Gene Donofrio

In this case, Christine Oliver (formerly Lucarell) sued her former attorneys Caryn Groedel and A. Scott Fromson, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were not entitled to additional attorney fees from her successful employment lawsuit against Nationwide Insurance, which had produced a multi-million-dollar judgment including compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest under a 40% contingency agreement. The trial court awarded Groedel $195,030.60 in fees from the judgment, and all parties appealed. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the fee award to Groedel on a quantum meruit basis for work performed but rejected her claim to fees from the Nationwide settlement itself; it also rejected Fromson’s claim to fees and Oliver’s challenges to the award. The court remanded solely for the trial court to determine whether Groedel was additionally entitled to fees from the prejudgment interest award.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Chartier v. Rice Drilling D., L.L.C., heirs of Anna Carpenter (appellants) claimed ownership of severed oil and gas rights under 135.771 acres in Belmont County based on 1940 deeds from Carpenter to her children, while current surface owners John and Jennifer Chartier (appellees) sought to quiet title to those rights. The Belmont County Common Pleas Court granted summary judgment to the Chartiers on claims under the Dormant Minerals Act, Declaratory Judgment Act, and Marketable Title Act, vesting them with 100% of the mineral interests. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Marketable Title Act extinguished the appellants’ interests through unbroken chains of title deeds from 1948 onward that contained no preserved exceptions or reservations benefiting the appellants’ predecessors, rendering further analysis of the Dormant Minerals Act unnecessary.

property

In James v. New Middletown, a property owner sued the Village of New Middletown for negligence after repeated basement flooding at his rental property, alleging that the village failed to maintain its storm sewer system after pipes installed by neighboring property owners became blocked by roots. The trial court denied the village’s motion for summary judgment, finding a factual dispute over whether governmental immunity under R.C. 2744.02 was lost because sewer maintenance is a proprietary function that could involve employee negligence. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the village was entitled to immunity and granting it summary judgment. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to establish the first element of negligence—a duty owed by the village—because he presented no evidence that the village owned or maintained the relevant pipes before the flooding or had actual or constructive notice of the blockage. Without proof of negligence, the statutory exception to political subdivision immunity did not apply.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Voltz, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of seven counts of rape, two counts of gross sexual imposition, and two counts of pandering obscenity, based on testimony from his former stepchildren and their childhood friend alleging sexual abuse when they were young children between 1998 and 2010; he received an aggregate life sentence. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and the overall judgment but reversed in part on the seventh assignment of error. The court held that the trial court had improperly applied the Adam Walsh Act’s sex-offender registration requirements to five counts whose offense dates (as found by the jury) fell before the Act’s January 1, 2008 effective date, which instead required application of Megan’s Law, and remanded solely for resentencing on those registration obligations.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Vanfossen, the defendant was convicted following a bench trial of four counts of gross sexual imposition based on allegations that he inappropriately touched three minors during and after a Memorial Day party in Carroll County. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms totaling 96 months and classified him as a Tier II sex offender. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, vacated the sentence, and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the defendant’s jury-trial waiver was invalid because the trial court failed to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05 by personally addressing him in open court to confirm the waiver; statements by counsel alone were insufficient to satisfy the statute’s requirements. The remaining assignments of error were deemed moot.

criminal lawprocedure

In 2009, Rudolph Matland pleaded guilty to several felonies and received an eight-year sentence that included five years of mandatory post-release control, though the sentencing entry omitted details about violations and penalties. After his release, Matland was convicted of escape for violating post-release control and later moved to terminate that supervision, arguing the original PRC imposition was defective and void under pre-2020 precedent. The trial court denied the motion, and the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that, under the Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions in State v. Harper and State v. Henderson, any error in the PRC notification rendered the sentence voidable rather than void, so the claim was barred by res judicata because it was not raised on direct appeal; those rulings apply retroactively to final sentences.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Ross, defendant Brian G. Ross appealed his 30-month prison sentence from the Monroe County Common Pleas Court after pleading guilty to one count of domestic violence, a third-degree felony, arising from an alleged physical altercation with his mother. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence. The court determined that the trial court had properly considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, including protecting the public and punishing the offender, as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, such as the victim’s injury, the defendant’s prior probation status, alcohol issues, and remorse. The 30-month term fell within the statutory range of 9 to 36 months for the offense. Citing State v. Marcum and State v. Jones, the appellate court held that nothing in the record showed the sentence was contrary to law and that it could not substitute its own judgment for the trial court’s application of the statutory factors.

criminal law

Nathaniel Dumas was convicted in 2012 of felony murder and aggravated robbery with firearm specifications and sentenced to 28 years to life in prison. He filed a fourth delayed petition for post-conviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, perjured testimony, prosecutorial misconduct, actual innocence, and other alleged constitutional violations based on evidence outside the trial record. The trial court denied the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Dumas had not shown he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts supporting his claims earlier, so the successive and untimely petition did not meet the statutory exceptions for consideration.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Runnion, Michael Runnion was convicted by a jury in Belmont County Common Pleas Court of two counts of rape of a child under ten and one count of gross sexual imposition involving three young victims who disclosed the abuse that occurred while he was babysitting or visiting their home; he was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 35 years to life in prison and classified as a Tier III sex offender. On appeal, Runnion argued that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from a sexual assault nurse examiner, a forensic interviewer, and a police officer that he claimed improperly repeated the children’s statements, violating hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that plain-error review applied because no objections were made at trial and finding no violations: the victims themselves testified and were cross-examined, certain statements were admissible under the medical-treatment hearsay exception, and other statements had already been presented via video. The court further concluded that counsel’s performance was not deficient because objections would have been overruled and the outcome depended on the jury’s assessment of the victims’ credibility.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Marquette ORRI Holdings, LLC and Utica ORRI Holdings, LLC, who held overriding royalty interests in oil and gas leases originally acquired in 2010 in Belmont and Jefferson Counties, Ohio; they sued defendants Ascent Resources-Utica, LLC, XTO Energy, Inc., and EQT Production Company for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and related claims, asserting that extension and renewal clauses in their 2010-2011 assignments entitled them to royalties on new or renewed leases covering the same lands. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendants were not parties to the original leases or assignments, had not assumed any obligations under them, and shared no privity of contract with the plaintiffs. The court further reasoned that the overriding royalty interests expired when the underlying leases terminated, so the extension clauses could not bind later acquirers of new interests.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Carter, Greg Eugene Carter appealed his jury convictions in Belmont County Common Pleas Court on five counts of rape (four under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and one under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)) involving two minor victims, L.W. and S.W., who were the daughters of his girlfriend and alleged the abuse began when each was seven years old. The trial court had imposed an aggregate sentence of 100 years to life. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence, overruling Carter’s nine assignments of error. The court held that the state presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, including adequate proof of the time frames and venue in Belmont County through victim testimony and other evidence; it further determined that the indictment properly alleged the offenses as required by R.C. 2941.03 and that the remaining claims lacked merit.

criminal law

In State v. Pugh, Donnie Pugh appealed his conviction and 10-to-15-year prison sentence for first-degree felony cocaine possession after pleading guilty in Belmont County Common Pleas Court; the state had dismissed related charges of trafficking, tampering with evidence, and weapons under disability. Pugh argued that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on speculation about his intent to traffic and an organized plan when imposing a near-maximum sentence, that his counsel was ineffective, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that a guilty plea waives challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel unless they render the plea unknowing or involuntary, and that Pugh had not shown his sentence was contrary to law or unsupported under the applicable felony-sentencing statutes. The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge’s comments about possible sentence reductions by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Delancey, the defendant was charged with two counts of kidnapping and one count of having weapons while under disability after he pointed a rifle at two insurance agents who came to his home following a lead card submitted by his wife. At trial, the jury acquitted him of the kidnapping charges but convicted him of the weapons offense, leading to a 24-month prison sentence. On appeal, Delancey argued ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to hearsay, a Confrontation Clause violation from admitting victim interview videos, and that his prior conviction did not properly notify him of a lifetime weapons disability. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that counsel’s performance did not prejudice the outcome, the victims testified and were cross-examined at trial so confrontation rights were satisfied, and the state was not required to prove the defendant had been advised of the disability in the prior case.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case involved Todd Perkins, who was charged in Mahoning County with multiple counts of rape and gross sexual imposition against his two young daughters, with the alleged offenses occurring years apart. Perkins moved to sever the trials for the charges involving each victim, arguing that joinder would prejudice him by allowing the jury to infer a criminal disposition from one set of allegations to the other; the trial court denied the motion without explanation. Perkins then entered no-contest pleas to two amended rape counts pursuant to a plea deal, resulting in consecutive prison sentences totaling 15 years. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance, because the offenses were distinct in time and victim and the joinder created clear prejudice. The court therefore reversed and vacated the judgment, remanding the case for separate trials.

