Stephen R. Shaw

The case involved defendant Darrel W. Allen, who was on bond with conditions including wearing a SCRAM ankle monitor for continuous alcohol monitoring. After a reported domestic dispute, police found that Allen had cut off and removed the monitor (which was later discovered damaged in his home along with an open can of alcohol), leading to his jury convictions for tampering with evidence (third-degree felony) and criminal damaging (second-degree misdemeanor). Allen appealed, arguing that the trial court should have merged the offenses for sentencing and that the convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the 24-month prison sentence, holding that sufficient evidence supported both convictions and that they did not merge because the offenses involved separate conduct and harms. The majority reasoned that cutting the monitor constituted tampering with evidence of a potential probation violation, while the dissent would have reversed the tampering conviction for lack of proof that Allen altered an existing piece of inculpatory evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved appeals by Reagan M. (mother of O.M. and A.D.) and Cory D. (father of A.D.) challenging the Hancock County Juvenile Court’s adjudication of the two young children as neglected and dependent children under Ohio law, following a November 2021 domestic violence incident between the parents that led to police and child protective services involvement and temporary placement of the children with relatives. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments in full as to the adjudications and dismissed the appeals in part. The majority rejected the parents’ claims of procedural error under the juvenile and evidence rules, insufficient evidence, and lack of reasonable efforts by the agency, concluding that the record contained clear and convincing evidence of an environment adverse to the children’s welfare due to the parents’ ongoing physical altercations. A partial dissent would have reversed the dependency findings, arguing that the agency failed to prove any nexus between the domestic incidents and actual harm or risk to the children.

family lawprocedure

In State v. Brown, defendant Tricia Brown was indicted on third-degree felony theft and grand theft of a firearm charges, entered a stipulation allowing polygraph results, then pleaded guilty to an amended fifth-degree felony theft count involving $1,000 to $7,499.99 in exchange for dismissal of the firearm count. The trial court imposed a four-year community control sentence that included 60 days in jail (with credit) and ordered her to pay $11,896.08 in restitution. Brown appealed, arguing the restitution exceeded the statutory maximum for her offense, that the sentence violated equal protection, that her counsel was ineffective for not objecting, and that the polygraph results were improperly admitted. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that restitution must be capped at the maximum value corresponding to the degree of the convicted theft offense under R.C. 2913.02(B)(2) and precedent, remanding for recalculation, while rejecting the remaining claims because the polygraph results were properly admitted at sentencing for impeachment under the parties’ stipulation after Brown denied taking the property.

criminal lawprocedurepropertycivil rights

In West v. West, Joy West filed for divorce in 2018, alleging a common-law marriage with Thomas West since 1990 and seeking dissolution on grounds of gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty. Thomas failed to file a timely answer to the complaint, resulting in the trial court deeming the allegations admitted under Civ.R. 8(D) and limiting his ability to contest the marriage's existence at later hearings, though Joy still had to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court found such a marriage existed, granted the divorce on the stated grounds with corroborating evidence like a medical report and domestic violence conviction, and ordered asset division and spousal support. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Thomas showed no excusable neglect to set aside the default, that the record supported the marriage finding, and that direct and corroborating evidence backed the divorce grounds under Civ.R. 75(M).

family lawprocedureproperty

In In re G.Y., the Mercer County Juvenile Court adjudicated a young child as abused based on injuries discovered in 2021 and placed him in the legal custody of his father after prior temporary placements with the paternal grandmother due to procedural delays in related cases involving the mother and her live-in partner. The mother appealed, arguing errors in the abuse finding, failure to dismiss the complaint, inadequate reasonable-efforts determinations, and improper custody award. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed both the adjudication and disposition, holding that competent evidence supported the trial court's conclusions that the child was abused, that placement outside the mother's home served the child's best interest, and that legal custody to the father was appropriate given safety concerns and the mother's circumstances.

family lawprocedure

The Bloomfields sued the Varners for trespass and related claims, alleging that the Varners had no right to drive on Johnson Road in Johnson’s Subdivision to reach their horse barn. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Varners, and the Third District Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the Bloomfields did not own Johnson Road and that the 1962 deed language granting subdivision lot owners “the privilege of ingress and egress to the Little Auglaize River” on Johnson-owned land did not create a restriction barring others from using the road itself. Because Johnson Road ends before reaching the river and the Varners used it only to reach County Road 177, not the river path, the covenant did not apply to their access.

