The case involved a dispute over whether a retired police officer's pension benefits should be calculated including his overtime pay in addition to his base salary. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of the officer, but on appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that overtime compensation is not part of "salary" under the relevant pension statute and ordinances. The court's reasoning focused on the legislative history, where the term was changed from the broader "pay" to "salary," which denotes fixed, regular compensation rather than variable overtime earnings. Additionally, excluding overtime promotes predictability and stability in managing the pension fund.
This case arose from a personal injury lawsuit filed by Cheryl Marshall against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT) after she was allegedly injured as a passenger on a SEPTA bus in 1979. After DOT repeatedly failed to respond to interrogatories served in 1980, including ignoring a court order to answer within twenty days, the trial court imposed sanctions under Pa. R.C.P. No. 4019 by precluding DOT from presenting any defense or evidence on liability at trial while leaving damages for later determination. DOT appealed, and the Commonwealth Court first addressed whether the sanction order was appealable, concluding it was final because its practical effect was to bar DOT from litigating the merits of liability. On the merits, the court held that the sanction was authorized by the rule and within the trial court's discretion given DOT's inexcusable noncompliance over five months, and it affirmed the order. The topics are procedure and torts & liability.
This case concerns a petition by Canterbury Village, Inc., a real estate developer, to incorporate its planned community development spanning over 500 acres in Cranberry Township as the Borough of Seven Fields under Sections 201 and 202 of the Borough Code. The petition was initially signed by the company's president and some prospective buyers, later amended to name the corporation itself, and asserted that the area formed a harmonious whole with distinct needs for services like police and fire protection. The Court of Common Pleas denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the proposed borough satisfied the incorporation criteria from Bear Creek Township v. Penn Lake Park Borough, including common interests and the ability to provide services, and that the trial court's denial was an abuse of discretion.
The case involved Philip Herbert appealing the six-month suspension of his driver's license by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation for refusing a breathalyzer test after a car accident where officers observed signs of intoxication and arrested him for driving under the influence. The Court of Common Pleas upheld the suspension after a de novo hearing, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The court found that the Department met its burden by proving the arrest, the request for the test, the warning about license suspension for refusal, and Herbert's refusal, while Herbert did not establish he was physically incapable of a knowing and conscious refusal. The court also rejected the claim of a right to consult counsel, holding that license suspension proceedings are civil and no constitutional or statutory right to attorney consultation exists before deciding on the test.
The case concerned the City of Scranton's request for a preliminary injunction to stop Wallace Putkowski from operating a mechanical car-crusher at his junkyard, which was located in a zoning district that prohibited junkyards under the 1965 ordinance but had operated as a lawful nonconforming use. Putkowski had purchased the property from a prior owner who used the crusher only occasionally, but after acquiring it Putkowski sought certification for full-time crusher use, which the zoning board denied as an impermissible expansion into a new use; he continued operating the machine pending appeals. The trial court granted the injunction, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the shift to regular, intensive mechanical crushing represented a drastic change in operations that exceeded the scope of the prior nonconforming use and violated the zoning restrictions.
The case involved West Chester State College terminating employee Richard Stein for misusing a college account with a camera shop to process personal films and purchase personal items. The Civil Service Commission reinstated Stein, finding that he acted under his supervisor's instructions and that the college had not proven the charges against him. On appeal, the court affirmed the Commission's order, holding that the Commission's credibility determinations and findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the charges were not established. The court reasoned that where the appointing authority's charges are not proven by the Commission's findings, the Commission may modify the disciplinary action.