The case involved a workers' compensation claim filed by Joseph L. McCanney against Boeing Helicopter Company for bilateral hearing loss resulting from decades of exposure to high-decibel noise in his roles as a riveter, assembler, and in research and development. The referee awarded specific loss benefits after determining that the claimant's injury manifested as a compensable loss for all practical intents and purposes on June 7, 1989—the date of his doctor's confirming report—and that he provided timely notice to the employer within days of that knowledge. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the award following remand for additional findings on the injury date and notice compliance. On appeal, the court held that the referee's findings were supported by substantial evidence, that the discovery-based date of injury satisfied both the 120-day notice rule in Section 311 and the three-year limitations period in Section 315, and therefore upheld the order granting benefits.
The Pennsylvania Medical Society challenged the constitutionality of section 18 of Act 6, which amended the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to limit the amounts physicians could charge and bill patients injured in automobile accidents, as well as the Insurance Commissioner's implementation of those limits. The Society claimed violations of substantive due process, unconstitutional vagueness, and improper delegation of legislative power. The Commonwealth Court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner on all remaining counts, dismissing the petition with prejudice. The court reasoned that the fee limits were rationally related to the legitimate state interest of controlling insurance costs, that the Commissioner's regulations adequately addressed billing issues to resolve any vagueness concerns, and that prior rulings had already disposed of the delegation claim.
The case involved Bart and Valerie Cullins appealing the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency's denial of their application for emergency mortgage assistance under the Homeowner’s Emergency Assistance Act after they defaulted on their mortgage payments. The court affirmed the agency's decision, upholding the hearing examiner's conclusions that the Cullinses were ineligible for assistance. The core reasoning was that the financial hardship resulted from circumstances within the appellants' control, such as employment decisions including quitting jobs and an unsuccessful business venture, and that there was no reasonable prospect they could resume full mortgage payments within thirty-six months given their inadequate income and overextension.
The case involved Peter Lantos challenging the denial of student housing licenses for two rental houses he owned in a residential district of Haverford Township. The Zoning Hearing Board and lower court denied the request because the properties did not comply with new student housing ordinances requiring limits on the number of unrelated occupants, parking, and other standards, and Lantos failed to prove a lawful pre-existing non-conforming use. The court affirmed, finding that prior rentals to more than three unrelated students did not qualify as a permitted "family" use under prior zoning rules, and the ordinances were constitutional as they had a rational relationship to preserving neighborhood character.
The case involved Thomas Monaghan, the business manager for the Reading School District, who was suspended without pay in 1990 and later terminated by the School Board after hearings on charges including incompetency, neglect of duty, violation of school laws, and improper conduct, primarily related to a large budget deficit incurred under his supervision. Monaghan appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, which affirmed the termination, and then to the Commonwealth Court, arguing that the administrative record was incomplete and that the trial court should have conducted a de novo hearing or remanded the matter. The Commonwealth Court reviewed the record under the standards of the Administrative Agency Law and determined it was full and complete, with substantial evidence supporting the findings of misconduct such as failures in budgetary oversight and compliance with school code provisions on expenditures and contracts. The court affirmed the lower decisions, holding that the School Board did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error in dismissing Monaghan.
The case involved Alfred Amoroso's appeal of a Pennsylvania Department of Transportation order suspending his driver's license for 90 days, one year, and two years following his guilty pleas to three counts of possessing controlled substances with intent to deliver under the Controlled Substance Act. Amoroso argued that the mandatory suspension provision was unconstitutional under due process and cruel and unusual punishment clauses because no vehicle was involved in the offenses and the statute lacked a rational connection to public safety. The trial court upheld the suspensions on rational basis grounds, but the Commonwealth Court affirmed on alternative grounds, holding that constitutional challenges to the underlying convictions constituted an improper collateral attack in a civil license suspension proceeding. The court's limited scope of review allowed only examination of whether the convictions occurred and whether DOT followed the law, with the proper forum for such claims being the criminal case or a nunc pro tunc appeal.