criminal lawprocedure

In State ex rel. Casey v. Brown, a Youngstown fire captain filed an original action for a writ of mandamus against the city’s mayor, fire chief, and finance director, seeking a court order to promote him to a vacant Battalion Chief position and award back pay, benefits, and costs; the suit was brought as a taxpayer action under R.C. 733.59. The claim arose from a collective bargaining agreement between the city and the firefighters’ union that established a four-step grievance and arbitration process for promotion-related disputes. The Seventh District Court of Appeals granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss and denied the writ. The court held that the CBA provided an adequate remedy at law through its grievance-arbitration procedure, precluding extraordinary relief in mandamus, and that any separate claim of unfair union representation would fall under SERB’s exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Bolon v. Bowers, the Columbiana County Treasurer sued property owner Alan Bowers to collect delinquent taxes on his Salineville residence, obtain a foreclosure judgment, and sell the property. After two mailed summonses were returned as undeliverable, the treasurer served Bowers by publication in a local newspaper, obtained a default judgment for $10,584.58 plus foreclosure, and completed the sale at auction. Bowers later moved to vacate the judgment, claiming he never received proper notice. The trial court denied the motion, and the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that R.C. 323.13 places the burden on the taxpayer to notify the treasurer in writing of any address change, that the treasurer’s additional searches of county records, phone books, and the internet before publication were reasonably diligent, and that service therefore complied with due process and statutory requirements.

taxespropertyprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a petition by Terry and Lisa Gigax to adopt F.W.G., a minor born in 2019, over the objection of the child's incarcerated father, Stephen Blazo. The Mahoning County Probate Court ruled that Blazo's consent to the adoption was unnecessary under R.C. 3107.07(A) because he had failed to provide maintenance and support for the child during the year before the petition was filed, then granted the adoption after a best-interests analysis. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed that judgment. It held that the probate court abused its discretion, because the record showed Blazo had provided $2,700 (plus earlier funds from the sale of his car) to his sister and mother, who used the money to purchase food, clothing, toys, and other items for the child. The court stressed that adoption statutes must be strictly construed to protect parental rights and that the evidence demonstrated Blazo had met his support obligation.

family law

This case arose when homeowners Charlene Rice and Arlene Obertance sued Columbiana County after a sewage backup flooded their basement, claiming the county negligently maintained the sewer line and that county officials had promised to pay for the resulting cleanup and repairs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the county on the negligence claim, ruling that the county was not immune from liability because the operation and upkeep of a sewer system constitutes a proprietary function under Ohio law. The court also affirmed summary judgment for the county on the negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel claim, finding no genuine issue of material fact because the homeowner testified in her deposition that she would have hired the remediation contractor even without any alleged promise from county officials.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

Thomas J. Stewart, a city patrolman, sued Mayor David Pugh (both officially and individually) and the City of St. Clairsville for libel, slander, and invasion of privacy after Pugh distributed a disciplinary memorandum detailing Stewart’s alleged on-duty misconduct and prior discipline, and made related public statements. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case, holding that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) required all disciplinary matters to be handled privately and that binding arbitration was Stewart’s exclusive remedy for any breach. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the claims against the City and against Pugh in his official capacity, because the CBA and R.C. 4117.10(A) make arbitration the sole forum for grievances involving the employer’s handling of discipline. It reversed, however, as to the claims against Pugh individually, reasoning that an individual who is not the “employer” is not bound by the CBA’s arbitration clause and therefore remains subject to ordinary tort suits in court. The case was remanded for further proceedings on those individual-capacity claims.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case concerned whether Amber Denman’s dog Tigger qualified as a “dangerous dog” under Ohio law after Tigger attacked and killed a neighbor’s miniature poodle/chihuahua mix, Pepper, on May 1, 2021. The Carroll County Dog Warden designated Tigger a dangerous dog pursuant to R.C. 955.11; Denman objected, claiming provocation, and the municipal court upheld the designation following a bench trial. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that competent, credible evidence supported the finding that Tigger acted without provocation when it twice seized and shook Pepper, ultimately causing her death. The court applied the manifest-weight standard, noting that any alleged provocation came from a person rather than the victim dog and that the statutory definition was therefore satisfied.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityproperty