Michael J. Eakin

This case involved appellant Tiarike Hodges, who was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related firearm and conspiracy offenses stemming from killings at a pizza parlor. He entered a guilty plea in exchange for the Commonwealth not seeking the death penalty, but it was later discovered he was only 15 at the time of the crimes, making the death penalty inapplicable under Supreme Court precedent. Hodges moved to withdraw his plea post-sentencing, arguing it was not knowing and voluntary because it was based on avoiding an illegal sentence. The trial court denied the motion, but the appellate court reversed, holding that when a plea is predicated on an illegal maximum sentence, manifest injustice results, allowing withdrawal.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the enforcement and application of an antenuptial agreement in the divorce of Mary M. Colonna and Robert J. Colonna, focusing on property division, alimony, and related credits. The trial court upheld the agreement despite the wife's claims of inadequate financial disclosure regarding the husband's business value and divided assets by awarding certain sole-titled properties to the wife while splitting joint property equally, denying most alimony and fees. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the agreement's enforceability, reasoning that the overvaluation of assets did not constitute unfairness or induce the wife's consent, but it reversed the trial court's handling of mortgage debts on the wife's sole properties, holding that consistent netting of debts was required to match the treatment of jointly held assets. The court remanded for recalculation of distributions and interest. The decision drew on precedents requiring full and fair disclosure for antenuptial agreements while applying a presumption of validity rebuttable only by clear evidence of harm.

family lawproperty

This case involved an appeal from a trial court order that vacated an arbitration award granting underinsured motorist benefits to the appellant under a policy issued by Nationwide to her mother. The appellant had been in a car accident, sought coverage after her own insurer became insolvent, and the arbitrators awarded $50,000 with a credit for the tortfeasor's policy limits even though the underlying tort action was still pending; that action later ended in a defense verdict. The trial court vacated the award, ruling that the underinsured motorist claim was premature and not ripe until all liability policies were exhausted. The Superior Court reversed, holding that the arbitrators committed no error of law because Nationwide received full credit for the available liability limits, consistent with precedent allowing arbitration to proceed without prejudice to the insurer, and that the goal of expedited dispute resolution supported proceeding despite potential inconsistent outcomes with the tort verdict. The matter was remanded for the trial court to address Nationwide's remaining arguments regarding a household exclusion, primary coverage by the insurance guarantee association, and stacking.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved CW seeking partial custody of a child born to LV (Mother) during her marriage to GV (Father), claiming to be the child's biological father based on a past relationship with the mother. The trial court granted the preliminary objections of GV and dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that under Pennsylvania law, a child born into an intact marriage is presumed to be the child of the married couple, and this presumption is irrebuttable when a third party seeks to establish his own paternity against the husband. The public policy supports preserving the family unit, and GV demonstrated an intact marriage, barring CW from challenging the paternity.

family lawprocedure

The case was an appeal by Kenneth Johnson from his conviction for two counts of possession of cocaine after a jury trial. Johnson argued that the prosecutor improperly referenced his post-arrest silence by questioning a defense witness about his failure to provide an address during booking, which could have been offered earlier to support an alibi, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a mistrial. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania agreed, holding that such commentary on post-arrest silence violates the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment and Pennsylvania Constitution, as it is fundamentally unfair to use silence to impeach a later explanation at trial. The court therefore vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the Commonwealth's appeal of a trial court's order granting expungement of an individual's conviction records for two summary disorderly conduct offenses, which resulted from a negotiated plea after misdemeanor charges were withdrawn in 1993. The court reversed the expungement of the conviction records, holding that such data could not be expunged under the equitable balancing test applicable to non-conviction data. Instead, expungement of convictions is governed exclusively by the statutory requirements of 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122, which were not satisfied here as the individual was neither 70 years old nor deceased. The court reasoned that a charge reduction in a plea deal does not imply the original charges were unsupported or improper, and permitting expungement would discourage future negotiated settlements between parties.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal from trial court orders determining the statutes of limitations for claims arising from latent defects in real estate construction, including breach of contract, negligence, and fraud, and dismissing some claims as time-barred. The trial court applied a four-year limitations period to the contract claims and a two-year period to the negligence and fraud claims, certifying the orders for immediate appeal. The appellate court held that a six-year statute of limitations applies to the breach of contract claims for latent construction defects under Pennsylvania law, while affirming the two-year period for the tort-based claims, and remanded for further proceedings after addressing the standards for certifying interlocutory appeals under Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In this case, Summit Towne Centre, the owner of a shopping center, sought a preliminary injunction to compel its tenant, Shoe Show, to reopen and operate its store as required by the lease after the tenant vacated the premises while continuing to pay rent. The trial court denied the injunction, finding an adequate remedy at law and disproportionate harm to the tenant. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that monetary damages would not adequately compensate the landlord for harms to its tenant mix and credibility with other tenants, and that forcing the tenant to reopen would not cause disproportionate injury since any losses were speculative and resulted from the tenant's own breach of the continuous operation clause.

business & regulatoryproperty

Thomas Feidler sued his former employer, Morris Coupling Company, alleging negligence in failing to maintain a safe workplace after he was injured in a physical altercation with a coworker. The employer moved for summary judgment, asserting that the claim was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court granted the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Feidler failed to rebut the presumption that the injury was work-related. The court found no evidence of pre-existing personal animosity between the two employees that would trigger the statutory exception for injuries inflicted for purely personal reasons.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In Commonwealth v. Kenner, the Commonwealth appealed a trial court's sentence after Helen Kenner pled guilty to aggravated assault for repeatedly stabbing a co-worker with a knife following a disputed sexual encounter, resulting in severe injuries. The trial court imposed a sentence of 1.5 to 23.5 months in prison plus probation, which was more than 30 months below the mitigated guideline range of 42 months, even with a deadly weapon enhancement. The appellate court found that the sentence presented a substantial question for review because it deviated unreasonably from the sentencing guidelines. It held that the trial court's considerations, such as the defendant's age and lack of prior record, did not adequately justify the departure, and noted the defendant's lack of remorse shown by her accusations against the victim at sentencing. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Henry Lewis Dennis appealing his conviction for rape under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(6) after having consensual sex with a 12-year-old victim when he was 18, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional because it imposed strict liability on the victim's age without allowing a mistake-of-age defense or requiring mens rea. The court affirmed the judgment of sentence, finding the statute constitutional. It reasoned that the legislature, in exercising its police powers, could validly prohibit sexual intercourse with children under 13 without permitting a mistake defense to protect those deemed incapable of protecting themselves, as supported by prior precedents like Commonwealth v. Robinson. The court also rejected the claim that imposing prison time without scienter was unconstitutional, noting exceptions for sex offenses involving minors, and dismissed the ineffective assistance claim as meritless.

criminal law

In Commonwealth v. Still, the defendant appealed his judgment of sentence for retail theft and criminal trespass, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed the charges due to a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1405(A), which requires sentencing within 60 days of conviction or plea unless good cause is shown. The Superior Court affirmed the sentence, holding that although the defendant remained unsentenced for more than 60 days after becoming available following his arrest on a bench warrant, he failed to demonstrate actual prejudice to his speedy trial or due process rights as required under Commonwealth v. Anders. The court reasoned that the defendant's own flight tolled the 60-day period until he was available for sentencing, and a mere assertion of presumed prejudice was insufficient to warrant discharge or further hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Sharon Cerankowski's claim for underinsured motorist benefits from State Farm after an auto accident, where she had settled a related product liability suit without the insurer's consent, prompting denial under the policy's consent-to-settle clause. Arbitrators ruled for State Farm, but the trial court vacated the award, and the appellate court affirmed that decision. The court reasoned that under the Uniform Arbitration Act and precedent from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lehman, an insurer must demonstrate prejudice to its interests before enforcing such a clause to deny coverage, as the clause's purpose is to protect against actual harm rather than technical subrogation rights. The opinion applied a plenary review to the public policy issue and found no error in vacating the award on that basis.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this case, Thomas Padden appealed the partial denial of his PCRA petition challenging his convictions for robbery, simple assault, and theft arising from a 1995 supermarket holdup in which he was identified by the clerk and linked to evidence recovered near the scene. The Superior Court reviewed multiple claims of ineffective assistance by trial and appellate counsel, including an alleged undisclosed conflict of interest because trial counsel's father reportedly owned the victim store, as well as claims concerning counsel's handling of a possible hearing impairment and other trial issues. The court affirmed the denial of most claims, finding that counsel had acted reasonably on the hearing issue and that other asserted errors did not establish prejudice or meet the standard for relief, but reversed on the conflict claim and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a disqualifying conflict existed and whether it warranted a new trial. The decision rests on application of PCRA standards for ineffectiveness and conflict-of-interest analysis under Pennsylvania precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

In Commonwealth v. Tuddles, the appellant, convicted of burglary and assault and originally sentenced to ten to twenty years in state prison, had his sentence reduced at resentencing to thirty to sixty months in county prison to accommodate his serious medical needs under 61 P.S. § 81. He later petitioned to further modify the sentence to house arrest, claiming the prison's medical care was inadequate and caused additional harm, invoking both § 81 (for removal of seriously ill prisoners) and 61 P.S. § 2141 (for temporary absences for medical or other purposes). The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that § 81 applies only when an institution cannot provide necessary care and that resentencing had already addressed the medical issues, while § 2141 grants courts discretionary authority for limited releases but creates no prisoner entitlement to sentence modification or house arrest. The court reasoned that these statutes recognize judicial discretion rather than mandating changes based on treatment disagreements.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a products liability claim by Mount Olivet Tabernacle Church against Emerson Electric Company, alleging that a defective immersion heater used in a baptismal pool caused a fire that damaged the church building. The jury found the heater defective and the proximate cause of the $981,000 in damages, awarding that amount to the church. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court's jury instructions on product defect were legally sufficient, that sanctions for spoliation of fire scene evidence were not required absent bad faith, and that admission of evidence regarding other fires was properly addressed by curative instructions. The court reasoned that the instructions accurately reflected Pennsylvania products liability law and that the plaintiff met its burden of proving a design defect in the preserved product.

torts & liability

This case involves an appeal challenging a trial court's decision to transfer venue in a civil action from Allegheny County to Mercer County. The plaintiffs, consisting of estates and family members of Leo Werner, sued other relatives involved in the family-owned Werner Company over claims that the defendants wrongfully induced Leo Werner to transfer his company stock in 1992 and diluted the plaintiffs' shares through a self-dealing stock plan, including allegations of civil conspiracy related to a will codicil. The court affirmed the transfer, holding that venue was improper in Allegheny County because the key transactions and occurrences giving rise to the claims—such as the stock transfers and company decisions—took place in Mercer County, where the company is headquartered, and preparatory actions like document drafting by Pittsburgh attorneys were insufficient under Pa.R.C.P. 1006 to establish venue there.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the sentencing of Thomas Lee Edrington after his guilty plea to aggravated assault and related offenses, his third violent crime following prior convictions for aggravated assault and burglary. The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's refusal to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2), instead sentencing him to ten to twenty years. The Superior Court ruled that the legality of the sentence remained reviewable despite the Commonwealth's failure to file a required Rule 1925(b) statement, and that the trial court had erred by not applying the mandatory provision. It also dismissed Edrington's cross-appeal challenging aspects of his sentence as untimely under appellate rules. The judgment of sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Richard Lee Hoffman, who was convicted in 1994 of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter and sentenced to 16-40 years in prison; his direct appeal was affirmed in 1995, making his judgment final that year. In 1999, Hoffman filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) seeking to challenge his conviction, but the trial court dismissed it as untimely under the one-year filing deadline. Hoffman argued that his ongoing mental illness should excuse the delay as an exception to the PCRA's time bar and that due process required personal notice of the deadline changes, but the court held that mental illness does not qualify under any of the three statutory exceptions (government interference, newly discovered facts, or retroactive constitutional rights) and that the time limits are strictly jurisdictional. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, emphasizing that courts cannot create additional exceptions beyond those in the statute.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved former employees of a disaster restoration business who left to start a competing company and were sued for allegedly breaching non-compete clauses in their employment agreements. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction barring three of the former employees from competing, later clarified that they could not complete ongoing projects, and then found them in contempt after they continued work on a project, imposing sanctions that included over $13,000 in costs and fees plus a $4,000 fine. On appeal, the court affirmed the contempt finding and sanctions, holding that the evidence supported a violation by a preponderance, the injunction order was not ambiguous, and the awards were proper compensatory measures in a civil contempt proceeding without abuse of discretion.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedure