Arlene Singer

The case involved Jody Mitten's appeal of her conviction and sentence in Sandusky County Common Pleas Court after she entered an Alford guilty plea to third-degree felony failure to comply with a police officer's order under R.C. 2921.331(B). The trial court imposed a maximum 36-month prison term, prosecution costs, and a mandatory 48-month driver's license suspension. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the sentence was not contrary to law because it fell within the statutory range under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), the court properly considered the purposes and factors in R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, and 2921.331(C)(5)(b), and the record lacked clear and convincing evidence of error. The court also rejected the claim that the plea was unknowing or involuntary, finding no basis to disturb the trial court's acceptance of it.

criminal lawprocedure

In Davis v. Johnson, appellees Douglas and Irene Davis sued for breach of a recorded land installment contract on Toledo property, seeking a money judgment for unpaid installments from defendant “Douglas G. Johnson.” The Toledo Municipal Court, Housing Division, entered a default judgment against “David G. Johnson” that instead terminated the contract and awarded the sellers immediate possession of the property. Appellant David G. Johnson moved under Civ.R. 60(B) to vacate the judgment, arguing improper party naming, defective service, and that he had acquired clear title through subsequent deeds; the trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the default judgment awarded relief different in kind from the complaint and that Johnson had alleged facts that, if true, could support relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), so the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion without a hearing. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the motion.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Maxcy-Tipton, the defendant appealed her fourth-degree felony arson conviction and community-control sentence from the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of Ohio’s arson-offender registry statute (R.C. 2909.15) or to seek a reduced registration period, and that the statute itself violated separation of powers. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case. It held that counsel’s failure to raise the constitutional issue at sentencing constituted ineffective assistance because conflicting appellate decisions on the statute’s validity made the objection reasonably apparent, and a guilty plea does not waive post-conviction claims like automatic registration requirements. The court declined to address the statute’s constitutionality itself on plain-error grounds and found no prejudice from counsel’s failure to request a shorter registration term, as the statute provides no mechanism for defendants to compel such relief.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Bowman, Ted Bowman was cited for violating R.C. 4511.12 after a state trooper stopped him for driving a semitruck in the far-left lane of the Ohio Turnpike, contrary to posted signs restricting trucks to the right two lanes. Following a bench trial, the municipal court found him guilty and imposed a fine; Bowman then sought reconsideration, arguing that the trooper’s red, white, and blue lights made the stop unlawful under R.C. 4513.17 and that he had been selectively prosecuted. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient and not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the statute on police lights does not bar red lights on marked cruisers, and that Bowman failed to show he was singled out for prosecution in bad faith when more than twenty others had been charged similarly in the same county. The court also ruled the appeal was not moot because the conviction carried collateral consequences in the form of license points.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In State v. Moore, Gerry L. Moore, Sr. was convicted by a jury in Erie County of retaliation, attempted aggravated murder, and conspiracy to commit aggravated murder after he solicited a fellow inmate at Marion Correctional Institution to kill his ex-wife Diane, who resided in Erie County. The trial court sentenced him to 22 years in prison. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals addressed Moore’s challenge to venue, noting that all of his alleged acts—including the solicitation, discussions, and creation of a map—occurred while he was incarcerated in Marion County. The court held that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that venue properly lay in Erie County, as the intended location of the completed crime alone does not establish where the charged offenses took place. As a result, the convictions were vacated and the judgment reversed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Masin, John D. Masin appealed the Vermilion Municipal Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop that led to his OVI conviction. On May 5, 2019, an officer stopped Masin after observing his vehicle drift over lane lines at least three times on Liberty Avenue around 2:30 a.m., resulting in charges for marked lanes violations and operating a vehicle under the influence. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing, and Masin entered a no-contest plea to the OVI charge. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the repeated lane violations supplied reasonable suspicion for the stop under the Fourth Amendment and that the officer’s additional observations—such as the odor of alcohol and Masin’s admissions—established probable cause for arrest independent of any field sobriety test results. The court found any potential error regarding those tests harmless.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Hayward Jones was convicted by a jury in the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity along with multiple counts of conspiracy and cocaine trafficking, following a trial in which he represented himself with standby counsel. On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Sixth District Court of Appeals addressed whether Jones had validly waived his right to counsel under Crim.R. 44. The court reversed the convictions, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a new trial. It held that the waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate oral colloquy advising Jones of the nature of the charges, the range of penalties, possible defenses, and the dangers of self-representation, and because the written waiver was similarly deficient.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Stull, Robert A. Stull was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of rape with a victim-under-ten specification and two counts of gross sexual imposition. The trial court imposed mandatory life-without-parole sentences on the rape counts and five-year terms on the gross sexual imposition counts, ordering the latter to run consecutively to the life sentences. Stull appealed, arguing that the court had failed to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive prison terms. The Sixth District Court of Appeals agreed, holding that neither the sentencing hearing nor the judgment entry contained the necessary statutory findings that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public or punish the offender, were not disproportionate to the conduct and danger posed, and satisfied one of the three additional statutory criteria. The court therefore vacated the sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Elizabeth Johns, who was convicted by a jury of complicity to having a weapon under disability after police found a handgun at her home during a search. Her boyfriend, Brian Brooks, who was prohibited from possessing firearms due to a prior conviction, had directed her via phone calls from jail to handle the gun stored in a book bag and safe at her residence; she had moved it and discussed its issues but was not herself under any disability. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove complicity under R.C. 2923.03(A). The court reasoned that Johns lacked knowledge of Brooks's disability and did not act with the specific intent to aid or abet him in possessing the weapon, as he had already constructively possessed it before the calls and she took no actions to help him commit the offense.