propertytorts & liability

In State v. Blessett, the defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty in Wyandot County to aggravated possession of drugs (a third-degree felony) under a negotiated plea agreement that included a joint recommendation for a 36-month prison term; the trial court imposed that term and ordered it to run consecutive to a sentence from an unrelated Hancock County case. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The court reasoned that R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) bars review of a jointly recommended sentence that is authorized by law and within the statutory range, as the trial court had considered the required sentencing factors. It further held that the consecutive sentence was proper because the Hancock County term had already been imposed, the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and the defendant’s contrary claims were unsupported by the record.

criminal lawprocedure

In re R.H. involved appeals by parents Nicole H. and Carl H. from a Crawford County Juvenile Court decision that, after adjudicating their children R.H., H.S., and C.S. as neglected or abused and placing them in temporary kinship custody, awarded legal custody to relatives at a scheduled review hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments and remanded the cases. It held that the parents received notice only of a review hearing, not a dispositional hearing on legal custody, and that the trial court failed to comply with the notice, evidentiary, and procedural requirements of R.C. 2151.353 and Juv.R. 34 before permanently altering custody. The appellate court rejected the lower court’s reliance on R.C. 2151.417 as authority to act sua sponte without proper process or sworn testimony.

family lawprocedure

This case concerned Roy Bell’s appeal from the revocation of community control after his judicial release from a 36-month prison sentence for failure to register a change of address as a sex offender. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case. It held that the trial court erred by reimposing the full original sentence rather than only the remaining balance of prison time, contrary to the judicial-release entry and R.C. 2929.20(K), and that the 119-day jail-time credit awarded was incomplete because it failed to account for additional time between Bell’s arrest in Kentucky and his return to Ohio. The matter was sent back for resentencing limited to those corrections.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Coronado, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification arising from an incident in which he entered the victim's residence and struck him. Coronado appealed, claiming the evidence was insufficient to support the firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145 and that the guilty verdict on that specification was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence—including police testimony describing the victim's round facial laceration consistent with a gun barrel, the victim's initial description of a black semi-automatic firearm, Coronado's admissions in a recorded interview and jail calls that he possessed and later secured a handgun, and recovery of an operable Ruger pistol—to allow a rational trier of fact to find that he displayed or used a firearm during the offense. The court further concluded that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence after reviewing the full record, including the victim's reluctant trial testimony.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In State v. Thomason, the defendant appealed his conviction and indefinite prison sentence after pleading guilty to multiple felony sex offenses, including rape, gross sexual imposition, importuning, and disseminating matter harmful to juveniles. The trial court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years to a maximum of fifteen years on the rape count under Ohio’s Reagan Tokes Law, along with consecutive terms on the other counts, for a total indefinite sentence of fourteen years and six months to nineteen years and six months, plus sex-offender registration. Thomason challenged the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law, arguing it violated separation of powers, due process, and the right to a jury trial. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, holding that its prior decisions, including State v. Ball, had already rejected these facial constitutional challenges to the law’s indefinite-sentencing provisions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Anthony Houston's appeal of his conviction for aggravated burglary with firearm and repeat-violent-offender specifications in Allen County Common Pleas Court. Houston had challenged the trial court's pretrial rulings allowing certain out-of-court statements by an unavailable witness (Jordan Crowder) to be admitted at trial under Evidence Rules 804(B)(1) and 804(B)(6). After the trial court denied his motion in limine seeking to exclude the statements, Houston entered a no-contest plea, was found guilty, and received a prison sentence of 19 to 24½ years. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the no-contest plea waived Houston's right to appeal the evidentiary rulings. The court reasoned that motions in limine produce only tentative, interlocutory decisions rather than final pretrial rulings on evidence, and that Crim.R. 12(I) therefore did not preserve the issues for review once Houston declined to proceed to trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Risner, the defendant was convicted by a Logan County jury of 58 theft-related offenses—including engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, multiple counts of theft, breaking and entering, grand theft of motor vehicles, and related crimes—stemming from a series of break-ins and thefts in July and August 2020 that targeted individuals, a business, a school, and family members, resulting in an aggregate indefinite sentence of 32-36 years. Risner appealed, claiming insufficient evidence and that some convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court erred in giving a consciousness-of-guilt jury instruction regarding his flight, and that hearsay evidence from the LeadsOnline pawn-shop database was improperly admitted. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. The court held that the evidence, including fingerprints, DNA, cell-phone records, accomplice testimony, recovered stolen property, and Risner’s flight and possession of a stolen truck, was sufficient and not against the manifest weight; the flight instruction was appropriate; and the LeadsOnline records were either properly admitted as business records or, if not, caused no material prejudice given independent pawn-shop testimony and video evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by mother Lacey W. from a Wyandot County Juvenile Court order granting legal custody of her dependent child L.W. (born 2013) to the child's paternal grandmother, Dawn S. The dependency finding stemmed from unsafe home conditions, including marijuana use and dealing in the household, poor hygiene, and incidents of exposing the children to drugs, which led to the child's removal from the mother's care while she was in a relationship with Kyle S. The Court of Appeals affirmed the custody order, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that legal custody to Dawn served the child's best interests. The court noted the child's improved school performance, cleanliness, and stability in Dawn's home, ongoing concerns about the mother's enabling of problematic behavior and lack of full remediation, and Dawn's willingness to facilitate contact with the mother.

family law

In State v. Thompson, defendant Patrick A. Thompson was convicted after a jury trial in Crawford County Common Pleas Court of possession of a fentanyl-related compound, possession of drug abuse instruments, and possession of drug paraphernalia, based on items found during execution of a search warrant at a residence where he was staying; he received an 11-month prison sentence. On appeal to the Third District Court of Appeals, Thompson challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, admission of certain photographs, effectiveness of trial counsel, the prison term imposed, and cumulative error. The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentence in full. It held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, supported all elements of the offenses, that the verdicts were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that no evidentiary or sentencing errors occurred, and that the cumulative-error doctrine did not apply because no multiple errors were found.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Shoaf, the defendant was charged in Findlay Municipal Court with OVI, leaving the scene of an accident, marked-lanes violation, and child endangerment after allegedly sideswiping another vehicle on Interstate 75 without stopping, with a child passenger present. The trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, and a jury convicted her on all counts (with the marked-lanes finding by the judge). Shoaf appealed, arguing the stop lacked reasonable suspicion, the convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court should have granted a mistrial, and trial counsel was ineffective. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the stop was justified by the reported accident and witness information, the evidence supported the jury’s findings, no mistrial was required, and counsel’s performance did not fall below constitutional standards.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Allen, Jamaree Allen appealed his convictions and 30- to 34-year indefinite sentence after pleading guilty in the Allen County Common Pleas Court to an eight-count indictment that included participating in a criminal gang, multiple felonious assaults, firearm discharges, weapons under disability, and related specifications. Allen argued that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, that his trial counsel was ineffective due to an alleged conflict of interest, and that the Reagan Tokes Law’s indefinite sentencing provisions violated constitutional protections. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in full. It held that the Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy established a valid plea, that the record contained no evidence of an actual conflict adversely affecting counsel’s performance, and that Allen’s constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law were barred by the court’s established precedent under plain-error review.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Trever Nelson's appeal of his conviction and sentence in Hardin County Common Pleas Court after he pled guilty, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, to aggravated possession of drugs and failure to verify his address as a sex offender. The trial court imposed consecutive prison terms totaling four years and ten months, along with an order to pay court-appointed counsel fees, and dismissed the remaining counts. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in full. It held that the fee order was authorized under R.C. 2941.51(D) after the court made the required finding of ability to pay, that any error was invited by Nelson's agreement in the plea deal and waived by his failure to object, and that his voluntary guilty plea to the registration offense waived any challenge to alleged defects in the statutory notice process.

criminal law

The case involved Emily King’s appeal from a Crawford County trial court judgment that revoked her judicial release community control and reimposed her original 48-month prison sentence (12 months on drug possession plus 36 months on tampering with evidence) along with 241 days of jail-time credit. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had erred by reimposing the full original sentence rather than only the remaining balance of the prison term after judicial release. The court further ruled that the trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) by not determining and stating at the sentencing hearing the precise number of days of jail-time credit to which King was entitled for time served on the current offenses. The opinion noted that crediting prior prison time is the responsibility of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, not the trial court, and that the existing record created ambiguity about which periods counted as jail time versus prison time.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Foust, the defendant appealed from a Crawford County Common Pleas Court judgment that revoked his judicial release and community control after violations, reimposed prison terms on two of his three original counts (receiving stolen property and engaging in corrupt activity), terminated the third count, and credited him with 104 days of jail time in the written entry. The Third District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred by reimposing the full original sentences on Counts 2 and 3 rather than only the remaining balance of those sentences after judicial release. The court reasoned that R.C. 2929.20(K) and the original judicial-release entry required reimposition of only the suspended portion, while the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction—not the trial court—handles prison-time calculations; it found no reversible error in the trial court’s determination of jail-time credit under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i).

criminal lawprocedure