Richard M. Rogers

The case involved Jose Valdez, Jr.'s appeal of his convictions for cocaine and heroin trafficking arising from controlled buys conducted by a confidential informant at his home in 2015. Valdez challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from the warrantless, recorded buys, the trial court's handling of the state's discovery violations, and the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his convictions and penalty enhancements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in part and the denial of suppression, holding that the informant’s consent eliminated any Fourth Amendment issue and that other claims lacked merit. It reversed in part and remanded, however, because the state presented insufficient evidence to prove the weight of pure cocaine (rather than the total mixture) needed for the first-degree felony enhancement under the statute as interpreted in State v. Gonzales. The court noted that the statute must be strictly construed against the state on this point.

criminal lawprocedure

State v. Thiel involved defendant Scott Thiel’s conviction for complicity to commit felonious assault arising from a 2014 bar fight in which he allegedly held the victim in a chokehold while a codefendant punched him. Thiel appealed, claiming the trial court wrongly excluded a hearsay statement by the codefendant, sustained objections that impaired his self-defense claim, gave incomplete jury instructions on complicity and self-defense, rendered a verdict against the weight of the evidence, denied a new-trial motion, and imposed restitution without a hearing. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and most rulings, finding the evidence sufficient, the instructions adequate, and the evidentiary decisions within the trial court’s discretion, but reversed the restitution order. It held that because Thiel disputed the $21,519.37 amount at sentencing, R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) required the trial court to hold a restitution hearing before imposing that obligation, and remanded for that purpose.

criminal law

In re C.B. involved a juvenile court proceeding in which C.B., adjudicated delinquent in 2010 and placed on probation, faced repeated violations, including a 2015 incident in which he argued with his mother and squirted ketchup on her. After C.B. admitted the violations, the trial court continued probation with conditions, imposed a stayed commitment to foster care, and later granted the county Department of Job and Family Services’ motion to lift that stay following further noncompliance and safety concerns. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third Appellate District, affirmed the order placing C.B. in temporary foster care. It reasoned that the record showed ongoing behavioral problems, prior services and interventions had failed, safety risks existed for both C.B. and his mother, and C.B. had improved when previously placed in foster care.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved Cody Sutherly’s appeal of his jury-trial conviction in Lima Municipal Court for public indecency, for which he received a 180-day jail sentence (90 suspended) and a fine. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and sentence. It held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its earlier dismissal of the case, which had occurred after the State failed to serve Sutherly with the summons. The appellate court determined that the officer’s erroneous return of the unserved summons did not qualify as a clerical error under Crim.R. 36 that would permit the trial court to reopen the matter sua sponte, so the dismissal remained a final judgment rendering all later proceedings void.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Larry Crapnell was eligible for unemployment benefits after the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services denied his November 2014 application for lacking the required minimum of 20 qualifying weeks of employment in his base or alternate base period under R.C. 4141.01(R). ODJFS and the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission determined, based on payroll records and Crapnell’s testimony at a hearing, that he had only 11 weeks in Q3 2013, 1 week in Q4 2013, 0 weeks in Q1 2014, 7 weeks in Q2 2014, and 8 weeks in Q3 2014. The Logan County Common Pleas Court reversed the Commission, concluding it was reasonable to infer an additional week from Crapnell’s earnings. The Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded, holding that the trial court improperly considered a new, unsupported factual claim of an extra week that had not been presented to the Commission and that the Commission’s decision was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence actually before it.

labor & employment

In Thompson v. Oberlander's Tree & Landscape Ltd., an employee sued his landscaping company employer (and related parties) for intentional tort after suffering a hand injury from a chainsaw kickback, alleging the company deliberately failed to repair or replace a required safety hand guard on the tool; the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation intervened to recover benefits paid. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, finding insufficient evidence that it had deliberately removed the guard or intended to injure the plaintiff. The Third District Court of Appeals reversed as to the company and remanded, holding that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence—through coworker affidavits and his own testimony about complaints and the guard's ongoing absence despite prior repairs—to create a presumption of intent under R.C. 2745.01(C), which the employer's self-serving denial affidavits did not rebut.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a dispute between the City of Marion and a union representing city employees over whether a “Healthcare Fee” imposed on bargaining-unit workers pursuant to the Affordable Care Act’s transitional reinsurance program constituted a breach of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was subject to the contract’s grievance and arbitration procedures. The union filed suit to compel arbitration after the City refused, arguing the fee fell within the employer’s responsibilities under the CBA; the City countered that the fee was a federal tax outside the scope of the agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the union and ordered arbitration, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third Appellate District, reversed that ruling. The appellate court held that the fee is a tax because it is a mandatory monetary charge imposed by the federal government to generate public revenue, and the parties’ joint stipulations expressly stated that the CBA does not cover disputes involving taxes; therefore, the grievance was not arbitrable as a matter of law. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that determination.

labor & employmenttaxeshealthcare

In State v. Thompson, defendant Travarus Thompson appealed the trial court’s denial of his 2015 pro se “Motion for Modification of Sentence,” which sought a shorter prison term after his 2012 guilty plea to first-degree cocaine trafficking. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. The court treated the motion as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief under R.C. 2953.21, filed nearly three years after the deadline, and held that Thompson had not shown any exception under R.C. 2953.23(A) that would allow a late filing, leaving the trial court without jurisdiction to consider it. The judgment was therefore affirmed on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the requested sentence reduction.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Thompson, defendant Travarus Thompson appealed the trial court’s denial of his 2015 pro se “Motion for Modification of Sentence,” which sought a shorter prison term after his 2012 guilty plea to first-degree cocaine trafficking. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. The court treated the motion as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief under R.C. 2953.21, filed nearly three years after the deadline, and held that Thompson had not shown any exception under R.C. 2953.23(A) that would allow a late filing, leaving the trial court without jurisdiction to consider it. The judgment was therefore affirmed on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the requested sentence reduction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Cristino Gaspareno’s appeal of his conviction in Marion County Common Pleas Court for one count of trafficking in heroin, for which he received a 12-month prison sentence after selling heroin to confidential informants with two co-defendants. Gaspareno raised four claims of error: the trial court’s use of his co-defendants’ sealed presentence reports at sentencing, its failure to advise him that it was not bound by any sentencing agreement with the State, its imposition of a mandatory three-year term of post-release control, and its failure to properly qualify the court interpreter. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and most aspects of the sentence, but reversed on the post-release control and related sentencing issues after finding those errors prejudicial. It therefore remanded the case for further proceedings while upholding the trial court’s handling of the interpreter and plea.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Castle, Donald Castle appealed his conviction and sentencing in Hardin County Common Pleas Court after pleading guilty to two counts of first-degree rape involving his ex-wife, who was unconscious due to sleep medication. The trial court imposed consecutive prison terms totaling eight years, citing the great or unusual harm to the victim under Ohio sentencing law, based on her statements about psychological trauma, manipulation, repeated betrayal of trust (including Castle's role as a probation officer), and effects on her church and family. Castle challenged only the consecutive nature of the sentences on appeal. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the record supported the trial court's findings that the harm was sufficiently severe to justify consecutive terms, as required by statute, regardless of any additional reasoning offered by the court.

criminal law

In State v. Welly, defendant Eric J. Welly appealed the trial court's denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief and motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a first-degree felony rape charge, for which he had been sentenced to an indefinite term of 25 years to life. Welly argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by pressuring him to accept the plea rather than proceed to trial, that police had coerced his confession, that newly discovered evidence (an affidavit from his sister regarding statements by the victim's mother) proved his innocence, and that his low intelligence and medication had impaired his plea. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. It held that the trial court lacked authority to consider the motion to withdraw the plea because Welly's conviction had already been affirmed on direct appeal, that res judicata barred claims (such as those involving his mental state) that could have been raised earlier, and that the ineffective-assistance claim, though not barred, failed on the merits because the record showed a knowing, voluntary plea and no prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

In In re R.H., a juvenile in Allen County, Ohio, was adjudicated delinquent for attempted rape in 2013, placed on probation with a stayed commitment to the Department of Youth Services, and later found to have violated probation after unsuccessful discharge from a residential treatment program. The juvenile court accepted his admission to the violation, imposed the DYS commitment, and classified him as a tier III juvenile sex offender registrant. On appeal, R.H. challenged the acceptance of his admission and the constitutionality of the classification statute. The Third District Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court’s judgment and remanded the case, holding that the court failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Juv.R. 29 when accepting the admission to the probation violation, as it did not adequately ensure the juvenile understood the allegations and rights being waived. The court declined to address the constitutional claims due to waiver and lack of sufficient development on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Navarro, defendant Brandon Navarro was indicted on charges of illegal marijuana cultivation, trafficking, and possessing criminal tools after police executed search warrants at his Seneca County residence and discovered a grow operation. He appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the first two warrants lacked probable cause and failed to describe the items to be seized with sufficient particularity. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the warrants were supported by probable cause based on citizen complaints, an anonymous tip corroborated by surveillance and thermal imaging that detected heat signatures consistent with grow lights, and the plain smell of marijuana detected during execution of the first warrant. The court further held that Navarro waived his particularity challenge by failing to raise it in his suppression motion or at the hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

In 2001, Thomas Nolde pleaded guilty in Defiance County to two counts of rape and five counts of gross sexual imposition involving multiple children and received a 25-year prison sentence without filing a direct appeal. Over a decade later, he filed a pro se motion to modify his sentence under R.C. 2941.25, claiming his convictions were allied offenses that should merge under the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in State v. Johnson. The trial court treated the motion as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed it. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the filing was far outside the statutory deadline for post-conviction petitions, that Nolde had not demonstrated any exception permitting an untimely filing, and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the allied-offense claim.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a promissory note for the purchase of a dairy cow, on which plaintiff Glessner obtained a cognovit judgment by confession against defendants Select Genetics LLC and its principals in Franklin County in 2014. After that, Glessner filed a second complaint for confession of judgment on the same note in Mercer County, which entered judgment in his favor in May 2015; the defendants then moved for relief from that judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), arguing it was barred by res judicata and that the original warrant of attorney had not been presented as required by R.C. 2323.13(A). The trial court denied the motion, finding the Franklin County judgment void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and that a copy of the warrant sufficed. The Third District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a court lacking direct-review authority cannot declare another Ohio court's judgment void, so the first judgment remained in effect and barred the second under res judicata; it therefore remanded for further proceedings.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Machuca, defendant Orlando Machuca was convicted of burglary and domestic violence after allegedly entering his estranged wife’s home and assaulting her; he appealed on grounds that his speedy-trial rights were violated, the trial court wrongly admitted evidence of his prior domestic-violence acts under Evid.R. 404(B), and the court should have granted his request for new appointed counsel. The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. It held that the continuance granted to new counsel for trial preparation was valid under State v. McBreen, that time was properly tolled during the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, that the prior-acts evidence was admissible to show motive, intent, and a pattern of abuse in the relationship, and that substitution of counsel was not required because any breakdown stemmed from Machuca’s misunderstanding of speedy-trial law and counsel’s performance was not shown to be deficient.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Chuck Brown II Bail Bonds could intervene in proceedings to challenge the forfeiture of a $45,000 surety bond posted by U.S. Specialty Insurance Company (with Surety Corporation of America and its agents) for defendant Michael Hawrylak, who had been charged with drug offenses, failed to appear in court, and remained at large. The trial court denied Brown Bail Bonds’s motion to intervene and ordered the bond forfeited. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Brown Bail Bonds failed to satisfy the requirements for intervention because the record showed only an agency relationship among the sureties and no evidence that its interests were inadequately represented or would be impaired. As a result, Brown Bail Bonds lacked standing to contest the forfeiture itself.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an appeal by Brittany Johnson, the mother of A.J., from a Crawford County Juvenile Court judgment granting permanent custody of the child to the Crawford County Department of Job and Family Services. A.J. had been adjudicated neglected shortly after birth while Johnson was serving a multi-year prison sentence, after which the agency sought permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413 and 2151.414 rather than pursuing reunification. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that statutory requirements for reasonable reunification efforts under R.C. 2151.419 did not apply to this permanent custody proceeding, and that the record contained competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) based on the mother’s ongoing incarceration and inability to provide care.

family law

In Hudson v. Flores, plaintiff Jeffrey Hudson sued hotel employee Steven Flores and his employer, Jay Sairam, Inc. dba Imperial Inn, after Flores pushed him during a personal dispute on July 27, 2013, causing Hudson to fall and break his arm; Hudson also asserted claims for negligent hiring and respondeat superior against the Inn, while its insurer Acuity intervened seeking a declaration that it had no coverage duty. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Inn and Acuity, and the Third District Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that Flores was acting outside the scope of his employment because the incident arose from a private accusation involving his girlfriend rather than any job duty, so the Inn could not be vicariously liable and Acuity’s policy did not apply; it further found no evidence supporting negligent hiring or ratification by the Inn.

torts & liability