a physician's office setting where the doctor creates a reasonable belief that the independent contractor is an employee or fails to provide adequate notice of the independent contractor status. The court reasoned that the changing nature of medical care and the patient's expectations in a doctor's office can support apparent agency liability even without a hospital or HMO context.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved the Estate of Stephen J. Haiko seeking to enforce a settlement agreement with Neil and Theresa McGinley regarding a promissory note that Haiko had given the McGinleys for a home purchase. The trial court granted enforcement after finding that the parties had agreed Neil would forfeit his inheritance share in exchange for release from the note obligation, and the McGinleys appealed on grounds including lack of a valid settlement, waiver due to their Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and insufficient evidence. The appellate court affirmed the order, concluding that a binding settlement had been reached through counsel and family negotiations, that the bankruptcy proceedings did not affect the antecedent forfeiture under state law because no timely objection was required to preserve the estate's position, and that the McGinleys' evidentiary and procedural challenges lacked merit or were waived. The court determined that Neil's interest in the estate remained subject to the settlement despite the bankruptcy discharge.

propertyprocedure

This case involved consolidated asbestos personal injury actions brought by five plaintiffs diagnosed with mesothelioma or asbestosis against multiple defendants, including John Crane, Inc., with additional claims pending against the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust. The trial court conducted reverse-bifurcated trials on damages and liability, molded verdicts to apportion shares among remaining defendants, and applied a pro rata set-off for the Trust's share despite unsettled claims. On cross-appeals, the court affirmed the denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the refusal of remittitur, and the sufficiency of evidence on exposure and causation, but vacated the judgments regarding the pro rata set-off. The core reasoning was that, absent a settlement release controlling the reduction, a pro tanto set-off based on the Trust's actual contribution was required to avoid unfairly diminishing the plaintiffs' recoveries, leading to remand for reapportionment on that basis only.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a 1995 car accident in which Glenn Hoffman and his passenger Sherry Robinson Hoffman were injured when defendant Kathleen Troncelliti turned into their path. Sherry, who was then unmarried and owned her own car insured under a separate limited-tort policy, was riding in her mother's van that carried full-tort coverage. The trial court ruled that the full-tort option applied to Sherry under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(b)(2), allowing her to recover non-economic damages without proving serious injury. On appeal the Superior Court held that the statute's plain language requires a named insured on another policy to be bound by that policy's tort option, so Sherry must establish serious injury under her own limited-tort election. The court therefore affirmed the judgment for Glenn Hoffman but vacated the judgment for Sherry and remanded for a new trial on her claim.

torts & liability

This case involved a dispute over whether Edward R. Henning, Jr. could recover uninsured motorist benefits under his father's State Farm auto insurance policy after an accident with an uninsured driver. State Farm had issued a declaratory judgment complaint seeking a ruling that a named driver exclusion endorsement barred coverage for the son, who owned and insured his own vehicle separately. The son and father filed preliminary objections seeking to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration under the policy's arbitration clause, which addressed disputes over fault and the amount of damages. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary objections, holding that the arbitration clause was limited to questions of fault and damages and did not cover disputes about policy coverage or the validity of the named driver exclusion, which instead had to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action. The named driver exclusion was authorized under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, a season ticket holder sued the owners and operators of a hockey arena after being struck in the mouth by an errant puck that passed through a gap in the plexiglass barrier near the players' bench and tunnel. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that arena owners owe no duty to protect spectators from errant pucks, which are a common and expected occurrence during hockey games, and that the facility did not deviate from established safety customs. It further ruled that installing partial plexiglass barriers did not constitute an assumption of duty under the Restatement of Torts, and that the trial court properly applied the assumption of the risk doctrine without being bound by its earlier denial of judgment on the pleadings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether Timothy and Donna Holstein were personally liable under a surety agreement they signed for a first mortgage on property owned by their corporation, Blue Mack, after defaults on both that mortgage and a second mortgage held by Ethan Good's corporation. The trial court found the Holsteins liable for over $315,000 based on a deficiency judgment calculation following a sheriff's sale and fair market value allocation. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Holsteins were not personally liable because the property's fair market value satisfied the senior mortgage in full, Good had a duty to apply proceeds to the senior lien first, and he could not extend the surety agreement to cover deficiencies on the unrelated junior mortgage. The court treated Good and his corporation as one entity and concluded the surety was discharged under principles of mortgage priority and merger.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Homeowners sued a pest inspection and treatment company for negligence and breach of warranty after purchasing a home that was later found to have extensive termite damage and structural issues, despite the company's initial report and assurances following treatment. The dispute was submitted to binding arbitration under the parties' agreement, resulting in an award of approximately $215,000 to the homeowners. The company petitioned to vacate or modify the award, arguing it exceeded the arbitrator's authority, the scope of the agreement, and the demand amount, and that certain fees and issues were improperly handled, but the trial court denied the petition and confirmed the award. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, noting the appeal was untimely, the arguments lacked evidentiary support, and the same claims had already been rejected by the arbitrator and trial court, while remanding for imposition of attorney fees and delay damages.

procedurepropertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved appellants Solomon and Judith Sherman appealing the dismissal of their petition to vacate an arbitration award denying their uninsured motorist benefits claim against Amica Mutual Insurance Company arising from a 1990 car accident. The arbitration panel had ruled in favor of the insurer, and the trial court dismissed the petition after finding it lacked authority to review the award under a "contrary to law" standard. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the parties' arbitration agreement was governed by the standard provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act (42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7314 and 7315) rather than the broader review under § 7302(d)(2), which applies only in limited circumstances such as when the Commonwealth or a political subdivision is involved. The court reasoned that the insurance policy did not expressly trigger the special statutory review standard, and adopting the appellants' interpretation would render other sections of the Act meaningless.

proceduretorts & liability

In Commonwealth v. Touw, the appellant pled guilty to four counts of delivering cocaine pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to fines and six and one-half to thirteen years in prison; he later filed a PCRA petition alleging that his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with him about filing a direct appeal based on a potential sentencing guidelines error. The PCRA court denied relief after a hearing, limiting its review to whether the appellant had specifically requested an appeal. The Superior Court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that counsel had reason to believe a rational defendant would want to appeal given the nonfrivolous sentencing issue and the Commonwealth's agreement on the guidelines interpretation, so the PCRA court should have determined whether counsel consulted the appellant and whether the appellant would have appealed but for any failure to consult.

criminal lawprocedure