The case involved whether a workers’ compensation carrier could reduce an injured worker's disability award by the amount he recovered from his uninsured motorist insurance policy after being struck by a co-employee. The court held that the carrier was not entitled to such a set-off. The decision rested on the legislative intent in 85 O.S. § 45 that independent insurance benefits of the employee should not affect compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and on the view that uninsured motorist coverage is a contractual right rather than one derived from tort, precluding subrogation by the carrier.
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff sued St. Francis Hospital after emergency room physicians allegedly misdiagnosed his appendicitis on two visits, leading to a rupture, peritonitis, and permanent injuries; he sought to hold the hospital vicariously liable for the doctors' negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital, ruling that the physicians were independent contractors employed by a staffing company rather than hospital agents or employees. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the hospital could be estopped from denying liability because the plaintiff had no prior physician relationship, relied on the hospital for treatment, and the hospital had represented through its emergency room operations and oversight that the physicians were acting on its behalf. The court reasoned that the hospital's contract attempting to disclaim responsibility did not override the apparent authority created by its conduct and the patient's reasonable expectations in seeking care at the facility.
In this divorce case, the wife sought repayment for her financial support of the husband while he attended dental school from 1973 to 1980, during which she earned significantly more than he did. The trial court awarded her alimony in lieu of property settlement totaling over $55,000, including adjustments for inflation and interest, citing Hubbard v. Hubbard, while ordering each party to pay their own attorney fees. The husband appealed, arguing that the Hubbard rule should not apply due to mutual incompatibility and possible fault by the wife, and also claimed judicial bias from the wife's counsel's political ties to the judge. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the Hubbard award is based purely on economic factors without regard to fault, that any bias claim was waived by failure to object, and that the attorney fee ruling was appropriate given both parties' self-supporting status. The divorce was granted on grounds of incompatibility.
This case involved lien claimants, including Cyclone Drilling, who filed an oil and gas lien foreclosure action against lease owner Don Woods after providing services on the Wild #1 Lease; they later joined Kiefer Pump & Supply as a defendant, alleging conversion of equipment (tanks, pumping unit, and gas engine) that Woods had purchased from Kiefer and briefly placed on the lease before returning it. The trial court ruled that liens attached only to the tanks but not the other items and awarded attorney fees to Cyclone. On appeal, the court held that under 42 O.S.1981 § 144, the liens attached to all the equipment because it was purchased specifically for the lease, placed on the premises after the liens' priority date, and remained subject to the liens regardless of removal or non-use, as the statute covers materials furnished for development of the leasehold. The court therefore affirmed the liens and fees on the tanks, reversed on the pumping unit and engine (awarding their value to the lien claimants), and remanded for additional attorney fees.
This case involved a workers' compensation claim in which claimant Reaves received a final 1981 award of permanent partial disability benefits for a back injury, with no provision for future medical expenses and no evidence presented on that issue at the time. The trial court later granted Reaves additional medical and travel expenses on a general motion, without any allegation or showing of a change in condition. The appellate court reversed, holding that a final award cannot be modified to add such benefits except through a properly filed motion to reopen based on a change of condition for the worse under the governing statutes, as the claimant had the opportunity to seek future medical coverage at the original hearing or on appeal but did not do so.