criminal lawguns

In State v. Brooks, the defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of having a weapon under disability, a third-degree felony, after police found a loaded handgun at his girlfriend’s Wood County home during a search on April 13, 2018. Brooks, who was serving a jail sentence at the time, appealed on grounds that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court should have granted his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that recorded phone calls between Brooks and his girlfriend established his constructive possession of the firearm. In the calls, Brooks referred to a “strap” (slang for a handgun) stored in his book bag or safe at the residence, gave the safe combination, and discussed its use, while stipulating that he was legally prohibited from possessing firearms. The court found this evidence sufficient to prove knowing constructive possession under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), regardless of the exact date charged or the girlfriend’s handling of the gun.

gunscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved James Montgomery’s appeal from his no-contest plea to second-degree burglary and his resulting indefinite sentence of three to four-and-a-half years under Ohio’s Reagan Tokes Law (S.B. 201). Montgomery argued that the law violated separation of powers and due process, and that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he believed the trial court had promised a two-to-three-year term. The Sixth District Court of Appeals dismissed the constitutional challenges as not ripe for review, following its precedent in State v. Maddox, because any potential extension of the minimum term by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction had not yet occurred. On the plea issue, the court examined the change-of-plea hearing transcript under Crim.R. 11 and the totality of the circumstances and concluded that the trial court had substantially complied with the required advisements, so the plea was valid. The court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment in full while certifying a conflict on the ripeness question to the Ohio Supreme Court.

criminal lawprocedure

Mark Alan Lowery was convicted in Lucas County Common Pleas Court of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and related offenses arising from the July 2015 killing of A.D. inside his trailer. Lowery entered the home while A.D. was away, struck and stabbed him upon his return, and stole collectible coins, guns, and other property; DNA from both Lowery and A.D. was later recovered from gloves found near the abandoned getaway vehicle. The trial court imposed two consecutive sentences of life without parole. On appeal, Lowery argued that several counts should have merged at sentencing and raised other evidentiary and procedural claims. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the offenses involved separate conduct or animus and that the trial court did not commit plain error in any of the rulings Lowery challenged.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a foreclosure action on a reverse mortgage for a vacation home on Put-In-Bay Island in Ohio. After borrower Clement Cody died in 2012 without paying off the loan, lender Generation Mortgage (later assigned to Nationstar) sought foreclosure, while the heirs (appellants Kevin Cody and others) countersued for trespass and conversion over the lender's actions to winterize and secure the unoccupied property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the lenders, awarding $703,201.45 and ordering foreclosure. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the borrower's death triggered default under the mortgage terms, that the agreement expressly authorized reasonable steps to protect vacant property, that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the debt or appraisal, and that the court properly preserved the statutory right of redemption by allowing a three-day period before confirmation of sale.

propertytorts & liability

In M.S. v. J.S., unmarried parents disputed a court-ordered shared parenting plan for their child after their relationship ended, with the father filing a complaint seeking parenting rights and the mother later objecting to a magistrate’s recommended plan. The Lucas County Juvenile Court denied the mother’s objections for failure to file a hearing transcript and denied her motion for reconsideration, then approved the shared parenting plan. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed those rulings. The court held that Juvenile Rule 40(D)(3)(b)(iii) required the objecting party to file the transcript within 30 days, and without it the trial court had to accept the magistrate’s factual findings while reviewing only legal conclusions; the mother’s delay provided no good cause for reconsideration. The appellate court also noted that a magistrate’s decision is not final until adopted by the trial court.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Peck, Kyle Peck appealed the trial court’s denial of his pro se motion to compel specific performance of his 2017 plea agreement in a drug trafficking case. He argued that the agreement was ambiguous about mandatory prison terms and judicial release, and that he had been sentenced to a longer mandatory term than promised. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. The court held that the plea agreement concerned only the plea itself, not a jointly recommended sentence, and that Peck’s claims were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised on direct appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In FitzGerald v. FitzGerald, a divorce case in Wood County, Ohio, the trial court found appellant Sean FitzGerald in direct criminal contempt on April 4, 2019, and in civil indirect contempt on September 11 and 23, 2019, imposing a 30-day jail sentence after concluding he had filed a grievance against opposing counsel, behaved unprofessionally, and failed to attend a real estate closing or comply with related purge conditions. FitzGerald appealed, arguing the findings lacked evidentiary support and violated due process. The Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgments and vacated all contempt findings and orders. It held that the initial criminal contempt was unsupported because FitzGerald’s statements about not yet filing a grievance were accurate and did not constitute misrepresentations or direct contempt in open court, while the later civil findings rested on an invalid underlying order and non-existent attendance requirement.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

In Buerkle v. VanAuken, appellants Vernie and Donna Buerkle sued appellees including Sharon VanAuken, Realty World, and John Kinn over title to property on Kelleys Island, seeking to quiet title and alleging that Kinn was not a bona fide purchaser and had tortiously interfered with contracts; appellees responded with counterclaims for fraud, theft, breach of contract, and related claims. The Erie County Common Pleas Court dismissed the Buerkles’ claims for failure to prosecute under Civ.R. 41(B), granted summary judgment to Kinn on the theft and fraud counterclaims, denied the Buerkles’ motions for reconsideration and Civ.R. 60(B) relief, and issued a nunc pro tunc order making the ruling final and appealable. On appeal, the Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Buerkles’ claims, finding their arguments about genuine issues of material fact inapplicable because the trial court had relied on failure to prosecute rather than summary judgment standards. The court reversed the summary judgment on the counterclaims and remanded for the trial court to vacate that portion of the judgment, while deeming the remaining issues moot.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Sotelo, Selena Sotelo was convicted after a jury trial in Lucas County Common Pleas Court on two counts of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor and one count of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material, based on evidence that she and her boyfriend electronically transmitted child pornography videos to each other via Facebook Messenger. The trial court sentenced her to five years in prison. On appeal, Sotelo challenged the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence supporting her convictions, arguing she lacked knowledge of the videos' content. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the state presented sufficient evidence of her knowledge—including her acknowledgment of a child video thumbnail during a police interview, her deletion of the videos from her account, and a follow-up text referencing a “preteen” image—and that the jury did not lose its way in rejecting her claim that she forwarded the videos without viewing them.

criminal law

In State v. Rybak, Brian Rybak appealed his convictions after a jury trial in Lucas County Common Pleas Court on charges stemming from a December 2017 incident in which he was accused of assaulting his wife, A.R., over several days, leading to her fleeing with their child; he was convicted of domestic violence as a third-degree felony (enhanced by prior convictions) and intimidation as a third-degree felony, and sentenced to 72 months in prison. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the domestic violence conviction, finding it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the jury could reasonably credit A.R.’s testimony, which was corroborated by responding officers who observed her injuries and demeanor immediately after the events. The court reversed the intimidation conviction, however, holding that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove A.R. was a “witness in the discharge of [a] duty” as required by R.C. 2921.04(A), and therefore vacated that conviction while rejecting an ineffective-assistance claim as a matter of trial strategy.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In State v. Wilkes, Joseph Wilkes Jr. was charged with cocaine trafficking and possession after police searched his Knights Inn motel room in Rossford, Ohio, on July 9, 2018, and found cocaine pursuant to a warrant. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, Wilkes entered a no-contest plea, was convicted, and received community control; he appealed, arguing the warrant was invalid because documents showed it was signed by the judge minutes after the search began. The Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of suppression. The court held that the inconsistent times resulted from clerical errors in police reports and warrant paperwork rather than misconduct, with evidence confirming the warrant was properly issued before execution and caused no prejudice to Wilkes. Such technical mistakes did not render the otherwise valid warrant unconstitutional or require exclusion of the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure