Julia L. Dorrian

In Willow Bend Apartments v. Koster, a landlord filed a forcible entry and detainer action in Franklin County Municipal Court to evict tenant Warren Koster for failing to submit income recertification paperwork required by the lease, resulting in a magistrate’s decision and trial court judgment granting restitution of the premises. Koster appealed and raised issues including federal regulations, retaliation, defective notices, and counterclaims. The Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot because Koster had vacated the property, as shown by an executed writ of restitution restoring possession to the landlord on April 28, 2026, and by Koster’s own statements in a later bond motion. The court explained that eviction appeals become moot once the tenant leaves, since the sole purpose of such actions is to resolve the right to immediate possession and no further relief remains available.

propertyprocedure

In Bolden v. Carmona, Jacqueline Carmona appealed a November 2024 Franklin County Domestic Relations Court judgment that adopted a magistrate’s decision denying her motion to hold her ex-husband, Terry Bolden, in contempt for alleged violations of their 2022 divorce decree. The decree required Bolden to pay $1,300 monthly spousal support for 36 months and addressed the division of the marital home; Carmona claimed he missed payments, interfered with the home transfer, and mishandled joint funds. The magistrate found that Bolden had offset some payments by covering mortgage amounts Carmona failed to pay, resulting in an overpayment, and that other claims lacked clear and convincing proof, so it denied the contempt motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Carmona waived her arguments by failing to file timely objections to the magistrate’s decision under Civ.R. 53 and by not providing a transcript of the hearing, requiring the court to presume the lower proceedings were valid absent plain error, which she did not argue.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Jodi A. Howell’s appeal from a Franklin County Probate Court judgment denying her 2025 motion for a formal accounting of her father Ira J. Rogers’s intestate estate, which was administered by her sister Danna Rogers. After years of proceedings that included an inventory, partial and final accounts, fee approvals, and asset sales—all approved by the probate court without timely objections—the court treated Howell’s motion as a request to vacate the settled final account under R.C. 2109.35. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that Howell had not established any statutory grounds to reopen the account: she alleged no newly discovered fraud within the one-year limit, was a participating party rather than a non-party, and was not the fiduciary. The court concluded that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In State v. Hipps, defendant Ismayl Hipps was convicted by a jury of two counts of murder with firearm specifications, and by the court of having weapons under disability, after Anthony Davis was fatally shot in the face at a Columbus sober-living house where both men lived. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denied Hipps’s motion for a mistrial after a detective testified about information that Hipps had displayed a gun to a neighbor while trying to resolve a separate dispute involving Davis; the court then imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 21 years. On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that even if the detective’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay, it did not deprive Hipps of a fair trial because the jury could still convict him of felony murder based on his actions after taking the gun from Davis. The court further concluded that the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence—including ballistic and DNA matches linking the recovered handgun to Hipps, witness accounts of the altercation, and recorded jail calls in which Hipps admitted shooting the gun and referenced self-defense—and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In State v. Pippins, defendant Keith J. Pippins appealed the trial court's denial of his 2025 petition for postconviction relief, which sought to vacate his 2015 convictions on multiple drug-related charges and grant a new trial. The petition relied on an affidavit from Juror No. 7 alleging she felt pressured by other jurors, was confused about the charges, and observed racial bias and improper external information during deliberations. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that the petition was filed well beyond the 365-day statutory deadline after the direct appeal and that Pippins failed to demonstrate he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the juror's information earlier, as the record showed known concerns with that juror at trial and no attempts to contact her in the intervening decade. Because Pippins did not establish an exception to the timeliness requirement under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition's merits, rendering issues of res judicata and the lack of an evidentiary hearing moot or non-prejudicial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Gordon, defendant Michael L. Gordon appealed the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas' December 2023 denial of his November and December 2023 petitions for postconviction relief, in which he challenged his 2003 convictions for felonious assault, kidnapping, and two counts of involuntary manslaughter based on claims of newly discovered evidence. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court reasoned that the petitions were both untimely and successive under R.C. 2953.23(A), as Gordon did not show he was unavoidably prevented from discovering facts about alleged breaches of a proffer agreement and federal sentencing promises earlier (or that a new retroactive right applied), and that res judicata independently barred the claims.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Thompson, the defendant appealed his convictions in two consolidated cases from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas: one for complicity to failure to comply with an order of a police officer, a third-degree felony, arising from a 2022 traffic stop where he allegedly encouraged the driver to flee, resulting in a crash; and another for having a weapon while under disability, also a third-degree felony, based on his possession of a handgun in 2022 after prior juvenile adjudications for robbery, aggravated robbery, and drug offenses. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions and the resulting sentences of community control. On the first claim, the court held that the jury’s guilty verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as testimony and video showed Thompson jumped back into the vehicle and repeatedly yelled “go, go, go” to incite flight, supporting liability for aiding and abetting under R.C. 2923.03. On the second claim, the court upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, ruling that R.C. 2923.13 was constitutional as applied because Thompson’s juvenile adjudications placed him outside the protections of the Second Amendment and the prohibition aligned with historical traditions of firearm regulation.

criminal lawguns

In State v. Brown, Charles E. Brown was convicted by a jury in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas of one count of having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony, along with a firearm specification, after police found two firearms during a consensual search of his home prompted by a reported drug overdose; the parties stipulated to his prior felony conviction of violence, and he received a mandatory prison sentence. Brown appealed pro se, arguing that a defect in the initial municipal court complaint deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and that delays violated his statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that any issue with the municipal complaint was irrelevant because the grand jury indictment properly conferred jurisdiction and the case proceeded to trial on that indictment. On the speedy-trial claims, the court found the statutory time was tolled by Brown’s own motions and continuances, and the constitutional claim failed under the Barker factors because most delay resulted from his conduct and he showed no prejudice to his defense.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In State v. Abukar, Abdikadir Abukar appealed his jury conviction in Franklin County Municipal Court for violating a protection order under R.C. 2919.27(A), raising claims that the trial court failed to appoint a qualified interpreter and that the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without addressing those arguments. The court held that the March 25, 2025 sentencing entry was not a final appealable order under Crim.R. 32(C) and R.C. 2505.02 because it omitted the fact of conviction—it did not identify the offense by name or statute. Although a separate March 21 entry recorded the jury verdict, Ohio law requires all required elements (conviction, sentence, signature, and journalization) to appear in a single document. The appeal was therefore dismissed as premature for lack of jurisdiction.

criminal lawprocedure

James K. Fraley filed an original action in mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to produce public records he had requested in February 2025. ODRC moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Fraley failed to follow the procedural steps added by 2024 Sub.H.B. No. 265 to R.C. 149.43(C)(1) and (2), which took effect on April 9, 2025. Those amendments require a requester to first serve a prescribed complaint on the public office, wait three business days for a response, and then file a written affirmation of compliance with any later mandamus petition; noncompliance mandates dismissal. Fraley’s September 2025 petition was filed after the amendments became effective and contained no such affirmation. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the post-amendment version of the statute governed the action.

procedure

Kimberly Jones sued Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center in the Court of Claims, alleging age and sex discrimination under state and federal law after her October 2022 termination as Director of Central Sterile Processing at age 53. The employer moved for summary judgment, stating that Jones was fired for unsatisfactory performance, including poor leadership, communication failures, and recurring departmental issues that led to a performance improvement plan and eventual recommendation for termination. The trial court granted the motion, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Jones failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing the stated reasons were pretext for discrimination. The court found isolated comments about “archaic” practices ambiguous and not tied to age, noted that some of her duties were assumed by a woman already in the department, and concluded there was no evidence that gender bias by a non-supervisor influenced the decision.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a dispute over whether Ashland Global Holdings and its sublessee Speedway properly renewed commercial ground leases for 24 properties (including eight in Ohio) with landlord SuperAsh Remainderman Limited Partnership after Ashland missed the September 3, 2021 deadline for the 2022 renewal term. Following a series of tolling agreements that preserved the status quo through mid-April 2022, the trial court granted declaratory relief and specific performance to Ashland and Speedway, ruling that SuperAsh had waived its right to enforce lease expiration by estoppel. On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the record contained no competent evidence SuperAsh accepted rent or otherwise acted inconsistently with its rights after the final tolling agreement expired on April 15, 2022. The court therefore concluded the trial court abused its discretion by applying waiver by estoppel and remanded the matter for further proceedings on SuperAsh’s remaining claims for breach of the leases.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

Christian Galoski sued MedVet Associates, LLC, a company that operates veterinary hospitals, after his dog Bailey was diagnosed with a brain tumor, received treatment recommendations involving delays for CT scans and radiation, and was euthanized following a seizure episode at MedVet’s Columbus facility. Galoski asserted claims including negligence, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, failure to deliver bailed property, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but did not name any individual veterinarians as defendants. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to MedVet on all claims and denied Galoski’s partial summary judgment motion; the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that the claims were all based in veterinary malpractice, which can only be committed by individually licensed veterinarians, so MedVet as a corporate entity could not be held directly liable and could not be held vicariously liable without the individual veterinarians being parties to the suit. The court further noted that any attempt to add those individuals or vicarious liability claims would be barred by the statute of limitations.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this case, Marvell Dixon sued the State of Ohio under R.C. 2743.48 seeking a declaration that he was wrongfully imprisoned after his 1998 convictions for aggravated murder and felonious assault, which were based primarily on identifications by witnesses Ervin Nixon and Joe Robinson. The trial court denied Dixon’s motion for summary judgment but granted the state’s, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the question of actual innocence. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Dixon’s motion but reversed the grant of summary judgment to the state and remanded the case. The court held that the witnesses’ later recantations—while supported by their perjury convictions and some prior credibility findings—raised inherent credibility questions that must be resolved at trial rather than on summary judgment, and that earlier criminal-case determinations did not bind the civil proceeding.

