Genevieve Blatt

The case involved a workers' compensation claimant who suffered a work-related herniated lumbar disc injury in 1985 and was receiving weekly benefits. Both the claimant's and employer's physicians recommended surgery with high predicted success rates and standard risks, but the claimant refused unless success was guaranteed. The employer petitioned for review, and the referee suspended benefits under Section 306(f) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, finding the claimant's refusal of reasonable medical services unreasonable; the Board affirmed. The court affirmed the Board's order, holding that substantial evidence supported the referee's finding that the proposed surgeries were reasonable services and that the claimant's demand for a guarantee made his refusal unreasonable.

labor & employment

In Ross v. Commonwealth, the appellant challenged the Department of Transportation's five-year revocation of his operating privilege under the habitual offender provision of the Vehicle Code (75 Pa. C.S. §1542), which was triggered by a prior DUI conviction plus two new summary offenses: driving without lights and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. The Court of Common Pleas denied his appeal after a de novo hearing, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the two offenses arose from separate acts as required by the statute. The court reasoned that, by statutory definition, fleeing or eluding a pursuing officer necessarily involves an act beyond merely driving without lights, and the appellant's guilty plea admitted to such distinct conduct. The decision rested on the plain language of the offenses and prior precedent allowing multiple convictions from one factual episode to qualify under the habitual offender law.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation's appeal from a trial court order that permitted Antoinette Campion Kruc to file a late appeal (nunc pro tunc) of her one-year driver's license suspension for refusing a breathalyzer test after a DUI arrest and then reversed the suspension on the merits. The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's order and reinstated the suspension. The court held that the issue of whether to allow the untimely appeal was jurisdictional and could be raised for the first time on appeal; it further held that Kruc's excuse—that she overlooked the suspension notice amid medical and junk mail—was insufficient as a matter of law to justify extending the 30-day appeal period, which is permitted only in cases of fraud, court breakdown, or completely non-negligent attorney error. Because the trial court lacked authority to hear the late appeal, its merits ruling was vacated.

procedure

This case involved a coal miner who sought workers' compensation benefits from his former employer, Split Vein Coal Company, alleging total disability from anthracosilicosis due to prolonged exposure to coal dust. The claimant had applied for federal black lung benefits in 1980 and filed a state claim petition in 1982, with a referee ultimately determining the disability date as July 26, 1982, based on medical testimony, and finding that notice to the employer was timely under Section 311 of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the referee's award of benefits, and the Commonwealth Court upheld that decision. The court reasoned that the statutory notice period begins only when the claimant knows or should know of the disability, which could not predate the July 26, 1982 determination here, and that the claimant's earlier federal filing provided sufficient notice without prejudice to the employer. It further held that receipt of federal benefits does not conclusively establish the claimant's knowledge of total disability for state compensation purposes.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Edward E. Hobson, a parolee, appealing the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's denial of relief from his recommitment as a technical parole violator for submitting urine samples that tested positive for cocaine. Hobson argued that his due process rights were violated because the preliminary hearing officer was not impartial and that testimony about his admission to cocaine use was inadmissible hearsay lacking sufficient evidentiary support. The court affirmed the Board's order, holding that the district director presiding over the preliminary hearing met the impartiality standards from Morrissey v. Brewer since he had no involvement in the violation report. It further ruled that the parole agent's testimony regarding Hobson's statements was admissible as a statement against interest and provided substantial evidence for the recommitment, noting Hobson's own hearing admission.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Obringer v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, petitioner Gary Obringer challenged the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's recomputation of his parole maximum date from November 2, 1988, to July 16, 1990, after he was found to be a technical parole violator for failing to report arrests while on parole from a 1979 burglary sentence. The Board had ordered him to serve six months of backtime and adjusted his sentence to exclude time he was delinquent on parole due to new criminal convictions and incarceration. Obringer argued that the Board improperly extended his parole without a revocation hearing, violated its own orders and regulations, and denied him due process. The court affirmed the Board's denial of administrative relief, holding that the recomputation followed Section 21.1 of the Parole Act by not crediting delinquent time, that only a violation hearing was required for a technical violator, and that the Board acted within its authority in sequencing the service of sentences.

criminal lawprocedure