Donna J. Carr

The case involved a discovery dispute in an underlying lawsuit where the Chlebinas sued Landmark over alleged breaches of a 2001 settlement agreement concerning oil and gas drilling rights on their property. Landmark appealed the trial court's order compelling a non-party witness to answer five deposition questions, arguing that the information was either irrelevant or contained protected trade secrets. The Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in part, holding that challenges based on relevance and proportionality under Civ.R. 26(B)(1) did not qualify as final appealable orders. It reversed in part, concluding that specific portions of the witness's answers (numbered 6 and 7 to question a, and the full answer to question c) satisfied the statutory definition of trade secrets under R.C. 1333.61(D) based on evidence of their economic value and the companies' secrecy measures, which the trial court had failed to consider. The matter was remanded for the trial court to implement an appropriate protective order.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Joshua Schaffer’s conviction for criminal trespass under Akron City Code 131.08(B)(1) after he entered Summa Hospital on August 19, 2024, refused to check in at the access desk, and declined multiple orders to leave despite claiming patient status. The Akron Municipal Court denied his motions to dismiss (including on speedy-trial grounds), struck his pro se filings after counsel was appointed, and imposed a suspended sentence and community service following a jury trial. On appeal, the Ninth District affirmed the conviction, holding that the City’s evidence was sufficient to show Schaffer lacked privilege once security personnel revoked it. It reversed in part on the speedy-trial claim, ruling that under State v. Hill, pro se motions filed while represented by counsel still toll time under R.C. 2945.72(E) for a reasonable period, but the trial court had failed to determine what constituted a reasonable tolling period here; the manifest-weight challenge was deemed moot. The matter was remanded for that limited calculation.

criminal lawprocedure

Clarence Johnson, then 77, fell on an uneven public sidewalk abutting Nic Smith’s property in Macedonia, Ohio, and sued Smith for negligence and negligence per se (based on a city ordinance requiring abutting owners to keep sidewalks in repair) plus loss of consortium. The trial court granted Smith summary judgment, finding the sidewalk defect insubstantial, no duty owed, and no causation shown. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of the Johnsons’ expert report (irrelevant to the ordinance cited) but reversed on the negligence per se claim, holding that evidence—including Johnson’s later deposition testimony identifying the raised sidewalk, the neighbor’s affidavit (admissible as an excited utterance) describing the two-to-three-inch height difference and Johnson’s statement at the scene, and photos—created a genuine issue of material fact on causation; it remanded for the trial court to properly analyze duty, breach, and the statutory claim under the ordinance.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case involved Anthony Ravida’s conviction in Stow Municipal Court for a third-degree misdemeanor under Hudson’s zoning code after he erected a fence on his property that violated the conditions of his AHBR-approved permit regarding setbacks and wire mesh lining. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, sustaining Ravida’s claim that the trial court failed to secure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel before allowing him to proceed pro se at the bench trial. The court held that the brief colloquy at trial was insufficient under Crim.R. 44 and precedents such as State v. Gibson and Von Moltke v. Gillies because it did not address the complexities of the zoning violation, possible defenses, or Ravida’s education and legal sophistication, and therefore reversed the conviction on that ground. It overruled Ravida’s sufficiency challenge, finding that the City presented evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude he acted recklessly in disregarding the permit conditions, and declined to reach his remaining assignments of error as moot or premature.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

Dwayne Depina was indicted in 2023 on rape and kidnapping charges stemming from 2007 events; after his motion to dismiss for preindictment delay was denied, he entered an Alford plea to reduced charges of gross sexual imposition and abduction, plus community-control violations in other cases, and received consecutive prison terms totaling three years. On appeal, he challenged the validity of his plea, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and contested the consecutive sentences. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the plea-related rulings, holding that the trial court’s Crim.R. 11 colloquy adequately informed Depina of the rights waived—including appellate rights—and that counsel’s advice to accept the favorable plea agreement did not render the plea involuntary. It reversed on the sentencing issue, concluding that the trial court failed to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the hearing or in the judgment entry, and remanded for the court to make those findings.