criminal lawprocedure

William Rhoades, a horse trainer, appealed penalties imposed by the Ohio State Racing Commission after his horse ShesWildNFree tested positive for D-methamphetamine following a November 2022 race win at Northfield Park. The track judges disqualified the horse, ordered return of the $2,750 purse, fined Rhoades $1,000, and suspended his license for 365 days under the Commission’s absolute-insurer rule and ARCI guidelines classifying the substance as prohibited; the Commission hearing officer and Franklin County Common Pleas Court upheld the order. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission’s decision was not in accordance with law. The court reasoned that the Commission improperly relied on external ARCI guidelines to deem D-methamphetamine a prohibited substance without properly incorporating those guidelines into the Ohio Administrative Code, rendering further review of Rhoades’s constitutional and penalty-authority claims unnecessary.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Diallo, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of murder and one count each of aggravated arson, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse, receiving an aggregate sentence of 27 years to life in prison. Following an earlier affirmance of the convictions on direct appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reopened the case solely to consider whether appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim that the nearly two-year delay between arrest and trial violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Applying the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo, the court determined that the length of delay was not presumptively prejudicial, the reasons for the delay were largely attributable to the defense or neutral factors such as COVID-19 protocols, the defendant never properly asserted his speedy-trial rights in the trial court, and he failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay. Because no constitutional speedy-trial violation occurred, the court held that appellate counsel was not ineffective for omitting a meritless claim and therefore confirmed its prior judgment affirming the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Othman A. Abdu’s appeal of his convictions in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for felonious assault (from a shooting that grazed Trevon Gammons), aggravated murder, and murder (from a separate shooting that killed Nazeer Winton), along with attached firearm specifications, arising from two October 31, 2021 incidents. Abdu challenged the trial court’s handling of his motion to suppress evidence from his cell phone (including its seizure at arrest and cell-site location data obtained via warrants) and the imposition of consecutive prison terms on three firearm specifications. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in full. It held that the trial court properly resolved the suppression issues, including the effect of the second warrant for historical cell-site data, and that the sentencing complied with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) and (B)(1)(b), which require two mandatory firearm-specification terms for offenses committed as part of the same act or transaction (the Rabbit Hill shooting) while limiting additional terms for a separate transaction (the Wedgewood shooting) to one.

criminal lawprocedureguns

Michael Oberdier sought a writ of mandamus after the Industrial Commission denied his second application for permanent total disability compensation, ruling that he had not shown the “new and changed circumstances” required by R.C. 4123.58(G). The Tenth District Court of Appeals granted a limited writ and remanded the matter to the commission. The court held that the commission’s staff hearing officer applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring “sufficient evidence of meaningful or substantial” new circumstances rather than the statute’s plain requirement that a claimant merely present evidence of new and changed circumstances. It further concluded that the statute contains no temporal limit on evidence and that the commission, as fact-finder, must apply the proper standard in the first instance.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a Franklin County juvenile proceeding in which Children Services sought custody of minor C.P. after allegations of the mother’s mental health issues, domestic violence, and a drug overdose incident with the child present; a magistrate found the child dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C), granted temporary custody to the agency, and allowed supervised visitation. The mother filed a pro se objection arguing insufficient reasonable efforts to prevent removal, but the trial court dismissed the objection without prejudice because she failed to submit a transcript or affidavit of the hearing evidence as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) and Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii). On appeal, the Tenth District affirmed, holding that the mother had not preserved her new claims (including challenges to statements in the complaint, the guardian ad litem’s performance, and the lack of a mental health assessment) by raising them below and that the absence of a transcript required the court to presume the regularity of the proceedings. The decision therefore upheld the dependency finding and temporary custody order.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Brett McCarthy, as executor of Kathleen McCarthy’s estate, suing Dr. Peter K. Lee and OhioHealth Physician Group for wrongful death. The complaint alleged that Dr. Lee’s negligent diagnosis and treatment of hemorrhoids from 2010 to 2015 caused Kathleen’s colon cancer (diagnosed in 2017) and death in 2022; the suit was filed in January 2024 on behalf of Brett, their children, and other family members. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. It held that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of repose for medical claims under Ohio law, which runs from the last alleged negligent act (April 2015) and is not tolled by the minority of two of the children. The court reasoned that the repose period functions as a substantive limit on the statutory right of action for wrongful death, not merely a procedural deadline subject to minority tolling.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability