The case concerned whether a public school employee who was a member of the Public School Employes’ Retirement System (PSERS) as a cafeteria worker forfeited her pension benefits under the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (Act 140) after pleading guilty to embezzling funds in her separate elected position as a tax collector, a crime enumerated under the Act. The Retirement Board sought a declaratory judgment on the issue, and no opposing responses were filed. The court held that forfeiture applied because the Act’s definitions of “public employee” and “public official” encompass any person who is a member of a qualifying retirement system, regardless of whether the forfeitable crime occurred in the position that generated the pension. It reasoned that Section 3(a) of Act 140 bars benefits for conviction of a crime related to public office or employment and that Matthews qualified as a covered public employee by virtue of her PSERS membership.
The case involved an employer's petition to modify a registered nurse's workers' compensation benefits after a 1996 knee injury, based on medical releases for light or sedentary work and a vocational assessment identifying potential roles like nursing director or admissions clerk. The court affirmed the denial of the modification petition, holding that the employer failed to establish the availability of specific job vacancies the claimant could perform. The core reasoning centered on the employer's lack of good faith in its job placement program, which did not match openings to the claimant's medical restrictions, combined with expert testimony showing no positions were actually open at the relevant times, contrary to requirements under the Workers' Compensation Act for proving earning capacity.
The case involved Philadelphia residents and taxpayers challenging three city ordinances that created a 'life partnership' status for same-sex couples, extended health and pension benefits to such partners of city employees, exempted their real estate transfers from the local realty transfer tax, and prohibited discrimination based on life-partner status in employment and public accommodations. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed two counts on preliminary objections and granted the city summary judgment on the remaining counts, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The court held that the ordinances were a valid exercise of the city's home-rule authority because they addressed employee benefits and local anti-discrimination rules rather than creating or regulating marriage, which remains a state matter, and because the tax exemption fell within the city's taxing powers under the Sterling Act.
The case involved whether Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., a California corporation that solicited orders in Pennsylvania for its parent's over-the-counter healthcare products, was exempt from Pennsylvania corporate net income tax under federal Public Law 86-272 for the 1993 tax year. The court reversed the Board of Finance and Revenue's determination that the taxpayer was liable for the tax. The court reasoned that the taxpayer's activities consisted solely of solicitation of orders for tangible personal property, which were approved and shipped from outside Pennsylvania, qualifying for the exemption under the federal statute regardless of whether the taxpayer held title to the products.
Councilman David Cohen filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunction challenging Philadelphia ordinances enacted in December 2000 that authorized financing, land acquisition, and a four-lease structure for constructing new stadiums for the Eagles and Phillies at a cost exceeding $1 billion, with the city contributing $394 million and a $53 million shortfall to be covered by non-city sources. The petition asserted that the lease arrangements and funding mechanisms violated the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, the Economic Development Financing Law, the Capital Facilities Debt Enabling Act, and related statutes governing municipal powers and eminent domain. Respondents including the City, Mayor, PAID, teams, and state officials filed preliminary objections in the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction. The court reviewed the background of the ordinances, public hearings, and lease terms to assess whether the petition adequately stated claims regarding legislative authority and procedural compliance.
In Gallagher v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, a parolee appealed the Board's denial of credit for pretrial confinement time on new criminal charges toward his original sentence, claiming the time should apply because his new sentence was only probation. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's order, upholding the recalculation that allocated the time to the new sentence instead. Following Supreme Court precedent in Gaito v. Board, the court reasoned that when a parolee is convicted on new charges and a sentence is imposed—even probation—the pretrial time is credited to the new sentence rather than the original one, as a probation sentence qualifies as a sentence under the law. The decision applied holdings from cases such as Smarr and Berry, rejecting arguments for an exception based on the nature or length of the new sentence.