criminal lawprocedure

In this partition action, Camille Howard (who acquired a 25% interest in Elyria property from S. Wentworth Anthony) sued Robert and Linda Woolbright over their 75% co-ownership, seeking partition, an accounting of rents and profits, and claims of fraud or undue influence (later dismissed), while disputing the property's $50,000 appraisal and attempting to add a waste claim due to alleged neglect. After years of litigation, the trial court approved the commissioner's report, denied Howard's requests for a jury trial on the accounting claim and to amend her complaint, granted only a one-day continuance despite her counsel's documented medical emergency, and ultimately transferred title to Woolbright following his election to purchase. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting an unreasonably short continuance after recognizing the valid medical basis, while overruling challenges to the denial of a jury trial (as the accounting claim is equitable) and the amendment (due to undue delay after the 2023 commissioner report), and finding other assignments moot.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Fort, Julian Fort appealed from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas after entering an Alford plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm specification, obstructing justice, and tampering with evidence, arising from a December 2022 fatal shooting in Akron. He argued that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court failed to conduct the heightened inquiry required for Alford pleas, obtain an adequate factual basis for guilt, or elicit his reasons for pleading guilty while maintaining innocence. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the plea satisfied constitutional and procedural requirements. The court reasoned that the trial court engaged in a sufficient colloquy confirming Fort’s desire to avoid trial risks in exchange for a lesser agreed sentence of 18 to 23½ years, and that the state’s statement of facts—describing Fort’s escalation of a planned assault into a fatal shooting—provided strong evidence of guilt supporting the original felony murder charge.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Zeitler, the victim S.Z. appealed after the Summit County Court of Common Pleas accepted Joseph Zeitler’s guilty plea to strangulation and domestic violence charges arising from an assault on his wife and immediately imposed a five-year community control sentence without her presence. S.Z. had filed an Ohio Victim Rights Form asserting her rights to notice, to confer with the prosecutor, to be heard at sentencing, and to request restitution, but she was not in court on the day the plea deal was reached and had expected to testify the following day. The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the sentencing judgment and remanded the case, holding that the trial court violated S.Z.’s rights under Ohio Constitution Article I, Section 10a and R.C. 2930.06 and 2930.09 by failing to ensure she had an opportunity to confer and be heard before accepting the plea and imposing sentence. The court noted that the State conceded the error and directed that a new sentencing hearing be held to allow S.Z. to exercise those rights.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Summit County and Springfield Township suing Akron Hotel Suites, LLC (owner of a Red Roof Inn hotel) to abate an alleged public nuisance stemming from hundreds of police calls for drug activity, violent crimes, and safety hazards over several years. After the hotel owner failed to respond to the complaint, the parties entered an agreed abatement order under which the hotel could remain open if specified improvements and protocols were followed; the order stated that any two felony incidents in a 60-day period would constitute clear and convincing evidence of a breach authorizing closure and other remedies. The trial court later found multiple breaches of the order, declared the hotel a nuisance, ordered it closed for one year, and authorized removal and sale of personal property on the premises. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county prosecutor properly brought the action (which also included common-law nuisance claims), that the owner had not preserved challenges to the plaintiffs’ statutory authority, and that the agreed order itself authorized the closure and property remedies upon a proven breach without requiring an additional finding that the owner had acquiesced in or participated in the nuisance.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

In State v. Thurman, the State appealed after the Oberlin Municipal Court granted a motion to suppress field sobriety test results in a case charging Alice Thurman with operating a vehicle under the influence and failing to obey a traffic device. The charges stemmed from an April 2025 traffic stop in Amherst, where an officer pulled over Thurman for making a right turn at a red light without stopping; she was coming from a tavern, initially denied drinking, later admitted to consuming alcohol hours earlier, presented her husband’s badge, and had glassy eyes but showed no odor of alcohol, slurred speech, or balance problems. The trial court found the totality of circumstances did not support reasonable suspicion of impairment to justify the tests. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the unchallenged factual findings did not establish the required reasonable suspicion under the applicable legal standard, and therefore the suppression ruling was proper.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Parsons, defendant Kelly Lee Parsons appealed the Summit County Court of Common Pleas’ denial of his 2025 motion to withdraw his 1990 guilty plea to aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. Parsons claimed the state violated the plea agreement by opposing his parole requests and argued that this created a manifest injustice. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial. The court held that the motion was barred by res judicata because Parsons had raised the identical claim in prior motions denied in 2019 and 2024. It noted that no supporting affidavit of newly discovered evidence accompanied the latest filing, making any alternative analysis of manifest injustice harmless.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Christopher Chrin’s administrative appeal from a Village of Silver Lake mayor’s decision upholding multiple citations for violations of former property-maintenance ordinances (Chapter 1357) after neighbors complained about the condition of his property. The common pleas court affirmed the mayor’s order; Chrin then appealed, arguing the ordinances were unconstitutionally vague, the evidence was insufficient, and due process was violated because the mayor both issued the violations and heard the appeal. The Ninth District affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It upheld the mayor’s findings on violations involving siding, windows, gutters, a dilapidated fence, and certain debris, but held that two provisions—Silver Lake Cod.Ord. 1357.03(a)(2) (vegetation “overgrown and unsightly”) and 1357.03(c) (yards “free of unsightly materials not appropriate to the area”)—were unconstitutionally vague. It rejected the due-process and remaining claims. The court reasoned that an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give fair notice of prohibited conduct or invites arbitrary enforcement; applying that standard, terms such as “in good repair” and “dilapidated” were sufficiently definite by their ordinary meanings, whereas the challenged phrases provided no objective benchmarks and therefore could not support the violations.

propertyprocedurecivil rights

In this case, several coaches from Canton McKinley High School sued Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, its attorney Kathryn Perrico, and school superintendent Jeffrey Talbert. They claimed that a $125,000 settlement resolving prior litigation over a student being forced to eat pepperoni pizza against his religious beliefs was collusive and unauthorized, harming the coaches’ related defamation suit, and asserted claims including bad faith, breach of contract, tortious interference, and legal malpractice. Perrico and Talbert moved to dismiss under R.C. 2744.07(C)(2), which bars challenges to a political subdivision’s decisions on entering settlements or the amounts involved. The trial court denied the motions without referencing or analyzing that statute. The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the absence of any discussion of the key statutory argument made meaningful appellate review impossible.

proceduretorts & liabilityreligious libertycivil rights

Christine Adkins was convicted after a jury trial of one count of criminal damaging for slamming doors at her former employer’s office on the day she was terminated, which broke the frame and components of a metal door leading to the parking lot. The municipal court sentenced her to 60 days of house arrest, five years of non-reporting probation, and $3,427.27 in restitution. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to take judicial notice of windspeed data from a weather report, as any error was harmless given the testimony that Adkins angrily slammed the doors and caused the damage. The court also held that the restitution award was proper because it was supported by competent evidence of replacement costs where the door’s prior fair market value was not readily determinable.

criminal lawprocedureproperty

In January 2025, Christopher Smith was charged with strangulation and domestic violence after his fiancée, C.C., called 911 three times reporting an assault at their home. Following a bench trial, the trial court found him not guilty of strangulation but guilty of domestic violence. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, overruling all five assignments of error. It held that the trial court acted within its discretion in calling C.C. as a court’s witness under Evid.R. 614(A) due to her inconsistent statements, that any discovery or evidentiary issues were harmless in a bench trial, and that the evidence was both sufficient and not against the manifest weight of the evidence to support the domestic violence conviction.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In State v. Fourdyce, defendant Tomas Fourdyce was convicted after a bench trial of menacing under R.C. 2903.22 for telling the Mayor of Wellington “I’m coming for you” during a June 2024 phone call amid a long-running dispute over the relocation of family cemetery plots. Fourdyce appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he knowingly caused the Mayor to believe physical harm would occur. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the irate call and statement, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude Fourdyce acted knowingly even without an overt threat or intent to harm. The court remanded solely to correct a clerical error in the sentencing entry, which had mistakenly listed a 30-day suspended sentence instead of the 10-day suspended sentence actually imposed.

criminal lawprocedure

In 1976, Jackie Robinson pleaded guilty to burglary in Summit County and received an indefinite sentence; decades later, while serving time on that and later convictions, he filed a 2025 motion seeking to vacate his indictment on constitutional grounds. The trial court treated the motion as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the filing—made nearly fifty years after the conviction with no direct appeal—fell far outside the one-year deadline under R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) and did not qualify for the narrow exceptions in R.C. 2953.23(A) that would allow an untimely or successive petition. The court therefore concluded the trial court had no authority to consider the claims. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Cobb, defendant Chad Cobb appealed the Summit County Court of Common Pleas’ denial of his post-sentence motion to withdraw his 2013 guilty plea to multiple serious offenses, including aggravated murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole. Cobb argued that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel and coercion stemming from threats that he would lose parental rights if he did not plead guilty. After an evidentiary hearing following a prior remand, the trial court denied the motion, finding Cobb’s claims lacked credibility. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in crediting Cobb’s original plea colloquy over his later testimony and that of family members, noting the absence of supporting evidence from counsel and the nearly decade-long delay in filing the motion.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In State v. Gainer, Dezmond Gainer was charged with multiple counts of cocaine and fentanyl trafficking and possession, along with specifications and forfeiture counts. He initially moved to suppress evidence but later withdrew the motion, entered a plea agreement, and pleaded guilty to reduced charges of cocaine trafficking with forfeiture specifications and fentanyl possession; the trial court sentenced him to five to seven-and-a-half years in prison and ordered forfeiture of money and firearms. Gainer filed a delayed appeal, and his appellate counsel submitted an Anders brief stating that no non-frivolous issues existed for review on direct appeal, while noting a potential ineffective-assistance claim concerning the withdrawn suppression motion. The Ninth District Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, including the plea and sentencing hearings, and found no arguable errors that could be raised on direct appeal. It therefore granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, observing that any ineffective-assistance issue would require a post-conviction petition rather than this appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In 2012, Erica Stefanko was accused of aiding and abetting her then-husband Chad Cobb in the aggravated murder of pizza delivery driver A.B., who was lured to a remote location, attacked, and strangled; Cobb later pleaded guilty and received life without parole, while Stefanko was convicted after a retrial. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed Stefanko’s convictions for aggravated murder and murder, sentencing her to life with parole eligibility after 30 years. The court held that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as the jury could reasonably credit Cobb’s testimony, a recorded conversation in which Stefanko made incriminating statements, and circumstantial proof of joint planning—including the purchase of burner phones, Stefanko’s order for the fatal delivery, and the presence of weapons and restraints—over Stefanko’s claim that she believed only a non-violent scheme was intended.

criminal law