Mary Degenaro

The case involved a dispute between R. Kashmiry & Associates (RKA), an insurance firm, and its former minority shareholder and employee Michael Ellis over the buyback of Ellis’s approximately 20% stake in RKA stock after his termination in 2014. The parties’ Shareholders’ Agreement required that, upon a triggering event such as termination, the stock be valued either by unanimous shareholder agreement within 90 days or by an appraiser who must give “great weight” to any prior valuation, including the $7,500 per share price at which Ellis had originally acquired his shares. The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s adoption of the appraiser’s lower valuation and remanded for a new determination, holding that the appraisal was untimely and had improperly disregarded the contract’s directive to weigh the prior $7,500 valuation; it affirmed the remainder of the judgment, including the injunction and expert testimony rulings, rendering portions of the cross-appeal moot.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Hopkins, Anthony Hopkins was convicted of aggravated murder and related charges after fatally shooting Frank Brown during an argument in the backseat of a car following a night at bars with a mutual acquaintance. Hopkins appealed, claiming the evidence failed to prove the "prior calculation and design" element required for aggravated murder, that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that his counsel was ineffective. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the ineffective-assistance claim as meritless due to invited error, since defense counsel had expressly agreed to dismiss a juror without further inquiry. However, the court held that the state presented no evidence of planning or premeditation, as the shooting arose spontaneously from an argument about stealing during the drive. It therefore modified the conviction to murder under R.C. 2903.02 and remanded the case for resentencing.

criminal law

In State v. Leonard, the defendant appealed after pleading guilty to burglary and receiving an eight-year sentence that included an order to pay the costs of prosecution, confinement, and supervision. The clerk promptly issued an execution for those costs, and Leonard argued this was improper because his appointment of counsel showed he was indigent and because the trial court had not made specific findings that he had failed to pay. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that Ohio law requires a defendant seeking relief from costs to file an affidavit of indigency before sentencing, and neither the appointment of counsel nor a presentence report substitutes for that statutory requirement. Because no affidavit was filed and the costs remained unpaid, the clerk’s execution was proper.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Davis, the defendant was convicted by a jury of fifth-degree felony marijuana trafficking after Youngstown police, responding to a report of drug activity, obtained his consent for a pat-down that recovered nine individually packaged bags of marijuana from his pocket; he was sentenced to twelve months in prison. On appeal, Davis challenged the denial of his motion to suppress and argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove trafficking. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of suppression, finding the pat-down lawful based on consent and officer safety concerns. However, it held the evidence insufficient to establish intent to sell or resell, noting the absence of other trafficking indicators and Davis's testimony that the marijuana was payment for a tattoo (supported by tattoo equipment found in his bag), while the multiple packages alone did not prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court therefore modified the conviction to the lesser-included offense of marijuana possession, a minor misdemeanor, and remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Kelly Nicholson, who sued LoanMax entities, the Bellaire Board of Education, and bus driver Judith Steele after she was injured stepping from a school bus into a pothole in a parking lot owned or maintained by the defendants. The Board and Steele moved for summary judgment on grounds of statutory immunity under Ohio’s Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act (R.C. Chapter 2744), but the trial court denied the motion. The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board and Steele were entitled to immunity as a matter of law. Under the statute’s three-tier analysis, political subdivisions and their employees are generally immune from liability for personal injuries, and the court found that none of the statutory exceptions—such as the negligent operation of a motor vehicle exception in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)—applied to remove that immunity.

torts & liability

In re M.A. involved the Monroe County Department of Job and Family Services seeking permanent custody of three children (ages 5–8) after removing them from their maternal grandmother’s home in May 2015 on allegations of abuse and neglect; the children had been living there with their mother, who was later incarcerated, and an uncle diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia who refused medication and carried weapons. The juvenile court granted the agency permanent custody after finding the children had been in temporary custody for over 12 of 22 consecutive months and that this outcome served their best interests under the statutory factors. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that clear and convincing evidence supported the decision because the mother had substance-abuse issues, repeated job instability, and no suitable housing or income at the time of the hearing, while the grandmother’s home remained unsafe due to the uncle’s presence; the children had bonded with their foster family, expressed a desire to remain there, and showed improved well-being in foster care.

family law

In Wittenbrook v. Electronics Recycling Services, Inc., plaintiff Kristen Wittenbrook sued her former employer ERS Ohio and related entities for sexual harassment/hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge, claiming management failed to address her coworker harassment reports and later fired her. JJS Developments, Ltd., a Canadian company with overlapping ownership and operational ties to ERS Ohio, appealed the jury verdict holding it liable as a joint employer, challenging the trial court's jury interrogatories, denial of its directed verdict motions, and lack of intervention during plaintiff's closing argument remarks about a "corporate shell game." The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the interrogatories accurately reflected joint employer standards, evidence of JJS's funding control, shared management, and use of the ERS name supported submitting liability to the jury, and the closing comments did not rise to plain error as they were not grossly abusive and aligned with admitted facts.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Sankovitch, Michael Sankovitch appealed his conviction and five-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to sexual battery, a third-degree felony; the charges of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor and witness intimidation were dismissed under the plea agreement, which also included a waiver of the right to appeal the sentence length. Appointed appellate counsel filed a no-merit brief under Anders v. California and moved to withdraw, asserting no arguable issues for review. The Seventh District Court of Appeals conducted an independent examination of the record and concluded that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because the trial court strictly complied with constitutional advisements under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and substantially complied with the remaining requirements. The court further determined that sentencing complied with applicable statutes, that allocution was afforded, and that the maximum term fell within the statutory range, with no reversible errors present. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed and counsel was permitted to withdraw.

criminal lawprocedure

In this foreclosure case, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) sued Gregory and Shannon Brown after they defaulted on a 2002 promissory note and mortgage by failing to make payments due October 1, 2013, seeking to recover the outstanding principal of $83,267.82 plus interest. The Browns filed counterclaims against Fannie Mae alleging breach of contract, fraud, and related claims, plus third-party claims against loan servicer Seterus for violations of RESPA and the FDCPA, while also challenging Fannie Mae’s standing and the accuracy of the amount owed. The trial court dismissed the Browns’ claims and granted summary judgment to Fannie Mae. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Fannie Mae established standing through the properly endorsed note and mortgage assignments, that the loan officer’s affidavit sufficiently proved the debt and default with no contrary evidence from the Browns, and that the counterclaims and third-party claims lacked merit.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, defendant Elijah J. Lashley, Sr., who had been convicted of two counts of kidnapping and two counts of felonious assault following a guilty plea and sentenced to an aggregate 13-year prison term, filed a pro se application for reconsideration (or alternatively to reopen) the Seventh District Court of Appeals' May 2017 decision in his direct appeal. In that prior decision, the court had identified an error in the trial court's sentencing entry regarding consecutive sentences—despite proper findings at the hearing, the entry merely quoted the full statute rather than stating specific findings—and remanded for a nunc pro tunc correction. The court denied both applications. It found the reconsideration request untimely under App.R. 26(A), as it was filed well after the 10-day deadline with no showing of extraordinary circumstances justifying delay, and the reopening request, though timely, failed to include required sworn statements or record materials under App.R. 26(B) and lacked merit on the proposed double-jeopardy and due-process claims, since the trial court had not yet issued its sentencing entry and thus retained jurisdiction to address the consecutive-sentence findings.

criminal lawprocedure

In re G.R. involved the Harrison County Department of Job and Family Services seeking permanent custody of a child removed from Mother B.K. and Father K.R. shortly after birth in 2015 due to testing positive for THC, with the parents later appealing the juvenile court's termination of their parental rights. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgment awarding permanent custody to the Agency. The court held that the child had been in agency custody for the statutory 12 of 22 months, triggering the filing requirement under R.C. 2151.413(D)(1), and that the Agency had made reasonable reunification efforts through a case plan addressing counseling, employment, drug-free status, and legal compliance. The decision rested on best-interest findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), including the child's strong bond with foster parents who wished to adopt, the parents' minimal case-plan progress amid incarceration, untreated mental health issues, ongoing drug use, school dropout, unemployment, and failure to complete assessments or visits, supported by clear and convincing evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

family law

Michael Spence, a business invitee at Baird Brothers Saw Mill, sued the company for negligence after he was struck on the head by a closing 16-foot overhead industrial door while retrieving materials from its warehouse in February. The trial court granted summary judgment to Baird, and the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the door presented an open and obvious hazard because Spence knew how the mechanically operated door worked—he had previously activated it himself—and it was functioning as intended with no evidence of defects or prior issues. Attendant circumstances such as nearby truck noise or the employee's decision to close the door on a cold day were ordinary conditions that did not reduce the duty to observe the door's movement. As a result, no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Baird's duty, making summary judgment proper.

torts & liability

In Schlabach v. Kondik, plaintiff Douglas Schlabach filed an equitable action in 2015 seeking to reform deeds executed in 2000 that conveyed portions of his property to defendants, claiming mutual mistake had omitted a reservation of rights under a 1982 oil and gas lease (including approval of well, tank, pipeline, and roadway locations plus royalties) that appeared in the purchase agreements. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the defendants and denial of Schlabach's cross-motion. Although the trial court improperly considered parol evidence about the parties' intent, the claims were time-barred under the ten-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2304.14 because the reserved rights were a revocable, non-possessory license rather than an interest in land that would qualify for the longer limitations period in R.C. 2305.04.

propertyprocedure

The case involved employees LaShonna Shakoor and Anzel Milini who filed a class-action lawsuit against their employer, VXI Global Solutions, alleging violations of Ohio's wage laws for unpaid off-the-clock work required before clocking in. After an earlier remand, the trial court found that the parties' arbitration agreement did not permit class arbitration, dismissed the case, and ordered individual arbitration. On appeal, the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed that the contract language did not authorize class arbitration. It reversed in part, however, holding that R.C. 2711.02(B) required the trial court to stay rather than dismiss the action pending arbitration, and remanded for the trial court to first address whether federal preemption (arising from a developing circuit split involving an NLRB case) applied as a gateway issue.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Stan, Justin Stan was charged with burglary and two counts of theft after he and his brother broke into the home of their 88-year-old uncle, restrained him at gunpoint, and stole cash, credit cards, and other items. Stan waived indictment, entered a guilty plea under a Crim.R. 11 agreement in which the State agreed not to oppose judicial release after four years, and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive prison terms totaling 66 months, plus restitution and post-release control. On appeal, Stan argued that his counsel was ineffective during plea and sentencing proceedings and that the sentence was improper. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the record showed no deficient performance by counsel and that the trial court properly made the required statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) for consecutive sentences, which were supported by the facts of the offense and Stan’s criminal history.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Gettings, Leon Gettings appealed his convictions after a bench trial on three counts of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), which alleged he engaged in sexual conduct with victim T.W. between August 2011 and June 2012; T.W. was in eighth grade but functioned at a third-grade level due to mental impairment. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and Tier III sex offender designation. The court held that the state presented sufficient evidence, including the victim's testimony and corroborating witnesses, to prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt and that the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It further found no ineffective assistance of counsel and no plain error in the handling of Gettings' withdrawn or untimely motions to suppress, which the trial court had addressed in pretrial proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Wells, Carl Wells appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate post-release control (PRC) following his 2002 convictions for three counts of sexual battery, for which he received a 12-year prison sentence. The sentencing entry stated only that his sentence would be "followed by mandatory post-release control" without specifying the term's length, whether it was mandatory or discretionary, or the consequences of violation. The Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the incomplete PRC notification rendered that portion of the sentence void under pre-2006 Ohio law, and because Wells had already completed his prison term, the error could not be corrected by resentencing. The court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to discharge Wells from PRC supervision.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Fleischer, Channe Fleischer was charged with aggravated murder and two counts of child endangering after she physically abused her sixteen-month-old son over several months, causing his death by blunt impacts to the head, trunk, and extremities along with multiple burn injuries. She entered a guilty plea pursuant to a Crim.R. 11 agreement that included a jointly recommended sentence of life without parole for twenty years, after being found competent and sane. The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and the prison sentence, concluding that the plea was knowing and voluntary, the offenses did not merge as allied offenses because they involved separate conduct and identifiable harms, and there was no other reversible error in the proceedings. The court reversed only the post-release control portion of the sentence, which had incorrectly imposed a five-year term instead of the three-year mandatory term applicable to the second-degree felony, and remanded for a limited resentencing hearing on that issue alone.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In 2012, JPMorgan Chase Bank filed a foreclosure action against Daniel Clark in Ohio state court, obtaining a judgment in 2013 that was not appealed; after the mortgage was assigned to Christiana Trust and Clark's bankruptcy stay was lifted, the property was sold at a sheriff's sale in 2016. Clark moved to vacate the sale and opposed its confirmation, arguing that Christiana Trust had not been properly substituted as plaintiff under the civil rules and that he had not received adequate notice of the sale under a local rule, which he claimed violated due process. The trial court denied the motions and confirmed the sale, and the Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court held that Clark failed to satisfy the standards for relief under Civ.R. 60(B) and that the sale notice complied with the requirements of R.C. 2329.26, even if the local rule was not followed; it further ruled that any local-rule violation did not automatically require vacating the judgment and that the trial court had not abused its discretion.

propertyprocedure

In Bond v. Halcon Energy Properties, Inc., property owners Bryce and Mary Bond sued an oil and gas lessee for breach of contract and mineral trespass, claiming the company improperly pooled their acreage into an oversized gas unit under a 1970 lease that capped oil units at roughly 40 acres and gas units at roughly 640 acres. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, but the Seventh District Court of Appeals reversed that ruling and remanded the case. The court held that the lease’s unitization clause is ambiguous because it does not define “well unit for oil” or “well unit for gas,” that the trial court wrongly equated a gas unit with any well merely “capable of producing gas,” and that factual disputes—including uncertainty over who drafted the lease—precluded summary judgment.

propertybusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability