Susan Peikes Gantman

The case involved Emily Joy Gross's appeal from the denial of her motion to dismiss state criminal charges on double jeopardy grounds after a prior federal prosecution. Gross had been charged in Monroe County with conspiracy, unlicensed firearm carrying, prohibited possession, and related offenses as an accomplice or co-conspirator, stemming from her purchase of a handgun that her boyfriend later used in a kidnapping and shootout that killed a state trooper; she had previously pled guilty in federal court to making a false statement on a firearm purchase form. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order, holding that the pending state charges were not based on the same conduct as the federal case under 18 Pa.C.S. § 111. The court reasoned that the federal and Pennsylvania firearm statutes each require proof of distinct facts and address substantially different harms, so double jeopardy did not bar the state prosecution.

criminal lawgunsfederal powerprocedure

This case involved Eric Watson's appeal from his resentencing in Philadelphia County after bench trial convictions for robbery, theft, receipt of stolen property, and simple assault stemming from an incident where he followed a woman, grabbed her wallet, and fled. On remand from a prior appeal, the trial court imposed a longer aggregate sentence, denied a new presentence investigation report and recusal motion, and sentenced separately for simple assault and robbery. The Superior Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge, holding that the increased sentence lacked justification on the record, the trial judge had demonstrated grounds requiring recusal, and the simple assault conviction merged with robbery for sentencing purposes because both arose from the same act and the elements of simple assault were included in the robbery charge.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the Commonwealth appealing a trial court's order removing the Philadelphia District Attorney's office and appointing a special prosecutor in a probation revocation proceeding for defendant Demetrius Mayfield, who had new criminal charges pending. The Superior Court reviewed the procedural history, including the trial court's directive for the DA to proceed with revocation before disposition of the new charges, contrary to the DA's internal policy. The court concluded that the appeal concerns the supersession of a district attorney by a trial court. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 722(5), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, requiring a petition for review rather than a direct appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court therefore transferred the case to the Supreme Court.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Bradley Kline, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, seeking a declaratory judgment against Travelers Personal Security Insurance Company regarding his entitlement to stacked underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under his own auto policy and his mother's separate policy with the same insurer. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the trial court's December 2018 order granting partial summary judgment and remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter summary judgment in Kline's favor on his right to claim stacked UIM coverage under both policies. The core reasoning was that Travelers did not obtain new stacking rejection forms when Kline added vehicles to his policy, and the household vehicle exclusion in his mother's policy was unenforceable under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Gallagher decision, which applies retroactively to this pending case and allows Kline to access combined limits of $200,000. The court directed that any award of money damages be determined separately.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a minor, N.M., who was adjudicated delinquent in Montgomery County Juvenile Court on multiple counts of theft by unlawful taking and burglary after entering homes in Norristown. N.M. appealed the resulting dispositional order, arguing that his confession should have been suppressed because police obtained it without a valid Miranda waiver or the presence of an interested adult during the afternoon interview session. The Superior Court affirmed the order, holding that the totality of the circumstances showed N.M. made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights after receiving Miranda warnings. The court further reasoned that the mother's decision not to attend or participate, combined with the several hours that had passed since an earlier interview, supported the validity of the statement under Pennsylvania juvenile law precedents.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

This case involved a widow suing multiple manufacturers and suppliers of industrial equipment after her husband was diagnosed with mesothelioma from asbestos exposure and later died. The trial court had precluded the husband's affidavit and deposition testimony from consideration and granted summary judgment to several defendants on grounds including lack of product identification. The Superior Court reversed the preclusion order, holding that the affidavit was properly executed under penalty of perjury and thus usable, and that the deposition testimony qualified for a hearsay exception under Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1)(B) because the defendants had attended and had an opportunity to cross-examine the now-deceased witness. The court therefore vacated the summary judgments and remanded for further proceedings, finding that the excluded evidence was necessary to oppose the motions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Scott Kerns, who in 2001 entered an open guilty plea to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a minor under 13 and was later classified as a sexually violent predator under Megan's Law II, resulting in a sentence of 7.5 to 20 years and lifetime sex offender registration. After multiple prior PCRA petitions, Kerns filed what he styled as a nunc pro tunc motion seeking to vacate his sentence due to an alleged breach of his plea agreement regarding registration requirements. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that sex-offender registration is an implied term of any plea agreement for the offense because it is mandated by existing law, and that elimination of registration requires an express provision in the agreement. The court further reasoned that a genuine petition to enforce a plea agreement falls outside the PCRA but that Kerns's filing was properly treated and denied on the merits, with additional claims such as equal protection waived or without prejudice shown.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a child custody dispute between biological parents T.D. (Mother) and M.H. (Father) over their minor child, focusing on whether the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania retained jurisdiction or should transfer it to Delaware under the UCCJEA. Father sought to transfer jurisdiction after Mother had briefly moved back to Delaware and then to Pennsylvania, and the trial court granted the transfer based on the parties' connections as of the date Father filed his transfer petition. The Superior Court reversed, ruling that Pennsylvania retained exclusive continuing jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that the trial court applied the wrong benchmark date under Section 5422 by using the transfer petition filing instead of the date of a custody modification motion filed in the original jurisdiction state, and no such qualifying motion existed in Pennsylvania to support relinquishing jurisdiction.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a married couple who jointly petitioned a Pennsylvania trial court for a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) to transfer $400,000 (later amended to $700,000) from the husband's ERISA-governed JetBlue retirement plan to the wife's IRA, while explicitly stating they had no pending divorce or other family law matter and intended the funds to remain marital property. The trial court initially granted the QDRO but later vacated it and denied the amended petition after a hearing. The Superior Court affirmed, holding that a QDRO under ERISA is a procedural tool available only in the context of a domestic relations matter such as divorce and cannot be used solely to move plan funds between spouses without such a proceeding, as it would violate ERISA's anti-alienation rules. The court reasoned that the parties' petitions lacked any qualifying domestic relations claim and amounted to an attempt to circumvent federal restrictions.

family lawprocedure

In this case, Pieattro Shaw appealed the dismissal of his first Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition challenging his 2006 convictions for third-degree murder, burglary, and related firearm offenses arising from a shooting during a home intrusion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the PCRA court's order dismissing the 2015 petition as untimely. The court reasoned that Shaw's alleged mental incompetence did not constitute a newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar because his mental health history was fully explored at trial and sentencing, he was found competent, and he failed to show due diligence or explain any change in his condition that would excuse the delay.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved homeowners who sued a home construction company and its managing member for building defective homes, alleging breaches of contract and warranties as well as violations of Pennsylvania's consumer protection law. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the homeowners after a jury found the managing member personally liable based on his assurances and guarantees. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the finding of personal liability and that the consumer protection statute's catchall provision encompasses misleading conduct, justifying doubled damages.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case arose from the death of a power plant worker in an industrial accident involving a grinder and ashpit system, leading his estate to sue multiple defendants including engineering firms for negligence, strict products liability under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, and breach of warranty. The trial court entered a judgment of non pros against the Gilbert defendants after the plaintiff failed to file a timely certificate of merit under Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3. The Superior Court held that the trial court should have examined the full complaint to identify which counts asserted professional negligence (subject to the certificate requirement) versus products liability or warranty claims (not subject to it), and that only the former could properly be dismissed for lack of the certificate. Accordingly, the court vacated the order denying the petition to open the judgment and remanded for further proceedings limited to the professional negligence claims.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Russell Diamond, who was convicted of aggravated assault and related charges after a police standoff in which he fired a shotgun near officers serving a warrant. The trial court imposed a sentence of 30 months to six years without applying the five-year mandatory minimum under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 for firearm use, ruling that the Commonwealth's notice was untimely and inadequate. The Commonwealth appealed, contending that notice provided on August 2, 2006—after conviction but before the August 30 sentencing hearing—met the statute's requirement of reasonable notice after conviction and before sentencing. The Superior Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the statute's plain language was satisfied by the post-conviction, pre-sentencing notice.

criminal lawprocedureguns

This case involves the permanency planning for S.B., a minor child placed in foster care in 2004 after a finding that she had been sexually molested, though no perpetrator was identified. The trial court changed the family goal from "return home" to adoption following multiple permanency hearings over several years, despite the parents' compliance with their plans, based on the child's stronger bond with her pre-adoptive foster mother, her need for permanency, and the potential for emotional healing through adoption. The parents appealed, contending that reunification was appropriate, reasonable efforts at reunification had not been made, cross-examination of the child's therapist was improperly limited, and subsidized permanent legal custodianship should have been considered as an alternative. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order, concluding that the trial court had properly evaluated the child's best interests, considered the relevant legal standards and alternatives, and exercised its discretion without error.

family law

The case involved Andrew Poncala's appeal from his sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of driving under the influence and one count of endangering the welfare of a minor, stemming from a 2004 accident in which he drove intoxicated with a child passenger, causing serious injury. The trial court denied his request for the county intermediate punishment program and imposed one to two years' imprisonment, initially viewing the offense as his third DUI in ten years but later determining it was his fourth. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, holding that the mandatory imprisonment provision in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804(c)(3) for a violation of § 3802(c) overrides the discretionary IPP provision in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9804(b)(5), regardless of whether the conviction was the defendant's third or fourth DUI in ten years. The court also addressed a procedural issue, concluding that the appellant's challenge was properly preserved despite not being raised in his initial Rule 1925(b) statement because it responded directly to the trial court's opinion. The decision rested on the principle that specific sentencing statutes control over general ones in this context.

criminal law

In Commonwealth v. Thomas, the defendant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained from a warrantless arrest because police lacked probable cause. The court held that Thomas waived his suppression claim on appeal because his brief contained only a generic recitation of the probable cause standard and failed to provide any analysis or citation to authority explaining why probable cause was absent in this case. The opinion noted that even if the claim had been preserved, the information from the confidential informant who participated in the drug transaction would have established probable cause. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose after a business property owned by Mark and Elizabeth Wisniski was flooded in 1999, causing over $375,000 in damages that were not covered because their commercial insurance policy excluded flood losses. The Wisniskis sued their insurance brokers, Brown & Brown Insurance Co. of PA and its agents, alleging negligence for failing to inspect the property, inform them of the flood exclusion, or recommend purchasing separate flood insurance despite a prior relationship and a 1995 risk inspection that noted the property's proximity to a river and stream. The trial court granted summary judgment to the brokers, and after remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Superior Court reconsidered the issue using the five-prong Althaus v. Cohen framework for determining whether a duty exists. The court concluded that insurance brokers have no duty to inspect business properties or advise on flood insurance, as the relationship is not one of special trust requiring such proactive steps, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The decision turned on factors including the foreseeability of harm, the nature of the relationship, and public policy considerations regarding the availability and cost of flood coverage.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case arose from a medical malpractice trial that ended in mistrial due to juror misconduct, during which the trial court held defense attorney F. James Gallo in contempt for two incidents. The appealed contempt citation stemmed from Gallo privately conferring with his expert witness during a recess in the witness's direct examination. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the contempt order, holding that the record lacked evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Gallo intended to disrupt proceedings or that any significant disruption occurred, as the conversation took place while court was in recess. The court further noted that precedent limiting attorney-witness conferences during depositions did not control this trial situation and did not support the criminal contempt finding.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Chester Sims was charged with escape after an incident in which he attempted but failed to leave a prisoner transport van while in custody. The trial court convicted him of attempted escape despite the fact that attempt was not charged as a separate offense. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence. The court reasoned that under Commonwealth v. Tate and the plain language of the escape statute, criminal attempt is a distinct offense that must be separately charged when the underlying statute does not expressly proscribe attempts.

criminal law

The case involved an at-will employee who resigned due to alleged sexual harassment by her employer, a business with fewer than four employees that did not qualify as an 'employer' under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). After the PHRC denied her claim for lack of jurisdiction, she sued in court for wrongful discharge, discrimination, and related claims, but the trial court dismissed most counts on preliminary objections, holding that the PHRA provided the exclusive remedy. The appellate court reversed, holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies was satisfied and that a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine exists to allow a common-law wrongful discharge claim based on sexual discrimination, even for small employers outside PHRA coverage, because the statute's size threshold does not reflect legislative approval of such conduct.

labor & employmentcivil rights